I quote this section in order to point out that this has not been the opinion of the enlightened only recently. Socrates is brought up against it by Protagoras:If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong, only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly.Rational punishment does not look to the past but to the future, Protagoras says. Indeed, since we cannot change the past, the only reason -- that is, the only kind of purpose to which rationality even might apply itself -- for punishment must be an eye toward the future. Deterrence is rational. Rehabilitation is rational. Mere retribution is bestial, so he argues.I think that the opposite is true. It is the beast who is most likely to forgo retribution. They will act not to revenge past harms, but to avoid fresh ones. They might kill you if they think you are still dangerous and sense a momentary advantage. They might just as readily avoid you to keep from presenting you with a chance to hurt them again. They will not feel any duty of honor to avenge themselves, or their families, nor to repay you for the wrongs you have done.Retribution is a higher, not a lower quality. This is orthodox, is it not? Vengeance is the divine quality, not a bestial one. Human beings are urged to mercy and kindness toward their enemies not because it is irrational or animal to punish past wrongs, but because they are not high enough to do it well and justly. Be patient, return kindness for cruelty, and you will heap hot coals on their heads.How fitting, then, that it was a Vicar who provided the author cited at the top of this post with his reasons. But this is not a purely Judeo-Christian view. The Ancient Greeks thought this too, those of them who were poets instead of philosophers. They also thought that vengeance and retribution were divine. Hesiod even tells you her name.
A Final Note on Exemplary Justice
I wrote on this directly in 2015. My thesis at that time contradicts every other philosopher; it is ancient in form, but it disagrees with all the ancient philosophers and sides instead with the poets, Plato's favorite enemy.
Plato and Aristotle on Exemplary Justice
In the Laws, Plato has his three strangers turn their attention to the matter in Book IX. Plato recommends for theft a proportionate equality, by which he means you must restore what you stole, and exactly that much again over it (thus, twice what you stole). This is purely retribution, and as I noted in the commentary it wouldn't have much deterrent effect.
Plato hopes deterrence won't much be needed, as the book had opened with: the Athenian stranger was embarrassed even to admit that so well-ordered and virtuous a people would require criminal punishments at all. The whole structure of the work of the Laws is to try to deter crime by structuring a society so well that virtue will be the inevitable result. In Book X, for example, he lays out the mythological structure that will keep the people aimed in the right direction without the need for punishments. The myth reinforces the law, and makes all sorts of lawbreaking a sort of blasphemy -- which was punishable by death. The example is in the myth, though, not the punishment: blasphemers were to be executed not to set the example but to punish their blasphemy. It was the myth that set the example.
It was curious to me at the time, and remains so, that the Athenian later proves very interested in military punishments in Book XII. Anyone who has been associated with the military understands that regular disciplinary actions are part of the life; and being so regularly necessary, capital punishment can't be the normal course of action. Thus, we can't view military punishments as a sort-of blasphemy requiring execution every time. In fact, military punishments in the model city are notably milder than the punishments recommended for civilians, which is an interesting feature of the Laws' model. That is not normally how military justice has worked, although I guess there are some exceptions -- everyone knows of the guy who was allowed to join the Marines instead of prison. (I did in fact know a guy like that growing up. He turned out great after the Marines.)
For Aristotle, justice divides between distributive and rectificatory. The latter is most like Plato's 'proportionate equality' in revenging theft in that it repays those who have suffered damage, and it does so on lines of arithmetical equality. Aristotle's version doesn't worry over the question of whether a good man or a bad one defrauded the other, or whether the fraud was an accident or by intention: what is owed is to make the defrauded one whole.
Now this was the EN, not the Politics, so we aren't looking at crime as such; more like a divorce settlement, I mentioned in that commentary, where it matters which spouse was the adulterer and which one not; it doesn't really matter which one was the better person, or how justified or not the adultery might have been because of neglect or hard feelings, just which one broke the agreement.
