More Roy Clark

 

Nicomachean Ethics III.3

Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But no more do we deliberate about the things that involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether of necessity or by nature or from any other cause, e.g. the solstices and the risings of the stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in another, e.g. droughts and rains; nor about chance events, like the finding of treasure. But we do not deliberate even about all human affairs; for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.

The word being translated as 'deliberation' -- prohairesis -- doesn't mean "think about" or "consider." Deliberation is about actions we should take; they are ends-to-means reasoning. As a result, the content of geometry or even theology is not where deliberation happens. 

Terence Irwin points out in his useful glossary accompanying his translation that the 'pro' here is etymologically temporal: hairesis is a choice, and 'pro-' means that you are taking the pre-decision step of thinking through what you should do. This can be done well in advance so that a decision in many cases can be made immediately based upon your existing moral principles; indeed, as we shall see, that is one of the best proofs of complete virtue.

We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done; and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and chance are thought to be causes, and also reason and everything that depends on man. Now every class of men deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts. And in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about which we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-making. And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding.

Whenever Aristotle says that something happens "in a certain way for the most part" he is indicating the presence of a Form. Here is commentary I wrote about the difference between Platonic and Aristotelean forms and their effect on causality. The form for Aristotle is often two of the four causes he recognizes in the Physics, the 'formal' and 'final' causes. That still leaves the 'efficient' and 'material' causes, either of which can keep the form from being realized perfectly. Thus "for the most part"; sometimes the material fails, or some chance accidentally introduces an unexpected element into the efficient causality. The relative reliability of the matter, however, implies a form is at work. (You will note that this is another version of the warning at I.3 that ethics is about probabilities and not certainties.)

We deliberate not about ends but about means.

That might be surprising; politically at least we often seem to deliberate about ends. Politics is an extension of ethics for Aristotle; it is where we try to create the conditions for the good human life that the ethics describes. All the same, he holds that at least in ethics, we don't deliberate about our ends.

For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. 

I'm not at all certain that Aristotle is correct about 'the statesman,' although perhaps he is assuming that his statesman is a good one. It isn't clear to me that some of our 'statesmen' aren't pursuing disorder as a strategy; certainly some of our city managers or mayors don't seem that interested in law and order. However, Aristotle believes that the end is assumed as obvious here as in his other cases.

They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. 

For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation- for instance mathematical investigations- but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming.

The inversion of priority in discovery versus causality is an interesting question. When we look at an event, we often do track backwards to the first principles, or to the first event in a series of causes. I'm not sure that we do that necessarily: I think sometimes we grasp the first principle quickly, and it helps illuminate where to look for the individuals that caused the particular event. If there were an assassination of an official, for example, we might start by tracking backwards first to the assassin and then to his organization and then to their goals and finally to the first principles that are their ends; but we also might realize that a group with that set of ends was likely to be responsible, and start our investigation by looking to see which groups of that sort might have been involved. 

And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.

The example shows that this is a pragmatic standard, again in line with I.3; 'we need money' is impossible in the sense that 'we need a square circle' would be. The latter is genuinely impossible, and indeed inconceivable in the proper sense of the word. 

By 'possible' things I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the moving principle is in ourselves. The subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases- sometimes the means, sometimes the mode of using it or the means of bringing it about.

A "moving principle" here doesn't mean that the principle is moving, but that it is a thing responsible for the motion, which can include any sort of action. It may seem strange to contemporary readers to describe a principle in this way because our physics usually only admits of efficient causes. As mentioned above, Aristotelian causality has four causes, and a principle can be a formal or final cause. A thing might be put into motion for the sake of a principle, e.g., "It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom — for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself."

It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a moving principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed can the particular facts be a subject of it, as whether this is bread or has been baked as it should; for these are matters of perception. If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.

Here the man is likely to be the efficient moving principle, his love of virtue hopefully the final principle of causation. It's ok that there are multiple principles for a single motion; the model in fact requires four, although often we find that two of them are the same (formal and final often are; efficient and material sometimes are).

The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice.

This is a technical distinction. These are important sometimes in Aristotelian philosophy, as for example when Aquinas finds that "good" and "existence" are the same thing really, though one is prior to the other conceptually. Here the action decided upon is both the thing deliberated upon and the chosen thing; but conceptually it is different once it becomes the choice because it is now determined, rather than still open to consideration.

