As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of character, others in respect of an activity...
That is to say that some people "are" good, and others sometimes "do" good. Of course the virtues are habits that become one's habitual character; but you don't develop a habit the first time out.
...so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'.
I have occasionally noted the similarities between these Ancient Greek notions and the Havamal, which provides us with advice that informs the Germanic/Norse tradition. Here the reference is verse 44: "If you find a friend you fully trust and wish for his good-will, exchange thoughts, exchange gifts, go often to his house." The frequent points of similarity shows how much of this is pragmatic, human ethics proven solid in many times and places.
Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together (since while it people who are in need that desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together; for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do.
As mentioned in the commentary on VIII.1, what Aristotle means by "living together" is quite broad; he considers politics a sort of friendship, as the will to live together in the same city or community is for him a species of friendship. Then we share not the same roof, but common festivals and feasts, civic organizations to which we may both belong, rules and laws and customs.
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for both these reasons.
It might be interesting to try to think of a counterexample. Can you think of two genuinely good men who knew but hated one another? We can think of examples of such men who were not in perfect agreement, as Tolkien and Lewis were at odds about Catholicism for example. We can think of men who are greatly praised but not yet fully good: Churchill had some infamous barbs for those in his social circle, but he also some real vices.
Well, as Aristotle himself said, "such men are rare." Still, feel free to comment with any counterexample that you happen to think of as you reflect on it.
Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of character. And in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the friendship of the good.
That's going to become important later when Aristotle talks about the friendship of social unequals, especially the case of the friendship of princes. Princes need friends too! But they have no equals, not among the people with whom they share a state or a polity; nor can they treat their unequals as equals without creating political tension due to the favoritism.
It is a problem for the rest of us, too. Perhaps you've had a friend who was much richer than yourself, or much poorer. This requires care, to minimize the appearance of inequalities and to address them practically as much as one can without drawing attention to them. We have friends who are older or more established, or younger and less experienced. Friendship does imply a sort-of equality, but not the same kind of equalities we talked about in Book V when the issue was justice. It's going to be yet another human equality, and one of a very different sort than the others.
Yet when we speak of politics as a sort-of friendship, the proportionate equalities from Book V will become obviously relevant anew.
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