Schlepping
I enjoyed this article about the adaptation of transport to the lack of paved roads, especially this photograph of windbarrows, which could move large loads on a narrow path:
Formal Logic, Part I
I told Tom I would accompany his early posts on Aristotle's logic with a companion series on formal logic as it is practiced today. It will be very introductory, and will take as its textbook Richard C. Jeffrey's Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits.
I'm going to be attempting no more than to introduce the basic concepts, with an eye toward showing how modern logic and Aristotle's logic differ. It's mostly for Tom, because he said he was interested, but perhaps some of you may find it interesting as well. Formal logic is not my chief area of interest in philosophy, of course, so if any of you are well-versed you will probably find points of disagreement which you are free and welcome to argue. For those of you who haven't studied it, I hope I can provide a solid enough introduction to make it worth your while.
The online text is the Fourth Edition, and it has lost what I think is a helpful explanation from earlier editions -- I suppose he thought on reflection that it was too basic. The earlier piece talks about truth, and it points out two things very helpful to keep in mind when doing formal logic:
He has a second example on the other side. There exist albino crows, which means that the following statement is false:
The Fourth Edition begins with validity. That gives us a good early point of contrast with Aristotle, who had a notion of validity that I think is actually better than the one in use in modern logic. See section 3.2 of this article, and contrast with what Jeffrey says. What is the difference, exactly? Do you agree with me that Aristotle is on stronger ground, or do you disagree? What are the strengths of each approach?
I'm going to be attempting no more than to introduce the basic concepts, with an eye toward showing how modern logic and Aristotle's logic differ. It's mostly for Tom, because he said he was interested, but perhaps some of you may find it interesting as well. Formal logic is not my chief area of interest in philosophy, of course, so if any of you are well-versed you will probably find points of disagreement which you are free and welcome to argue. For those of you who haven't studied it, I hope I can provide a solid enough introduction to make it worth your while.
The online text is the Fourth Edition, and it has lost what I think is a helpful explanation from earlier editions -- I suppose he thought on reflection that it was too basic. The earlier piece talks about truth, and it points out two things very helpful to keep in mind when doing formal logic:
It is the job of pure logic to point out that if it is true to sayHe goes on to point out that in natural language we would find the second statement to be much LESS true, assuming we know for a fact that Tom stole whatever it was. Pure logic doesn't deal in greater or lesser degrees of truth. It is purely binary: a statement is true, or it is not true. Since it is true that "Tom stole it or Dick stole it," the statement evaluates as true.Tom stole it,then it is equally true to sayTom stole it or Dick stole it.
He has a second example on the other side. There exist albino crows, which means that the following statement is false:
All crows are black.But of course the next statement is true:
Nearly all crows are black.That means we'd be inclined to say that "All crows are black" is NEARLY true. But there is no 'nearly true' in pure logic, any more than there is 'less true.' It is true, or it is false. So "All crows are black" is false. (Examples are from the 1967 edition, pages 3-4.)
The Fourth Edition begins with validity. That gives us a good early point of contrast with Aristotle, who had a notion of validity that I think is actually better than the one in use in modern logic. See section 3.2 of this article, and contrast with what Jeffrey says. What is the difference, exactly? Do you agree with me that Aristotle is on stronger ground, or do you disagree? What are the strengths of each approach?
It's Exactly Alike, Except For Being The Opposite
Now here's a title guaranteed to grab the attention: "The John Kerry Republicans."
The problem wasn't that Kerry had changed his mind. People change their minds on the basis of new evidence.
The problem is that Kerry was trying to convince a crowd who favored "it" that he was their guy, because he had supported their cause before he voted against it. That argument -- "I was on your side before I voted against you" -- is really worthy of the ridicule it received.
House Republicans now are talking to voters who are increasingly, and rightly given recent revelations, suspicious that the NSA program really does have adequate oversight and limits. They're telling the voters, "We once thought this seemed reasonable, but as we have learned more we, like you, have developed concerns."
It's true that both situations involve mind-changing, but otherwise they are precise opposites.
During the 2004 presidential campaign, John Kerry was widely ridiculed when, in discussing Iraq and Afghanistan war funding, he declared, “I actually did vote for [it] before I voted against it.”The author, Marc Thiessen, goes on to claim that this represents a kind of hypocrisy. However, he misunderstands the force of the problem Kerry had in 2004.