For every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses. This is plain also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented; for the kings announced their choices to the people. The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.

We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is concerned with means.

Malagueña

 

Free Speech on Texas Campuses

The WaPo has a point this time. It's probably behind a paywall, so I'll quote the relevant part here.

The campus protest law actually directs public colleges and universities to implement a version of free-speech zones and adopt sweeping limitations on protests. Encampments? Banned. Megaphones or speakers during “class hours”? Forbidden — if anyone claims your “expressive activity” is one that “intimidates others” or “interferes” with an employee’s duties. Even wearing a mask during a protest — something many do for safety — could land a student or employee a disciplinary hearing resulting in “sanctions.” And any expressive activity between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. is off-limits altogether.

Though each restriction raises potential First Amendment issues, this last one is perhaps the most concerning. State law defines “expressive activity” as “any speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment” — speeches, writing, art, symbolic actions, even just talking to your friends. It’s problematic enough that legislators seek to prohibit nighttime or early-morning protest activity, but the language could affect late-night art events, student journalists, and even assigned research, course or thesis work for students or faculty in the habit of burning the midnight oil. 

Thus, Texas can't argue that it's not intending to infringe upon protected First Amendment activity; it is doing so by its own definition. In addition to being strictly forbidden by the Constitution, this is ridiculously broad:  apolitical events like concerts for college-aged people are often held until after 10 PM, and indeed may not start until midnight. I no longer wish to be out after ten, but it's not at all unusual for young people to enjoy it. 

Still, the First Amendment isn't chiefly about artistic entertainment events like concerts. It's especially about political speech. I can see the "no megaphones when it will make it impossible to conduct classes" rule, as the teachers' and students' work in class is also protected free expression (and something the students are paying a pretty penny to receive). I can see the rules against intimidating students or professors or interfering with their ability to do the thing that the institution exists to do. Banning First Amendment protected activity outright during hours when classes aren't even in session cannot survive any constitutional review. 

Nicomachean Ethics III.2

In the next chapter of Book III, Aristotle moves on to that which is chosen. The word being used is prohairesis, which can be translated either as "choice" or "decision." It's the same Greek word whichever of those English words is used.

Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been delimited, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do.

Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen.

This is not how we today talk about choosing. Note that Aristotle is setting aside 'choice' as something that requires not only access to the Order of Reason, but in fact adult levels of reasoning. He is probably incorrect that neither children nor animals partake of that; some animals like crows and orcas seem to do so, and many children are more rational than he is giving them credit for here. Still, we can admit the exceptions without undermining the basic distinction he is making between that which is driven by impulse and that which is chosen after consideration. 

Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and anger are. Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts with choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.

I mentioned this continent/incontinent distinction in I.13. We will hear a lot more about this, so you might want to review the note there.

Still less is it anger; for acts due to anger are thought to be less than any others objects of choice.

So much so that even today we have a lesser standard of punishment for murders committed in anger than murders that were premeditated in cold blood.

But neither is it wish, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate to impossibles, and if any one said he chose them he would be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g. for immortality. And wish may relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, e.g. that a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; but no one chooses such things, but only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts. Again, wish relates rather to the end, choice to the means; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will make us healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our own power.

You can't choose to ride a unicorn to work, obviously. There's a broader point here about the importance of ends and means being in alignment, and within one's own power. I wish for my favorite football team to win, but I can't really do anything about it; increasingly, our politics looks like that too. I wish for things to happen, but cannot control or even influence them through the means available to me.

This point is greatly elaborated by the Stoics, who will go on to find that much of the time we are fooling ourselves about what we actually have power to control. (If you are interested, follow the link on prohairesis for more.) That removes our responsibility for them, for Aristotle; for the Stoics, it should also liberate us from our need to be bothered about them. What we end up responsible for is how we choose to respond internally rather than what happens in the world outside of us. Aristotle does not go that far. He expects you still to care, even very deeply, about things you cannot control. He just doesn't think you are making choices that you are responsible for in doing so.

For this reason, too, it cannot be opinion; for opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by these.