What isn't advocated for here, though, is either revenge or example-setting. It would be wrong to punish the adulterous husband (or wife) a whole lot more just to send a message to other spouses; what is just is to recognize the harm done in the specific case, and address that and only that.
Prime Conan
Having seen what Amazon Prime wanted to do with Tolkien, I don't know if I'm pleased to hear this or not. However, since I subscribe to Amazon Prime anyway for the free delivery (even way out here, well, almost -- the mailbox is half a mile away), I suppose I'll see what it looks like if it makes it the screen.
Exemplary Punishment
There is a standing philosophical debate about exemplary versus retributive punishments. The sentences handed down yesterday against the ANTIFA cell in Texas -- 100 years for shooting a gun aimed at the ground, thirty years for moving a box of literature connected to the attack -- are versions of exemplary punishment, i.e., punishments that are meant to 'make an example' to deter others.
Exemplary punishments are favored by some philosophers as the only moral form of punishment, because they think that retributive punishments do not work. Retribution on the other hand has Biblical warrant, famously 'an eye for an eye,' etc., so especially Christian philosophers have often suggested that it is moral to punish someone only for their own crimes/sins, and not for those of someone else -- especially crimes (or sins) that haven't even been committed yet, and may never be at all!
My favorite philosophical theory on retributive punishment -- not because I advocate for it, but because I love retelling it to see people's faces -- is Kant's theory. Kant especially loved capital punishment, which he advocated for a very great many things. One of those things was rebellion against your sovereign, as he was very much a law-and-order kind of guy. In the Metaphysics of Morals, he talks about two Jacobites who come to trial for their rebellion -- which sufficed, for him; the details didn't matter beyond that they were rebels. (For those of you who want to look it up, this is in Ak. 6:334).
Kant said that the judge ought to offer each of them the choice between death or lifelong slavery. He imagines that one chooses death and the other slavery. The one who chose death should receive his wish and be put to death, because he is "acquainted with something that he values more highly than life, namely honor, while the scoundrel considers it better to live in shame than not at all." The one who prefers slavery should be denied his will, because he has proven he is unworthy of the honor of having his will respected: he should also be put to death.
Hegel was also a retributionist; he thought that treating a man as a man by punishing him only for his own actions was just, whereas punishing a man to deter others was like "raising a stick at a dog," i.e., treating the other men as if they were animals to be intimidated rather than men to be respected. The use of the first man as a mere instrument rather than as an individual worth respect offended both.
Hobbes is mostly a retributionist, but he allows that a valid secondary choice is to correct others liable to the similar offense.
Those are all Modern thinkers, in the philosophical sense of the term -- Hobbes is really Early Modern. Among the Ancients, the exemplary punishment is the usual standard. Plato advocates for it the Protagoras as the only valid reason for imposing punishment.
If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong, only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention...
Likewise in the Gorgias and the Laws, the latter of which we went through at length together once. The Stoic position is similar, advocated by Seneca in (De Ira 1.19). Aristotle's discussion in the EN, which we also went through together, spells out retributive punishment explicitly, but also allows for deterrence and for restorative punishment as alternative forms.
Not that it has only ancient advocates; deterrence/examples live also in J.S. Mill's utilitarianism, Bentham's as well (Rationale of Punishment).
I'll do a follow-up post later, I think, examining what I said about the issue in my commentaries on the Laws and the EN. For now, I just want to raise the matter for our discussion. What do you think about it?
Follow-up to Prior
The last post was more than long enough, and attacked the basic problem of 'what is wrong with this coherent argument about fairness?'. However, the Clovis example reminds me of an interesting fact about the Beowulf.
Clovis asks his warriors for a gift of honor at the end of a successful fight. He does not simply lay claim to a share of the treasure that is not warranted by the equal law governing their unequal society: "I ask you, O most valiant warriors, not to refuse to me the vase in addition to my rightful part."
