There are two more chapters in Book V.
Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same.
Terence Irwin translates this "equitable" language as "decency." Decent, he says, "is cognate with eikos, 'likely,' and means 'plausible, reasonable, respectable,' (as we say 'a likely lad' or 'a reasonable candidate for the job'). Hence it is used more generally for a decent person, and hence interchangeably with 'GOOD' in the right contexts, as Aristotle remarks[.]" You may or may not find it helpful to substitute 'decent' for 'equitable' as you follow along in this section; equity has some connotations in modern English that may not be relevant. On the other hand, fairness is a core component of justice, and equity suggests treating people with fair consideration for their stake in the matter.
These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice.
It is more than the law requires, in other words; going beyond what is mandatory because you recognize that the other person deserves more than what is required. Thus, treating a person equitably may go beyond the 'lawfulness' requirement of justice in pursuit of the 'fairness' requirement. Yet not 'fairness' in the sense of 'treating relevantly similar cases similarly,' but in the sense of 'ensuring just deserts.' This may indeed be more than what is average, not only more than what is required; it might be the case that equity in this sense requires exceptional payments or rewards in exceptional cases.
The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.
There's an interesting bit of architectural history! The Lesbian rule has been used by several philosophers since Aristotle to capture the idea of a thing that is both a reliable standard, but one flexible enough to make appropriate adjustments for circumstances.
It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.
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