Nicomachean Ethics Interlude: The Charmides

Some of you may be flagging from all of the relatively dense philosophy, and would appreciate a more pleasing story. As it happens, this discussion of incontinence and its problems -- philosophical and actual -- is a good occasion to look at one of the relevant dialogues of Plato. The Charmides is Plato's most famous investigation of this set of problems, but it takes the form of a story told by Socrates about a time in his youth when he had just returned from battle and was enjoying a moment of peace and comradeship. 

The story happens right after the Battle of Potidaea. Socrates does not recount any of the battle in the dialogue, he only mentions that there was a long discussion of it and great interest about it. This is because no recounting of it was necessary, for one thing; and for another, Socrates was one of the great heroes of this battle that was otherwise a tremendous disaster for Athens. Plato did not wish to embarrass Socrates by suggesting that he would have been bragging about his role in it, and in any case everyone knew what Socrates did at Potidaea. 

After the talk about the war and the army, some young men join the company, including one named Charmides. It is possibly not quite a coincidence that the word looks like our "charm," but the etymology doesn't follow a clear route to us from the Greek through the Latin to the French to the English like usual. Rather, the linkage if it exists is all the way back to the Proto-Indo-European *kan. In any case Charmides is not a fictional character whose name was invented by the author to sound 'charming'; that was his real name. He was in fact Plato's uncle. Charmides went on to be one of the Thirty Tyrants, which makes his inability to understand these matters of self control and self-discipline a matter of significant importance to the generation Plato was speaking to directly with his dialogues. 

In other words, this dialogue treats a military disaster that led to the great war in which Athens was defeated by Sparta, an even greater disaster; it concerns one of the Tyrants that were placed over Athens after the war, perhaps a greater disaster yet. This is set up as a charming story about a beautiful young man who has hangovers because he drinks too much wine by night, and is seeking a war hero's sympathy and help (as well as, perhaps, his love). Yet it is really an examination of some of the most dire events of the age, and an attempt to understand how they could have happened.

A Backdoor Departmental Closure

Clever idea, in a way. If you can convince the school systems to walk away from the money, in order to secure their academic freedom and independence, the Department of Education would eventually only be funding relatively right-leaning school districts. That would greatly reduce the resistance to closing the DoE entirely, since right-leaning institutions generally support that (although in this case there would be strongly countervailing rice-bowl winds, especially as new funds were freed up to support those districts directly).

Nicomachean Ethics VII.1

Today we begin Book VII.

Let us now make a fresh beginning...

This characteristically Aristotelian move also happens in Physics I.9. There as here, nothing that has been said before is being set aside; yet it is being pushed into the background. You are meant to clear your mind of all those technical details for the moment for a fresh discussion. Keep the furniture in the back of your mind so that you can call on it when appropriate, but we are beginning as if anew. 

...and point out that of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds-vice, incontinence, brutishness. The contraries of two of these are evident,-one we call virtue, the other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,

For he seemed not, he,
The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came.

Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice.

So part of our new beginning, you'll notice, is that we are no longer talking about vice as the balancing point between two errors. We are talking about it as a clean opposition to vice. Also, now we aren't just talking about virtue and vice; we're adding in two other states to avoid, and (therefore) two other states to strive for in ourselves.  

Now, since it is rarely that a godlike man is found-to use the epithet of the Spartans, who when they admire any one highly call him a 'godlike man'-so too the brutish type is rarely found among men; it is found chiefly among barbarians...

Hey!

...but some brutish qualities are also produced by disease or deformity; and we also call by this evil name those men who go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice.

We often think of those whom drugs have rendered toothless and covered in scabs to have been reduced to more of an animal state; and not a healthy animal, at that. In men health entails rational control of such desires, i.e. virtue, and in fact one of the particular virtues (temperance) already discussed earlier. Yet there the account stops short of brutishness; Aristotle said (in III.12) that self-indulgence doesn't destroy the nature of the man. Here we see a way in which those who 'go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice' can have their human nature destroyed, and be reduce to brutish things.

A contemporary philosopher would usually try to avoid a 'fresh start' like this, since getting people to think through and adopt even one new model is hard enough; but it is a mark of Aristotle's sophistication that he can come at the same problem in more than one way, and find important insights on each road.

Of this kind of disposition, however, we must later make some mention, while we have discussed vice before we must now discuss incontinence and softness (or effeminacy*), and continence and endurance; for we must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor as a different genus.

Once again we are making a distinction between things that aren't at least completely different. The vice of self-indulgence wasn't the same thing as the brutality that can result from extremes of vice; but they are not completely separate either.  

We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.

Another I.3 point: we're not after a logical proof that would establish this exactly and forever, because that isn't the right kind of exactness for ethics. It suffices as a proof if we can refute the objections without creating disturbances for the common opinions (common, that is, among those whose opinions are worth considering due to their proven excellence of character or age and experience, not common in the sense of just anyone's opinion at all). 

Now (1) both continence and endurance are thought to be included among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and softness among things bad and blameworthy; and the same man is thought to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them. And (2) the incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them (3) The temperate man all men call continent and disposed to endurance, while the continent man some maintain to be always temperate but others do not; and some call the self-indulgent man incontinent and the incontinent man self-indulgent indiscriminately, while others distinguish them. (4) The man of practical wisdom, they sometimes say, cannot be incontinent, while sometimes they say that some who are practically wise and clever are incontinent. Again (5) men are said to be incontinent even with respect to anger, honour, and gain.-These, then, are the things that are said.

And indeed, they were said here too in the second part of Book III, when we discussed incontinence the first time. I warned you that you'd be hearing a lot more about it. So you shall.

