Fine distinctions continue.
Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of understanding)...
Because all men have opinions, but also because scientific knowledge as Aristotle understands it is about unchangeable things like the truths of mathematics.
...nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good understanding.)
So the word here given as 'understanding' is sungnome, which Irwin helpfully points out is derived from gnome, 'mind' or 'judgment.' That word is also the root of gnosis, which those of you who are given to Bible Study or the history of thought in the Church will know well enough.
Irwin translates this as "consideration" or sometimes "pardon," as the best sort of person will often on consideration choose to set aside an inflexible rule. We learned in Book I that the virtuous man is the best judge of virtue and of the virtuous things to do; sometimes you keep the rule, and in some cases you set it aside. (These are, as Aristotle just said, the sort of decisions that require questioning and deliberation.)
Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned-and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.
Thus, the virtuous man is a man of good judgment; he can be trusted to resolve the hard questions that come up in life.
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