That point might be debatable to students of theology, and not merely Christian ones; your opinion about eternal things is often said by the monotheisms to be a choice of great significance. Some say your very soul may depend on this choice of what to believe about the eternal things. Terence Irwin's translation even gives this word not as "opinion" but as "belief," and framed that way we are used to hearing it described as a decision of the very first importance.

For Aristotle, it is not a decision nor choice at all, and definitely not something that would greatly inform us about your character. That is, pragmatically, how Americans tend to behave: we usually don't concern ourselves with others' religious views at all, but instead accept that anyone can be a good person (or a bad one) regardless of his or her religious opinions. Most of us have known people we greatly liked and considered to be good in spite of significant differences in religious opinions.

Whether Aristotle was right or wrong about that is, of course, an opinion of just the type under discussion. He goes on to dismiss all sorts of opinions (or 'beliefs' of this sort) from ethics; they are, he argues, not even the right kind of things to consider as ethical decisions.

Now with opinion in general perhaps no one even says it is identical [with decision]. But [decision] is not identical even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding certain opinions. And we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being related to the right object rather than for being rightly related to it, opinion for being truly related to its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not quite know; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it, that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but whether it is identical with some kind of opinion.

What, then, or what kind of thing is [decision], since it is none of the things we have mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things.

A consequence of that last is that all of ethics is limited to that which is or ought to be decided rationally. You can still be judged for irrational behaviors, but only if your reason should have controlled your actions and didn't. 

If You Like Pipes and Drums, Arab Christians, or Scouts

 

Pecking Order

The NYT published a piece (h/t Instapundit) on perhaps starting to not shun your right-wing kinfolk. The folks at Instapundit found something different in it than I did; what caught my eye was the following setup coupled with a later line:

The setup:

I met Matt Kappler in 2012, and it was immediately clear we had nothing in common. He lifted weights to death metal; I jogged to Sondheim. I was one of President Barack Obama’s speechwriters and had an Ivy League degree; he was a huge Joe Rogan fan and went on to get his electrician’s license.

The second line, after they begin surfing together:

It helped that in the ocean, our places in the pecking order reversed. Matt’s a very good surfer — one might call him “an elite” — and I am not. According to surfing’s unwritten rules, he had the right to look down on me. But he never did. His generosity of spirit in the water made me rethink my own behavior on land.

The author who thinks 'our places in the pecking order reversed' edited Yale's humor magazine and now writes for McSweeney's and the Onion. How did he ever imagine that he outranked a licensed electrician and expert surfer? Just because he wrote some speeches that a politician pretended to believe long enough to read them? 

Still, the open-mindedness is refreshing.

Matt and I haven’t really changed each other’s minds on major national issues. But we have changed each other. His fearlessness in consequential surf made me more courageous. His ability to go “over the ledge,” launching himself off breaking lips, helped me curb my overthinking. Ostracizing him wouldn’t have altered his behavior — and it would have made my own life worse.

That's not nothing.

Revolution

More from ChicagoBoyz, Jay Manifold this time:

If things go as I both fear and hope, it may become a modern-day (and admittedly far more comfortable) version of hunkering down in a Christian community in the Eastern Mediterranean in the 60s and 70s AD. This is where I note that for all the rationalizations of every imaginable political system by believers over the past two millennia, the political advice of the New Testament may be summarized as “stay out of trouble.”

He closes with a quotation from the libertarian POV character in the excellent "The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress":

I will accept the rules that you feel necessary to your freedom. I am free, no matter what rules surround me. If I find them tolerable, I tolerate them; if I find them too obnoxious, I break them. I am free because I know that I alone am morally responsible for everything I do.

Abundance

From David Foster at ChicagoBoyz:

I see posts from Left-oriented people who don’t seem to realize that production is necessary at all. The assertion is made that abundance is the natural state of man, and scarcity is caused by capitalists fencing everything off to deliberately create scarcity.

That golden goose belongs to us, and if we feel like it we can kill it! That'll show 'em!

The natural relationship between mother and infant does not scale up well to society.

Nicomachean Ethics III.1

In Book III we will get our first fully described virtue, courage. Courage is not the most important virtue for Aristotle -- indeed, it is not even one of his major virtues -- but it is the easiest to conceptualize. It therefore serves as a useful model for the more theoretical ones.