* In Latin, 'virtue' is derived from 'vir,' which means man. As we've discussed, the Greek word ἀρετή doesn't imply manhood in the way that the Latin word does. This word being translated here is μαλακίας, which Irwin gives as "softness." The word could be used to indicate effeminacy; it was so used by Herodotus and Thucydides according to Liddell. Yet, Liddell points out, it was also used by Caesar in its Latin form to indicate the softness or calmness of the sea ("malacia ac tranquillitas").

The school where Aristotle taught Alexander would have been an exclusively male space, however, which does explain the male-focused discourse. Effeminacy is an exclusively male trait, a defect in achieving their full nature as men; women are never effeminate because they are feminine by nature rather than by defect, according to this Ancient view. 

Alexander Hamilton

As a rule, I favor politicians and bureaucrats fighting duels. It keeps the worst people out of the field for fear of it, and it provides a bracing risk that can temper rhetoric. The last time I can remember one being discussed in explicit terms was in 2004, when Zell Miller expressed regret that dueling was no longer legal after a media nobody who had browbeaten a woman on his show got in his face about something.

There's a lot to be said for the institution, which I used to write about much more often. Once Saddam Hussein challenged George W. Bush to a duel to settle the Iraq War, which is literally Homeric. In retrospect I wish it had happened. It would have been far better than the war, whichever way it had gone. 

UPDATE: On the subject of Presidential duels, I recently read this story.

You would think that Andrew Jackson was giving you his undivided attention, and then you would glance over and notice that he had devoted the last several minutes to making a laborious sketch of an alligator.

“Mr. President!” you would gasp, indignantly.

“I have a bullet lodged inside my body,” he would say. “From killing a man in a duel. A better man than you.” He would resume drawing the alligator.

I don't know if that story is actually true: it's from the Washington Post, after all. But the alligator doodle is real. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.13

This is the end of Book VI. There are ten books in total.

We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the same, but like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense.

This is the first time that Aristotle has mentioned "natural virtue." Until now we've talked about virtue as an acquired habit. But, to return to the potentiality/actuality distinction that is so important in Aristotle, you can't make a saw out of wool. Potentiality is first actuality: iron can become a saw, and so it is already potentially a saw in a way that wool is not. Natural virtue is going to play the role of this first actuality of virtue. 

This is going to become important. It is where we get the notion of something being "second nature" to you: you have your first nature -- the potential -- and then your second nature -- what you developed that potential into. Let's continue.

For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense-we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are evidently hurtful.

This is a point that will appeal to AVI, I think, for whom nature tends to prevail in the nature/nurture discussion. Here is Aristotle's nod to it: some people, by nature, have more fitness to be brave or self-controlled. These qualities can and should be guided and perfected by reason, but if you don't have them as potentials to start with you never will have the actualities either.

Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. 

Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom.

So: while you may be born fitted for courage (say), you won't become courageous in the strict sense until you develop phronesis. You have to learn to apply this natural quality wisely. at you

Now we can talk more completely about how this process works (which Thomas was interested in earlier: how to realize it). The steps are these:

1) Birth, with the natural virtues that you happen to have.
2) A good upbringing, which gives you stories about the good and noble, honorable and virtuous from trusted sources.
3) Intuitive reason, which apprehends what is good from the stories and the way in which they are told.
4) Philosophical wisdom, which derives the first principles about what is good, noble, honorable, and virtuous from the findings of your intuitive reason about the stories from that upbringing.
5) Practical wisdom (phronesis), by which you derive in the circumstances in which you find yourself what the virtuous thing to do actually is, and do it using your natural virtue's potential to do such a thing.
6) Virtue, the state of character that arises from this practice becoming a habit and then the state of character itself. 

This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right.

This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue. 

Nice concession to Socrates there. I suspect he would have appreciated it; there's a chance he would have bought the argument, since it considered his difficulties directly and addresses them in a way that many subsequent generations found satisfactory.. He and Aristotle never met directly but were connected by Plato, who was the student of one and the teacher of the other.   

Aristotle goes right on to solve another puzzle that daunted Socrates.

But in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in separation from each other; the same man, it might be said, is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already acquired one when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end.

That issue of the separation (or not) of the virtues really bothered Socrates; it is ubiquitous in Plato's dialogues. Aristotle has given us the furniture for a straightforward answer to why a man could be virtuous in one way but not another: he lacked the natural virtue for one virtue, but had it for another. As such, when he applied his phronesis, he was able to excel in one virtue (say courage) but not the other (say moderation of sexual appetite). The phronesis is the same; but the underlying potential is not the same in all people. 

Some people become more virtuous than others because they had the potential to actualize. Some people become virtuous in one way and not another because they had potential here but not there. We can look at the cases we know empirically and see how plausible that answer is: he's just like his father; he reminds me of his grandfather; it's no wonder he turned out that way. 

But again [phronesis] is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.

The art of medicine is not supreme over health because it is practiced for the sake of health. Therefore, it is subordinate because it is in the service of the prior thing. Philosophical wisdom showed us what the great, the noble, and the good were. Phronesis is just helping us achieve what philosophy attained: it is the servant, not the master.  

Nicomachean Ethics VI.12

Almost finished with Book VI; one more after this.

Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.

Only philosophers talk like this, but Tom wanted to read some philosophy and now you know we really are! This is a related problem to those I raised before, but here the issue is that the categories are artificial. The issue in (1) above is that "philosophical wisdom" has been defined as pertaining only to unchanging things, which for Aristotle include the movement of the stars as well as mathematical truths. It is possible to be philosophical about the nature of justice, but not about how to be just in a particular case: that requires practical action in a set of things that come-to-be and have a particular history. For that we are told we need a separate thing, "practical wisdom," which is -- being separate -- somehow unrelated to the philosophical wisdom from which it draws its first principles for which to reach particular conclusions.