The one soldier who refused him obeyed their law about division of spoils, but also then refused the king a requested gift -- he denied him an asked-for honor, which is to say that he imposed a shame. It was this, I think, that Clovis was revenging with his later murder of that soldier in a shameful manner, imposing a shame on him in turn. The entry does not mention, however, if Clovis later paid a blood-price to the soldier's family, as is highly likely. Fairness and unfairness were not the only issues in that society; the honor requested and the shame of being publicly embarrassed had to be addressed as well.
In the Beowulf, which holds up the title character as the very model of honor, we get demonstrations of what contemporary societies thought ideal behavior looked like. Having come to help the Danes with Grendel (in order to repay a debt of honor to Hrothgar incurred by Beowulf's father, who had enlisted Hrothgar's aid to help settle a wergild dispute of his own), Beowulf defeats first Grendel and then, when it proves necessary, Grendel's more powerful and magical mother. In doing the latter, he discovers and wins a great treasure.
What does he do with it? He gives it all to Hrothgar.
Beowulf spake, offspring of Ecgtheow:“Lo! we blithely have brought thee, bairn of Healfdene,Prince of the Scyldings, these presents from oceanWhich thine eye looketh on, for an emblem of glory.
Beowulf had come, after all, to help Hrothgar and settle his father's debt of honor. He keeps nothing for himself. Yet Hrothgar recognizes that this 'gift from the ocean' is too great on top of the fight Beowulf has borne, and creates a new debt of honor on him. He repays this by giving Beowulf presents of his own, rich ones; and later, when Beowulf would leave him to return home, parting gifts as well. Hrothgar declares that all the old feuds are forgotten, and the two peoples united in friendship by this mutual exchange which will bring further visits and exchanges and growth and prosperity.
Unferth, a thegn of Hrothgar's who had not been able to defeat the monsters, gives Beowulf his sword as a gift -- an honor that repays the shame Unferth likely felt at having been unable to do the deed himself. Beowulf's acceptance of this redeems Unferth's incapacity, and restores the honor he might otherwise have lost by not being part of the story of Grendel's defeat.
On the return home to his own king, Hygelac, Beowulf is met by the coast guard to whom he gives a sword as a gift; then, on arrival to the king, he gives the king all that Hrothgar had given him as gifts to his own king, thus eliminating any chance that Hygelac would see Beowulf's newfound wealth as a potential threat to their relative positions. But this is also not the end of the exchange, because Hygelac then gives Beowulf great gifts in return for the substantial honor that Beowulf has shown to him by this free-handedness with what he had won. These gifts include manors and establishments that will produce wealth, placing Beowulf higher in the structure of Geat power because he has proven he can be trusted to keep faith with his king. Indeed, after Hygelac's death and then the death of his son, Beowulf arises to the kingship himself.
This mode of gift-giving looks unbounded and without economic logic to modern eyes: Beowulf was the one who had earned the 'presents of the ocean' through combat; why give it to Hrothgar, who had already received much by having the monsters killed? One present, perhaps, but all of it? Then too with Hygelac, who had perhaps contributed by allowing Beowulf to go on the trip rather than insisting he stay at home; but did he thereby deserve all of the spoils of the venture? In freely giving away everything and keeping nothing for himself multiple times, Beowulf places his fate in the hands of men who are the very sort of men that the author of the 'fairness' piece would suggest ought to be expected to take unfair advantage, being already in positions of social power and authority. It looks illogical and uneconomical.
Perhaps outside of a work of literature, the kings would have behaved more like Clovis than like Hrothgar or Hygelac. Yet in the poem, where the ethic is being spelled out purely and on its own terms, honor provides an answer to these problems of economic grasping. Each recognizes the honor being done him and repays it fairly -- fairly, not disproportionately to his own advantage according to a notion of 'fairness' that is derived from the system's own extant inequalities. At least in the poem, honor proves to have an economics and a logic of its own, one that leads to Beowulf reigning in peace and stability for many decades. His people love him; nations abroad respect him whether they love him or fear him.