First, however, he wants to say a few more words about the importance of choice on what is or isn't virtue. He has already said once that virtue is only about things where we make a choice; here he expands on that by considering some things that can make our actions compelled or involuntary.

Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments. Those things, then, are thought-involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power.

Emphasis added. This notion of the principle of action being outside is exactly parallel to his model in Physics II.1: "Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes." These 'things' include motions, so if a motion of yours (e.g. an action) exists, either it was caused by your own nature, or it was caused by something else. If it was caused by your nature -- your quest for food, or love, or honor -- then it was an action of yours that must be judged (although it could still have been done in ignorance). If it was caused by something else, like men forcing you as their prisoner, then it was not your action at all: it was involuntary. 

But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary.

As already mentioned, Aristotle will endorse a notion of justice that requires laws that compel virtue; but we will also see that he doesn't value such actions as real examples of the virtue. Hector's courage, for example, he will compare to a soldier whose action on the battlefield is driven by the law rather than by an inner drive; being at least partly externally compelled, it doesn't count for as much in the final judgment. 

Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself.

Emphasis added. As in I.3, where we were talking about things that are true "probably" or "for the most part," here too we end up having to make some pragmatic distinctions. It's not a binary: some things are sort-of voluntary, or closer-to voluntary, but there are elements of the involuntary present, unchosen considerations like the storm. 

For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful in return for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that 'forced' Euripides Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not.

After the jump, more on how to decide what is compulsory, is not, and how to balance the judgments. I won't break this chapter up into multiple parts; it's fairly straightforward.

Si Vis Pacem

The videos today are of a sobbing female police officer in the UK crying that nobody from the crowd came to help her. Colonel Kurt points out that the UK has taught its subjects that they aren't entitled to self-defense; how then to expect them to know how, or be willing, to jump in to defend the police? Commenters note that it's even worse that the assailants were Muslims, because in the UK anyone jumping in would also have to fear hate crime prosecutions. The police have to take care of themselves, without necessarily having nearby backup, but it's no longer a hiring consideration whether or not they are physically capable.

Now one place that female police work pretty well is in Japan. Japanese society is intensely rule-following and group-harmony-directed. The odds of violence being turned against the police are very low there, so polite requests from the police and security personnel are usually sufficient. There too, however, they're finding themselves at a loss to deal with the assault situation from Islamic tourists. Fortunately in that case the assault was merely spittle. 

In both of these countries the police are generally not armed, so their congruent lack of physical strength and size is doubly risky. Disarming yourselves and trusting to the kindness of others is only fit for the hoped-for world to come; in our world, a government strong enough to make that viable has proven tyrannical.

For fear of his yasa and punishment his followers were so well 

disciplined that during his reign no traveller, so long as he was 

near his army, had need of guard or patrol on any stretch of road ; 

and, as is said by way of hyperbole, a woman with a golden 

vessel on her head might walk alone without fear or dread. 

And he enacted minute yasas that were an intolerable imposition 

upon such as the Taziks, e.g. that none might slaughter meat in 

the Moslem fashion nor sit by day in running water, and so on. 

The yasa forbidding the slaughter of sheep in the lawful manner 

he sent to every land ; and for a time no man slaughtered sheep 

openly in Khorasan, and Moslems were forced to eat carrion. 

-Juvayni, Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik, trans. John Andrew Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror (Harvard: 1958), 272.

Safe enough for the submissive, but intolerable all the same. 

250 Years of USMC Service "Rifles"

The earliest ones are not technically rifles but muskets. This is an official Marines.mil site, so you can enjoy the history with confidence in spite of that little conflation on their part.

The Horrors of Syria

The Assad regime carried out mass bureaucratic murder. That story is quite horrifying; you may not wish to read it. I will not quote the more harrowing details here.

Inside the prison, a pair of concrete buildings ringed by razor wire on a mountainside near Damascus, Assad’s regime carried out industrial-scale torture and death that likely killed tens of thousands of people over more than a decade. The regime orchestrated the killing in a bureaucratic manner rarely seen in recent history. Assad’s security apparatus kept meticulous records of the detainees’ transfer to the prison and other facilities, court documents and death certificates of those executed. 