Yet obviously these things are unified. We unify them. They are parts of a whole, the whole that is us. The way the cuts are made may be customary, as the French butcher beef differently from Americans. 

The problem with (2) is about 'coming to be,' to whit, how goodness comes to be. If a man is good, what use has he for a faculty for becoming good? (The answer, probably obvious to all of you, is that it was only by having the faculty in the first place that he got to being good.)

(3) is potentially a serious problem, except that it has the same issues as (1). 

These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only stated the difficulties.

(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.

(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicine produces health, however, but as health produces health; so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy.

Since you need both philosophical wisdom (to get the first principles) and practical wisdom (to get to the correct actions) to be virtuous, each is part of "virtue entire." Since virtue produces happiness, each of them thus is a necessary condition for producing happiness. The analogy to 'health producing health' seems to me to further complicate the artificial divisions: the analogy suggests they are really a whole. 

(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. (Of the fourth part of the soul-the nutritive-there is no such virtue; for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do.)

The nutritive is the part of the soul we share even with plants, for Aristotle: but it doesn't make decisions, it just does what it has to do. A man has to eat; a buzzard, same as worms.  

(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man ought)...

Now, you'll remember that in V.1 justice-as-lawfulness was said to be complete virtue, but not absolutely. Here Aristotle seems to deny that it is properly even justice; just as he had said in III.8 that courage was not really true courage if it was compelled by law, as it is in the citizen-soldier. In both cases he's looking for good-enough solutions for the many, for whom perhaps it is good enough if they can be made to do the right thing even if only under duress. Yet he is truly interested in what the best kind of person will do, not just what will make people behave.  

...so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart.

So, above he pointed out that to really be good, and not just being driven to right actions by the law, you have to be in the right state. That state is the state of setting yourself the right ends for the right reasons. You got the right reasons from what he is calling "philosophical wisdom." But you have to derive from those reasons the right acts; and you have to choose those right acts because of those right reasons. That's the only thing that counts as "being good," properly speaking. It isn't obedience to authority; it's internal choice for proper reason. 

Practical wisdom is not the faculty [of cleverness], but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good.

That's a fascinating way to conclude this, since the problem he raised in the first (2) was that it might be possible to be good without being practically wise. This inverted proof that B requires A doesn't prove that A requires B.

If we take it with the claim that 'being good' only occurs when you do the things that practical wisdom entails, however, we can see the point: you don't get to 'being good' without practical wisdom. A clever man can choose noble aims, but cleverness can easily devolve into mere smartness, in which one is applying intelligence to bad purposes. It's only when you make the shift into tying your intelligence to this facility of wisdom -- whether or not that wisdom is properly divided into two parts, the up-looking "philosophical wisdom" and the down-looking "practical wisdom" -- that you can be sure of being good.

Joining the good guys

This X post by someone named "Comet" caught my eye last week, because it's so similar to my own experience, and echoes a theme that C.S. Lewis often uses. I think it appeals to people who were raised as atheists, or became determined atheists when they came of age after a perfunctory childhood religious training. It was a huge stumbling block to me to believe in a literal, personal God and an afterlife. It still is difficult, when the chips are down, though it's a faith I strive for all the time. Even now, Comet's gut conviction is the one that keeps me trying:

I’ve never been a religious person because I don’t know if God is real

But I’m becoming more religious every day because I know that Evil is real, and I want to be on the other side of it

A Lemonade Stand

On a country road high in the mountains today, I came across a young lady of seven or so running a lemonade stand. Naturally my wife and I stopped our motorcycles and bought some lemonade from the girl. It was the sort of thing children used to do when I was young, but I haven't seen in ages. 

There were more precautions than we had as kids. Her family was watching from above near the house, and she had a dog that came over to be sure she was ok -- as well as, I noticed, a walkie-talkie on her belt in case she needed to call for help. I think we would have only had a dog, and he was a beagle.

It was obviously being a good experience for her, in spite of the light traffic way up there. She explained that she and her brothers and sisters had been doing it for a while, and they'd only recently expanded into baked goods as they made enough money to buy the lemonade supplies, then more supplies. 

As we were leaving a big dump truck towing a heavy-equipment trailer stopped, and the bearded trucker got out to buy some lemonade too. He looked so happy. I imagine it was a nostalgic moment for him too.

I would have taken a picture before we left, but I didn't wish to take a photo of a minor without her parents' permission (which I would easily understand them not granting to a stranger, although they might remember me either from the hurricane or from the time I drove their horse back up to their house from standing in the road). You'll just have to imagine a lemonade stand from your own youth. It was just like that. 

Go Rest High On That Mountain

An Oklahoma boy who made it good.

Longhaired Redneck

I'm shaved bald myself, it seeming the only honorable response to the thinning hair of early middle age; but I found an actual original copy of that album in a local 'vintage/antique' store today while attending Sylva's Mountain Brewfest. David Allan Coe, who just turned 86 last week, would have been honored to know what they wanted for it. It's vinyl, so it sounds worse than the lossless versions you can get easily and cheaply online. 

I bought it anyway; it has several of my favorite of his songs, and there's just something about the physicality of the original thing. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.11

Here we have a claim that is psychologically interesting, but which might or might not be true.

What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to 'be sympathetic judges' and to 'have judgement', is the right discrimination of the equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity with sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judgement is judgement which discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly; and correct judgement is that which judges what is true.

You will remember 'the equitable' from V.10. It is one of the virtues that is superior to ordinary justice. Justice itself was said in V.1 to be 'complete virtue, but not absolutely' so you might ask in what way to be equitable is better than to be just. The just is "what is fair and lawful," but the equitable may be "what is fair but more generous than the law requires." Thus, the equitable person is trying to treat the other not merely as the law requires, but in a manner that really befits their circumstances. This applies both to things like business deals -- perhaps your employee deserves some profit-sharing, to be raised to a partnership of some sort, or at least a raise, given their robust contributions -- and also to criminal courts. The sympathetic judge is understanding of the circumstances, and correctly discerns how to adjust the law's requirements to the situation. In this way, the lawfulness requirement proves insufficient to complete virtue in its absolute form (this may be another reason John Rawls thought he could dispose of the lawfulness requirement and cash out 'justice as fairness' alone).

