Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Emphasis added. This is not going to be a list of rules; it is not going to be a list of moral principles, even. It is certainly not going to try to be a deduction from logic. We are talking about developing a state of character that is fit for the world you live in. We judge whether a thing is a virtue by whether or not it works, making due allowances for the chance and fate that are also part of the world.
Who judges? Not every man equally.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
It will turn out to be that the virtuous man is the best judge of virtue, for his education is complete. The man who is courageous is a good judge of courage; the man who is just in his treatment of others is a good judge of justice. Not to get too far ahead of ourselves, but both justice and the virtue he calls magnanimity have a claim to be 'complete virtue,' such that a truly just or magnanimous man can be said to have received an all-round education in virtue and to be a good judge in general. They differ in a key aspect, however, which we will discuss when we get there.
7 comments:
Holy cow.
Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.
That is the best description I've seen of Critical Theory scholars. That is exactly what's happening and they say themselves that their work is aimed at producing action, not just "knowing stuff."
And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs.
Hence the old Marxists who are "youthful in character."
Did not expect to find this in Aristotle. Maybe there really is nothing new under the sun.
I like the idea that "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs." It's a good reminder to me.
I may need to be reminded as we go, but this is possibly the one aspect of this study that will seem natural to me. I chose the nom de net "Doubting" for a reason.
"That is the best description I've seen of Critical Theory scholars. That is exactly what's happening..."
There's an additional problem in Critical Theory, which I went into here:
https://grimbeorn.blogspot.com/2023/11/on-examined-or-unexamined-life.html
"...it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits..."
This is a key insight for the whole EN, which also then holds for the Rhetoric and the Politics. They are similarly practical philosophy where 'for the most part' or 'most probably, most of the time, due exceptions being made for chance and such' is as good as it gets. That's the correct degree of precision: asking for more is a warning sign that an error is being made (as, again, is true of Kantian deontology but also utilitarianism's conceit that it will turn ethics into a sort of calculation, if only we could map out exactly what is meant by 'utility').
There are two really big things being said in this section. That is the first one: you should look for the right degree of precision given the field. In strict logic and mathematics, you should look for proofs, and you'd be a fool if you accepted, 'Well, most likely..." as an answer there. But in ethics, politics, and rhetoric, you should not only not expect proofs, you should reject them as suspect.
The second big thing being said here is also a hard pill for most Americans, especially the young: not everyone is an equally good judge in these matters. Some are more fit than others.
As I understand it, your point was that, when oppression (racism, etc.) is pointed out, people want to reform things and, in fact, do change things. So, that change is possible disproves the assumption that the whole system is designed to ensure the oppression. That is, if the system actually did operate to ensure oppression, change wouldn't really be possible. Is that right?
Of course, your point that the assumptions have to be tested outside the argument is well-taken.
It's kind of a rule in physics that your measurement has to have an estimated error to go along with it.
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