But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each other; for it is not the same that exists between parents and children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for which they love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also.
It's commonplace today to hear feminist objections to this passage as demonstrating the inequality of men and women in Ancient Greece, which was never in doubt; what is rarely noticed is the demonstration that Aristotle expected a husband and wife to be friends.
The society of even the Greek city-states had some noteworthy inequalities, some of which we have come to consider manifestly unjust. Chief among these is slavery. It's noteworthy that there's nothing here suggesting that a slave and his master should be friends; there's nothing to suggest that a wife should be friends with the female slaves who kept her house. All the relations that are designated here are ones that Aristotle would have considered not to be shameful relationships to be in: everyone is a child first and a parent, if at all, only later; most citizens of this era are never rulers, only subjects. The inclusion of husband and wife in these honorable relationships, relationships in which friendship is to be expected as the normal and just condition, ought to be important.
The point Aristotle is making about inequality here is the inverse of the one he was making about the equality of unequals in VIII.6. There the uenqual friends were equals 'in a way' because they were getting the same things from each other. Here, the unequals are not getting the same things from each other: a father's friendship to his son gives the son different things entirely than the father receives in return. Presumably something analogous is true of rulers and citizens, wives and husbands: the relationship is a sort of friendship, but it is not a friendship based on equality, neither of condition nor of things received. (It is also not 'proportionate equality' of the sort we considered in Book V).
Each party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek it; but when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent.
Since Aristotle intends this remark to apply of all of these analogous cases, I have bolded the universal language. He expects that, when these kinds of people do right by each other, these friendships will be "abiding and excellent." Indeed, those who have successfully had good friendships with their parents or with their spouses might consider those relationships as some of the very best friendships of their lives.
In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship.
Here "in a sense arises equality" merely means that each is giving the other their due, and so both are treating each other 'in the same way' by each doing so for the other.
Equality talk can be confusing under the best of circumstances; even in our era, as it almost never actually means "equality" in a strict mathematical sense. From Aristotle's perspective, 'equality' in ethics or politics only ever means mathematical equality when dealing with restitution for crimes or harms. Yet we have inherited from the Greeks a notion that we should seek some sort of 'equality' even when the people involved are manifestly, even rightly, unequals (as for example when a citizen who became an astronaut is compared with another citizen who is a drug addict).
This is not an inheritance shared by civilizations not influenced by Ancient Athens to the same degree; there is no 'equality' expected in Confucian civilization, for example, especially not between parents and children (that is indeed their model for why inequality is right and proper in society). There is no equality between Muslim and non-Muslim in Islamic civilization: non-Muslims may be allowed to pay a tax in order to become protectorates of the Muslims, but the non-Muslims may never be armed nor capable of self-defense against the Islamic society, and as such they are not considered dignified human beings. The Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd, better known in the West as Averroes, did inherit Plato's ideas about equality between men and women: but even he had to interpret those within the context of Islamic law, so that he could suggest that women deserved to have an 'equivalent' to a right to divorce such as their husbands have, or a equal right to participate in jihad (if they were able) in order to obtain non-Muslim slaves and to please God. For similar scholars who didn't read Plato's Republic, or weren't as convinced by it, even those 'sort-of equalities' aren't important or extant.
Aristotle is going to reinforce the point, now, that this expectation of friendship implies a closeness in condition. He uses 'equality' language again, which confuses the point he is trying to make.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship; for in acts of justice what is equal in the primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while quantitative equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.
For the purpose of the question of the relations between husband and wife, then, this shows that Aristotle conceives them as being sufficiently close in virtue, vice, wealth, "or anything else" as to be fit for friendships; so too parents and children, and ordinary rulers and citizens. Kings and princes may be too far removed, as we have already discussed. They may have to seek their friendship from the gods, who are too far for us ordinary mortals.
This is a remarkable point of dissonance with Christianity, which expects to receive and pursues friendship with God, and especially with Jesus; but I think this was also true of northern European pagan faiths, which invited the gods into their homes and sought to have an older-relation-to-younger-relation relationship of friendship; Odin is frequently claimed as an ancestor, and the Rígsþula claims that all men are descended from Heimdall.
This is in fact the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good.
Ancient Greek religion did posit that men could become gods in a process called the apotheosis. This is another point of dissonance. Aristotle intends that discussion seriously and unironically.
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