Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief, an adulterer, or a brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly in all other cases.
This is a place where Christianity offered a real shift, I think. If a man steals he is a thief, but only among all the other things he is, including beloved by God. In any case Jesus was hung between two thieves, one of whom he invited to accompany him to heaven.
Even in that story, you can see the effect of the ancient world's moral code. The thieves were condemned to death, and condemned precisely for 'being thieves'; and the penitent thief admits the justice of that condemnation, for they had committed the crimes for which they were being punished. There is thus a serious question involved in whether 'a man is not a thief, though he stole,' or whether in fact his character is thus defined.
Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just without qualification but also political justice.
We normally speak of justice in terms of political justice, so it's nice to see this distinction drawn out. Aristotle now gives an account of political justice that happens, by the way, to spell out the difference between just states and unjust tyrannies.
This [i.e. political justice] is found among men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy.
We've already seen that 'equality' means 'proportional equality' in most senses, but can mean 'arithmetical equality' when we are trying to balance the effects of crimes and other injustices. Aristotle points out that the reason we need such laws is that, in fact, these free and equal men treat each other badly:
For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though there is not injustice between all between whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.
There is then a warning against letting any man have too much power, and instead trusting to the laws and the courts to find what is really just. (An interesting reflection for the present moment.)
This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he* is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that he labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege; but those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.
The "he*" there is ambiguous. Structurally it looks like it should point to the magistrate as its antecedent, but the sentence doesn't make as much sense as if "he" is the ruler. Irwin goes ahead and translates this line as, "If a ruler is just, he seems to profit nothing by it." If he does not profit by his rule, he is just and deserves honor and privilege; but if he does profit from ruling, he is a likely to become a tyrant.
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself).
There are many highly debatable assertions in that sentence. They are obvious enough that I will leave them as an exercise for the interested reader.
Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this is different from political justice.
The idea that family business is not resolvable in the public political courts is Aristotle's more than it is ancient Greece's. A wife could initiate a divorce if she wished, apparently without the state having the power to contest her decision; but the state would be involved to ensure the proper return of her dowry and other matters. Thus, the Greeks had clear ideas about political justice as it applied to the dissolution, at least, of marriages; and a notion of what it would mean for her to receive (proportionately) equal and fair treatment.
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