Irwin translates today's central topic as "concord," which makes a lot more sense to me than "unanimity." One often sees broad agreement about how to proceed without it being perfect agreement; likewise, one often sees people who are willing to go along even with a plan even if they don't fully agree with its every aspect. For that reason, I shall follow Irwin's usage in my comments.
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do not know each other....
In fact we won't know a lot of the people we do share concord with in Aristotle's sense; these days, far and away most of our fellow citizens that we are in concord with about central ideas will be people we haven't met. This was less true in Ancient Greece, where populations were much smaller in scale.
The point he's making there isn't really about whether you've met, but about the fact that the agreement might be an accident. Now you might believe X, and some people in Africa might believe X as well, as might some people in Asia. You haven't all been part of a political discussion that brought you to those positions. You just arrived at them on your own, due to independent causal chains that led you each to separately adopt this opinion X. Thus, while it is true that you don't know those other people, the real issue here is that your agreement of opinion is not a concord that has somehow been produced between you; it is just an accident that you happen to share that opinion.
...nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation)...
Presumably we agree with strangers about the basic facts of mathematics, not because we have established friendly relations but because those facts are just there in the world to be discovered. The sun is warm, the grass is green, etc. Agreement about that is not a concord.
...but we do say that a city is unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved in common.
This is to say that concord is a species of political friendship. It is not necessarily that all people in a given polity share it, either: concord is often what holds factions together, not necessarily states. Aristotle goes on to explain this:
[Unanimity/concord] is about things to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is unanimous when all its citizens think that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people [or groups -- Grim] wishes himself to have the thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae, they are in a state of faction...
Is it possible to be in both a state of concord and a state of faction at once?
...for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of the same thing, whatever that may be, but only when they think of the same thing in the same hands, e.g. when both the common people and those of the better class wish the best men to rule; for thus and thus alone do all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life.
The above is ambiguously phrased. It might seem to suggest that concord is maintained if both parties agree on a principle, i.e., that 'the best men should rule'; they just differ about which of the men are in fact the best ones. Irwin translates 'in the same hands' instead as 'the same person,' such that a difference about which of the people should lead is itself a change from concord into faction.
Yet I think it is often possible to be in both states at once: in the United States it is very common to disagree about which party should lead the government while still agreeing very broadly about some policies (e.g. that the National Parks should not be abolished; that there should be some form of public education; that there should be a continuation of popular programs like Social Security). It seems to me that there are often substantial elements of concord even in cases where factions exist and are striving quite loudly against one another for the leadership.
I do not mean to put that forward as Aristotle's position, however: given the ambiguity, it is difficult to say that he thinks that. I simply say that it is a plausible position that might be one Aristotle would agree to if you put it before him. He might intend a simpler distinction, however, as Irwin implies: either concord exists because people do agree, or faction exists because people differ.
Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavour as well.
This is quite similar to the point from IX.4 about why only virtuous men can be true friends to each other, i.e., because they are internally already wishing the right things for themselves they therefore can also transfer those wishes to another. The virtuous here too already are in internal agreement about what is good and best, and desire those things for their society; and thus it is easy for them to agree with each other, since they will all be internally discerning wisely about what is best.
But bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbour and stands in his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just.
The compulsion described here is a compulsion for members of the other party 'to do what is just' without being willing to do it yourself. Since we are speaking of political friendship, 'what is just' refers to political justice rather than the justice that exists between true friends, i.e., Book V justice rather than the kinds we've seen discussed more recently. The compulsion to do what is just is exactly what Book V wanted justice to accomplish: to require citizens to behave as a virtuous person would, in this case a just person.
Book V's argued that this justice was 'fairness plus lawfulness.' Even insofar as the law requires that one behave justly (i.e. virtuously towards others, since 'justice is another's good' as V.1 phrased it), because only one side is being forced and the other allowed to behave unjustly the fairness requirement is no longer achievable: "For my friends everything, for my enemies the Law."
The the law itself then becomes a tool of faction, and thus breaks Book V's notion of justice because it creates a division between its elements of 'fairness' and 'lawfulness.' Justice is not achievable if the lawfulness is not applied fairly: it requires both elements on Aristotle's reading.
In addition to making justice impossible, the success of a faction of bad men in gaining political power also increases the amount of vice permitted in the society. The 'lawfulness' that is a compulsion to behave virtuously is now not being applied to all, so at least the victorious faction is able to behave in ways that are not virtuous. Thus, whereas justice properly applied is both fair and compels virtue from all, this sort of factional 'justice' is neither fair nor as successful at extracting virtue from the citizenry.
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