Role-Playing Games

That is, pen & paper RPGs / table-top RPGs, to be exact. One free, one Arthurian, one Viking.

Basic Fantasy RPG

If you liked the early editions of Dungeons & Dragons (pre-AD&D or AD&D) or you like free RPGs, let me recommend the free and open Basic Fantasy RPG.

It's based on early D&D and was started when Wizards of the Coast created the Open Game License (OGL). The creator, Chris Gonnerman, keeps it "open source" and free -- you can download PDFs of all of the books, adventures, etc., for free on the website as well as the LibreOffice files if you want to edit them and create your own version of the game. You can also order print versions for cost from Amazon, DriveThru RPG, and Lulu.com. Gonnerman makes almost nothing on these, e.g., the softcover 208-page core rulebook is only $10 on Amazon as of this posting and since it's print-on-demand, that mostly covers printing.

The BFRPG community is great and has created all kinds of supplements for the game. Want more character races or classes? There are free supplements for that. Want more monsters? There is a free 3-volume field guide for that. Want a ton of ready-made adventures? Free supplements. Want to write some free supplements? The community is happy to look at your work and give feedback. If you come up with something you think others would like, you can share it on their website. (Check out the downloads page for most of the free PDFs and LibreOffice files.)

Pendragon

Want to play an Arthurian RPG? Chaosium's Pendragon is the best I've seen.

Pendragon has a relatively simple rules set that heavily encourages role-playing (vs roll-playing) Arthurian-type adventures. It begins in the 5th century, moves through Uther Pendragon's reign, then Arthur's life, the quest for the Holy Grail, and on somewhat further into the "Twilight" years. The PCs play knights (yes, just knights -- no wizards or thieves or rangers). Stafford sets the game in the late 5th and early 6th centuries, but he also included some anachronisms like castles and heraldry.

In addition to the Arthurian setting, there are two features that are particularly interesting. The most interesting to me is that it has rules for virtues and vices which come into play, as well as passions (loves and hatreds). These don't control the character, per se, but encourage the player to play to the character's virtues, vices, and passions. Like such things in the real world, the character's actions can improve or worsen the scores for these. E.g., one's character becomes more courageous by doing courageous things. Although maybe it's not a common use for RPGs, I thought this virtue / vice aspect could be a fun way for a group of youngsters to learn about virtue ethics.

The second feature I found interesting is that the player will play several generations of a family. Rolling up a character begins with rolling up the feats, battles, and deaths of the character's father and grandfather, events that can result in passions if, e.g., one's father was killed by Irish raiders which could result in a hatred of the Irish. This gives the family a history. The player's first character is the heir of a knight with a manor which he will inherit, and marriage and family are part of the game. When the character dies, the player takes up the character's heir as a new PC.

I played the 5th edition and have a couple of small complaints, although these may have been fixed in the 6th edition. First, there is a huge amount of material, which is great, but it's not entirely well-organized and I spent too much time looking at the table of contents and index to see where the rule for one thing or another was. Second, I don't know why, but it seems that every medieval story I have read lately has to have the local priest shacking up with some young woman and Pendragon's starter adventure carried on this sordid tradition. But that can be easily changed by the GM.

I only played it for a few months, but it was engaging and I really hope I get the chance to play more sometime. It would be fun to do the entire campaign from Uther to post-Arthur.

Age of Vikings

Another Chaosium title, Age of Vikings looks pretty good. I haven't played it, but I think I'd enjoy it and since Vikings are a common topic here, I thought I'd mention it.

Here's the product blurb:

Age of Vikings covers the history of mythic Iceland in minute detail. The book outlines the life of a Viking, laws and government, religion, and the wild and wondrous creatures of legend. Take to the frigid seas with extensive rules for ships and seafaring, including naval combat—No other roleplaying game so effortlessly thrusts you into one of the most fabled cultures and time periods in history!

If you play, let us know how you like it.

Relief & Refinement of Terms

After Charlie Kirk's assassination and the resulting sense of outrage on the right and rejoicing on the left, I was concerned that the violence would escalate. The number of leftists celebrating was shocking.  It was possible, I thought, that left extremists might be encouraged to step up attacks and right extremists might retaliate. I am very relieved that hasn't happened and impressed that the right has broadly responded peacefully, both in remembering Kirk and in their recognition that there is an extreme element of the left that hates them. I sense a stiffening of the spine on the right which is nonetheless peaceful.

