Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Combat Veteran Lee Marvin on Marines
A contrast with the recruiting ad for the Army we recently saw.
And in other news....
Secretary Panetta’s Statement on Certification of Readiness to Implement Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Grim's going to love talking about this item.
Now, I seem to remember some EC comics from the 1950's (you can find reprints of these things if you look) with titles like "Frontline Combat" that had all sorts of stories about GI's going bonkers in combat--mostly they seem to be Korean War stories--that seems to agree with the first paragraph above.
Maybe the saying is right: It's all in your head.
So what is actually going on here? American writer Ethan Watters’s recent book, Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the Western Psyche, offers a highly subversive answer. It is that American society has been permeated by psychoanalytical beliefs about the fragility of the human mind.
This creates an expectation, he argues, that people who have been through horrible experiences will be traumatized. The veterans are simply falling in with that expectation, and exhibiting the symptoms that the theory says they should be showing.
In Britain, where the psychoanalytical approach never got such a hold on popular culture, this expectation is much rarer—and so are the symptoms of PTSD.
Now, I seem to remember some EC comics from the 1950's (you can find reprints of these things if you look) with titles like "Frontline Combat" that had all sorts of stories about GI's going bonkers in combat--mostly they seem to be Korean War stories--that seems to agree with the first paragraph above.
Maybe the saying is right: It's all in your head.
Traveling Vietnam Wall
Last weekend I attended a ceremony in Huntington, Long Island for the traveling Vietnam Wall exhibit that is stopping in two hundred cities across the country. Regrettably I did not have my embroidered Soldiers' Angels jean-jacket with me, as I did not know I would be attending until after I had left for my business trip to San Fran. I would have loved for all the Vietnam guys there to have seen a soldier-support group be present (though later in speeches someone recognized that today things are better for soldiers support-wise). The man who sang God Bless America was simply phenominal. Christopher Macchio belted out the song in a way that makes everyone a little misty-eyed.
I was extremely touched by the POW-MIA Remembrance Ceremony, which, if you have never witnessed or heard being read, take a look here.
What an occasion and an honor to be at this event. It was terrible weather, but we all gladly said the Pledge of Allegiance, paid our respects, learned a thing or two (at least I did), and properly recognized our Warriors and their tremendous sacrifice on our behalf.
I was extremely touched by the POW-MIA Remembrance Ceremony, which, if you have never witnessed or heard being read, take a look here.
What an occasion and an honor to be at this event. It was terrible weather, but we all gladly said the Pledge of Allegiance, paid our respects, learned a thing or two (at least I did), and properly recognized our Warriors and their tremendous sacrifice on our behalf.
The event was held at a park named for a NYC Firefighter who died on 9-11.
Someone with whom my Mom went to school (below), Edward L. La Barr, had died and is listed.
We checked her yearbook when we got home.
Here's how you find a name you are looking up (below).
I think this was the hardest moment for me, seeing this book.
Some people posted signs, left beer, or flowers...
John Corr was someone my aunt knew.
58,267
We Remember!
Give them the bayonet.
The colonel was hard core. He would have been an interesting man to serve with.
Colonel Lewis L. Millett, an Army veteran of three wars who received the Medal of Honor for leading a rare bayonet charge up a hill in Korea, died Saturday in Loma Linda, Calif. He was 88.
The colonel was hard core. He would have been an interesting man to serve with.
Even the Guardian thinks Obama is messing up.
The dithering was noticed a while ago. Now the the previously adulant press is beginning to notice. And this administration hasn't even been in office for a year.
That has got to be a record.
A key adviser to Nato forces warned today that Barack Obama risks a Suez-style debacle in Afghanistan if he fails to deploy enough extra troops and opts instead for a messy compromise.
David Kilcullen, one of the world's leading authorities on counter-insurgency and an adviser to the British government as well as the US state department, said Obama's delay in reaching a decision over extra troops had been "messy". He said it not only worried US allies but created uncertainty the Taliban could exploit.
Speaking in an interview with the Guardian, he compared the president to someone "pontificating" over whether to send enough firefighters into a burning building to put a fire out.
The dithering was noticed a while ago. Now the the previously adulant press is beginning to notice. And this administration hasn't even been in office for a year.
That has got to be a record.
Jingle Bombs.