That's not the psychological point I wanted to emphasize. The claim Aristotle is going to make is that this virtue is not just another species of practical reason (phronesis) but a distinct part of the soul. He opens with some evidence against that idea:

Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be expected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding.

That sounds like a good argument that these really are the same quality, perhaps just being expressed differently in different situations. In the 19th and 20th century, Gottlob Frege and those who followed his threads pointed out that sometimes you can mistakenly identify the same thing by two different names (this became known as the "Hesperus is Phosphorus" example, because the 'evening star' and 'the morning star' turned out both to be Venus). Here we are observing a quality of excellence of judgment, sometimes towards decisions about fairness towards others and sometimes towards practical actions of one's own. Perhaps they are just the morning star and the evening star, appearing at different times in different places but actually the same thing. 

There developed also in philosophy a whole collection of arguments about the identity of indiscernibles that is relevant here. The problem was raised as soon as the Stoics, so a bit after Aristotle, but it comes down to questions about things like this. We can't really observe the mind/soul, so we can't discern whether phronesis and sugnome and prohairesis are different objects or parts of the mind/soul. Many philosophers have accepted the idea that in these cases you should think you have reason to believe they are the same thing unless you can find qualities that clearly distinguish them. Aristotle has given us distinguishing characteristics: this one is about judgment and that one is about action. Yet it could be one quality applied to multiple problem sets, and it is only the problems that differ rather than the quality of the soul. This might seem especially true given his next remarks about how all these faculties deal with problems of the same basic kind:

For all these faculties deal with ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for the equities are common to all good men in relation to other men. Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or ultimates; for not only must the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e. the minor premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.

Intuitive reason's existence as a separate faculty was given in VI.6 as a deduction that none of the other intellectual virtues could do what we ask it to do. Here, though, it's doing something very similar to what judgment and practical reason are said to do, just 'in the other direction.' What Aristotle means by that is that intuitive reason seeks out the first principles, working backwards from the particulars we have encountered in the world to the universals that should be our starting point. This is what was supposed to happen during 'the good upbringing' -- we would be introduced to many stories by respected elders and, using intuitive reason, derive the necessary first principles about what courage is and what justice is and so forth. Once we have those first principles, we are ready to begin the study of ethics.

What judgment and practical reason are doing is working down the chain from those first principles to the particular facts in front of us: we must render a judgment in this particular case, in which this particular person did this particular thing; or we must decide on a particular action we must take right now in these particular circumstances. Aristotle is suggesting that these are three connected but distinguishable parts of the soul. You could perhaps reduce them to two: intuitive reason is a sort of inductive reasoning from given examples to first principles; the other sort is a deductive reasoning from those first principles down to conclusions about actions to take (judgment, in this sense of the word, being a sort of action you take when you issue a judgment). 

Or perhaps it's just one quality, whatever we call it, which works up and down, and which sometimes considers practical matters pertaining to the self and sometimes considers matters facing justice/equity towards others. Aristotle is going to hold that they are different, partly because they appear at different times of life -- and not to everyone.

This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments-why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, [yet] people are thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement; this implies that nature is the cause. (Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and about these.) Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.

We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are, and with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

Friday Night Jukebox

Innocent blood

From First Things:

Innocent blood is a powerful reality. It turns the wheel of history. I believe Kirk’s murder will have this effect.

The evil deed of September 10, 2025, will expose the desperation of the old and failed consensus that Kirk opposed. The consensus he hoped to turn us toward, one that restores faith, family, and flag, will triumph.

Nichomachean Ethics VI.10

Fine distinctions continue.

Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of understanding)...

Because all men have opinions, but also because scientific knowledge as Aristotle understands it is about unchangeable things like the truths of mathematics.   

...nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good understanding.)

So the word here given as 'understanding' is sungnome, which Irwin helpfully points out is derived from gnome, 'mind' or 'judgment.' That word is also the root of gnosis, which those of you who are given to Bible Study or the history of thought in the Church will know well enough. 

Irwin translates this as "consideration" or sometimes "pardon," as the best sort of person will often on consideration choose to set aside an inflexible rule. We learned in Book I that the virtuous man is the best judge of virtue and of the virtuous things to do; sometimes you keep the rule, and in some cases you set it aside. (These are, as Aristotle just said, the sort of decisions that require questioning and deliberation.) 

Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned-and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.

Thus, the virtuous man is a man of good judgment; he can be trusted to resolve the hard questions that come up in life. 

Random Graffiti

Seen in a bathroom on the wall, not all that long ago and in the Deep South.

Just in case anybody thought they were getting off easy.

You're not the first to face this

Via Instapundit, Sarah Hoyt:

You’re not safe. Life isn’t safe. The world isn’t safe. But you can’t live hiding under the rug. And some things are worth doing. Square your shoulders, decide what you have to do. Then do it. Death will come either from it or from merely living. Death is the price of being alive.

* * *

As for “We can’t reconcile.” and “We can’t share a nation with people like this.” Well, your ancestors did.

After the revolution, after the civil war, wounds were bound, and people learned to live together, even though each had done horrible things to the others.

You will too. And most of them not-media-personalities are mostly dumb, lied to and histrionic. Which is bad enough, but not evil incarnate.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.9

Book VI continues with more fine distinctions. Unhelpfully translations differ, and you really need to know which Greek concept is being put in play. For example, the one we've been using wants to talk about "deliberation."