In the comments here soon after Kirk's assassination I said that, while I didn't think it probable, for the first time I felt there was the chance of a civil war. I used the term "civil war" just because it's been floating around for some years now and that's what came to mind. However, it's a particularly good time to use language clearly. I do not at all fear a civil war like the US war from 1861-1865. What I fear is more of a low-intensity conflict, like "Bleeding Kansas" in the five years leading up to the Civil War or like the Troubles in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s to 1998. The 1960s and '70s here in the US had more violence as well with riots and the Weather Underground bombings, etc. Maybe a return to that as Angela Davis and other leftist terrorists are now leading lights on the left. That said, I am much relieved by the right's reaction over the last week. We'll see how it plays out.

Dragons and Trees of Woe

 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.3

This is a longer chapter, most of which will be after the jump. Aristotle begins his investigation into the difficulties described yesterday.

Of some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth. (1) We must consider first, then, whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then (2) with what sorts of object the incontinent and the continent man may be said to be concerned (i.e. whether with any and every pleasure and pain or with certain determinate kinds), and whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly with regard to the other matters germane to this inquiry. The starting-point of our investigation is (a) the question whether the continent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their objects or by their attitude, i.e. whether the incontinent man is incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects, or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead of that, by both these things; (b) the second question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not.

Nicomachean Ethics VII.2

Today we discuss some of the problems around incontinence. 

Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange-so Socrates thought-if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best-people act so only by reason of ignorance.

This sort of ignorance would be a special sort, a thing where you often think you know that something is wrong, but don't really know.  Is that plausible, enough that a man like Socrates could take it seriously? 

It seems like it might be. We all know people who get involved with someone whom they know to be a bad person, suffering the obvious consequences eventually. Or we can think of Charmides, who must have known after a while that hangovers would follow the drunken nights. Or even ourselves: I doubt any of us is without some habit that doesn't have predictable negative consequences, yet we keep doing it.

Signs of decaying society

From Robert Heinlein's 1982 science fiction novel "Friday," a list of symptoms of a society circling the drain.

Citizens identify themselves primarily with a group rather than with the nation.

The population loses faith in the police and the courts. The justice system combines denial of bail with failure to grant a speedy trial.

Taxes are high, the currency is inflated, and the country runs a chronic deficit.

The country passes unenforceable laws regarding private behavior.

The culture treats as civil rights conditions that must be earned by behavior, such as good credit and academic credentials.

Violence is increasingly uncontrolled.

The government relies on arbitrary compulsion, such as slavery and military conscription.

Personal civility collapses, in favor of a conviction that everyone is entitled to tactless expression of his true self at all times.

Heinlein admires characters who gamely try to fight a losing battle against this decay, but identifies more strongly with those willing to emigrate to new worlds and start again. He believed strongly that emigration was a sorting process that would so improve the new population that secular success would at last be achieved. He had no use for religion, but to the end of his days obviously had a core faith in personal honor and virtue.

Uh-oh

A Guardian reporter describes her experience at England’s recent mega-rally. 

Since leaving I’ve been grappling with how best to describe what I saw and heard. It was a far-right rally, yes, but many people attended unperturbed by the fact it had been billed as such by many media outlets, including the Guardian. They did not feel alienated by such an extreme, and previously fringe, label.

The shields are failing, Captain.  

Trump as Next UK Prime Minister?

GB News is running a poll on this. Until this evening I did not know that Trump's mother, Mary Anne MacLeod Trump, was a Scottish immigrant. That appears to make him eligible for British citizenship, which would then make him eligible to run for office in the UK. Coincidentally, the next major election in the UK is scheduled for 2029.

This adds a point to my "the Democrats' claim that Republicans hate immigrants is absurd" argument. Trump's mother and wife as well as Vance's in-laws and Rubio's parents all immigrated here.

Evil as the Demons that Haunt You

I don't watch TV, but I've never once seen a Jimmy Kimmel bit that was even a little bit funny. All the same, this alignment of corporate and government power to silence opposing view is wicked. He was himself a corporate mouthpiece, of course; it's not like he was a human being. Not when he was speaking on ABC, he wasn't, though I'm sure he is over coffee. 

