Nicomachean Ethics III.8: Courage II

Continuing from Friday, more of Aristotle's thoughts on courage. Today Aristotle wants to talk about things that are sometimes called courage, but that he doesn't think are the genuine article.
Courage, then, is something of this sort, but the name is also applied to five other kinds.

First comes the courage of the citizen-soldier; for this is most like true courage. Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of the penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would otherwise incur, and because of the honours they win by such action; and therefore those peoples seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. This is the kind of courage that Homer depicts, e.g. in Diomede and in Hector:
First will Polydamas be to heap reproach on me then; and
For Hector one day 'mid the Trojans shall utter his vaulting
harangue:
Afraid was Tydeides, and fled from my face.
This kind of courage is most like to that which we described earlier, because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to desire of a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of disgrace, which is ignoble. One might rank in the same class even those who are compelled by their rulers; but they are inferior, inasmuch as they do what they do not from shame but from fear, and to avoid not what is disgraceful but what is painful; for their masters compel them, as Hector does:
But if I shall spy any dastard that cowers far from the fight,
Vainly will such an one hope to escape from the dogs.
And those who give them their posts, and beat them if they retreat, do the same, and so do those who draw them up with trenches or something of the sort behind them; all of these apply compulsion. But one ought to be brave not under compulsion but because it is noble to be so.

In our time and country, we tend to think of the citizen-soldier as the ideal exemplar of courage. Ours differ somewhat from the ancient Greek and Trojan cases in that we have an all-volunteer military; thus, our fighting men and women are in fact choosing military service freely rather than being compelled by laws to serve. This makes them better than the citizen-soldiers that Aristotle is talking about on his own terms. He would likely have admired those who elect to enlist in the United States Marine Corps, knowingly choosing an especially hard service; or those who choose the Army's combat arms. The portions of the service for which you must volunteer multiple times -- for example special operations or Airborne, where you have to volunteer first for the service and then again for the hard selection process -- would have drawn his admiration and approval, I think.

We do share his disdain for citizen-soldiers of nations that assign their NCOs or officers to kill any soldiers who don't press forward, as the Soviets were said to do in WWII. We generally agree, I think, that service under such compulsion is less noble and more based in fear than true courage. I also think that we tend to sneer at the indiscipline of such an army, or such a nation as cannot command loyalty from love instead of tyranny. 

Hector is usually considered a noble figure, but it is true that in the end he flees from Achilles. (Iliad XXII). Achilles is the favorite Greek example, but he had an unfair advantage that kept him from harm in almost all circumstances; I think of Odysseus as the best example of Greek courage because his courage was coupled with practical wisdom. This question is debated between Socrates and the Sophist Hippias in the Lesser Hippias or Hippias Minor, in which Socrates takes the position that Odysseus was the greater; philosophers usually treat that document as ironic or a reductio ad absurdum, but I think there is a serious point being made therein.

More after the jump; this is a longer chapter.

(2) Experience with regard to particular facts is also thought to be courage; this is indeed the reason why Socrates thought courage was knowledge. Other people exhibit this quality in other dangers, and professional soldiers exhibit it in the dangers of war; for there seem to be many empty alarms in war, of which these have had the most comprehensive experience; therefore they seem brave, because the others do not know the nature of the facts. Again, their experience makes them most capable in attack and in defence, since they can use their arms and have the kind that are likely to be best both for attack and for defence; therefore they fight like armed men against unarmed or like trained athletes against amateurs; for in such contests too it is not the bravest men that fight best, but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the best condition. Professional soldiers turn cowards, however, when the danger puts too great a strain on them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to fly, while citizen-forces die at their posts, as in fact happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter flight is disgraceful and death is preferable to safety on those terms; while the former from the very beginning faced the danger on the assumption that they were stronger, and when they know the facts they fly, fearing death more than disgrace; but the brave man is not that sort of person.

Socrates discusses the nature of courage in Plato's Laches. Socrates generally argued that virtue was a species of knowledge, as we have already discussed; although sometimes (e.g. in the Protagoras) he argued that it was knowledge that, for unknown reasons, could not be taught or conveyed. Knowledge usually can be, so that was a mystery that bothered him. 