There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp the nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other kind of thing.

You will recall that we already discussed deliberation separately in III.2-3. The translation's use of the term here is ambiguous; the concept Aristotle was discussing in Book III was prohairesis but here it is phronesis, the latter of which began to discuss the other day. If any of you are reading the Irwin translation, he tries to keep the English words he uses linked carefully to the Greek words, but even then you'll see him talk of "inquiry" versus "deliberation" versus "intelligence" versus "wisdom." 

Following this section exactly may not be possible on the first pass. These are intricate distinctions about invisible mental faculties, originally in ancient Greek and now in several English translations. If you really want to map this down, it will take a little time. 

Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things they know about, but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and he who deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly.

Irwin translates what they are giving as "it is not skill in conjecture" instead as that intelligence "is not good guessing." The problem with even very good guessing is that you could go wrong; what Aristotle is looking for from phronesis is a little more security that you'll choose your actions correctly.

Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is no such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such thing as error of knowledge)...

"There is no such thing as correctness of knowledge" and "there is no such thing as error of knowledge" both sound very suspicious to contemporary readers.  You have to know that Aristotle's definition of knowledge assumes truth: knowledge, per the Posterior Analytics, is "Justified true belief." Thus, your knowledge can't be in error because it would then not be true, and if it's a false belief it wasn't knowledge to begin with. 

So, just as he wants phronesis to be more secure than 'good guessing,' he defines knowledge to be safely true. 

Socrates was aware of this theory of knowledge and had rejected it (at least in Plato's telling), but Aristotle found it satisfactory. This account of knowledge held up a very long time. It was not until the late 20th century that a serious problem was found with it (though the Wikipedia article does give some earlier examples of people asking questions about it). In 1963 kind of a fun challenge was raised by Edmund Gettier, which nobody has yet figured out how to solve. Actually, epistemology is a lot of fun all the way around. Nothing very serious hangs on it (except for little things like knowledge and truth), and it's a great deal of fun to think about.

Underappreciation

Oh, it's far more dangerous than that, Poppy. (That is her name.)

If men like Charlie Kirk can’t even speak to American students without fearing a gunman in the crowd, America is in a far more dangerous place than anyone has so far been willing to concede.

The gunman wasn't in the crowd. He was 200 yards away with a rifle he knew how to use very competently. 

America is a much more dangerous place that you Brits can even imagine. That's the precipice we are on right now. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.8

This is an important chapter. Today is an inauspicious day for it because of the political murder of the early afternoon, but the wisdom it speaks of is eternal.

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom'; this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to 'take part in politics'; for these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do things'.

So too we don't assign to legislators but to the bureaucrats who execute and define policy the idea of action. In our system, legislators are mostly fundraisers who delegate authority to bureaucrats. It's the bureaucrats who decide; and the police who execute the decisions not of the legislature, but of the bureaucracy.

Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which is concerned with a man himself-with the individual; and this is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds one is called household management, another legislation, the third politics, and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial.

This is Aristotle carefully avoiding the fallacy of composition. It is commonly and wrongly assumed that knowing how to order one level of human activity -- being a good businessman, for example -- ought to transfer to governance, family leadership, etc. It does not. Many a good businessman is a terrible husband; many a politician couldn't run a business to save their lives.

Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides, [Grim: Shocklingly to English speakers, that is pronounced euro-PEE-dees, as Socrates is soh-KRAT-ees.]

But how could I be wise, who might at ease,

Numbered among the army's multitude,

Have had an equal share?

This Movie Has a Sad Ending

It was a good shot. I didn't know Charlie Kirk from Adam before somebody took that shot and made him famous. The only reason I ever heard his name is that somebody decided to kill him; now I know he was a prophet, apparently.

I guess we've been here before; America has a very bloody political history. The whole world does. Maybe it's only violence that ever solves anything. What a shame.

UPDATE:

Havamal 38. 

Cyberpunk Revolution

The saying he is trying to think of is: "The internet interprets censorship as damage, and routes around it." The internet was designed to keep information available by routing around damage to the network, expected to be caused by nuclear weapons on key nodes, so that we would know enough to keep fighting. Turns out that's what it does, thanks be to God.

Marines & Mules

 

The Glories of Nepal

Every day is a great day for burning down Communist governments, but they picked a beautiful one.

More Luke Bell

Since the first one got such a heartfelt reaction, here's some more.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.7

Book VI continues with an exploration of wisdom.

Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but (2) we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,

Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman

Nor wise in anything else. Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

The "highest objects" as Aristotle discusses them are immaterial things of great importance: the soul, the unmoved movers (of which there are several, not one only as with Avicenna and later theological Aristotelians), the Forms as they exist in themselves instead of in things. In fact Aristotle isn't convinced that forms do exist except as immaterial additions to material things; the form of the table is in the table, because the parts have been put into the order of a table. If they were in a heap on the floor, they wouldn't be a table even though they'd still have all and only the same material parts. 

So there is at least an idea of what the form of a table might be, separate from actual tables. It exists, perhaps, in our minds. Perhaps -- Plato wanted to say -- it exists as a feature of reality, that such things as tables are possible and this is what they are like. Aristotle is not convinced of that.

Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.

True, but remarkable given that Aristotle has already praised political science as the highest human good.  

Now if what is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will entrust such matters.

It's difficult to know if 'white' or 'straight' is indeed the same for fishes, or bats.  

He's Right, Boys

"When you have horrible killings, you have to take horrible actions."

That's one of those truths I really hate. That doesn't make it less true.

Sometimes you just have to ride it out. That line at the end finishes, “The best thing you can do with death is ride off from it.”

Georgia 2020

It was stolen, obviously. That's around ten times the margin of victory.

