Before we move on to Book II, here is a place for any last questions or thoughts about Book I. I'll start on Book II probably later today. Maybe tomorrow, because the MIT site I use to easily access the text is down right now.
This is good timing; I just finished my review last evening. I worked to synthesize chapter 1 to understand it better. Here is part of the synthesis I came to:
It seems to me that, even when he is admitting that others have good points, he comes back to the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with reason. I like how he subsumes other arguments into his. E.g., in Book 8 he notes that, for the virtuous, acting virtuously is a pleasure, thus subsuming the argument that happiness is pleasure into his in a fashion. Similarly, for those who say happiness is virtue, he notes that acting virtuously is better than virtues that are not put into action, and so he subsumes that argument into his as well. By subsume here, I mean that he doesn't contradict these other arguments or say they're wrong, but he takes them on their own terms and shows how they fit even better into his system. It's a kind of elegant argument, I think.
His discussion of the problem of death is interesting in a couple of ways. Can we only say a man is happy after he has died, so we can judge his complete life? And how can a dead man be happy? His answer seems to be in Book 10, where he says that doing well or badly isn't in one's fortunes, but rather that activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity, which Bartlett and Collins translate as being "great souled," and indeed: magna - anima would equal "great soul." (I re-read the text in their translation, so some of my wording here is a bit different.)
Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue.
So, what does everyone think? Does this seem to line up with Aristotle's argument so far?
1 comment:
This is good timing; I just finished my review last evening. I worked to synthesize chapter 1 to understand it better. Here is part of the synthesis I came to:
It seems to me that, even when he is admitting that others have good points, he comes back to the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with reason. I like how he subsumes other arguments into his. E.g., in Book 8 he notes that, for the virtuous, acting virtuously is a pleasure, thus subsuming the argument that happiness is pleasure into his in a fashion. Similarly, for those who say happiness is virtue, he notes that acting virtuously is better than virtues that are not put into action, and so he subsumes that argument into his as well. By subsume here, I mean that he doesn't contradict these other arguments or say they're wrong, but he takes them on their own terms and shows how they fit even better into his system. It's a kind of elegant argument, I think.
His discussion of the problem of death is interesting in a couple of ways. Can we only say a man is happy after he has died, so we can judge his complete life? And how can a dead man be happy? His answer seems to be in Book 10, where he says that doing well or badly isn't in one's fortunes, but rather that activities in accord with virtue have control over happiness, and that nobility shines through ill fortunes when someone bears up calmly under them. This is the virtue of magnanimity, which Bartlett and Collins translate as being "great souled," and indeed: magna - anima would equal "great soul." (I re-read the text in their translation, so some of my wording here is a bit different.)
Although there are places where Aristotle admits (or seems to admit) other, external things seem necessary to happiness, he keeps returning to and developing the argument that happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue.
So, what does everyone think? Does this seem to line up with Aristotle's argument so far?
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