Well, now 50 House Republicans can say the same thing about their votes on the National Security Agency’s (NSA) terrorist surveillance program.
The problem wasn't that Kerry had changed his mind. People change their minds on the basis of new evidence.
The problem is that Kerry was trying to convince a crowd who favored "it" that he was their guy, because he had supported their cause before he voted against it. That argument -- "I was on your side before I voted against you" -- is really worthy of the ridicule it received.
House Republicans now are talking to voters who are increasingly, and rightly given recent revelations, suspicious that the NSA program really does have adequate oversight and limits. They're telling the voters, "We once thought this seemed reasonable, but as we have learned more we, like you, have developed concerns."
It's true that both situations involve mind-changing, but otherwise they are precise opposites.
Aristotle’s Categories
My first reading was Paul Studtmann’s article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), “Aristotle’s Categories.” The Categories basically lays out Aristotle's ontology — what exists and what you can say about what exists. Studtmann falls prey to a very common malady in academics, an inability to write for true beginners. I supplemented my reading with a much more amenable SEP article by Robin Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” which, along with Grim's explanations in email, helped me understand some unexplained terms and concepts in Studtmann.
There were a couple of interesting things to me about the Categories. The lesser interesting thing is Aristotle’s ontology itself. In essence, he claims there are substances and accidents. Substances exist independently while accidents only exist in substances. For example, a human being is a substance while skin color and height are accidents. You can’t have color by itself; color only exists as a property of a substance.
Substances and accidents are further categorized into universal and particular. Sadly, I discovered that universal accidents are not what happens when God goes on vacation and forgets to turn the gravity off. Instead, universal accidents are the concepts of accidents, such as redness. Universal substances are similarly concepts of particular substances. Humanity would be a universal substance, while Steve Earle would be a particular substance.
Aristotle prioritizes particular substances, calling them first substances; all the rest depend on them for existence: humanity doesn’t exist without individual humans, redness doesn’t exist without apples and other particular things that have that color. Here, he firmly disagrees with Plato, and I agree with him.
Although they use different and somewhat less precise terms, the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation is easily explained with this set of categories. The bread and wine maintain their accidents, but their substances are transformed into the body and blood of Christ.
But that’s old news. More interestingly on this occasion, Aristotle uses the term ‘said of’ for something that only exists in something else, an interesting use of grammar to describe reality. Studtmann informs us that some philosophers have tried to argue that Aristotle was really laying out a theory of language, but too much of the Philosopher’s work treats words as referring to actual things and most philosophers take the Categories as an ontological work, not a linguistic one. Even so, the Categories basically come down to substances and things you can say about substances. The Latin for the title is even the Predicamenta, The Predicates.
Language is a fascinating and important part of philosophy, and I’ll come back to it again.
There were a couple of interesting things to me about the Categories. The lesser interesting thing is Aristotle’s ontology itself. In essence, he claims there are substances and accidents. Substances exist independently while accidents only exist in substances. For example, a human being is a substance while skin color and height are accidents. You can’t have color by itself; color only exists as a property of a substance.
Substances and accidents are further categorized into universal and particular. Sadly, I discovered that universal accidents are not what happens when God goes on vacation and forgets to turn the gravity off. Instead, universal accidents are the concepts of accidents, such as redness. Universal substances are similarly concepts of particular substances. Humanity would be a universal substance, while Steve Earle would be a particular substance.
Aristotle prioritizes particular substances, calling them first substances; all the rest depend on them for existence: humanity doesn’t exist without individual humans, redness doesn’t exist without apples and other particular things that have that color. Here, he firmly disagrees with Plato, and I agree with him.
Although they use different and somewhat less precise terms, the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation is easily explained with this set of categories. The bread and wine maintain their accidents, but their substances are transformed into the body and blood of Christ.
But that’s old news. More interestingly on this occasion, Aristotle uses the term ‘said of’ for something that only exists in something else, an interesting use of grammar to describe reality. Studtmann informs us that some philosophers have tried to argue that Aristotle was really laying out a theory of language, but too much of the Philosopher’s work treats words as referring to actual things and most philosophers take the Categories as an ontological work, not a linguistic one. Even so, the Categories basically come down to substances and things you can say about substances. The Latin for the title is even the Predicamenta, The Predicates.
