Nicomachean Ethics IV.2: Magnificence

The following is probably the least interesting of Aristotle's virtues to most of us, simply because it is out of our range to do either well or badly. Magnificence is the greater of the 'spending virtues,' one that pertains to heavy expenses of the sort that only the truly rich can entertain. It is possible to do these well or badly, as with anything else. We can at least admire from afar the actions of a wealthy man who strives to use his wealth in ways that better everyone, as when Carnegie paid for public libraries to help everyone attain better access to learning and the classics. We can despise the misuses of great wealth. However, we can't do much to practice or habituate ourselves to this virtue one way or the other. 

As such, I will mostly put this past a jump break. If you're wanting to skip something, this is a good section to leave for later. The next virtue, magnanimity, is of the very first importance and demands attention. Magnificence is a spectator sport for the vast majority.

It would seem proper to discuss magnificence next. For this also seems to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality extend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to those that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in scale. For, as the name itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure involving largeness of scale. But the scale is relative; for the expense of equipping a trireme is not the same as that of heading a sacred embassy. It is what is fitting, then, in relation to the agent, and to the circumstances and the object. The man who in small or middling things spends according to the merits of the case is not called magnificent (e.g. the man who can say 'many a gift I gave the wanderer'), but only the man who does so in great things. For the magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. The deficiency of this state of character is called niggardliness, the excess vulgarity, lack of taste, and the like, which do not go to excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by showy expenditure in the wrong circumstances and the wrong manner; we shall speak of these vices later.

The magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting and spend large sums tastefully.

This is the first important point: magnificence is a sort-of art project, in which one is using wealth to create something grand. As such it is a matter of taste. We typically say that there is no accounting for taste, which would seem to place this outside of the proper work of philosophy. However, Kant's Third Critique was largely concerned with trying to find rational bases for taste and the sense of the sublime; and Aristotle's ad populum approach also gives us at least a basis to work with in considering the question. 

It is dangerous to use contemporary examples in philosophy because it is hard to discuss them rationally and in a detached manner. I have mostly attempted to avoid them in this discussion, but I will dare one here. We can see a sketch of the virtue and one of the vices by contrasting Elon Musk's magnificence with Donald Trump's. Musk uses his wealth to pursue grand ventures like helping humanity become multiplanetary; he fronted satellites to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's war of conquest; he spent billions on Twitter chiefly to defend the principle of free speech. Whether you agree with or disagree with his approaches, he is guided by a clear vision of what the good is for humanity and he is using his wealth to pursue it. This strikes me as at least potentially satisfying Aristotle's terms, insofar as Musk did it well. People have strong opinions about that, but I think Musk is at least a plausible candidate for Aristotelian magnificence.

Trump, on the other hand, buys gilded skyscrapers and casinos. These strike me as failed attempts at magnificence; we can discuss how when we get to the opposing vices. 

For, as we said at the begining, a state of character is determined by its activities and by its objects. Now the expenses of the magnificent man are large and fitting. Such, therefore, are also his results; for thus there will be a great expenditure and one that is fitting to its result. Therefore the result should be worthy of the expense, and the expense should be worthy of the result, or should even exceed it. And the magnificent man will spend such sums for honour's sake; for this is common to the virtues. And further he will do so gladly and lavishly; for nice calculation is a niggardly thing. And he will consider how the result can be made most beautiful and most becoming rather than for how much it can be produced and how it can be produced most cheaply.

Emphasis added. We often have debates about whether government buildings should be beautiful and symbolic, or whether they should be considerate of the taxpayer and thus modestly constructed. Those considerations do not apply here, because the magnificent person is funding the creation out of private wealth. Thus, building something that is artistically beautiful is part of the overall consideration. Acts of magnificence are art projects in a way; they are attempts to realize a vision of the good, which subdivides into the true and the beautiful. Both truth and beauty are important considerations. 

For Aristotle, there is the additional consideration of greatness or magnitude.