My very good friend Jim Hanson is happy about the designation -- provisional, but the paperwork will likely catch up given that the Secretaries of State and the Treasury seem to be on board with the President -- of Antifa as a 'terrorist organization.' It was the considered conclusion of his wife and his after a fairly thoughtful discussion. I respect their thoughtfulness. All the same, it's hard to say what the limiting principle might be that would guarantee the rights that is the only legitimate reason for any government to exist. Antifa is barely an organization at all. That lack of structure will open anyone who's been anywhere near one of the protests at which their ilk have been seen to Federal prosecution or worse.

What worse? We're killing people in the Caribbean now without due process, on the strength of the President's word that, you know, we were really sure they were hauling drugs. 

Well, I've participated in killing a lot of people myself. In Iraq, we'd blow them apart if they were out at night near a road with a shovel in their hands even if they had no visible weapons. Probably planting IEDs, obviously; and anyway, why take a chance? In Afghanistan, it was worse still. 

These demons you're haunted by, they turn you. It's not for no reason that I turned to philosophy after the war. Strong feelings about what's good and evil aren't going to help you. Such feelings give you pleasure and pain, and if you've learned anything from the recent study it should have been that you should push off pleasure and pain like the old men looking on Helen at the gates of Troy. Troy, whose failure to do that led to her being so leveled by the Greeks that her very location was lost for two thousand years. Homer carefully conveyed what their helmets looked like, but they were so comprehensively destroyed that for all that time nobody could even find their high and ancient walls. Even the Wise came to believe that they were no more than a myth.

Beware.

Nicomachean Ethics Interlude: The Charmides

Some of you may be flagging from all of the relatively dense philosophy, and would appreciate a more pleasing story. As it happens, this discussion of incontinence and its problems -- philosophical and actual -- is a good occasion to look at one of the relevant dialogues of Plato. The Charmides is Plato's most famous investigation of this set of problems, but it takes the form of a story told by Socrates about a time in his youth when he had just returned from battle and was enjoying a moment of peace and comradeship. 

The story happens right after the Battle of Potidaea. Socrates does not recount any of the battle in the dialogue, he only mentions that there was a long discussion of it and great interest about it. This is because no recounting of it was necessary, for one thing; and for another, Socrates was one of the great heroes of this battle that was otherwise a tremendous disaster for Athens. Plato did not wish to embarrass Socrates by suggesting that he would have been bragging about his role in it, and in any case everyone knew what Socrates did at Potidaea. 

After the talk about the war and the army, some young men join the company, including one named Charmides. It is possibly not quite a coincidence that the word looks like our "charm," but the etymology doesn't follow a clear route to us from the Greek through the Latin to the French to the English like usual. Rather, the linkage if it exists is all the way back to the Proto-Indo-European *kan. In any case Charmides is not a fictional character whose name was invented by the author to sound 'charming'; that was his real name. He was in fact Plato's uncle. Charmides went on to be one of the Thirty Tyrants, which makes his inability to understand these matters of self control and self-discipline a matter of significant importance to the generation Plato was speaking to directly with his dialogues. 

In other words, this dialogue treats a military disaster that led to the great war in which Athens was defeated by Sparta, an even greater disaster; it concerns one of the Tyrants that were placed over Athens after the war, perhaps a greater disaster yet. This is set up as a charming story about a beautiful young man who has hangovers because he drinks too much wine by night, and is seeking a war hero's sympathy and help (as well as, perhaps, his love). Yet it is really an examination of some of the most dire events of the age, and an attempt to understand how they could have happened.

A Backdoor Departmental Closure

Clever idea, in a way. If you can convince the school systems to walk away from the money, in order to secure their academic freedom and independence, the Department of Education would eventually only be funding relatively right-leaning school districts. That would greatly reduce the resistance to closing the DoE entirely, since right-leaning institutions generally support that (although in this case there would be strongly countervailing rice-bowl winds, especially as new funds were freed up to support those districts directly).

Nicomachean Ethics VII.1

Today we begin Book VII.

Let us now make a fresh beginning...

This characteristically Aristotelian move also happens in Physics I.9. There as here, nothing that has been said before is being set aside; yet it is being pushed into the background. You are meant to clear your mind of all those technical details for the moment for a fresh discussion. Keep the furniture in the back of your mind so that you can call on it when appropriate, but we are beginning as if anew. 

...and point out that of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds-vice, incontinence, brutishness. The contraries of two of these are evident,-one we call virtue, the other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,

For he seemed not, he,
The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came.

Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice.