Language is a fascinating and important part of philosophy, and I’ll come back to it again.
Second look at Detroit?
Maybe the Democrats who've been pointing to Detroit lately as the poster child for libertarian principles are onto something, after all. If so, there's hope even for Somalia.
In my old neighborhood in Houston, we all chipped in and bought private security to beef up our patrols. It was entirely voluntary at $100/year--well within almost anyone's budget. The ones who opted out were understood to be getting a free-rider benefit to some extent, but as long as they didn't mind forgoing perks like a special vacation watch, no one minded all that much.
Much more can be done privately that we often assume.
In my old neighborhood in Houston, we all chipped in and bought private security to beef up our patrols. It was entirely voluntary at $100/year--well within almost anyone's budget. The ones who opted out were understood to be getting a free-rider benefit to some extent, but as long as they didn't mind forgoing perks like a special vacation watch, no one minded all that much.
Much more can be done privately that we often assume.
Conversion stories
Re AGW. They're all in one direction, of course, since they come from Watts up with That. On the other hand, have you ever heard of anyone who converted from deep skepticism to firm AGW belief?
Birth of a party
My eyes popped at the three-year swing in these poll results on NSA surveillance and the proper balance between security and privacy.
As the author notes, every faction swung wildly except for moderates in both parties. A huge majority overall believe the government will use NSA surveillance data for purposes other than to fight terrorism. The author wonders whether a third party will coalesce out of the libertarians on the left and right.
Origins of other life, and more on negative capability
From the NYT book review of "What Darwin Got Wrong," which was linked in the Dyson interview that was linked in my prior post:
On the subject of the book itself, the reviewer notes the extraordinary hostility that has greeted its authors, who are viewed suspiciously as catering to religious extremists. In fact, they mostly are complaining of a tendency to take literally Darwin's "metaphor" of natural selection and talk as if nature willed a new creature into being. As evolutionary biologists often note with exasperation, evolution has no foresight. The reviewer suggests that instead of “natural selection” we should talk about differential rates of survival and reproduction. That's not very pithy, though, does it? At least "natural selection" deftly gets across the idea that a few successful individuals are plucked out of the group in the sense of thriving where others fail, such that their descendants come to dominate the population. The whole idea of calling it "natural" selection surely was to contrast this unintentional mechanical process with deliberate design of the sort that produced poodles from wolves. But it's true that a lot of anthropomorphic nonsense is talked by supposedly secular biologists who would faint dead away if that tendency were equated with the worldview of the intelligent-design community. As the reviewer observes:
How does one detect life on Mars? One suggestion was to send up a sort of microscope, collect some dust from the Martian surface, and see if anything wiggled. If it wiggles it is alive. This seemed too unsophisticated for the space scientists.
Instead they sent up a sort of vacuum cleaner filled with a nutrient solution containing a radioactively labeled simple sugar. If the dust sucked up from the surface contained living cells, they would start to grow and divide, metabolize the sugar, and release radioactive carbon dioxide, which would be detected by a counter. The Mars lander never detected any life activity although it was determined to be in perfect working order. But that does not mean that there is no life on Mars. It means that there is no life in Martian dust that grows on the sort of sugar provided. This device certainly would not have detected a science-fiction Martian. What the space scientists had done was to provide an ecological niche for a specific kind of life that they knew from earth, a niche that does not match a vast variety of earthly organisms. If you do not specify the kind of organism you are looking for you cannot specify its ecological niche. Perhaps the space program should look again for wiggly things.This quotation is a casual aside in the review, but I liked it even more than the main body. It's so difficult for us to think about the development of life in any way but our own, as if the development of DNA itself were not something of a long shot, and something we have no reason at all to suppose might develop spontaneously in parallel on another planet.