It is necessary, then, that the magnificent man be also liberal. For the liberal man also will spend what he ought and as he ought; and it is in these matters that the greatness implied in the name of the magnificent man-his bigness, as it were-is manifested, since liberality is concerned with these matters; and at an equal expense he will produce a more magnificent work of art. For a possession and a work of art have not the same excellence. The most valuable possession is that which is worth most, e.g. gold, but the most valuable work of art is that which is great and beautiful (for the contemplation of such a work inspires admiration, and so does magnificence); and a work has an excellence-viz. magnificence-which involves magnitude. 

Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures of the kind which we call honourable, e.g. those connected with the gods-votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices-and similarly with any form of religious worship, and all those that are proper objects of public-spirited ambition, as when people think they ought to equip a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant way.

Emphasis added. Aristotle occasionally makes the point that honor must be valuable because it is what we give the gods, the great dead, and desire for ourselves as well. Here we might consider a kind of magnificence that is communal in character rather than individual: I am thinking especially of the building of cathedrals in the Middle Ages, when the community might come together for two or three generations to put up a building that aimed to honor God. The expense was divided across many individual donations as well as the Church itself, so it doesn't quite qualify as true magnificence on Aristotle's terms. However, there is no doubt that the medieval cathedrals include some of the greatest artworks humanity has ever produced: they are both great and beautiful, and an expenditure devote to honoring that which is most worthy of honor. 

But in all cases, as has been said, we have regard to the agent as well and ask who he is and what means he has; for the expenditure should be worthy of his means, and suit not only the result but also the producer. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means with which to spend large sums fittingly; and he who tries is a fool, since he spends beyond what can be expected of him and what is proper, but it is right expenditure that is virtuous. But great expenditure is becoming to those who have suitable means to start with, acquired by their own efforts or from ancestors or connexions [sic], and to people of high birth or reputation, and so on; for all these things bring with them greatness and prestige. Primarily, then, the magnificent man is of this sort, and magnificence is shown in expenditures of this sort, as has been said; for these are the greatest and most honourable.

To reiterate, then, magnificence is a spectator sport for most of humanity. We have opinions about it; and given Aristotle's frequent reference to public opinions, at least of the Wise, those opinions aren't without merit. However, we can't practice it. 

Of private occasions of expenditure the most suitable are those that take place once for all, e.g. a wedding or anything of the kind, or anything that interests the whole city or the people of position in it, and also the receiving of foreign guests and the sending of them on their way, and gifts and counter-gifts; for the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects, and gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings. A magnificent man will also furnish his house suitably to his wealth (for even a house is a sort of public ornament), and will spend by preference on those works that are lasting (for these are the most beautiful), and on every class of things he will spend what is becoming; for the same things are not suitable for gods and for men, nor in a temple and in a tomb. And since each expenditure may be great of its kind, and what is most magnificent absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, but what is magnificent here is what is great in these circumstances, and greatness in the work differs from greatness in the expense (for the most beautiful ball or bottle is magnificent as a gift to a child, but the price of it is small and mean),-therefore it is characteristic of the magnificent man, whatever kind of result he is producing, to produce it magnificently (for such a result is not easily surpassed) and to make it worthy of the expenditure.

Now we can discuss the vices.

Such, then, is the magnificent man; the man who goes to excess and is vulgar exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. For on small objects of expenditure he spends much and displays a tasteless showiness; e.g. he gives a club dinner on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when he provides the chorus for a comedy he brings them on to the stage in purple, as they do at Megara. And all such things he will do not for honour's sake but to show off his wealth, and because he thinks he is admired for these things, and where he ought to spend much he spends little and where little, much. The niggardly man on the other hand will fall short in everything, and after spending the greatest sums will spoil the beauty of the result for a trifle, and whatever he is doing he will hesitate and consider how he may spend least, and lament even that, and think he is doing everything on a bigger scale than he ought.

These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not bring disgrace because they are neither harmful to one's neighbour nor very unseemly.

So how are gilded skyscraper-casinos failures? They are surely vulgar rather than niggardly, which is a demonstration of tastelessness. They are close to Aristotle's example of having the chorus dressed in purple clothing, purple dye having been in the ancient world a tremendous expense to produce.  

Notably this is a vice that does not bring disgrace, which is unusual for vices. There's an almost-libertarian principle there: the vice doesn't have a victim, so it's not really harmful, and therefore no disgrace to practice.