So the working dogs are being treated 10x better than Marines? Heh. I'd be tempted to say that all is right with the world, but Grim would probably come a-huntin'.
Still, heh.
Go and give the doggy a cooling jacket!
(via Instapundit)
(Not that anyone complains, but it is humorous for everyone to see that the dogs get treated even better than Air Force personnel, who are treated 2x better than soldiers, who are treated 5x better than Marines. That means bomb dogs are treated at least 10x better than Marines.)
So the working dogs are being treated 10x better than Marines? Heh. I'd be tempted to say that all is right with the world, but Grim would probably come a-huntin'.
Still, heh.
Go and give the doggy a cooling jacket!
(via Instapundit)
"This is not news, this is just the Marines."
-commentor
Heh. Ooo-rah. Get some, you jar-heads.
(hat tip to Ace)
-commentor
Heh. Ooo-rah. Get some, you jar-heads.
(hat tip to Ace)
Learning to hunt.
Everything old is new again.
Hunting used to be one of those skills that was always wanted for soldiers. The Roman author Vegetius explicitly mentions the desirablity of enlisting huntsmen in his De Rei Militari 1700 years ago. The Greek author (and soldier) Xenophon, wrote On hunting some 800 years before Vegetius, in which he says:
Smart guys, those Ancients.
Everything old is new again.
Hunting used to be one of those skills that was always wanted for soldiers. The Roman author Vegetius explicitly mentions the desirablity of enlisting huntsmen in his De Rei Militari 1700 years ago. The Greek author (and soldier) Xenophon, wrote On hunting some 800 years before Vegetius, in which he says:
Therefore I charge the young not to despise hunting or any other schooling. For these are the means by which men become good in war and in all things out of which must come excellence in thought and word and deed.
Smart guys, those Ancients.
Happy Birthday, USA.
Bob Krumm has a report of 1,215 soldiers reenlisting this day in Iraq.
This country is lucky to have such citizens. They make it possible that, as Washington wrote to Moses Seixas, "...everyone shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid."
Enjoy the day, yourselves, your family and your country. Have a fig. And remember.
Bob Krumm has a report of 1,215 soldiers reenlisting this day in Iraq.
This country is lucky to have such citizens. They make it possible that, as Washington wrote to Moses Seixas, "...everyone shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid."
Enjoy the day, yourselves, your family and your country. Have a fig. And remember.
Shattered Sword.
To day is June 5. 66 years ago today, the battle of Midway had its most crucial 10 minutes: Between 10:20 and 10:30, Dauntless Dive Bombers from the US Carriers Yorktown and Enterprise, Put out of action 3 of the 4 Japanese carriers the Imperial Japanese Navy brought to the battle of Midway.
Steeljaw Scribe (via OPFOR) has a lessons learned post. Which needs to be developed a little.
--First of all, the take away from many (if not most) wars is that those that make the fewest mistakes win. That needs to be remembered as both the Japanese and Americans made several mistakes. Obviously, the Japanese made worse ones.
Its doubtful that the US would have diverted more than what was for the Aleutian operations. The Japanese, however, turned what was supposed to be a diversion into a full fledged operation, drawing off resources better used elsewhere, including 2 light carriers commited, and a further 3 others earmarked, but ultimately not sent. Think about that for a bit. 5 carriers that could have been used at Midway were not. But make no mistake, the breaking of the Japanese codes made the battle possible.
The crew of the Yorktown did that at Coral sea, but the crew of the Lexington did not. (I don't know about the Langely). While it seems a 'mundane' thing, its clear that other ships in the US Navy, (never mind the Japanese) weren't either as talented, trained or lucky as the Yorktown's crew, and its hard to account for that.
Training requires time, which the unfortunate USMC aviators didn't have. Henderson's flight group was probably the rawest in the battle, and it showed. Some of them had not even flown an SBD until a few days previously, and more than half the unit had only joined a few days before. Henderson tried what he thought his men could do, and if there's a fault, its sending untrained men into combat. But you go to war with what you have. Other measures, such as the use of B-17's and the rigging of torpedoes on B-26 Maurader medium bombers were a clear sign of desperation.