On the subject of the book itself, the reviewer notes the extraordinary hostility that has greeted its authors, who are viewed suspiciously as catering to religious extremists. In fact, they mostly are complaining of a tendency to take literally Darwin's "metaphor" of natural selection and talk as if nature willed a new creature into being. As evolutionary biologists often note with exasperation, evolution has no foresight. The reviewer suggests that instead of “natural selection” we should talk about differential rates of survival and reproduction. That's not very pithy, though, does it? At least "natural selection" deftly gets across the idea that a few successful individuals are plucked out of the group in the sense of thriving where others fail, such that their descendants come to dominate the population. The whole idea of calling it "natural" selection surely was to contrast this unintentional mechanical process with deliberate design of the sort that produced poodles from wolves. But it's true that a lot of anthropomorphic nonsense is talked by supposedly secular biologists who would faint dead away if that tendency were equated with the worldview of the intelligent-design community. As the reviewer observes:
The other source of anxiety and anger is that the argument made by Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini strikes at the way in which evolutionary biologists provide adaptive natural historical explanations for a vast array of phenomena, as well as the use by a wider scholarly community of the metaphor of natural selection to provide theories of history, social structure, human psychological phenomena, and culture. If you make a living by inventing scenarios of how natural selection produced, say, xenophobia and racism or the love of music, you will not take kindly to the book.
Even biologists who have made fundamental contributions to our understanding of what the actual genetic changes are in the evolution of species cannot resist the temptation to defend evolution against its know-nothing enemies by appealing to the fact that biologists are always able to provide plausible scenarios for evolution by natural selection. But plausibility is not science. True and sufficient explanations of particular examples of evolution are extremely hard to arrive at because we do not have world enough and time. The cytogeneticist Jakov Krivshenko used to dismiss merely plausible explanations, in a strong Russian accent that lent it greater derisive force, as “idel specoolations.”
Even at the expense of having to say “I don’t know how it evolved” most of the time, biologists should not engage in idle speculations.
Negative capability
A commenter over at Sarah Hoyt's place mentioned that Freeman Dyson used to run simulations of systems that might result in a decrease in the world's human population, and that the only factor that consistently worked was the introduction of reliable electricity to fast-breeding cultures. I spent some time this morning trying to track down more information about that interesting line of inquiry, but failed. Instead, I came across this refreshing interview with Mr. Dyson on the subject of the origin of life, in which he time and again declines the interviewer's invitation to express a view on a controversy about which he is either not fully up to speed, or about which any answer must be the rankest sort of individual speculation.
Keats famously endorsed "negative capability," the willingness to endure ambiguity. It may not always be such a terrific idea in moral matters, where it often seems to take the form of choosing not to be aware of what we already know perfectly well, such as that it's not possible to excuse systematic lechery with the phrase "I'm a hugga." Nor have I ever been convinced by his idea that poetic aesthetics trumps all other considerations. Nevertheless, the capacity to remain "content with half-knowledge" is a fine thing for a scientist. Dyson candidly refuses to pretend that he knows what he doesn't.
I particularly enjoyed this exchange:
Keats famously endorsed "negative capability," the willingness to endure ambiguity. It may not always be such a terrific idea in moral matters, where it often seems to take the form of choosing not to be aware of what we already know perfectly well, such as that it's not possible to excuse systematic lechery with the phrase "I'm a hugga." Nor have I ever been convinced by his idea that poetic aesthetics trumps all other considerations. Nevertheless, the capacity to remain "content with half-knowledge" is a fine thing for a scientist. Dyson candidly refuses to pretend that he knows what he doesn't.
I particularly enjoyed this exchange:
Suzan Mazur: You draw an analogy in your book between origin of life and the origin of body plans half a billion years ago, a "sudden efflorescence of elaborate body plans," during the Cambrian explosion. Have you had further thoughts about this in light of the "evo-devo revolution"? Did form come first or did form arise from genetic programs? . . .
Freeman Dyson: By the time of the Cambrian explosion is very late in the history of life and genetics had become very powerful. But, of course, we have no idea what happened in detail.
Suzan Mazur: How soon do you think we'll get to the bottom of things regarding origin of life, i.e., make the breakthrough?
Freeman Dyson: Give it a hundred years, perhaps, but I don't think my prediction is worth anything. It all depends on what nature says, because nature is always surprising us. And probably in this case too.
Suzan Mazur: A hundred years. You think it's going to take that long?
Freeman Dyson: Well I would call that short.