So part of our new beginning, you'll notice, is that we are no longer talking about vice as the balancing point between two errors. We are talking about it as a clean opposition to vice. Also, now we aren't just talking about virtue and vice; we're adding in two other states to avoid, and (therefore) two other states to strive for in ourselves.  

Now, since it is rarely that a godlike man is found-to use the epithet of the Spartans, who when they admire any one highly call him a 'godlike man'-so too the brutish type is rarely found among men; it is found chiefly among barbarians...

Hey!

...but some brutish qualities are also produced by disease or deformity; and we also call by this evil name those men who go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice.

We often think of those whom drugs have rendered toothless and covered in scabs to have been reduced to more of an animal state; and not a healthy animal, at that. In men health entails rational control of such desires, i.e. virtue, and in fact one of the particular virtues (temperance) already discussed earlier. Yet there the account stops short of brutishness; Aristotle said (in III.12) that self-indulgence doesn't destroy the nature of the man. Here we see a way in which those who 'go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice' can have their human nature destroyed, and be reduce to brutish things.

A contemporary philosopher would usually try to avoid a 'fresh start' like this, since getting people to think through and adopt even one new model is hard enough; but it is a mark of Aristotle's sophistication that he can come at the same problem in more than one way, and find important insights on each road.

Of this kind of disposition, however, we must later make some mention, while we have discussed vice before we must now discuss incontinence and softness (or effeminacy*), and continence and endurance; for we must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor as a different genus.

Once again we are making a distinction between things that aren't at least completely different. The vice of self-indulgence wasn't the same thing as the brutality that can result from extremes of vice; but they are not completely separate either.  

We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.

Another I.3 point: we're not after a logical proof that would establish this exactly and forever, because that isn't the right kind of exactness for ethics. It suffices as a proof if we can refute the objections without creating disturbances for the common opinions (common, that is, among those whose opinions are worth considering due to their proven excellence of character or age and experience, not common in the sense of just anyone's opinion at all). 

Now (1) both continence and endurance are thought to be included among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and softness among things bad and blameworthy; and the same man is thought to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them. And (2) the incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them (3) The temperate man all men call continent and disposed to endurance, while the continent man some maintain to be always temperate but others do not; and some call the self-indulgent man incontinent and the incontinent man self-indulgent indiscriminately, while others distinguish them. (4) The man of practical wisdom, they sometimes say, cannot be incontinent, while sometimes they say that some who are practically wise and clever are incontinent. Again (5) men are said to be incontinent even with respect to anger, honour, and gain.-These, then, are the things that are said.

And indeed, they were said here too in the second part of Book III, when we discussed incontinence the first time. I warned you that you'd be hearing a lot more about it. So you shall.

* In Latin, 'virtue' is derived from 'vir,' which means man. As we've discussed, the Greek word ἀρετή doesn't imply manhood in the way that the Latin word does. This word being translated here is μαλακίας, which Irwin gives as "softness." The word could be used to indicate effeminacy; it was so used by Herodotus and Thucydides according to Liddell. Yet, Liddell points out, it was also used by Caesar in its Latin form to indicate the softness or calmness of the sea ("malacia ac tranquillitas").

The school where Aristotle taught Alexander would have been an exclusively male space, however, which does explain the male-focused discourse. Effeminacy is an exclusively male trait, a defect in achieving their full nature as men; women are never effeminate because they are feminine by nature rather than by defect, according to this Ancient view. 

Alexander Hamilton

As a rule, I favor politicians and bureaucrats fighting duels. It keeps the worst people out of the field for fear of it, and it provides a bracing risk that can temper rhetoric. The last time I can remember one being discussed in explicit terms was in 2004, when Zell Miller expressed regret that dueling was no longer legal after a media nobody who had browbeaten a woman on his show got in his face about something.

There's a lot to be said for the institution, which I used to write about much more often. Once Saddam Hussein challenged George W. Bush to a duel to settle the Iraq War, which is literally Homeric. In retrospect I wish it had happened. It would have been far better than the war, whichever way it had gone. 

UPDATE: On the subject of Presidential duels, I recently read this story.

You would think that Andrew Jackson was giving you his undivided attention, and then you would glance over and notice that he had devoted the last several minutes to making a laborious sketch of an alligator.

“Mr. President!” you would gasp, indignantly.

“I have a bullet lodged inside my body,” he would say. “From killing a man in a duel. A better man than you.” He would resume drawing the alligator.

I don't know if that story is actually true: it's from the Washington Post, after all. But the alligator doodle is real. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.13

This is the end of Book VI. There are ten books in total.

We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the same, but like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense.

This is the first time that Aristotle has mentioned "natural virtue." Until now we've talked about virtue as an acquired habit. But, to return to the potentiality/actuality distinction that is so important in Aristotle, you can't make a saw out of wool. Potentiality is first actuality: iron can become a saw, and so it is already potentially a saw in a way that wool is not. Natural virtue is going to play the role of this first actuality of virtue. 

This is going to become important. It is where we get the notion of something being "second nature" to you: you have your first nature -- the potential -- and then your second nature -- what you developed that potential into. Let's continue.

For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense-we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are evidently hurtful.

This is a point that will appeal to AVI, I think, for whom nature tends to prevail in the nature/nurture discussion. Here is Aristotle's nod to it: some people, by nature, have more fitness to be brave or self-controlled. These qualities can and should be guided and perfected by reason, but if you don't have them as potentials to start with you never will have the actualities either.

Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. 

Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom.

So: while you may be born fitted for courage (say), you won't become courageous in the strict sense until you develop phronesis. You have to learn to apply this natural quality wisely. at you

Now we can talk more completely about how this process works (which Thomas was interested in earlier: how to realize it). The steps are these:

1) Birth, with the natural virtues that you happen to have.
2) A good upbringing, which gives you stories about the good and noble, honorable and virtuous from trusted sources.
3) Intuitive reason, which apprehends what is good from the stories and the way in which they are told.
4) Philosophical wisdom, which derives the first principles about what is good, noble, honorable, and virtuous from the findings of your intuitive reason about the stories from that upbringing.
5) Practical wisdom (phronesis), by which you derive in the circumstances in which you find yourself what the virtuous thing to do actually is, and do it using your natural virtue's potential to do such a thing.
6) Virtue, the state of character that arises from this practice becoming a habit and then the state of character itself. 

This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right.

This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue. 

Nice concession to Socrates there. I suspect he would have appreciated it; there's a chance he would have bought the argument, since it considered his difficulties directly and addresses them in a way that many subsequent generations found satisfactory.. He and Aristotle never met directly but were connected by Plato, who was the student of one and the teacher of the other.   

Aristotle goes right on to solve another puzzle that daunted Socrates.

But in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in separation from each other; the same man, it might be said, is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already acquired one when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end.

That issue of the separation (or not) of the virtues really bothered Socrates; it is ubiquitous in Plato's dialogues. Aristotle has given us the furniture for a straightforward answer to why a man could be virtuous in one way but not another: he lacked the natural virtue for one virtue, but had it for another. As such, when he applied his phronesis, he was able to excel in one virtue (say courage) but not the other (say moderation of sexual appetite). The phronesis is the same; but the underlying potential is not the same in all people. 

Some people become more virtuous than others because they had the potential to actualize. Some people become virtuous in one way and not another because they had potential here but not there. We can look at the cases we know empirically and see how plausible that answer is: he's just like his father; he reminds me of his grandfather; it's no wonder he turned out that way. 

But again [phronesis] is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.

The art of medicine is not supreme over health because it is practiced for the sake of health. Therefore, it is subordinate because it is in the service of the prior thing. Philosophical wisdom showed us what the great, the noble, and the good were. Phronesis is just helping us achieve what philosophy attained: it is the servant, not the master.  

Nicomachean Ethics VI.12

Almost finished with Book VI; one more after this.

Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.

Only philosophers talk like this, but Tom wanted to read some philosophy and now you know we really are! This is a related problem to those I raised before, but here the issue is that the categories are artificial. The issue in (1) above is that "philosophical wisdom" has been defined as pertaining only to unchanging things, which for Aristotle include the movement of the stars as well as mathematical truths. It is possible to be philosophical about the nature of justice, but not about how to be just in a particular case: that requires practical action in a set of things that come-to-be and have a particular history. For that we are told we need a separate thing, "practical wisdom," which is -- being separate -- somehow unrelated to the philosophical wisdom from which it draws its first principles for which to reach particular conclusions.

Yet obviously these things are unified. We unify them. They are parts of a whole, the whole that is us. The way the cuts are made may be customary, as the French butcher beef differently from Americans. 