Pursuant to the point above, some 50 odd Japanese ships were detailed to the first phase of the Aluetian campaign, that obviously could have been used elsewhere. But the other thing to remember with 20-20 hindsight is that so far, the entire war had been going Japan's way. Its hard to call something outmoded or ill thought out if it seems to be working. The destruction heaped on the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor forced the US Navy to instantly rethink how to fight--because it didn't have its battleships anymore. That still didn't stop hare-brained schemes like Doolittle raid, which risked two of the four carriers that the US had in the Pacific. It worked, so one sees no real criticism of it, but what were they thinking? The best Nimitz could think of for a while was sending the carriers out on raids, which again, worked out in the end, but had no guarantee that they would.
Best was supposed to attackt he Akagi in the first place. Best's change came from ill coordination/communication between the American flight groups, --bombing six and scounting six ended up simultaneously attacking the Kaga, leaving both the Akagi unmolested, and yes, Best attacked the Akagi with 3 planes out which one lucky bomb hit, which ultimately doomed the Akagi. He could have missed. Infact, he actually did not attack according Wade McClusky's instructions, (which weren't to doctrine) and instead of sending Bombing 6 at the Akagi as instructed, Best continued attacking the Kaga--only at the last second after seeing McClusky and Scouting 6 dive on Kaga, along with the rest of Bombing 6, did Best and two other planes actually pull out of their dives and attack the Akagi. It sort of puts the lie to the idea that it was inspired initiative. In reality, it was nearly blind adherence to doctrine.
The entire attack ought to have been a study in how *not* to do it, given the horrible coordination between the torpedo and bombing squadrons, and the losses suffered. The Hornet's bombing assets did not even manage to make it into battle. --If they had, perhaps the Hiryu might have been hit at the same time as the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu, and the Yorktown would not have been hit in the Japanese counterstrike from the Hiryu later that day.
The Americans attacked the Japanese piece-meal from 0700 that morning, with everything from B-17's to B-26's (jury rigged with torpedoes!), Henderson's ill-trained Marines and of course all the doomed carrier torpedo squadrons. While this kept the Japanese off balance, and contributed to the success of the divebombing attacks, It wasn't planned that way, it just worked out that way. We were lucky.
While the Japanese planning was sub-par for Midway, one could argue that the entire war was a really bad idea in the first place, and any tactical success was not, in the end, going to help the Japanese out of their predicament. The Japanese had indeed 'run wild' for six months, but ill will between the Japanese Army and Navy precluded any sort of efficiencies that would be required for the war. The entire Guadalcanal campaign only underscored this.
One could make the same analogy with Bin Laden and Al-Queda, which while achieving a spectacular tactical success on 9/11, committed a monumental strategic blunder, which has essentially doomed them.
Even the US was dogged with the machinations of MacArthur vs. Nimitz and the directions of the American campaigns in the Pacific. This also highlights the difficulty of such fighting such a big war.
I am not sure what's being ignored here, not having read the rest of SJS's blog, but I'm not certain things are being ignored the way he implies.
Still, as Rumsfeld so elequently put it:
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
And yes, we need to keep thinking about the last.
To day is June 5. 66 years ago today, the battle of Midway had its most crucial 10 minutes: Between 10:20 and 10:30, Dauntless Dive Bombers from the US Carriers Yorktown and Enterprise, Put out of action 3 of the 4 Japanese carriers the Imperial Japanese Navy brought to the battle of Midway.
Steeljaw Scribe (via OPFOR) has a lessons learned post. Which needs to be developed a little.
In racing there is a saying - ‘luck is where preparation meets opportunity’ Perhaps there is no truer an example than the Battle of Midway. Popular literature seems to emphasize the American forces stumbling into a heaven-sent scenario of laden carrier decks and little to no opposition to the dive bombers, while giving short shrift to the preparation that enabled them to make use of that opportunity. How so?
--First of all, the take away from many (if not most) wars is that those that make the fewest mistakes win. That needs to be remembered as both the Japanese and Americans made several mistakes. Obviously, the Japanese made worse ones.
COMINT: Communications Intelligence - the US code breakers labored mightily to figure out what the IJN was up to. Were it not for their efforts prior to Midway, and some particularly inspired thinking and risk taking, the US may well have fallen for the feint up to Alaska and end up caught in the trap laid by Yamamoto.
Its doubtful that the US would have diverted more than what was for the Aleutian operations. The Japanese, however, turned what was supposed to be a diversion into a full fledged operation, drawing off resources better used elsewhere, including 2 light carriers commited, and a further 3 others earmarked, but ultimately not sent. Think about that for a bit. 5 carriers that could have been used at Midway were not. But make no mistake, the breaking of the Japanese codes made the battle possible.