The origin of life is one of my favorite scientific mysteries. Where I always get brought up short is the explanation for how replication started in the first place. Once you have both a metabolism ("defined in a general way as the evolution of a population in which some of the molecules catalyze the synthesis of others") and a replicating system, it's easy enough to see how the ones with a successful metabolism will out-replicate the others and glom onto more metabolic resources. But how do you get started on this pairing? How do clumps of chemical reactions start to replicate and compete? Dyson thinks that a profitable area of study would be how pre-biotic chemical reactions spontaneously form a rudimentary metabolism, which they clearly do in the lab; advances in nano-technology are opening the door for better experiments in this area. Next, he thinks that some kind of primitive self-replicating mechanism formed (rather as crystals automatically replicate) and made its living for a while as a parasite on the metabolic system. Eventually host and parasite merged and became the earliest precursors to cells, in the form of lipid walls enclosing little globs of water with a lot of stuff dissolved in it. Later, the replicating mechanism developed into the advanced form of RNA, setting the stage for the "RNA world" that's captured so much attention in recent years.
If he turns out someday to be right, that would make us mongrels at least twice over: once from the mating of metabolisms and replicators, and next from the capture of mitochondria by their host cells.
If he turns out someday to be right, that would make us mongrels at least twice over: once from the mating of metabolisms and replicators, and next from the capture of mitochondria by their host cells.
A fitting memorial
Nothing argues more eloquently against the racist tendency to treat young black men on the street with suspicious caution than yelling "This is for Trayvon Martin" while you beat up and rob a citizen. Dr. King would be proud.
Molon labe
More from the Daily Caller, complaints from the Children's Defense Fund in favor of the "common sense" gun-control legislation that they favor:
The U.S. has as many guns as people. The U.S. accounts for less than 5 percent of the global population, but owns an estimated 35 to 50 percent of all civilian-owned guns in the world. . . . America’s military and law enforcement agencies have four million guns. Our citizens have 310 million. Has this made our children safer?Yes. Of course, it depends somewhat on from whom you think they need to be protected.
That explains it
Jamie Weinstein at the Daily Caller reports:
In 1988, Mahmoud Salam Saliman Abu Harabish and Adam Ibrahim Juma’a-Juma’a decided to firebomb a bus of Israeli civilians.
The result was gruesome. A 26-year old school teacher, Rachel Weiss, was incinerated, along with her three young children, who ranged from three years old to 9-months. An Israeli soldier who came to their rescue also died as result of the attack.
Thanks to Secretary of State John Kerry’s nimble negotiating skills, Harabish and Juma’a-Juma’a will reportedly be among the 104 violent Palestinian terrorists released from Israeli prisons in stages as a goodwill gesture by the Jewish state in advance of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that are set to begin Monday in Washington, D.C.My email feed adds:
TheDC Morning is starting to suspect that making John Kerry Secretary of State was a political ploy to make Hillary Clinton look competent by comparison.
Beginning Aristotle: A Disclaimer, a Request, a Plan
I am not a trained philosopher, nor do I play one on TV. The length of time from my first post until this post can be explained by two things: I don’t know how to write interestingly about Aristotle’s philosophy in a blog post, and I’m just exploring that philosophy, so I can’t be terribly informative except in the most mundane, “This is what I learned today” way.
For now, I’ve decided my posts on Aristotle will be a student’s thoughts rather than a synopsis or attempt to be profound (although the humor value of an attempt to be profound cannot be discounted, the prepositions would be all wrong (laughing at, vs. with)). Naturally, I welcome any discussion in the comments, but my request is that you would let me know either here or as we go what you might find interesting in a study of Aristotle. Maybe then I can tailor my writing to my audience a bit better.
Grim’s suggested plan of study:
That's the plan.
For now, I’ve decided my posts on Aristotle will be a student’s thoughts rather than a synopsis or attempt to be profound (although the humor value of an attempt to be profound cannot be discounted, the prepositions would be all wrong (laughing at, vs. with)). Naturally, I welcome any discussion in the comments, but my request is that you would let me know either here or as we go what you might find interesting in a study of Aristotle. Maybe then I can tailor my writing to my audience a bit better.
Grim’s suggested plan of study:
Roughly, the medieval approach for students is:
1) Start by understanding his logical system. Getting a grasp on just what he means by "substance" and "attribute," and just what his categories are and how they work together, is very helpful.