Technology Continues to Outstrip Our Philosophy and Ethics

 "Brain in a Box"?  Yes, available for purchase (aimed at researchers).  What are the implications?  We'll figure that out as we go, I guess- onward into the void.

Let's hope that doesn't turn out poorly, but I guess as a species, we are not a patient lot.

Focus & Attention

It can be overdone. 

I’m trying to make weight for a Strongman competition in October, so I got this calorie-counter app.  It helps me make sure that I’m cutting weight in a reasonable manner, so that I’ll hit the target weight without losing muscle. 

For some reason, it is insanely concerned with sodium. If I eat a tortilla, it warns that this is a high sodium choice. If I eat a can of beans, it warns about the sodium. 

But tequila on a Saturday night? Good job, buddy! What a responsible decision!

El tequila blanco.

Happy Birthday, DAC

The most Outlaw of the Outlaws is 86 today. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.5-6

I'm moving faster through Book VI than I did through the previous book, but what is being said is quite important. We are talking about how it is possible for a human being to know the truth, and what the practical limits of this are. 

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it.

That, for example, is an interesting choice. How would we know who is practically wise? (The word in Greek is phronesis; there's a lot of Greek today so I'm going to skip the accent marks) We might look at something empirical, like how well their decisions work out. We can't observe their reasoning process unless they describe it to us, since the mind is not visible; and they could be wrong about it anyway. Many people, asked to justify their decisions, will rationalize what they did. They may not really know why they did what they did, not understand it, or know but be embarrassed by it. We want to know about wisdom, but we have to try to infer what it is like. (This is another place where a good upbringing helps, which meant as you will recall having been raised with good examples and stories. Who was practically wise? Odysseus, for Aristotle; Gandalf was, perhaps for us.) 

Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.

Practical wisdom is about successfully achieving the good life.  

This is shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art.

Art is concerned with making, we learned yesterday, so what this means is that we aren't talking about things like breadmaking, or house-building. This kind of knowledge, again, is techne in the Greek; it was Socrates' favorite candidate for real knowledge because it could be reliably explained, taught, and practiced. For Aristotle it is one of the intellectual virtues, but not phronesis. Techne is concerned with making things; phronesis is concerned with making a good life. Phronesis is the intellectual virtue of applying the moral virtues to craft a complete and honorable life. It is about taking specific actions in individual contexts, but also about placing them in the larger context of a vision of what such a complete life looks like.

The Bullfighter

Sadly that young man is already dead, at 32, reportedly from fentanyl. It’s a deadly poison that makes all illegal drugs unsafe these days. I was never inclined to them, but many musicians have been including many good ones. It’s a tragedy to lose a good one. 

The Second is for all Citizens

However clever it may be politically, I'm not going along with this push to strip American citizens of their Second Amendment rights just because some government bureaucrat rules that they have debatable 'mental health' issues. 

There are people who do have mental health issues, certainly. Yet some of you are old enough to remember when homosexuality was considered a mental illness; the trend has not been to make the 'science' more conservative. There is nothing at all stopping the revision of the categories of psychology to fit present fashion -- usually the fashion of the elites, psychology being the most popular major in the United States and a special predilection of Blue America. That road is going to end up paved with "your prejudices, which I have diagnosed in you whether or not they can be practically demonstrated, make you dangerous to others and in need of being disarmed."

We saw how readily psychology and psychiatry could be weaponized in the Soviet Union, where it was a standard practice to determine that opponents of the state were mentally ill (and thus in need of protective imprisonment, lobotomies, and/or drugging). It can do good in the right hands, on a voluntary basis. I have grave concerns about using it anywhere in the law, especially criminal law, and most especially as an excuse for the restriction of basic rights. 

So no, absolutely not. 

Rights in Iran

In a post at ChicagoBoyz, Mike quotes Tim Kaine (whom, you may well have forgotten, was once a candidate for Vice President). 

The notion that rights don’t come from laws and don’t come from the government, but come from the Creator — that’s what the Iranian government believes. It’s a theocratic regime that bases its rule on Sharia law and targets Sunnis, Bahá’ís, Jews, Christians and other religious minorities. And they do it because they believe that they understand what natural rights are from their Creator. So the statement that our rights do not come from our laws or our governments is extremely troubling.

Ah yes, those noted champions of the idea of rights, the Ayatollahs. 

It is true that Sharia law endows Muslims with rights (or at least powers) that are not possessed by others. Taking slaves, for example, is part of the double-goodness of jihad:

...the conceptual roots of 'jihadism' are in the faith, and will come to be known to anyone who studies it closely; and anyone who studies the great scholars of Islam will find much support for the idea. Avicenna, that great philosopher, describes jihad as a kind of double good in his Metaphysics of The Healing, because it brings one closer to God's will while also providing you access to practical goods like slaves captured in the war. The philosopher Averroes, in a reflection on Plato's Republic, agrees with Plato that the best kind of women should be admitted to a kind of equality with the best kind of men, and that this equality means that they should be allowed to join in jihad and the taking of slaves and wealth. The Reliance of the Traveler, one of the great medieval works of Islamic jurisprudence, is a favorite example of Andy McCarthy's (who came to know it while prosecuting the World Trade Center bomber, an earlier example of mass killings by bomb).

It isn't true that the Iranian government is or ever has been concerned with rights in the Western sense. Nor is it true that government can or should be conceived of as the origin of rights, since it is the chief danger to the human dignity that is found in nature. What government gives, government can take away. What nature gives, no man may rightly:  not even many men with many guns. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.3-4

Book VI continues with an examination of science and art. We'll get through two chapters again today.

Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more.

"These states" being what we develop out of our sensation, reason, and desire: the states in ourselves that are connected to the truth we find in the world. 

Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

It's easy to miss that this implies that truth is necessarily connected to wisdom and intuitive reason. We expect it to be connected to scientific knowledge, the first state he will examine, but not necessarily so: we are used to science being mistaken to a certain degree. That is because our science is experimental. Aristotle's was connected with the apprehension of a Form, which guarantees thing coming to be "always or for the most part." 

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.

The classic example is astronomy, the stars being thought at the time to have been ungenerated and eternal, as well as more necessary than we now think that they are. In Aristotle's time, the motions of the stars had been known for generations and generations, and had not changed. Now we know that stars also have a life cycle, and can change for several reasons. 

Mathematics is a purer example. The Forms of points and lines, the postulates and axioms and theorems, that were formulated by Euclid (c. 300) in the generation after Aristotle (384-322) persisted until the 19th century. Though Euclid had not formulated his work in Aristotle's time, the basics of geometry had existed since Pythagoras (570-495) as major entities of Greek thought, and had pre-existed ancient Greece in places like Babylon by perhaps 1,500 years. (All those dates are B.C., and thus reversed in order; lower numbers are later.) You can see how they might be thought to be eternal and ungenerated; indeed, philosophers of mathematics even today argue as to whether or to what degree mathematical truth is created by our conventions about how to handle mathematics, or alternatively are indeed basic features of the reality we inhabit.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.1-2

At this point in the work, we are approximately halfway through the EN. Book VI is going to further examine the meaning of wisdom, different sorts of wisdom, judgment, and other qualities of one's state of character. The first two chapters are short, so we will take them together. 

Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule.

This is in a way a restatement of what has been said, but in another way it seems to introduce the concept of having "the right rule." If you had a rule to follow, what would you need with a state of character? Indeed, the justice discussion of Book V seems to indicate that we should just have laws that require us to obey the rule that will make us behave virtuously. 

That doesn't seem to be what Aristotle meant. Terence Irwin instead translates that phrase as "having the correct reason," but reasoning is a process rather than a measuring tool. H. Rackham gives it as "in conformity with the right principle." The principle is going to admit of clear cases that look very rule-like, e.g., 'Don't throw down you shield and flee in the face of the enemy'; but also there are going to be vague areas, where you are determining if it is more courageous to die holding your ground or to conduct a fighting withdrawal to where you might be able to hold the ground and not lose the field. Likewise, as we have seen in the distinction between justice and magnanimity, there are lesser and greater ways of doing things that are both permissible: the just will do what the law requires, but the magnanimous will go beyond what is required to seek what is most worthy of honor. Likewise, the 'equitable' may go beyond the rule to do more than what is needed out of a sense of fairness to another.

We have not, then, fundamentally altered the project. It is still about using your reason to find the right way to behave, so there are rational principles to seek. Yet we must also look to our sense of fairness and honor, and if we are to be the very best sort of people, go beyond what mere rules require of us.

But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.

Nicomachean Ethics V.11

This is the final part of Book V, and the close of Aristotle's lengthy examination of justice. We live in a time when the word 'justice' is frequently invoked by people who haven't closely examined it, and often seem like they couldn't explain what they mean by it; at least all of you will now have had the experience of a close examination of the concept.

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what has been said.

Is it? Before you read on, decide what you think about that question based on what has been said. 

For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g. the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what [the law] does not expressly permit it forbids.

Thank goodness that is not true, at least for laws as practiced in our own time. It would have to be an extraordinarily long and detailed legal code that expressly permitted everything, so that anything not considered could be assumed forbidden. Military law sometimes approaches that level of detail: I recall that at the Baghdad Airport there was a signpost that read, approaching the airport, "No Hat Area," but leaving, "Hats Mandatory Past This Point." Everything not forbidden was required.

An account of justice that leaves so little room for liberty is wanting. I suppose it would be possible to construct express permissions that were very broad, e.g., "As long as you don't hurt anyone with your action, do whatever you want." Here we are asking if you can be unjust to yourself, so that would have to include you in 'don't hurt anyone.'  

Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another (otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his action and the instrument he is using; and he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly.

He is acting unlawfully, not unfairly. 

But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly.

Is it possible to treat the state unjustly? Socrates is supposed to have claimed that the state had the rights over its citizens that a master has over his slaves, because the state arranged for your safety and upbringing, food and shelter. Certainly many states exercise tyrannical powers over people, denying them their basic rights and freedoms in a manner analogous to slavery. Can a slave be unjust to his master, given the basic injustice of that relationship? 

Even in a healthy relationship between citizen and state, the state is not in a position of equality; and the state is not a person, having no feelings to be hurt and no dignity to be insulted. Burning the flag doesn't actually injure anyone, for example. 

If justice is lawfulness plus fairness, as Aristotle says, the law can certainly establish standards that citizens have to abide by with regard to the state; then, violating those laws is injustice by definition. Yet if justice is the virtue of respecting the interests of others, the state isn't properly an 'other.' It's a fiction, a legal but not an actual entity. I'm not convinced that you can be unjust to the state. 

Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which the man who 'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense; the unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round, so that his 'unjust act' does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i) that would imply the possibility of the same thing's having been subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time; but this is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more than one person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (for the man who because he has suffered does the same in return is not thought to act unjustly); but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same things at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife or housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,

Recall that justice was said to be, 'in a way,' complete virtue. Being unjust seems as if it is at least a failure to achieve complete virtue; but here we are talking about a sense in which one can be unjust without being generally wicked. The failure to achieve the whole doesn't mean that you haven't gotten anything right.  

In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly?' is solved also by the distinction we applied to the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly?'

(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more than the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice and is blameworthy-involves vice which is either of the complete and unqualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative, because not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of character), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad, but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to your being taken prisoner or put to death as the enemy.)

