This final chapter of Book IV is so short I'll go ahead and do it today, even though we've already had a post about an interesting topic of contemporary interest.
Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character.
It won't surprise contemporary thinkers that shame should not be described as a virtue, but it probably does surprise that it might have ever been mistaken for one. In our age we have tended to reject it as a proper guide at all. Confidence in embracing yourself as you are is instead our age's watchword for virtue. Shame is considered something like a negative product of anxiety, used probably as an enforcement mechanism by oppressive actors, inculcated through practices that were probably abusive: an overbearing mother, conservative Christians, patriarchy, all of which have strongly negative connotations.
Nevertheless if a sense of honor is the most reliable guide to not merely keeping to what is permitted but striving for the very best, then fear of dishonor could seem like almost a parallel sense. What separates them so cleanly for Aristotle?
First, notice that his remarks on shame make it a kind of passion like fear of danger. The virtue is not a passion, but a state of character that allows you to act properly regardless of passions.
Second, recall that receipt of honors -- which is the actual parallel to fear of receiving dishonor -- was dismissed as a proper end of ethics in I.5 because it depends too much on others to give it to you or withhold it from you. Shame is the same way: you are motivated by things you don't control. The proper attitude of the virtuous to honor and dishonor are the same, as we learn in the chapters on magnanimity: you should behave in the manner that is most worthy of honor, but disdain whether or not you receive honor or dishonor for doing so. If you receive dishonor but know you behaved honorably, you disregard it because you know it does not rightly attach to you.
The feeling [of shame] is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling...
This is a good concept because you can see the relationship between shame and a proper upbringing. The young, who have not fully understood how to reason yet and are driven by feeling, will find in being fearful of dishonor at least a road to the right starting point. Once they understand to avoid the base and seek the noble, and have some working examples of what those things are from which to reason, they should lay aside shame as 'when I became a man, I put away childish things.' (Cor. 13:11)
...but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions.
Here Aristotle says something a little different than in the chapters on magnanimity: here he says that a good man needn't fear disgrace because he won't do anything bad -- neither bad things in fact, nor bad things in the common opinion. He may be speaking only of 'good' men here, and not of the 'great,' as when he was speaking of magnanimity. When seeking the best, it may sometimes be the case that common opinion is against it; it may often be that common people don't see why it was right. The best do what they know is most worthy, and disregard the common opinion about it.
The more ordinarily good, of course, avoid scandal as well as actual wrongdoing. Like our former Vice President refusing to dine or meet alone with any women not his wife, he avoids even the possibility of scandal. However: "The wicked flee when no one pursues, But the righteous are bold as a lion." (Proverbs 28:1)
But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification. And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss justice.
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