2) Then read the Physics; the relevant article is here. This is a quite difficult work, and almost no one reads it today, but it's fundamental -- and, in fact, asks some very good questions about the nature of reality that our modern physics often elide past rather than engage.
3) Then read De Anima (see here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/) and here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/)). Once you've understood how he thinks the world has to work, from the earlier pieces, this work will help you understand how he thinks human beings relate to the world and understand it.
4) Then read the Metaphysics ... This will explain what Aristotle thinks about the ultimate ends behind reality. If the Physics explains how things are, this work explains why things are as they are.
5) Finally, engage the Ethics and Politics. These should be read together, because the purpose of politics is to provide a state that supports an ethical life -- a life, in Aristotle's terms, in which the pursuit of happiness is most possible.
That's the plan.
An Acceptable Excuse
A friend of mine is writing a Young Adult novel based in ancient Greek mythology. She asked me to review it for comments. I told her that, unlike other Greek gods who were portrayed as teenagers who spoke in ordinary speech, her male hero Prometheus was portrayed as an adult who spoke with great formality, especially when he addressed the female lead. "He doesn't speak like a teenager, which may make him seem strange to your audience," I said. "He sounds like me."
Her response was, "Well of course he does. He's not a man. He's a god."
Well that's... very flattering, really.
Her response was, "Well of course he does. He's not a man. He's a god."
Well that's... very flattering, really.
Coercion and persuasion
Or, as I like to call the alternatives, tyranny and liberty. I have just finished reading Kevin D. Williamson's very interesting book, "The End Is New and It's Going to Be Awesome." Though I'm not entirely persuaded of one of his central premises, which is that politics' flaw is its inability to learn from mistakes (more on that later), he's got a very appealing thought experiment in the Epilogue about an alternative to coercion in dealing with the inevitable bad actors among us:
It's an essentially democratic approach, but without the need for a uniform decision binding on any minority. It's not winner-take-all uniformity. The winning political party doesn't get to say how the car company treats Liberian workers and ignore what the losing party thinks. But then, there are very, very few social dilemmas that require a uniform approach, and those arguably are limited to circumstances of outright theft and violence. Other disputes over who should marry whom, how long the workweek should be, and whether the workplace is hospitable enough to someone of your gender, age, race, or religion might be better handled by the kind of ongoing collective decision-making process that's often called "voting with your feet" or ostracization. In fact, Williamson argues that the "right of exit" is essential to any form of ordered liberty. Nothing but the power of another person to say "that won't suit me; I won't combine with you in this enterprise" can ever really keep well-meaning nanny-bullies in check.
Williamson's example is deliberately commercial and impersonal. We already have traditional social mechanisms for policing behavior by damage to reputation in more intimate settings. And it's still possible to rely on the police for help with crime -- without dragging them into disputes over gay marriage or the minimum wage.
This "crowd-sourcing" of approval and disapproval certainly has its downside. Social ostracism can be very costly, and there's no guarantee that what society collectively decides will not marginalize people we think should be heroes. But that danger is hardly unique to free crowd-sourcing. At present, a more and more intrusive government takes a vote and then cheerfully imposes the majority view on everyone -- and the government has more than a tarnishing of reputation in its arsenal to enforce the universally binding result.
How will everyone know how to judge all the myriad social evils out there that we now rely on Congress to regulate? Well, how do they know how to vote at present? And how to Congressmen know? They mostly don't. In practice, they'll vote on the issues they know and care most about and keep their noses out of the rest.
It's not an all-purpose system, obviously. Williamson approves of voluntary arrangements under which people locked in close proximity with each other agree to adopt community standards for matters that would be unworkable otherwise. In a city, for instance, the local garbage pickup and potable water systems are likely to be mandatory; if you don't like it, don't live there. Out where I live, we're free to arrange for our own water and garbage services: rainwater, wellwater, truck the water in, or support the development of a local MUD; burn your garbage, bury it, or pay for a weekly or monthly pickup of one, two, or three large containers by a private company. But even in a city, close-huddled citizens probably can figure out a way to address the staggering problem of sugary drinks in oversize containers without calling in the awesome power of the state and demanding a unanimity of practice.