I don't know that I agree with Aristotle here that it is braver to die at your post than to withdraw from a hopeless fight. There are times when it might be proper to do that, and then braver; but in general the professional soldier's art includes the retreat in good order (exactly the point of our own military's failure in Afghanistan). Socrates himself was famously in a rear guard action that was fought successfully; in the above-mentioned Laches, that is why other men of proven courage seek his opinion on the subject of how to teach courage to the youth. Being wise and artful might not be the same as being courageous -- Socrates seems to have been wrong that it was a sort of knowledge, but rather a habituated character, as Aristotle says -- but it shouldn't be incoherent with courage. Applying practical wisdom to the problem is a species of 'doing the right thing at the right time for the right reason,' which is Aristotle's general definition for virtue (as we saw in EN III.7)

(3) Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be brave, because brave men also are passionate; for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion' and 'aroused their spirit and passion and 'hard he breathed panting' and 'his blood boiled'. For all such expressions seem to indicate the stirring and onset of passion. Now brave men act for honour's sake, but passion aids them; while wild beasts act under the influence of pain; for they attack because they have been wounded or because they are afraid, since if they are in a forest they do not come near one. Thus they are not brave because, driven by pain and passion, they rush on danger without foreseeing any of the perils, since at that rate even asses would be brave when they are hungry; for blows will not drive them from their food; and lust also makes adulterers do many daring things. (Those creatures are not brave, then, which are driven on to danger by pain or passion.) The 'courage' that is due to passion seems to be the most natural, and to be courage if choice and motive be added.

Men, then, as well as beasts, suffer pain when they are angry, and are pleased when they exact their revenge; those who fight for these reasons, however, are pugnacious but not brave; for they do not act for honour's sake nor as the rule directs, but from strength of feeling; they have, however, something akin to courage.

Just as we punish murders less if they are committed in moments of passionate anger, thus lessening the responsibility of the actor for his crime because of the passion, so here we regard such actions as less brave. The actor deserves less credit on the same terms.

(4) Nor are sanguine people brave; for they are confident in danger only because they have conquered often and against many foes. Yet they closely resemble brave men, because both are confident; but brave men are confident for the reasons stated earlier, while these are so because they think they are the strongest and can suffer nothing. (Drunken men also behave in this way; they become sanguine). When their adventures do not succeed, however, they run away; but it was the mark of a brave man to face things that are, and seem, terrible for a man, because it is noble to do so and disgraceful not to do so. Hence also it is thought the mark of a braver man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than to be so in those that are foreseen; for it must have proceeded more from a state of character, because less from preparation; acts that are foreseen may be chosen by calculation and rule, but sudden actions must be in accordance with one's state of character.

"Sanguine" is one of the humors, a theory that probably predates Ancient Greece. It refers to a character that is enthusiastic and youthful; it is associated with the blood (indeed, it literally means "bloody"). Aristotle would have known of this theory, which was forwarded by Hippocrates among others, but here I think he simply means that a man is "blooded," that is, experienced in fighting and war.

(5) People who are ignorant of the danger also appear brave, and they are not far removed from those of a sanguine temper, but are inferior inasmuch as they have no self-reliance while these have. Hence also the sanguine hold their ground for a time; but those who have been deceived about the facts fly if they know or suspect that these are different from what they supposed, as happened to the Argives when they fell in with the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.

Again, this may be part of the practical wisdom aspect of the military art; one is almost always at least partially ignorant in war, as von Clausewitz pointed out with his theory of  'the fog of war.'  As you learn more information, you certainly ought to adjust accordingly; this is not cowardice, but practical wisdom. 

Unlike Socrates, Aristotle was not a fighting man. He admired them, and taught one of the greatest ones in human history, but his own experience did not extend to it practically. I think he gets a few things wrong here. Still, we are talking about his thoughts some two thousand years and more after he gave them, so they have stood the test of time. It is very unlikely anyone will care about anything I wrote even a thousand years after I'm gone. One ought to admire his proven worth.

We have, then, described the character both of brave men and of those who are thought to be brave.
There is still one more chapter on courage, but it is short.

No comments: