Dr. J. Rufus Fears [is] professor of an incredibly manly subject: the history of freedom. One of the things the good professor emphasized to us captivated students was that a politician and a statesman are not the same thing. A statesman, Fears argues, is not a tyrant; he is the free leader of a free people and he must possess four critical qualities:These four qualities are explored in greater depth in the article. Is he right? If so, who among the candidates has these qualities?
1. A bedrock of principles
2. A moral compass
3. A vision
4. The ability to build a consensus to achieve that vision
What Make Statesmen?
As the time to vote nears, The Art of Manliness republishes an article on the four qualities of a statesman.
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13 comments:
They left out something pretty important:
5. The ability to negotiate principled compromises when sufficient consensus for their position does not exist.
Unless, of course, we're living in a world where, if you can't get 100% of what you want, you just give up.
In answer to your question, I'm not sure any of the current candidates possess even all 4 of those qualities.
As the article says, "In considering these four qualities of a democratic statesman, it may seem like a real one has never existed[.]" But the Professor's three favorite examples were Pericles, Lincoln, and Churchill.
Among them, Lincoln could have had a compromise, and it is manifestly obvious that sufficient consensus for his position did not exist. He didn't give up, though. Nor did Churchill, now that I think about it, either favor compromises or giving up. He was dead set against both. But maybe that's where your "principled" adjective comes in: no compromises can be made on at least some principles, whether by a statesman, or just a good man.
Well, from my reading, Churchill was a skilled negotiator and was never dead set against compromise. He just refused to do so under threat or duress. That is a very different thing, but I agree with you that some issue lend themselves more to compromise than others :)
Lincoln likewise openly acknowledged that his personal convictions would not and could not always prevail. His inaugural speech gives a very good example of this, particularly here:
Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States, that by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property, and their peace, and personal security, are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed, and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this, and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves, and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:
Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."
I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming Administration. I add too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause -- as cheerfully to one section as to another.
That having been said, he personally regarded slavery as an unmitigated evil. So his personal convictions were necessarily compromised in the performance of his duty as President to faithfully execute the laws (even those he personally disagreed with).
I commend the entire speech to the Hall, and very much fear we've lost the ability for hard choices.
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm
Cass, I don't know if you missed it or it just didn't interest you, but I have a post titled "Common Ground: Sources," about halfway down the page at the moment, and I would be very interested in anything you might add. Of course, if you're not interested, please don't worry about it.
As to the OP, first, I regret to tell you that Dr. Fears passed away in 2012.
Then, I take 4 to include 5, actually, but maybe I'm overdoing it. 4 and 5, though, are difficult when so many seem set on wholly selfish ends that are destructive to the rest of society. "Tries really hard to ..."? I don't know.
You know, when I think of Churchill and compromise, I think of "Unconditional Surrender." It was FDR's idea, and Churchill wasn't a fan. He felt it would (and quite likely did) prolong the war by causing many Germans to commit to fighting to the last rather than being offered honorable terms.
But, he compromised -- on being uncompromising. :)
There is a similar criticism of the demand of unconditional surrender in the Pacific. I have some doubts, but some suggest the Japanese might have considered an earlier surrender with a guarantee of keeping the emperor. (Which, we let them do anyway.)
Cass, I don't know if you missed it or it just didn't interest you, but I have a post titled "Common Ground: Sources," about halfway down the page at the moment, and I would be very interested in anything you might add. Of course, if you're not interested, please don't worry about it.
Hi Tom! I did see it (and was very interested, but didn't have time to think through a response). I keep coming back to it and reading the comments, though.
Sorry I didn't make time to comment. My job these days chews up a lot of mental energy - sadly, not on terribly important issues but all the same I often feel somewhat shell shocked by lunchtime :)
I'll try to find time to comment later today - it's a worthy topic, though my response in particular might be disappointing!
Compromises are on principle, a bad thing. It's done only out of weakness, not due to virtue.
Mercy and compassion, can only be achieved and dished out by the strong, those with control and resources. It is not a "compromise" in that sense.
I have some doubts, but some suggest the Japanese might have considered an earlier surrender with a guarantee of keeping the emperor. (Which, we let them do anyway.)
That was MacArthur's decision, to make use of Hirohito as a living treasure and symbol of peace and progress.
If it had been up to FDR or Churchill, Hirohito would have been dead pretty much, same as the Nazis on trial.
There were also a lot of things going on in Japanese domestic politics which didn't make surrender very easy. It wasn't one faction in control, thus while some may have agreed to a limited surrender, other ones would not have. The sword that cut through to Japan's Gordian knot was the decision of their Emperor via his radio address. It cut through the Gordian Knot.
Yeah, the Army faction was never going to surrender, I think, and they were the most powerful, at least politically. But I think the emperor could have agreed to surrender earlier, though who knows?
There is some evidence the Japanese equivalent of the State Dept. was trying to get the Allies to agree to allow keeping the emperor a condition on a surrender. They were politically powerless at the top, but maybe they could have taken that to the Navy faction and done something with it.
But that's all pretty hypothetical. Due to massive propaganda throughout the education system, news, literature, etc., the Japanese people themselves didn't want to surrender. You are right that it took the emperor to cut the knot.
Of course, it's been a long time since I've read through all this. Maybe my details are wrong.
I think, and they were the most powerful, at least politically. But I think the emperor could have agreed to surrender earlier, though who knows?
Parts of the military were going to put the Emperor on house arrest, preventing him from making the surrender. I'm sure he realized just how precarious his own position were, since previous Shoguns in Japanese history have gotten so powerful the Imperial family began to starve, given how much reliance on the Shogun they were.
And like any patriot, Hirohito would not consider surrender until it was a last resort. Until the second atomic bomb, when the scientists said the plutonium would allow mass production by America.
The Japanese believed they were fighting for the Emperor and the Japanese vision of pan pacific prosperity and liberation from Western colonial powers. In actuality, the military junta was high on their own power trip, particularly the Army. The people were told that they were winning the war, even as Americans invaded Okinawa. That level of self deception would have even gotten to the highest levels. This inability to face reality through to lost of face. More than half the military upper commanders killed themselves after Emperor Hirohito surrendered, rather than face it.
This decision was not so easy for the Japanese as the winners of WWII would like to think.
Parts of the military were going to put the Emperor on house arrest
Sure, but when they tried after the announcement they failed. I am not saying it's likely that Hirohito would have surrendered before the atomic bombs, just that it might have been possible. There were discussions in the cabinet of conditional surrender beginning in early 1945. None of the proposals were accepted, but they talked about it.
This decision was not so easy for the Japanese as the winners of WWII would like to think.
I don't think it was easy at all. Psychologically speaking, surrendering to their enemies would have seemed like surrendering to madness.
Sure, but when they tried after the announcement they failed.
They tried before the announcement, the night before. They were going to stop the motorcade and arrest their own Emperor and hold him. This operation was stopped because an American bomber flew over their capital, and everything went nights out. This prevented the ambush units from locating the Emperor.
The morning after, the Emperor then recorded the message for the radio.
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