Of some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth. (1) We must consider first, then, whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then (2) with what sorts of object the incontinent and the continent man may be said to be concerned (i.e. whether with any and every pleasure and pain or with certain determinate kinds), and whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly with regard to the other matters germane to this inquiry. The starting-point of our investigation is (a) the question whether the continent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their objects or by their attitude, i.e. whether the incontinent man is incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects, or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead of that, by both these things; (b) the second question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not. The man who is incontinent in the unqualified sense is neither concerned with any and every object, but with precisely those with which the self-indulgent man is concerned, nor is he characterized by being simply related to these (for then his state would be the same as self-indulgence), but by being related to them in a certain way. For the one is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure; while the other does not think so, but yet pursues it.
The objects with which the self-indulgent were concerned were food, drink, and sex (III.10). The self-indulgent differs from the incontinent in that the former chooses excesses of these because he takes them for the good (usually, for though as Aristotle points out you can go wrong by choosing deficient amounts as well normally people go the other way). The incontinent, by contrast, knows he shouldn't but does anyway. Thus, the incontinent man is in one way better (because his knowledge of the good is superior) but somehow also worse (because he knowingly pursues what is wrong).
(1) As for the suggestion that it is true opinion and not knowledge against which we act incontinently, that makes no difference to the argument; for some people when in a state of opinion do not hesitate, but think they know exactly. If, then, the notion is that owing to their weak conviction those who have opinion are more likely to act against their judgement than those who know, we answer that there need be no difference between knowledge and opinion in this respect; for some men are no less convinced of what they think than others of what they know; as is shown by the of Heraclitus. But (a), since we use the word 'know' in two senses (for both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and he who is using it are said to know), it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge but is not exercising it, or is exercising it; for the latter seems strange, but not the former.
The difference between opinion and knowledge is justification and truth (because one does believe one's opinions by definition, so justified-true-belief (JTB) is then satisfied). Aristotle here specifies "true opinion," which means that the justification criterion is all that remains. If that were the case, then the problem of incontinence ends up being a knowledge problem after all: if you really knew X, you would not do the bad thing, but you don't really know X because you don't know (second-order knowledge, there) the right justification of X.
The example of Charmides shows why this is unlikely: in his clear-cut case of incontinence, he did know that drinking was his problem, and he had the best sort of justification: direct, repeated and replicable empirical evidence. It doesn't seem likely that this is going to account for many cases, but perhaps we can imagine a case in which you have the true opinion that X, but not the knowledge that X, because you don't also know (JTB) the right justification for X.
Aristotle points out two two things along the way: that some men are more convinced by their opinions than others are by their knowledge; and that having and using knowledge are not quite the same thing.
(b) Further, since there are two kinds of premisses, there is nothing to prevent a man's having both premisses and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premiss and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done.
To clarify: remember that on Aristotle's model we have philosophical reason, which infers first principles from examples; and then practical reason, which deduces correct actions from these first principles. If your inductive philosophical reason/wisdom works well, you could have the right first principle, and thus know that premise correctly. You might still go wrong practically by not getting to the correct particular action because your deductive practical reason is faulty.
If that is true, it is a reason for supporting Aristotle's notion that these are separate faculties of the soul rather than the alternative, i.e., that they might be a single faculty working on different problems. If one part is healthy and the other part defective, that implies a difference of kind. However, it is a different kind of reasoning being done, inductive versus deductive; you could still have one faculty of reason that happens to be well-trained or intuitively good at induction, but poor at deduction (which would be odd, since deduction is both easier and more certain).
And there are also two kinds of universal term; one is predicable of the agent, the other of the object; e.g. 'dry food is good for every man', and 'I am a man', or 'such and such food is dry'; but whether 'this food is such and such', of this the incontinent man either has not or is not exercising the knowledge. There will, then, be, firstly, an enormous difference between these manners of knowing, so that to know in one way when we act incontinently would not seem anything strange, while to know in the other way would be extraordinary.
Aristotle is using 'such and such' exactly as I was using 'X' above.
And further (c) the possession of knowledge in another sense than those just named is something that happens to men; for within the case of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk. The fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing; for even men under the influence of these passions utter scientific proofs and verses of Empedocles, and those who have just begun to learn a science can string together its phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to become part of themselves, and that takes time; so that we must suppose that the use of language by men in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage.
"A similar condition," not obviously the same condition but an analogous one. They aren't quite in the right state of mind, we might say. One reason for this can be that they are still in the process of learning, so that they 'can string together the phrases of the science' but do not really understand yet. They are play-actors at knowledge and science, we might say -- and well we might say that, especially today of undergraduates in what we are pleased to call 'the social sciences.'
(d) Again, we may also view the cause as follows with reference to the facts of human nature. The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (e.g. if 'everything sweet ought to be tasted', and 'this is sweet', in the sense of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that 'everything sweet is pleasant', and that 'this is sweet' (now this is the opinion that is active), and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally-for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion-to the right rule. It also follows that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, viz. because they have no universal judgement but only imagination and memory of particulars.
The use of the imperative there, combined with the claim that appetite can move each of our body parts, shows the distinction between Aristotelian choice/decision and later Western philosophy's idea of 'the Will.' Desire is a source of motion in Aristotle, indeed it literally makes the world go 'round: it is the desire of the spirits of the crystal spheres on which the stars rest for the beauty they perceive in the Unmoved Mover that causes the universe to have its circular motion. What choice/decision can do is interrupt such a motion; it isn't necessary to begin one.
Thus, you can see how the incontinent might get started towards a forbidden fruit just because it was fruit. Practical reason has to reach back to the first principles that philosophical reason/wisdom has attained, apply itself to the appetitive motion already underway, and decide to put a stop to it if appropriate.
Practical reason can also begin motions based on decisions, as well. Yet we aren't quite in the world in which the Will decides everything and moves us, whatever its reasons are. Our animal nature can do it too, and it is up to our human nature to seize control of it if it does so inappropriately. Yet nature often guides rightly: usually appetites exist because the body really does need nutrition, and satisfying them is not wrong.
The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must go to the students of natural science for it. Now, the last premiss both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what determines our actions this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or has it in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking, as a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles. And because the last term is not universal nor equally an object of scientific knowledge with the universal term, the position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this that is 'dragged about' as a result of the state of passion), but in that of perceptual knowledge.This must suffice as our answer to the question of action with and without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently with knowledge.
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