“It’s the worst atrocity of the 21st century in terms of the number killed and the way a government was directly involved,” said Stephen Rapp, a former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes. “I do draw a line to the Nazis and to Soviet Russia in terms of the organized nature of state terror.”

...

In addition to the many thousands killed in organized executions, former detainees and war crimes experts say perhaps an equal number of people died in Saydnaya from torture and extreme conditions, including beatings with pipes and rods, along with starvation, thirst and disease.... 

The hundreds who walked free in December represented a tiny minority among the many thousands of Syrians who went missing during the war. Some 160,123 Syrians were forcibly disappeared by the Assad regime throughout the war according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a respected watchdog group.

The war also displaced more than thirteen million people, millions of them still refugees in Europe and elsewhere. 

Nicomachean Ethics II.9

This is the last chapter of Book II.  

That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry- that is easy- or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.

This is the point I was making in the update to the Bladesman's post. Because this is a pragmatic ethics, it is about adapting yourself to the world. It's not a purely internal exercise, where you determine how much courage or temperance or justice is right for your soul. You have to be right not just for yourself, but for the external situation. Sometimes more or less will be needed because the challenge you are facing is greater or lesser.

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises-

Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.

Obviously that is the only way to push off in a ship, so the Homeric reference may seem superfluous. Unlike Plato, who was constantly at war with the poets, Aristotle has the greatest respect for Homer especially. It conveyed to his students, especially Alexander: "Aristotle taught Alexander and his companions about medicine, philosophy, morals, religion, logic, and art. Under Aristotle's tutelage, Alexander developed a passion for the works of Homer, and in particular the Iliad; Aristotle gave him an annotated copy, which Alexander later carried on his campaigns."  

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the way we describe. But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

This is a restatement of yesterday's point about love of pleasure being much more dangerous than insensibility to pleasure, for example. He continues on the subject: 

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

The reference is to Iliad 3: "The two sages, Ucalegon and Antenor, elders of the people, were seated by the Scaean gates, with Priam, Panthous, Thymoetes, Lampus, Clytius, and Hiketaon of the race of Mars. These were too old to fight, but they were fluent orators, and sat on the tower like cicales that chirrup delicately from the boughs of some high tree in a wood. When they saw Helen coming towards the tower, they said softly to one another, 'Small wonder that Trojans and Achaeans should endure so much and so long, for the sake of a woman so marvellously and divinely lovely. Still, fair though she be, let them take her and go, or she will breed sorrow for us and for our children after us.'"

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the mean and what is right.

That's fair enough. This is hard work, and our reason can only get us so far sometimes given the depths of emotional entanglement and the difficulty of the problems. Sometimes we'll go astray, but if we err in the wisest direction we'll be closer to what was best.  

Managerialism vs. Democracy

It's really just an updated version of what Weber said a long time ago -- see the sidebar for that commentary -- but it is where we are.

[Democracy] risks extinction because the authorities that run our societies seem to find the practice, values, and very spirit of democracy to be increasingly intolerable.

In France, where the ruling government maintains power despite being the most widely hated in decades, the most popular candidate of the most popular political party has been barred from challenging that government in upcoming elections, on legal grounds that are openly political.

In Romania, when the “wrong” outsider candidate appeared poised to win an election, authorities canceled the election outright and then had him arrested, the unelected national security state inventing entirely unsupported excuses about foreign meddling to justify their coup d’état against the democratic process.

In Germany, the state has now begun the process of banning the country’s most popular party, supported by more than a quarter of the voting population, in order to avoid facing any real political opposition. “We did it in Romania, and we will obviously have to do it in Germany, if necessary,” is how a former European Commissioner confidently foreshadowed events on live television a few months ago....In Brazil, a single Supreme Court judge, in alliance with the country’s leftist president, has effectively established a judicial dictatorship, locking up political rivals by decree, silencing the speech of opposition figures, and utilizing state leverage over the financial system to punish political enemies by banishing them from public economic life. 

But of course Brazil’s authorities learned these tactics by observation. Observation of Canada, to be precise, where Justin Trudeau’s government first employed debanking — along with a little brute force — as a tool to crush peaceful protest of his draconian and disastrous pandemic lockdown policies. 