And so there is peace, until the dragon comes.
Justice as Unfairness
AVI has posted an interesting challenge, an article that strikes me as making a coherent but wrong argument; yet saying just exactly why it is wrong is the interesting and challenging part. It also plays with examples with which I am well-familiar, such as the diyya, an Islamic form of the wergild/weregeld that I have written about many times because we used to help negotiate them in Iraq as a means of trying to bring peace in tribal disputes that were contributing to the insurgency.
The basic thesis is stated here:
Fairness does not come from external principles that exist in the universe and bind us. Fairness norms are human solutions. They are the rules for playing the game of life properly and agreeing on everyone’s due in society.Fairness norms allow people to avoid having to haggle all the time in real life and to agree quickly on how to split rewards and costs in their interactions. But they can work in practice only if they are not too far from what people could actually claim using their raw bargaining power in a hard-fought bargaining process. Only norms that are broadly in line with actual differences in bargaining power will tend to last.
The immediate problem with that thesis is that it does itself do what it claims it cannot do: it defines fairness, i.e., as "playing the game of life properly and agreeing on everyone's due in society." If this is a universal truth across all of the various societies covered, then there is a philosophical universal at work; the fact that different societies have come up with different ways of agreeing about how to address that universal is actually evidence against the idea that "fairness does not come from external principles," i.e., external to the facts about a given society. If every society develops some idea of fairness in spite of their substantial differences, there probably is -- indeed almost certainly must be -- something external to the facts of any given society driving that project.
The second problem with the thesis arises from the examples. Since I started with the diyya, I'll begin this part with it too. He's arguing that fairness norms essentially ratify existing imbalances in social bargaining power, and points to the fact that in Iranian law (his example, but Islamic law generally) a woman's life is worth half the compensation of a man's. It is true that women have less bargaining power in Islamic societies and under Islamic law; a woman's testimony is also worth half of a man's. Yet the diyya is not the only such system historically, and the value of free women compared to free men has not always disfavored women even though presumably women always had less bargaining power in the era.
This effectively made killing a celibate priest as expensive as killing a nobleman, a useful incentive for communities tempted to settle disputes with the local clergy through violence.
Women of childbearing age occupied an unusual position. The Salic Law valued a free woman who had begun bearing children at 600 solidi, triple the price of a free man, reflecting the community’s loss of future population.
Note that those arguments about why the price was set where it was are assumptions of the modern author, and that they are in direct conflict. If the concern was with future population, a celibate priest would be worth less, not much more. Still: the priest in that society had a very high bargaining power, being able to draw on the authority of the Church as its representative locally in an era of great Church power. One who was powerful enough that he could retain his position even though he was known not to be celibate presumably had greater bargaining power, though, not less: if the author's thesis were correct, he should command more compensation, not less, but the facts say otherwise. And the valuing of a free woman at three times the rate of her husband is not likely a demonstration that she had three times the bargaining power in society! Yet it was the case.
This points to the second problem, but I'll go through another one of his examples before stating it. He opens with an example of king Clovis killing a soldier after that soldier enforced the (actually perfectly equal in spite of differing social/bargaining positions) Frankish rule about distribution of captured war treasure. The conclusion the author draws is that this shows that the equal rule couldn't survive in an unequal society. The example is contingent, however; if the soldier had survived Clovis' attempt and killed the king in revenge, he might well have been rewarded by being elevated to the kingship himself by his fellows (the same ones who had, after all, accepted his rebuke of the king earlier). Then we would be reasoning from the example that the equality demonstrated by the rule was so persuasive, even in an unequal society, that violating it allowed you to rebuke kings or, in extreme cases, kill and replace them (which is, by the way, the story of how the fictional Conan the Cimmerian became king by his own hand -- a story from a much later time).
