Mountain Heritage
The Cherokee Stickball exhibition was at this year's Mountain Heritage Day. This blog has been in existence for more than two decades, so I have probably told all of my family stories before. Our part of the mountain heritage on display was this part.
Cherokee Stickball
One Year On
A year ago this morning I started five hours of chainsawing my way out to the highway and two weeks without power. Even a year on the worst effects of the hurricane are still visible. Parts of the Blue Ridge Parkway will need another year of repairs; I-40 is kind of open for limited traffic with major delays.
It was quite an experience. The main thing I learned was to look to your community and not to the Feds for help in such times. Help each other and stick together, and have faith in the people but not the government. An amazing amount of charity effort came flowing in through roads that were barely open, or flown into tiny airfields some of which didn’t formally exist.
Hopefully the two storms forming off the coast blow back to sea. We don’t need them.
A Little Truth Finally Outs
I suppose we knew this all along, but it's nice to see it finally come out.
The FBI finally acknowledged to Congress that 274 plainclothes agents were embedded in the January 6 crowds in Washington.
As the years have scrolled by since that momentous day, we've learned that Buffalo Shaman here was actually allowed in by the police, with whom he spoke on several occasions during the adventure; he was nonviolent and allowed to enter without force. I learned from a friend on hand that day that the Park Police were understaffed if anything; we've learned that the National Guard was requested but denied by Congress; we've learned a great many similar things. There was some rioting on the one side of the building, but a lot of the people were let in: there is video of police opening the barricades and the doors.
We had already received an admission from the FBI that dozens or hundreds of their informants were present in the crowd. Now we know it actually had agents* in plainclothes in large numbers in the crowd. "The news comes in the wake of claims by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General that the FBI had no undercover personnel in the Jan. 6 crowds."
That changes the flavor of the whole thing, doesn't it? Not an insurrection any more: an information operation designed to leverage popular anger and protest at legitimate election tomfoolery in several states, and turn it into a cause for the Federales to consolidate power. As late as the 2024 election season the DOJ was still lying to us all about this in official reports. I recall that they walled off the Congress and deployed the National Guard afterwards for months.
* The FBI and the CIA use the term "agent" very differently. An "agent" for the CIA is not a CIA officer, but a foreign national they've recruited to execute their plans within the host country. This term is almost wholly misused by Hollywood accounts of what the Agency does, where a 'secret agent' is supposed to be the James Bond type of CIA officer: these are in fact called "operations officers." An "agent" for the FBI is an officer and employee; an 'agent' in the CIA's sense is called a "confidential informant" by the FBI. Thus, the admission here is that the FBI had actual secret police agents throughout the crowd on 6 January 2001.
The Age of Arthur
Anti-Revolutionaries
“[T]he Beatles were hard men,” he wrote in his 2004 memoir White Line Fever. “[Manager] Brian Epstein cleaned them up for mass consumption, but they were anything but sissies. They were from Liverpool, which is like Hamburg or Norfolk, Virginia – a hard, sea-farin' town, all these dockers and sailors around all the time who would beat the piss out of you if you so much as winked at them. Ringo's from the Dingle, which is like the fucking Bronx.”He continued: “The Rolling Stones were the mummy's boys – they were all college students from the outskirts of London. They went to starve in London, but it was by choice, to give themselves some sort of aura of disrespectability."
Hard men they may have once been, for all of the fact that they came to be emblems of the Flower Children thanks to Lennon. I'm prepared to take Lemmy's word on that. It's interest, though, that the song that Vodkapundit is riffing off of contains a cautionary note very appropriate to our own moment. In fact it's repeated three times as variants:
But when you talk about destruction
Don't you know that you can count me out?...But if you want money for people with minds that hate
All I can tell you is brother you have to wait...But if you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao
You ain't gonna make it with anyone anyhow...
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.
Incontinence and Alcohol
Nicomachean Ethics VII.10
Nor can the same man have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for it has been shown that a man is at the same time practically wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the incontinent man is unable to act-there is, however, nothing to prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our first discussions, and are near together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in respect of their purpose-nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or drunk.
Indeed, the incontinent man is likely to be drunk; excessive drinking is the clearest case of incontinence, though not the only one.
There's a slight ambiguity there that I think is helpfully cleaned up: the incontinent man isn't unable to act per se, but unable to act in accord with what he knows is the right rule. He does act, just not well.
And [the incontinent man] acts willingly (for he acts in a sense with knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it), but is not wicked, since his purpose is good; so that he is half-wicked. And he is not a criminal; for he does not act of malice aforethought; of the two types of incontinent man the one does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberation, while the excitable man does not deliberate at all. And thus the incontinent man like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them, as in Anaxandrides' jesting remark,The city willed it, that cares nought for laws; but the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked laws to use.Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the continent man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than most men can.
Strictly applied, that makes "most men" neither continent nor incontinent in what Aristotle likes to call 'the unrestricted sense' of the terms; most men therefore vary between the states, rather than being defined by either state.
Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is easier to change a habit than to change one's nature; even habit is hard to change just because it is like nature, as Evenus* says:I say that habit's but a long practice, friend,And this becomes men's nature in the end.
So this is a version of what will end up being a core doctrine for Aristotle, the idea of 'second nature.' I have spoken of this already, in the commentary on VI.13; the idea is going to be that you have a 'first nature,' i.e. the nature you are born with, and also a 'second nature,' that which your habituation builds into a permanent character. The second nature will end up being dominant over the first nature, training and guiding it, yet will be as difficult to defy as your first nature can be.
We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and softness are, and how these states are related to each other.
This is one of the longer inquiries in the EN, and not the most pleasant. The inquiry into friendship will be of more interest to most of you, I think.
* I'm not sure which Evenus is intended by Aristotle here; probably not the river god, but perhaps one of the other two associated with the Iliad. However, my guess is it really might be Evenus the poet, whom Socrates mentions in the Phaedo and to whom Socrates ascribes the character of a philosopher.
Nicomachean Ethics VII.9
Bull-headed readers, should any be found in the Hall, will find themselves discussed in this section.
Is the man continent who abides by any and every rule and any and every choice, or the man who abides by the right choice, and is he incontinent who abandons any and every choice and any and every rule, or he who abandons the rule that is not false and the choice that is right; this is how we put it before in our statement of the problem. Or is it incidentally any and every choice but per se the true rule and the right choice by which the one abides and the other does not? If any one chooses or pursues this for the sake of that, per se he pursues and chooses the latter, but incidentally the former. But when we speak without qualification we mean what is per se. Therefore in a sense the one abides by, and the other abandons, any and every opinion; but without qualification, the true opinion.
So, properly speaking, it is not incontinent to abandon a bad decision or a stupid rule. You could say so in a way, since it's similar to the most proper ('without qualification') use of the term in that it means not living up to your rule. But if it was not a good rule, probably because your upbringing misled you as to what the most worthy thing to do was (as sometimes it does, as for example when the young are taught to admire antiheroes instead of heroes), the wise man will reform the rule and adjust his behavior accordingly.
There are some who are apt to abide by their opinion, who are called strong-headed [or bull-headed --Grim], viz. those who are hard to persuade in the first instance and are not easily persuaded to change; these have in them something like the continent man, as the prodigal is in a way like the liberal man and the rash man like the confident man; but they are different in many respects.
Yes, for example, the rash man has a vice rather than a virtue; the prodigal likewise. Thus, bull-headed stubbornness is a vice, whereas tenacious continence is a virtue. But not, we shall see at the end of this chapter, as good a virtue as actual temperance, as liberality is not of the scale of magnificence and the love-of-lesser-but-proper-honor is less than true magnanimity.
For it is to passion and appetite that the one will not yield, since on occasion the continent man will be easy to persuade; but it is to argument that the others refuse to yield, for they do form appetites and many of them are led by their pleasures. Now the people who are strong-headed are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish-the opinionated being influenced by pleasure and pain; for they delight in the victory they gain if they are not persuaded to change, and are pained if their decisions become null and void as decrees sometimes do; so that they are liker the incontinent than the continent man.
But there are some who fail to abide by their resolutions, not as a result of incontinence, e.g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes; yet it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not stand fast-but a noble pleasure; for telling the truth was noble to him, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not every one who does anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent, but he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure.
In the story Neoptolemus is a boy, and Odysseus persuades him to lie to Philoctetes, who was given the bow of Heracles, in order to obtain access to that bow. Neoptolemus does so under the persuasion of his famous elder, but eventually is overcome by guilt and admits the truth. Thus, here he did not obey his 'rule,' or choice; but it was a bad rule. Aristotle cashes this out as a sort-of persuasion by pleasure, since the boy hasn't achieved the right age to have fully-formed first principles from which to reason (i.e., his noble upbringing is not complete and, indeed, it is being deformed a bit by Odysseus here).
Nicomachean Ethics VII.8
More on incontinence and repentance.
The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he stands by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation of the problem, but the self-indulgent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent, the latter an intermittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence is not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily beside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others); for the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e. on less than most people.
This last analogy is a little ironic, because the kind of person who gets drunk quickly and on little wine is most likely to be the one who usually abstains completely. A tolerance is generally the product of practice, and the heavier the practice the greater the tolerance is likely to become.
Fat Bear Week
Nicomachean Ethics VII.7
Still more examination of incontinence and softness. We are about halfway through this book after today.
With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and temperance were formerly narrowed down, it is possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated; among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence and continence, those relating to pains softness and endurance. The state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more towards the worse states.
Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains, the man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-indulgent; for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore incurable, since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured.
Necessary pleasures include sex for the purpose of procreating children, without which society and civilization would cease to exist; eating and drinking; and certain other necessary bodily functions. The unnecessary pleasures include fine wines and silken sheets and so forth. So you can go wrong by pursuing an excess of unnecessary pleasures, but also by pursing to an excess the necessary things.