As we've just seen in the Epstein case, even when a rejected candidate gets elected they often go along with the managers. The managers are the real danger; they are the real problem. Getting rid of them will not be accomplished by elections. What else?

An Actually-Helpful Suggestion

The boys at Free Beacon are misunderstanding this Russian offer, I think. 

"Russia has technological solutions for uranium depletion and is ready to work with Iran in this field," Lavrov said in remarks published by Iran’s state-controlled media. "We have technological capacities and we are ready to offer them, taking the excess of overly enriched uranium and returning the power-generation-grade uranium to the Islamic Republic and its nuclear facilities."

I understand that to be offering to take the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) remaining in Iran off their hands, and trading it for uranium that is a better fit for the power generation the Iranians claim to want.* That would be unsuitable for weapons production, and put Iran on a more plausible path towards having nuclear power but not a weapons program. 

Getting Iran's remaining stockpiles of HEU out of Iran's hands is helpful. Russia is already a nuclear power, so this wouldn't be a risk for proliferation. As long as Iran didn't set up its enrichment centrifuges again, everyone could relax if they gave up their HEU for reactor-grade material. 

* The distinction has to do with the isotopes found in the Uranium, 238 versus 235. An unnaturally high purity of U-235 is necessary to build nuclear weapons. You only need about 20% for power generation, 95% for weapons. Thus, the comment about 'overly enriched uranium' strikes me as one about getting rid of the stuff they've been working on for the weapons program. 

Complex Attack

A reasonably decent analysis of the Alvarado attack. The author is using the language of military intelligence, including specifying MLECOA and MDECOA (you’ll see it spelled out at the link). His alternative is that one I think is actually the most likely. 

A “complex attack” is one in which more than one element is involved, e.g. instead of just opening fire with a rifle, first setting off explosions and then opening fire. In Iraq, a common version was to use an IED to disable an American convoy, and then hit it with a team using small arms fire once the American soldiers dismounted. Here, an attention-drawing fireworks attack drew out law enforcement, who were then ambushed by shooters. 

Nicomachean Ethics Interlude: A Bladesman's Insight

In the comments to the post below, I mentioned that the 'balancing point' I keep talking about in my commentary is my own insight and not something I'm getting out of Aristotle's text. He uses words that are translated as "mean" or "intermediary," and students sometimes go wrong by missing that he doesn't mean the exact average or middle point. He is quite explicit about that repeatedly, as I've pointed out, but it remains a common misconception.

By the way, when I talk about the 'balancing point,' that's my own way of describing what Aristotle is after. He doesn't use that phrase or anything like it, but I think it's helpful in thinking about how a 'mean' or 'intermediate' can be 'closer to one end than the other.'

I'm thinking of that thing we do to test the balance of a blade, where you put it longways across one finger and find where it balances. The blade may be longer than the hilt, but the hilt is more densely constructed; if so, the blade's tip may be much further out from your finger than the tip of the hilt, but it balances there. That's just another analogy, of course, and it's one I'm creating and importing to the text. It's not there in the original; I just find it helpful in conceptualizing the model.

Here is what I mean by that.

Balancing point on a Type XII arming sword, common c. 13th century.

Balancing point on a typical American Bowie knife.

As you can see, the balancing point is sometimes much closer to the middle, and sometimes much closer to one end than the other. The blade is balanced perhaps well forward of the guard, perhaps nearly upon it. Sometimes it's the exact middle of the blade, which we sometimes refer to as 'perfectly balanced,' but sometimes the tip of the blade extends well beyond the balancing point.

Again, it's just another analogy, and it's mine instead of Aristotle's. If you find it helpful in conceptualizing the point he's making about finding the exactly right place between two extremes, however, that's good. Use the analogy as far as it is useful. 

It does amuse me to wonder if Aristotle's most famous student had this insight, and if he brought it to his master's attention. That student was well-familiar with such tools! If so, however, it didn't survive to us in the text.

UPDATE: It occurs to me that I ought to point out that blades are balanced the way they are for a reason: even if we speak of a 'perfectly balanced' blade as being in the exact middle, that doesn't mean another way is wrong. A perfectly balanced knife is good for throwing, though you can throw any of them if you can figure out their rotation properly. I enjoy axe throwing, and usually the axes aren't balanced with that consideration at all. You just have to figure out how far away you have to stand to have them strike at the correct point in their rotation.