Damage Control: Had the crew of the Yorktown not been so proficient in DC, particularly something as seemingly mundane as draining the avgas lines and filling them with inert gas prior to the battle of Coral Sea, the Yorktown may very well have been lost, leaving CINCPAC with only two carriers facing four, forcing a different battle plan. Conversely, the almost lackadaisical approach the Japanese took in repairing Shokaku’s damage or replinishing Zuikaku’s air wing and repairing her light damage from Coral Sea’s action ensured their nonavailability for Midway, keeping the balance of forces on a razor’s edge.
The crew of the Yorktown did that at Coral sea, but the crew of the Lexington did not. (I don't know about the Langely). While it seems a 'mundane' thing, its clear that other ships in the US Navy, (never mind the Japanese) weren't either as talented, trained or lucky as the Yorktown's crew, and its hard to account for that.
Training: The contrast between USN and USMC effectiveness in employing dive bombers at Midway was signatory. Using the same platform (SBD-3’s) USN pilots scored major hits while minimizing losses to AAA and fighters, whereas the Marines suffered significant losses for little, if any gain. The difference? Tactics, training and procedures or TTP (yes, we know -ugh, one of those modern terms…) - the Navy employed steep, usually 70-degree, dives on the target whereas the Marines used much shallower, gliding approaches. The former minimizes your exposure time and profile to AAA and fighters while increasing the likelihood of a hit. However, it requires considerable practice at obtaining the proper dive angle, avoiding target fixation and knowing how/when to pullout of the dive and avoid over-stressing the airframe. Lots of practice, underscoring the maxim about training like you are going to fight…
Training requires time, which the unfortunate USMC aviators didn't have. Henderson's flight group was probably the rawest in the battle, and it showed. Some of them had not even flown an SBD until a few days previously, and more than half the unit had only joined a few days before. Henderson tried what he thought his men could do, and if there's a fault, its sending untrained men into combat. But you go to war with what you have. Other measures, such as the use of B-17's and the rigging of torpedoes on B-26 Maurader medium bombers were a clear sign of desperation.
Employment of forces: The Japanese were the first to employ massed striking power using carriers and the strike at Pearl (and subsequent actions through SE Asia and the IO) validated the philosophy. The problem was the Japanese failed to comprehend the inherent flexibility of carrier-based air and thus eschewed opportunities to utilize it in other scenarios, such as scouting, which in turn, led to less than robust search plans and reliance on out-dated search aircraft and methodologies. Curiously, the Japanese broke this rule in planning the Aleutian invasion, diverting forces on a mission of questionable value and success for territory that would prove to be exceptionally harsh on man and machine while yielding little, if any strategic value outside of propaganda for an overly wrought plan of entrapment. This leads to questions of planning…
Pursuant to the point above, some 50 odd Japanese ships were detailed to the first phase of the Aluetian campaign, that obviously could have been used elsewhere. But the other thing to remember with 20-20 hindsight is that so far, the entire war had been going Japan's way. Its hard to call something outmoded or ill thought out if it seems to be working. The destruction heaped on the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor forced the US Navy to instantly rethink how to fight--because it didn't have its battleships anymore. That still didn't stop hare-brained schemes like Doolittle raid, which risked two of the four carriers that the US had in the Pacific. It worked, so one sees no real criticism of it, but what were they thinking? The best Nimitz could think of for a while was sending the carriers out on raids, which again, worked out in the end, but had no guarantee that they would.
Planning/Command: In studied contrast to the run-up at Pearl, Japanese planning for Midway was poorly thought out, egregiously evaluated and gamed and haphazardly executed (cf: the entire submarine picket plan). Indeed, it was put together and executed in such a toxic atmosphere of arrogance and bluster that even when one of the final wargame sessions showed American forces gaining an upper-hand because of gaps in the air search pattern, referees for the wargame manipulated the environment and other factors to bring about a successful conclusion for Kido Butai. As for dealing with changing factors at sea, commanders were loath to step outside the boundaries of the plan and demonstrate initiative. In studied contrast were the actions of the Americans from Nimitz’s orders based on calculated risk to Dick Best’s last minute change in targets.
