Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But no more do we deliberate about the things that involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether of necessity or by nature or from any other cause, e.g. the solstices and the risings of the stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in another, e.g. droughts and rains; nor about chance events, like the finding of treasure. But we do not deliberate even about all human affairs; for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.
The word being translated as 'deliberation' -- prohairesis -- doesn't mean "think about" or "consider." Deliberation is about actions we should take; they are ends-to-means reasoning. As a result, the content of geometry or even theology is not where deliberation happens.
Terence Irwin points out in his useful glossary accompanying his translation that the 'pro' here is etymologically temporal: hairesis is a choice, and 'pro-' means that you are taking the pre-decision step of thinking through what you should do. This can be done well in advance so that a decision in many cases can be made immediately based upon your existing moral principles; indeed, as we shall see, that is one of the best proofs of complete virtue.
We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done; and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and chance are thought to be causes, and also reason and everything that depends on man. Now every class of men deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts. And in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about which we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-making. And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding.
Whenever Aristotle says that something happens "in a certain way for the most part" he is indicating the presence of a Form. Here is commentary I wrote about the difference between Platonic and Aristotelean forms and their effect on causality. The form for Aristotle is often two of the four causes he recognizes in the Physics, the 'formal' and 'final' causes. That still leaves the 'efficient' and 'material' causes, either of which can keep the form from being realized perfectly. Thus "for the most part"; sometimes the material fails, or some chance accidentally introduces an unexpected element into the efficient causality. The relative reliability of the matter, however, implies a form is at work. (You will note that this is another version of the warning at I.3 that ethics is about probabilities and not certainties.)
We deliberate not about ends but about means.
That might be surprising; politically at least we often seem to deliberate about ends. Politics is an extension of ethics for Aristotle; it is where we try to create the conditions for the good human life that the ethics describes. All the same, he holds that at least in ethics, we don't deliberate about our ends.
For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end.
I'm not at all certain that Aristotle is correct about 'the statesman,' although perhaps he is assuming that his statesman is a good one. It isn't clear to me that some of our 'statesmen' aren't pursuing disorder as a strategy; certainly some of our city managers or mayors don't seem that interested in law and order. However, Aristotle believes that the end is assumed as obvious here as in his other cases.
They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last.
For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation- for instance mathematical investigations- but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming.
The inversion of priority in discovery versus causality is an interesting question. When we look at an event, we often do track backwards to the first principles, or to the first event in a series of causes. I'm not sure that we do that necessarily: I think sometimes we grasp the first principle quickly, and it helps illuminate where to look for the individuals that caused the particular event. If there were an assassination of an official, for example, we might start by tracking backwards first to the assassin and then to his organization and then to their goals and finally to the first principles that are their ends; but we also might realize that a group with that set of ends was likely to be responsible, and start our investigation by looking to see which groups of that sort might have been involved.
And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.
The example shows that this is a pragmatic standard, again in line with I.3; 'we need money' is impossible in the sense that 'we need a square circle' would be. The latter is genuinely impossible, and indeed inconceivable in the proper sense of the word.
By 'possible' things I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the moving principle is in ourselves. The subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases- sometimes the means, sometimes the mode of using it or the means of bringing it about.
A "moving principle" here doesn't mean that the principle is moving, but that it is a thing responsible for the motion, which can include any sort of action. It may seem strange to contemporary readers to describe a principle in this way because our physics usually only admits of efficient causes. As mentioned above, Aristotelian causality has four causes, and a principle can be a formal or final cause. A thing might be put into motion for the sake of a principle, e.g., "It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom — for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself."
It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a moving principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed can the particular facts be a subject of it, as whether this is bread or has been baked as it should; for these are matters of perception. If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.
Here the man is likely to be the efficient moving principle, his love of virtue hopefully the final principle of causation. It's ok that there are multiple principles for a single motion; the model in fact requires four, although often we find that two of them are the same (formal and final often are; efficient and material sometimes are).
The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice.
This is a technical distinction. These are important sometimes in Aristotelian philosophy, as for example when Aquinas finds that "good" and "existence" are the same thing really, though one is prior to the other conceptually. Here the action decided upon is both the thing deliberated upon and the chosen thing; but conceptually it is different once it becomes the choice because it is now determined, rather than still open to consideration.
For every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses. This is plain also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented; for the kings announced their choices to the people. The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is concerned with means.
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