A rapier (and similarly, thrusting weapons) is often balanced 'towards the hilt' as this allows the point to be moved rapidly and precisely to a desired position. Having most of the weight closer to the hand, or in the hand, means that smaller and gentler movements can be used to direct the point to exactly where you want it to go.

A slashing weapon is often balanced 'towards the blade.' This is because a sword is essentially a lever, and the lever's effect is greatest at the opposite end of the lever rather than in the middle. Since F=ma, putting more of the mass towards the place where the lever will exert more force on it increases the acceleration the lever produces, and thus the force of impact. 

All of these considerations also have analogs to ethics. Ethics is about getting things inside us right to deal with the world outside of us. Thus, we too may find that the correct balancing point is sometimes here, and sometimes over there. It's not an operation of looking inside of ourselves and determining how much bravery, or anger, or temperance is best for us: we also have to consider how much the external situation requires.

Departments of Analysis

Noting a 'professor of American studies' who wants to dismantle America, this Substack asks: 

Ironically, she’ll be teaching this anti-American rhetoric for Macalester’s American Studies Department. More like Anti-American Studies?

Well, no; the business of analyzing anything is the business of breaking it apart. That is what the word "analysis" means.

1580s, "resolution of anything complex into simple elements" (opposite of synthesis), from Medieval Latin analysis (15c.), from Greek analysis "solution of a problem by analysis," literally "a breaking up, a loosening, releasing," noun of action from analyein "unloose, release, set free; to loose a ship from its moorings," in Aristotle, "to analyze," from ana "up, back, throughout" (see ana-) + lysis "a loosening," from lyein "to unfasten" (from PIE root *leu- "to loosen, divide, cut apart").

There's a Chinese critique of the Western way of learning that we study a flower by cutting it into its component parts, then studying each in turn to understand the whole. We generate a deeper understanding, but we also thereby destroy the flower and its beauty.

When I was studying at the University of Georgia, one of their lawyers told me that they got by far the most civil rights complaints from the Department of Religion, because students would take courses on their own religion and be deeply offended at the analysis of its core claims. Naturally a department of 'American Studies' is going to do the same thing for America. 

You might say, "Well, Grim, what about the department of Women's Studies? Isn't that for promotion of women's interests?" "What about African-American studies?" Perhaps those departments are intended in that way; but look at the effect it has on the people who study them. The ones I know who've gone on to happiness have done so by walking away from the department's core claims and embracing a more traditional life at least in those core elements. 

Nicomachean Ethics II.8

This chapter is a fairly technical spelling-out of how Aristotle conceives of his model. It's an analog to mathematics, but it isn't meant to be a mathematical model, just like one. His model for motion in the Physics in which there are two contraries and a substrate is the real model, as I have already mentioned. We are, in this case, the substrate that unifies the contraries and allows for motion between them: we have the capacity to be cowardly or brave, and can shift our position between those extremes in search of the right balancing point.

There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the prodigal. Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate man each over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and correspondingly in the other cases.

That's a good point about how we perceive each other, as well as the effect we tend to have on each other in deliberating together. The rash man thinks of the brave man as cowardly; and by associating with the rash, the brave man may move away from the correct balancing point as they draw him towards their position. It's important to choose your friends carefully if you are to live the best life. 

These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate; for these are further from each other than from the intermediate, as the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both are from the equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other; now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.

To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to temperance.

Another demonstration that the 'mean' he keeps talking about is not the middle point: sometimes one of the extremes is more opposed to the 'mean' than the other, i.e., the right balancing point may not be in the exact middle. 

This happens from two reasons, one being drawn from the thing itself; for because one extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. E.g. since rashness is thought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are thought more contrary to it.

Again, "one extreme is nearer," i.e., we aren't talking about the 'mean' in a strictly mathematical sense even though that term is preferred by translators. The mathematical similarity is analogical, rather than logical.

This, then, is one cause, drawn from the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.

Another good point about human psychology by Aristotle: relatively few of us are inclined to being insensible to pleasure, so it's really self-indulgence we're guarding against on that particular scale. The other contrary doesn't hold much interest for most of us.