This is the first mention of repentance as a concept, and a core concept: those who cannot repent cannot be cured. The object here is not to save them, as in their souls; it is to fix them in the present life, so they become virtuous rather than vice-ridden people.
The Natural Law and the EN
Well, for those of you who are Catholics, Aristotle's ethics were adopted into Catholic ethics as the Natural Law as it applies to human beings. Because Aristotle derived the virtues and vices without benefit of scripture or Judeo-Christian tradition, but from reason applied to nature, Aquinas adopts them and the later traditions about them into the model on the terms of natural theology: things we can know about God's intent by knowing about God's works.
Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."I answer that, As stated above (Article 2,Article 3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Later Protestant traditions walk away from this ancient but pagan heritage to some degree, preferring to return to Scripture alone. And indeed, Aristotle's ethics and the classical ethics that follow from it differ substantially from, say, the Ten Commandments. There is no prohibition against murder, though there is a virtue of justice and a vice of lawlessness. There is no prohibition against having other gods, but there is a virtue of piety and a vice of blasphemy.
The two come down very similarly on the duty to respect one's father and mother, and not to bear false witness against one's neighbors, however, as well as on many other points.
Nicomachean Ethics VII.6
Incontinence and anger,* today. Who among us hasn't lost their temper and said or done some things they knew they shouldn't? Perhaps some of you; I have definitely given way to temptation on this one. Fortunately:
That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to see. (1) Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge.
A Scene from Lonesome Dove
Equinox
Free Speech: An Opportunistic Defense
Of the countless words expressed by friends and foes since the shocking killing of conservative provocateur Charlie Kirk, the young husband and father who dared express opinions in the crowded public square, only two matter: free speech.
Hopefully some of it is sincere, and not just occasioned by the moment. Arguments against interest are usually assumed to be sincere, so people challenging Trump and Bondi from the right probably are:
Both [FCC Carr's and AG Bondi's] statements were badly out of line as a matter of law and policy. But they were also politically damaging. Republicans in general, and Trump in particular, have fought an endless battle to preserve freedom of speech and to claim the high ground of being the protectors of free speech. They need to keep this high ground.
It's better than the usual mode in which people are trying to compete to see how much speech they can rule out of bounds, I guess. At least it's a short break.
Apparently I Missed Quite a Service
Words hitting my gut
Nicomachean Ethics VII.5
(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are so without qualification...
Existence itself, for example; almost without qualification beings of all sorts will try to continue to exist, either through themselves or through having children or creating great and memorable works that will survive them.
...and (b) others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of originally bad natures.
If you've ever tried Jagermeister, "a drink that was once used as a field anesthetic by doctors in World War II," you probably didn't like it the first time.
This being so, it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those recognized with regard to the former; I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight-in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon-or of the story told of Phalaris.
The reference is to his cannibalism, not to his innovative torture and execution device, the brazen bull.
These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit.
Yes, it's that kind of a day in the study of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Note that this provides Aristotle's assessment of our contemporary 'born this way' controversy, in which he takes both horns of the dilemma: in his opinion, some people are born inclined to pederasty ("by nature") but others because they were victimized from youth and became accustomed to it ("from habit").
Here be Sea-Dragons
Nicomachean Ethics VII.4
(2) We must next discuss whether there is any one who is incontinent without qualification, or all men who are incontinent are so in a particular sense, and if there is, with what sort of objects he is concerned. That both continent persons and persons of endurance, and incontinent and soft persons, are concerned with pleasures and pains, is evident.Now of the things that produce pleasure some are necessary, while others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess, the bodily causes of pleasure being necessary (by such I mean both those concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse, i.e. the bodily matters with which we defined self-indulgence and temperance as being concerned), while the others are not necessary but worthy of choice in themselves (e.g. victory, honour, wealth, and good and pleasant things of this sort).
We often say that wealth can be pursued excessively. This is usually put in a Christian context, but the pagan Greeks understood the idea as well. The character of a man for whom wealth is unreasonably important admits of many bad things, even though there's nothing per se wrong with wealth. Simply not valuing the several goods of life in the right order is damaging to one's character.
Yet it is much harder to see how one can go to excess in pursuing victory. Perhaps in unimportant matters, as when it might be praiseworthy to let someone else have a turn rather than having to win all the time; but in the ancient world especially, a great deal hung on victory. Even today it can. Remembering the Charmides' introduction, the failures of Athenian virtues that led to their defeat in the Peloponnesian War led to their loss of power, their subjugation by Sparta, and a period of rule by the Thirty Tyrants over them. For Troy it led to the destruction of their city, the death of almost all of their men and boys, and the enslavement of their women. Victory in that sense surely has to be pursued with a whole heart.
And honor, we have said repeatedly in this commentary, defines how one identifies the best and most worthy of actions and lives. How can one go wrong with that?














