Before we move on to Book II, here is a place for any last questions or thoughts about Book I. I'll start on Book II probably later today. Maybe tomorrow, because the MIT site I use to easily access the text is down right now.
This is good timing; I just finished my review last evening. I worked to synthesize chapter 1 to understand it better. Here is part of the synthesis I came to:
It seems to me that, even when he is admitting that others have good points, he comes back to the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with reason. I like how he subsumes other arguments into his. E.g., in Book 8 he notes that, for the virtuous, acting virtuously is a pleasure, thus subsuming the argument that happiness is pleasure into his in a fashion. Similarly, for those who say happiness is virtue, he notes that acting virtuously is better than virtues that are not put into action, and so he subsumes that argument into his as well. By subsume here, I mean that he doesn't contradict these other arguments or say they're wrong, but he takes them on their own terms and shows how they fit even better into his system. It's a kind of elegant argument, I think.
His discussion of the problem of death is interesting in a couple of ways. Can we only say a man is happy after he has died, so we can judge his complete life? And how can a dead man be happy? His answer seems to be in Book 10, where he says that doing well or badly isn't in one's fortunes, but rather that activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity, which Bartlett and Collins translate as being "great souled," and indeed: magna - anima would equal "great soul." (I re-read the text in their translation, so some of my wording here is a bit different.)
Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue.
So, what does everyone think? Does this seem to line up with Aristotle's argument so far?
"...activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity... Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue."
Good. That will also prove to be the root of Stoicism, which takes that concept all the way to the wall. They will declare that happiness is entirely in your control and not dependent on external goods, only internal states of character.
Aristotle does not, as you note; he does admit that there are some external things needed even for some virtues to be possible; and also thinks that the fortune of your descendants and friends (which is outside of yourself entirely) can affect happiness to some degree. Even in the dead, sort of: though he wants to minimize that he won't quite reject it. However, he wants the core of the idea that happiness is yours to control, for the most part.
That takes us all the way back to the opening few books: "always or for the most part" is the right standard for Aristotle. Reality has chance and fate, and even doing the probably best thing won't always work. If it's the thing that would work 'always or for the most part,' that's as good as we should be looking for. Seeking proofs in ethics or politics is foolish, like accepting a rhetorical argument in mathematics.
That last reminded me of the Stoics as well, though as you say it's not the same.
Something that interests me is that often Aristotle talks as if happiness is a binary -- this person is happy, that one is not. However, it would seem to me that it would be more of a spectrum, with some more happy and others less happy. However, so far, he seems to be defining things and I'm interested to see if he does anything with this aspect of it.
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This is good timing; I just finished my review last evening. I worked to synthesize chapter 1 to understand it better. Here is part of the synthesis I came to:
It seems to me that, even when he is admitting that others have good points, he comes back to the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with reason. I like how he subsumes other arguments into his. E.g., in Book 8 he notes that, for the virtuous, acting virtuously is a pleasure, thus subsuming the argument that happiness is pleasure into his in a fashion. Similarly, for those who say happiness is virtue, he notes that acting virtuously is better than virtues that are not put into action, and so he subsumes that argument into his as well. By subsume here, I mean that he doesn't contradict these other arguments or say they're wrong, but he takes them on their own terms and shows how they fit even better into his system. It's a kind of elegant argument, I think.
His discussion of the problem of death is interesting in a couple of ways. Can we only say a man is happy after he has died, so we can judge his complete life? And how can a dead man be happy? His answer seems to be in Book 10, where he says that doing well or badly isn't in one's fortunes, but rather that activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity, which Bartlett and Collins translate as being "great souled," and indeed: magna - anima would equal "great soul." (I re-read the text in their translation, so some of my wording here is a bit different.)
Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue.
So, what does everyone think? Does this seem to line up with Aristotle's argument so far?
"...activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity... Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue."
Good. That will also prove to be the root of Stoicism, which takes that concept all the way to the wall. They will declare that happiness is entirely in your control and not dependent on external goods, only internal states of character.
Aristotle does not, as you note; he does admit that there are some external things needed even for some virtues to be possible; and also thinks that the fortune of your descendants and friends (which is outside of yourself entirely) can affect happiness to some degree. Even in the dead, sort of: though he wants to minimize that he won't quite reject it. However, he wants the core of the idea that happiness is yours to control, for the most part.
That takes us all the way back to the opening few books: "always or for the most part" is the right standard for Aristotle. Reality has chance and fate, and even doing the probably best thing won't always work. If it's the thing that would work 'always or for the most part,' that's as good as we should be looking for. Seeking proofs in ethics or politics is foolish, like accepting a rhetorical argument in mathematics.
That last reminded me of the Stoics as well, though as you say it's not the same.
Something that interests me is that often Aristotle talks as if happiness is a binary -- this person is happy, that one is not. However, it would seem to me that it would be more of a spectrum, with some more happy and others less happy. However, so far, he seems to be defining things and I'm interested to see if he does anything with this aspect of it.
It’s very much the root of what will become Stoicism.
See what you think about this spectrum idea as we proceed. There’s at least a multi-place position, not just a binary.
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