Best was supposed to attackt he Akagi in the first place. Best's change came from ill coordination/communication between the American flight groups, --bombing six and scounting six ended up simultaneously attacking the Kaga, leaving both the Akagi unmolested, and yes, Best attacked the Akagi with 3 planes out which one lucky bomb hit, which ultimately doomed the Akagi. He could have missed. Infact, he actually did not attack according Wade McClusky's instructions, (which weren't to doctrine) and instead of sending Bombing 6 at the Akagi as instructed, Best continued attacking the Kaga--only at the last second after seeing McClusky and Scouting 6 dive on Kaga, along with the rest of Bombing 6, did Best and two other planes actually pull out of their dives and attack the Akagi. It sort of puts the lie to the idea that it was inspired initiative. In reality, it was nearly blind adherence to doctrine.
The entire attack ought to have been a study in how *not* to do it, given the horrible coordination between the torpedo and bombing squadrons, and the losses suffered. The Hornet's bombing assets did not even manage to make it into battle. --If they had, perhaps the Hiryu might have been hit at the same time as the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu, and the Yorktown would not have been hit in the Japanese counterstrike from the Hiryu later that day.
The Americans attacked the Japanese piece-meal from 0700 that morning, with everything from B-17's to B-26's (jury rigged with torpedoes!), Henderson's ill-trained Marines and of course all the doomed carrier torpedo squadrons. While this kept the Japanese off balance, and contributed to the success of the divebombing attacks, It wasn't planned that way, it just worked out that way. We were lucky.
While the Japanese planning was sub-par for Midway, one could argue that the entire war was a really bad idea in the first place, and any tactical success was not, in the end, going to help the Japanese out of their predicament. The Japanese had indeed 'run wild' for six months, but ill will between the Japanese Army and Navy precluded any sort of efficiencies that would be required for the war. The entire Guadalcanal campaign only underscored this.
One could make the same analogy with Bin Laden and Al-Queda, which while achieving a spectacular tactical success on 9/11, committed a monumental strategic blunder, which has essentially doomed them.
Even the US was dogged with the machinations of MacArthur vs. Nimitz and the directions of the American campaigns in the Pacific. This also highlights the difficulty of such fighting such a big war.
Luck indeed smiled on the Americans that day, but she did not grab them by the hand (or scruff of the neck) and tell them what must be done in PowerPoint bulletized format. She merely opened the door, a crack, and offered a fleeting moment to change the course of the battle…the Americans grasped it and changed the direction of the war. Review the list above - these are timeless lessons learned, every bit as applicable today as they were 66 years ago. My observations lead me to believe we are ignoring them at our future peril. - SJS
I am not sure what's being ignored here, not having read the rest of SJS's blog, but I'm not certain things are being ignored the way he implies.
Still, as Rumsfeld so elequently put it:
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
And yes, we need to keep thinking about the last.
Don't piss off the boss.
Wired magazine's DANGER ROOM has a little background:
It isn't the cold war anymore, and I think the Air Force is chafing at the role of essentially being air-borne artillery.
WASHINGTON, June 5, 2008 – Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today announced the resignations of Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley following an investigation revealing a decline in the Air Force's nuclear program focus, performance and effective leadership.
Wired magazine's DANGER ROOM has a little background:
The move, initially reported by Inside Defense and Air Force Times, isn't exactly a shocker. The Air Force has come under fire for everything from mishandling nukes to misleading ad campaigns to missing out on the importance of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Most importantly, the Air Force's leadership has been on the brink of open conflict for months with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England. That's because in the halls of the Air Force's chiefs, the talk has been largely about the threats posed by China and a resurgent Russia. Gates wanted the service to actually focus on the wars at hand, in Iraq and Afghanistan. "For much of the past year I’ve been trying to concentrate the minds and energies of the defense establishment on the current needs and current conflicts," he told the Heritage Foundation. "In short, to ensure that all parts of the Defense Department are, in fact, at war."
It isn't the cold war anymore, and I think the Air Force is chafing at the role of essentially being air-borne artillery.
...“You probably have time to put on pants, Sir.”
LT G relates his and his platoon's experiences during the recent Mahdi army 'revolt' in Iraq.
I want to send SSG Bulldog more milkbones.
LT G relates his and his platoon's experiences during the recent Mahdi army 'revolt' in Iraq.
I want to send SSG Bulldog more milkbones.
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