After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge.
Is friendship a virtue, or does it imply virtue, or is it both? It does not seem like a virtue. A capacity for friendship would seem to be a candidate for a virtue, as virtues are excellences of capacity. An actual friendship is a relation between two individuals, not a quality possessed by either individual independently.
Well, sort of. Aristotle's ontology states that there are, most basically, substances that have attributes; one of those kinds of attributes is relations. Yet a relationship doesn't have independent existence for Aristotle. In other words, as Aristotle conceives the world it's not the case that I exist, and you exist, and the friendship between us also exists. It is the case that I exist, and you exist, as substances -- and substances are the realest things in the world. As a substance, I have as one of my attributes a relation: ("Friend to X.") My friend X, likewise a substance, has a completely separate attribute: ("Friend to Grim"). So our friendship is not an independently existing thing, as he sees it: it's a attribute of mine and, separately, an attribute of yours. Thus, a friendship can belong to you the way a virtue ought to do; and it can be done well or badly, thus admitting of an excellence. For that reason, friendship can be a virtue.
Yet it also makes sense to say that friendship implies virtue. Who seeks vicious friends? Even among members of organized criminal enterprises, i.e. people who might wish to be able to be vicious to outsiders, among friends what is wanted is honor and respect, loyalty and courage, faithfulness and generosity. The ability to win and sustain friends implies that you have virtues that others would seek in a friend.
[Friendship] helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more able both to think and to act.
The original Fafhrd and the Grey Mouser stories were collected in a book called "Two Sought Adventure." We see the truth of these remarks clearly in fictional accounts such as this: Frodo is able to go forth because of Sam's friendship, which is enhanced necessarily by Merry and Pippin; yet it is when they befriend Aragorn that their counsel improves and their capacity to reach help. What kind of help? More friends, and more councils, which increase their capacities further yet. That is how they come to understand together, to develop a plan that might work, and to dare it.
Again, parent seems by nature to feel [friendship] for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other.
We might even divide animals by this quality: snakes do not have it, but birds do; sharks do not, but whales; the lion loves his children but slays another male's.
Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
Most of us would not consider "political friendship" to be real friendship, but only 'friendship' by analogy. Yet Aristotle -- for whom politics was much smaller, and much more built upon actual personal relationships with other people one really knew -- does consider political friendship to be the foundation of successful politics. In the Politics III.9 he describes the will to live together in a city as a sort of friendship, an extension of how roommates who choose to live together do so because they like each other's company to some degree. They join societies together, hold festivals that all participate in, feasts, celebrations, holidays, and so forth. The community as he sees it is an kind of extended friendship.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends.
Consider that question for a moment. Whom do you consider to be a good man? Can you think of an example of someone who was not also a good friend to his friends? Even among bad men, we tend to find it a redeeming quality: as in the case of Doc Holliday, the murderous gunfighter who has passed into American folklore as a heroic figure because of his loyal friendship with Wyatt Earp.
Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. On this very question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.
I hope you will find these next two books engaging; many people find them to be the most intriguing part of the work.
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