Short of your Hitlers and psychopathic killers, there are some very good alternatives to coercion. In a world of instantaneous information exchanges and complex social relationships, reputation is extraordinarily important. We should be looking at ways to use technology to build on that -- something a little more sophisticated than Yelp reviews.Williamson describes a hypothetical car purchase. You hand the salesman your card, only to see his face fall when he runs it.
YOU: "My card has been declined?" SALESMAN: "No, your card has . . . declined us." A second later your iPhone buzzes with a text message.You have signed up for an account alert from BeCool Card Services, which warns you when you are about to conduct a business transaction with a company that has violated one of the principles you hold dear. Perhaps your car is offered for sale by a company that mistreats workers on Liberian rubber plantations. Shortly thereafter, the car company's head of marketing gets a similar text message. Does the company immediately mend its ways in Liberia? Probably not, but what does the board think when the VP of marketing reports 100 or 1,000 such messages in a single year?
It's an essentially democratic approach, but without the need for a uniform decision binding on any minority. It's not winner-take-all uniformity. The winning political party doesn't get to say how the car company treats Liberian workers and ignore what the losing party thinks. But then, there are very, very few social dilemmas that require a uniform approach, and those arguably are limited to circumstances of outright theft and violence. Other disputes over who should marry whom, how long the workweek should be, and whether the workplace is hospitable enough to someone of your gender, age, race, or religion might be better handled by the kind of ongoing collective decision-making process that's often called "voting with your feet" or ostracization. In fact, Williamson argues that the "right of exit" is essential to any form of ordered liberty. Nothing but the power of another person to say "that won't suit me; I won't combine with you in this enterprise" can ever really keep well-meaning nanny-bullies in check.
Williamson's example is deliberately commercial and impersonal. We already have traditional social mechanisms for policing behavior by damage to reputation in more intimate settings. And it's still possible to rely on the police for help with crime -- without dragging them into disputes over gay marriage or the minimum wage.
This "crowd-sourcing" of approval and disapproval certainly has its downside. Social ostracism can be very costly, and there's no guarantee that what society collectively decides will not marginalize people we think should be heroes. But that danger is hardly unique to free crowd-sourcing. At present, a more and more intrusive government takes a vote and then cheerfully imposes the majority view on everyone -- and the government has more than a tarnishing of reputation in its arsenal to enforce the universally binding result.
How will everyone know how to judge all the myriad social evils out there that we now rely on Congress to regulate? Well, how do they know how to vote at present? And how to Congressmen know? They mostly don't. In practice, they'll vote on the issues they know and care most about and keep their noses out of the rest.
It's not an all-purpose system, obviously. Williamson approves of voluntary arrangements under which people locked in close proximity with each other agree to adopt community standards for matters that would be unworkable otherwise. In a city, for instance, the local garbage pickup and potable water systems are likely to be mandatory; if you don't like it, don't live there. Out where I live, we're free to arrange for our own water and garbage services: rainwater, wellwater, truck the water in, or support the development of a local MUD; burn your garbage, bury it, or pay for a weekly or monthly pickup of one, two, or three large containers by a private company. But even in a city, close-huddled citizens probably can figure out a way to address the staggering problem of sugary drinks in oversize containers without calling in the awesome power of the state and demanding a unanimity of practice.
Too good to source
I can't tell where this originated, so I give up on giving CWCID: George Zimmerman is reportedly changing his name, to ensure that neither the Obama administration nor the press will ever again pay him a moment's attention. His choice? "Ben Ghazi."
Which of course reminds me of this:
Which of course reminds me of this:
No, he didn't
Ace recently joked on Twitter that he wasn't even making jokes about Candidate Weiner; he was just taking his information straight from the press conferences. So when he posted today that Weiner responded to his campaign manager's decision to quit by assuring the public that "We have an amazing staff," I figured he had made it up. No, no. As Ace mused,
Meh. I don't know about "amazing." Let's just say "famous" or "well-traveled."
Phony scandals
“If Gov. Christie believes the constitutional rights and the privacy of all Americans are ‘esoteric,’ he either needs a new dictionary or he needs to talk to more Americans, because a great number of them are concerned about the dramatic overreach of our government in recent times,” Paul senior advisor Doug Stafford said.Washington Times.
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