The author of the original piece is a behavioral economist, not a philosopher nor a historian. He is attempting a philosophical project from historical examples. The problem with doing that is that the two disciplines are diametrically opposed to one another: history is concerned with stating the particular facts that actually happened; philosophy is concerned with the universals (such as this notion of 'fairness,' which appears in at least some form from Aristotle's 'justice as fairness plus lawfulness' to Iranian diyya to Saxon wergild to American payments for wrongful death or dismemberment). The attempt to straddle that line with economics is closer to the historical project, but the historical facts are in a sense accidents that might have gone this way or a different one as far as we know. The universals are found where, regardless of which way the facts happened to go, we still find the same themes emerging.
Fairness and its relationship to justice is one of those things. I think it is probably true that those who occupy powerful bargaining positions are able to use their bargaining power in part to get the people around them to ratify their unfair position. The fact that they always feel the need to do so, with tools like laws or by purchasing social praise from journalists, or from skalds or scops or poets, or by purchasing masses from priests or commissioning praise-plays from playwrights, shows not that fairness is defined by their power. It shows that they are universally keenly aware that the unfairness makes their position perilous, and are always in every society seeking to shore it up.
So what is fair, regardless of the facts of society? That was a question asked by John Rawls in the last century in his famous 'Veil of Ignorance' thought experiment. It's not an experiment that can actually be performed successfully, only imagined as a way of thinking about the problem. If you could pull people from different societies, times, and places, and put them through this 'veil' so that they were temporarily unaware of the facts of their society, and ask them to devise fair rules for any society -- knowing that any society would have inequalities of these kinds, but not knowing where they would fall -- what kinds of rules would they devise?
Rawls wrote a long book about the idea that 'justice JUST IS fairness,' but if you read it he ends up smuggling back in Aristotle's idea that you need laws to enforce people treating each other the way that virtuous people would do by free choice. Thus, after the whole long thing you end up all the way back at the beginning with Aristotle. But there's your universal: two thousand years of law and economics and philosophy, and we always end up in the same place.
A Small Matter
Nobody's thinking about Syria right now, but there is a little complication in US policy there.
Congress is nearing a vote on the Pentagon’s request to send $130 million in military assistance to armed groups in Syria fighting the Islamic State, but changing dynamics on the ground could weaken the program’s effectiveness and dampen the Trump administration’s efforts to improve ties with Damascus.The Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund has disbursed hundreds of millions of dollars since 2014 to pay salaries, provide weapons and train vetted partner forces fighting ISIS — primarily in Syria and Iraq.But in Syria, the organizations that the fund was intended to support, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, are in the process of integrating with the formal Syrian military, which is overseen by a government the State Department still formally designates as an SST — a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
The SDF are mostly Kurdish peshmerga militia, highly effective fighters with longstanding relations with US Special Forces; 5th Group particularly has ties with the Kurds going back to the era when Saddam was firmly in charge of Iraq. The Syrian leadership were linked to al Qaeda quite directly until not that long ago, but seem to have broken free of that and established a surprisingly decent attempt at ending internal divisions and unifying the long-fractured country. However, they are still on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list.
It's not an insurmountable problem; a similar thing came up in Libya during the Obama administration, when they wanted to back the anti-Gaddafi rebels who were also al Qaeda affiliates. The State Department had them as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and had to go through the process of rescinding that designation. That proved manageable; but there is an additional workaround that you can probably imagine for yourselves, the one that was being employed in Benghazi. That was of course why we had a consulate in Benghazi staffed by a high-level official with a nearby "Annex." Still, to get the official money soon to be approved by Congress there they have to go through the motions of doing it.
Solstice
That's quite a hat.
The article is paywalled, but the photo caption says, "Kefan Wang (4th generation Shaman of Liaoning Province, China) dances as visitors enjoy the sunrise at Stonehenge Credit: Finnbarr Webster/Getty Images." I would guess that makes Wang a Manchu shaman, a very small and not well-known branch of Chinese folk religion. I have no idea what connection such a one would have to Stonehenge, but we still don't fully understand what the builders were doing there.