I think Aristotle answered the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly' with both yes and no, as for example the virtuous man might take less than he really deserves: this is a proof of his virtue (because it displays his generosity), rather than a charge against it (because he doesn't insist on his rightful share). The drunkard is suffering something he freely chose while he had the power to choose; but now he doesn't have the power to reject it any longer. So, typically, 'yes, but at the same time also no.'

Nicomachean Ethics V.10

There are two more chapters in Book V.

Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same.

Terence Irwin translates this "equitable" language as "decency." Decent, he says, "is cognate with eikos, 'likely,' and means 'plausible, reasonable, respectable,' (as we say 'a likely lad' or 'a reasonable candidate for the job'). Hence it is used more generally for a decent person, and hence interchangeably with 'GOOD' in the right contexts, as Aristotle remarks[.]" You may or may not find it helpful to substitute 'decent' for 'equitable' as you follow along in this section; equity has some connotations in modern English that may not be relevant. On the other hand, fairness is a core component of justice, and equity suggests treating people with fair consideration for their stake in the matter.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice.

It is more than the law requires, in other words; going beyond what is mandatory because you recognize that the other person deserves more than what is required. Thus, treating a person equitably may go beyond the 'lawfulness' requirement of justice in pursuit of the 'fairness' requirement. Yet not 'fairness' in the sense of 'treating relevantly similar cases similarly,' but in the sense of 'ensuring just deserts.' This may indeed be more than what is average, not only more than what is required; it might be the case that equity in this sense requires exceptional payments or rewards in exceptional cases.

The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.

There's an interesting bit of architectural history! The Lesbian rule has been used by several philosophers since Aristotle to capture the idea of a thing that is both a reliable standard, but one flexible enough to make appropriate adjustments for circumstances.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.

What's Going On in Germany?

According to the NY Post:

Four candidates and two reserves from the right-wing AfD political party in Germany have dropped dead within 13 days of each other — just before elections, according to reports.

The Alternative for Deutschland candidates were set to appear on ballots in North Rhine-Westphalia on September 14.

Officials said no foul play is currently suspected in any of their deaths, the BBC reported.

Um, "dropped dead"? I sense that the NYP doesn't particularly care for the AfD.

Ralph Lange, 66; Wolfgang Klinger, 71; Stefan Berendes, 59; and Wolfgang Seitz, 59, all kicked the bucket within two weeks of each other, the European Conservative reported. Two reserve candidates also died over the same period.

Kicked the bucket? Do they have editors at the NYP?

While 6 candidate deaths looks suspicious, there are 20,000 candidates up for election in September, and according to the more measured BBC reporting there have been deaths among the candidates of other parties as well. Still, six from the most hated party in Germany seems suspicious.

Requiescat in Pace Alexander "Tank" Armor

This one will be known to none of you, I imagine, although he had some celebrity within the sphere of Strongman athletics. He was a personal friend of mine. His military service left him in a wheelchair, which he took as a challenge; he was kind and encouraging to me when I was developing as a Strongman athlete even though he was a decade younger. He himself won awards and recognition, and helped the sport develop a category for those faced with challenges like his own.

One hopes King Charles II learned something from this exchange.

I will simply quote his father's remarks.

In Loving Memory of My Son, Alexander Armor

June 6, 1986 – August 30, 2025

With deep sorrow and immense pride, we honor the life of Alexander Elliot Armor, who passed away on August 30, 2025, at the age of 39 quietly in his sleep. A man of rare depth and boundless talent, Alexander lived a life that defied limits and inspired all who knew him.

Although born in Calgary, Alberta on June 6, 1986, Alexander moved to boarding school for his last 4 years at Hargrave Military Academy in Virginia where in his senior year he served as Band Major. 

Alexander served his country with distinction in the United States Army, earning the rank of Corporal before being medically retired. His service was marked by courage, integrity, and an unwavering commitment to others. 

Learning was very important to Alexander, and as such he holds a Doctorate in Military and Strategic Studies,  a Ba in Philosophy and a Bs in Neuroscience.  His life was filled with research of new subjects and expanding his horizons.

After his military career, Alexander became a trailblazer in the world of adaptive athletics. He broke numerous world records in adaptive Highland Games and adaptive strongman competitions, and in 2018, he introduced adaptive Highland Games to the International Highland Games Association (IHGA) at the historic Mey Games, in the presence of the now King Charles. His pioneering efforts earned him the title “Father of Adaptive Highland Games,” and his legacy continues to empower athletes across the globe.

But Alexander’s strength extended far beyond the field. He was a gifted musician, known for his artful guitar playing and mastery of multiple instruments. His original recordings—still available online—reflect a spirit that was both fierce and tender, capable of expressing the full spectrum of human emotion. Music was not just a hobby for Alexander; it was a language he spoke fluently, alongside many others. A polyglot, he could converse in several languages, bridging cultures with ease and curiosity.

In quieter moments, Alexander found joy in crafting custom knives by hand, blending artistry with precision. Each piece he created was a reflection of his patience, skill, and reverence for tradition. 

He also served his community as a proud member of the Hermitage Springs Volunteer Fire Department, always ready to lend a hand or risk his own safety for the well-being of others.  In an attempt to further serve his community Alexander Armor for TN House - District 38 ran for State Representative of Tennessee in 2024.

Alexander is survived by his devoted father, Dale Armor, and his beloved son, Jonah Lee Danger Armor, who inherits not only his name but the indomitable spirit of a man who lived with purpose and passion. His uncle Bruce Armor and his grandmother Maureen Armor.

Alexander’s life was a symphony of service, strength, creativity, and love. He lifted stones, saved lives, wrote songs, and forged steel—but most of all, he lifted hearts. His legacy will live on in every athlete who dares to dream, every melody that stirs the soul, and every flame of courage that burns in the face of adversity.

Rest well my son, Alexander. 

You were—and remain—unforgettable.