The problem with (2) is about 'coming to be,' to whit, how goodness comes to be. If a man is good, what use has he for a faculty for becoming good? (The answer, probably obvious to all of you, is that it was only by having the faculty in the first place that he got to being good.)

(3) is potentially a serious problem, except that it has the same issues as (1). 

These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only stated the difficulties.

(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.

(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicine produces health, however, but as health produces health; so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy.

Since you need both philosophical wisdom (to get the first principles) and practical wisdom (to get to the correct actions) to be virtuous, each is part of "virtue entire." Since virtue produces happiness, each of them thus is a necessary condition for producing happiness. The analogy to 'health producing health' seems to me to further complicate the artificial divisions: the analogy suggests they are really a whole. 

(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. (Of the fourth part of the soul-the nutritive-there is no such virtue; for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do.)

The nutritive is the part of the soul we share even with plants, for Aristotle: but it doesn't make decisions, it just does what it has to do. A man has to eat; a buzzard, same as worms.  

(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man ought)...

Now, you'll remember that in V.1 justice-as-lawfulness was said to be complete virtue, but not absolutely. Here Aristotle seems to deny that it is properly even justice; just as he had said in III.8 that courage was not really true courage if it was compelled by law, as it is in the citizen-soldier. In both cases he's looking for good-enough solutions for the many, for whom perhaps it is good enough if they can be made to do the right thing even if only under duress. Yet he is truly interested in what the best kind of person will do, not just what will make people behave.  

...so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart.

So, above he pointed out that to really be good, and not just being driven to right actions by the law, you have to be in the right state. That state is the state of setting yourself the right ends for the right reasons. You got the right reasons from what he is calling "philosophical wisdom." But you have to derive from those reasons the right acts; and you have to choose those right acts because of those right reasons. That's the only thing that counts as "being good," properly speaking. It isn't obedience to authority; it's internal choice for proper reason. 

Practical wisdom is not the faculty [of cleverness], but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good.

That's a fascinating way to conclude this, since the problem he raised in the first (2) was that it might be possible to be good without being practically wise. This inverted proof that B requires A doesn't prove that A requires B.

If we take it with the claim that 'being good' only occurs when you do the things that practical wisdom entails, however, we can see the point: you don't get to 'being good' without practical wisdom. A clever man can choose noble aims, but cleverness can easily devolve into mere smartness, in which one is applying intelligence to bad purposes. It's only when you make the shift into tying your intelligence to this facility of wisdom -- whether or not that wisdom is properly divided into two parts, the up-looking "philosophical wisdom" and the down-looking "practical wisdom" -- that you can be sure of being good.

Joining the good guys

This X post by someone named "Comet" caught my eye last week, because it's so similar to my own experience, and echoes a theme that C.S. Lewis often uses. I think it appeals to people who were raised as atheists, or became determined atheists when they came of age after a perfunctory childhood religious training. It was a huge stumbling block to me to believe in a literal, personal God and an afterlife. It still is difficult, when the chips are down, though it's a faith I strive for all the time. Even now, Comet's gut conviction is the one that keeps me trying:

I’ve never been a religious person because I don’t know if God is real

But I’m becoming more religious every day because I know that Evil is real, and I want to be on the other side of it

A Lemonade Stand

On a country road high in the mountains today, I came across a young lady of seven or so running a lemonade stand. Naturally my wife and I stopped our motorcycles and bought some lemonade from the girl. It was the sort of thing children used to do when I was young, but I haven't seen in ages. 

There were more precautions than we had as kids. Her family was watching from above near the house, and she had a dog that came over to be sure she was ok -- as well as, I noticed, a walkie-talkie on her belt in case she needed to call for help. I think we would have only had a dog, and he was a beagle.

It was obviously being a good experience for her, in spite of the light traffic way up there. She explained that she and her brothers and sisters had been doing it for a while, and they'd only recently expanded into baked goods as they made enough money to buy the lemonade supplies, then more supplies. 

As we were leaving a big dump truck towing a heavy-equipment trailer stopped, and the bearded trucker got out to buy some lemonade too. He looked so happy. I imagine it was a nostalgic moment for him too.

I would have taken a picture before we left, but I didn't wish to take a photo of a minor without her parents' permission (which I would easily understand them not granting to a stranger, although they might remember me either from the hurricane or from the time I drove their horse back up to their house from standing in the road). You'll just have to imagine a lemonade stand from your own youth. It was just like that.