More photos from Stonehenge, here.
Mississippi John Hurt
Grim got me started listening to Jimmie Rodgers and I've been exploring the early 20th century for other musicians like him. Although the style's different, Mississippi John Hurt (1893-1966) is a very worthwhile listen. Of course, I loved the blues long before I loved country, but Hurt is country blues, so there's something for all of us in his music.
He grew up the son of ex-slaves sharecropping the land they had been slaves on. In the 1920s he got a deal to record some of his music, but it didn't sell very well and then the Great Depression hit. He went back to sharecropping. In the 1950s the folk music revival hit and musicologists discovered his recordings. Eventually, one of these musicologists found him on his farm and he started touring and recording again in the early 1960s. He's known for old-time, folk, blues, spirituals, and country, though it seems he most often gets labeled country blues.
Here's a good spiritual:
Here's some live blues:
Two Arthurian Recommendations
1. The King Arthur Trilogy by Rosemary Sutcliff
The King Arthur Trilogy is a worthy retelling of the Arthurian stories for a younger audience, Amazon listing it as for ages 9-12. At several multiples of that age, I thoroughly enjoyed reading it. She based her version on primary sources but, like any good storyteller, has added to and shaped the stories, weaving them into a coherent whole. In particular, she is skilled in her presentation of the characters in the story, while remaining firmly within the tradition. This is the best introduction to the whole of the Arthurian stories I've found. After reading this, someone new to the stories will have a good grasp of the essential elements and story lines and will be well-prepared to tackle more complex versions of the stories.
Sutcliff retold a number of other classical stories for this age group. I believe that her Black Ships before Troy has become the standard introduction to the Illiad for younger readers in much of the classical education and homeschooling community, which she follows with The Wanderings of Odysseus. She also has Beowulf, Dragon Slayer. I'll be adding these three books to my "read for fun" list.
2. The Pendragon Cycle: The Rise of the Merlin
The Daily Wire has made a 7-episode series from the first two of Stephen Lawhead's Pendragon Cycle series of novels. It focuses on the bard Taliesin and on Merlin's life up through being advisor to Uther and setting the stage for Arthur.
Overall, I thought it was very well done. The production was as high quality as I've seen in any TV series, the acting was good, the story is well-told, and I thoroughly enjoyed it. Two possibly unique aspects of the story is that it weaves in Plato's story of Atlantis as background and it presents Merlin as a Christian wizard, though still with one foot in the pagan world.
My only complaint is that near the very end Merlin experiences a severe internal conflict which is just difficult to show on screen and so comes across a little flat. A possible solution might have been to add a couple of imaginary scenes running through Merlin's mind to show that conflict. That said, overall, it was an excellent show and I'll watch it again.
Alas, it is currently only available by subscribing to the Daily Wire. I got a discounted one-year subscription and have been enjoying it. They have a number of conservative movies and a number of programs on history, mythology, and of course tons of political talk, their bread and butter. They also have a number of conservative-friendly children's shows. For me, it was worth a one-year subscription, but I doubt I'll re-up.
Here's the trailer:
Rainer Maria Rilke Poems
The late 19th & early 20th century Austrian poet Rilke was recommended to me by a literature professor, so I gave him a try. Here are a few I thought were worthwhile. In this collection, translated by Stephen Mitchell, Rilke mostly gives us snapshots or vignettes with a single focus. His work was influential on a number of 20th century poets you might have heard of, such as Robert Bly, M. S. Merwin, and W. H. Auden.
The Panther
His vision, from the constantly passing bars,
has grown so weary that it cannot hold
anything else. It seems to him there are
a thousand bars; and behind the bars, no world.
As he paces in cramped circles, over and over,
the movement of his powerful soft strides
is like a ritual dance around a center
in which a mighty will stands paralyzed.
Only at times, the curtain of the pupils
lifts, quietly--. An image enters in,
rushes down through the tensed, arrested muscles,
plunges into the heart and is gone.
Alas, Babylon
Eight airmen dead after a B-52 crash. We’ve been flying the same planes since before any of us were born, on the same mission. They are the wall that keeps the world.
Some Brief Remarks on "Peace"
As I said at AVI's place, I tend to think that this "peace deal" is just an attempt to push the matter off until after the midterms, and that it doesn't really matter what it says because neither side intends to keep the promises being made. It is probably to our national dishonor that we are led by a man whose word doesn't mean anything, but we all know that it doesn't, so why worry about it? The horse is out of the barn; it'll come back or not in God's good time. For now, it's out of our control -- it's not like the other side has honorable men or women to offer as an alternative.
The one thing that should die with this peace, however, is the idea that Israel in some way runs the USG. My Israeli contacts are livid. They feel completely betrayed which, in fairness, is what the United States generally does to its allies. That's how you know you're a US Ally in good standing: you get betrayed by this government or the next one, usually sequentially. That also is probably to our national dishonor, but it is at least a demonstration of some kind of self-governance: we can't have permanent promises because we actually do change at least the top dressing of the government once in a while. The unwashed underwear, by which I mean the bureaucracy, tends to go unchanged decade after decade; but some top-level policies get reversed as the pendulum swings.
White House Fight Night
I went to UFC headquarters last time I was out in Vegas. It's quite a thing, really.
I have heard that the President slept through part of it, but the man is 80. He should sleep.
There Is No Such Thing as Intelligence
So claim "other psychologists."
Not serious ones, I imagine, though serious psychology strikes me as a philosopher as a sort of joke. Psychology's history is mostly philosophy of mind without the possibility of falsification; I am told it's gotten better of late, but the replication crisis doesn't inspire a lot of faith in that assertion. All things equal, though, let's assume 'not the more serious psychologists.'
One of the very replicable findings about at least one measure of intelligence -- reading comprehension -- is that girls get it faster than boys. My elementary school broke the law (such differences already being forbidden) by sorting classes by reading comprehension level, so we had what the kids knew as and referred to as the 'high' 'middle,' and 'low' classes of intelligence. Since I learned to read well fairly early, my classmates were 26 girls and 3 boys, plus myself. The effects of that approximately 9-1 ratio, combined with alphabetical arrangement of students, were that I learned to talk to girls early. This has been an accidental but entirely beneficial outcome, as human beings sort by sex and by age cohort more than is rational. My friendships with women and with people much older than myself have been especially enlightening.
But it's not true, not remotely true, that anyone can learn anything. Try teaching anything. You'd think that one wouldn't get headway among educators, but somehow it has.
The Communist Supercar
No, it's ironic, but it's no joke.
BYD said the Denza Z featured “shattering high performance” with over 1,000 hp and the ability to sprint from 0 to 62 mph (0 to 100 km/h) in less than two seconds, it didn’t reveal specifics....[New details show] the four-seat EV roadster is slightly larger than the Porsche 911 and closer in size to the Mercedes-AMG GT Coupe. The Denza Z is more powerful than both, with the 911 Turbo S delivering up to 701 hp and the Mercedes-AMG GT Coupe offering up to 1,153 hp.BYD’s electric supercar can reach a top speed of 217 mph and weighs 5,842 lbs (2,650 kg) for the hardtop version.The Denza Z will be available with a soft top and a souped-up track package that gains a massive rear wing spoiler.
Nearly six thousand pounds moving at over two hundred miles an hour is a lot of F=ma. That Mercedes is closer to three and a half. Wonder how good the spoiler is? How about the brakes?
It's strange to see luxury goods coming out of a Communist country; being consumed there by connected elites, certainly, but actually produced there? It seems like that should hardly be a priority in the Five Year Plan.
Well, what do I know? I'm not a Communist.
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