You might say, "Grim, you're almost a quarter century late on this; the Iraq War was a clear example of America aggressing against a nation that had not attacked us, on false pretenses." I was a great supporter of the Iraq War at the time we started it, on the grounds of humanitarian intervention: Saddam was engaged in genocidal efforts against the Shia "Marsh Arabs," as well as a general attempt at socialist totalitarianism. Any nation that could, I thought at the time, had at least a right to try to set right such things. The outcome of that war, one in which I wagered my own life and honor in the cause of human freedom, has been sadly instructive to me. The last good that might be gotten out of it is to learn from our -- from my -- mistake.
* The cited text is Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second Edition. It is now on its Fifth edition, which may vary slightly from the text here.
16 comments:
The only thing I've got on this is a minor disagreement over your posited criticism: ...on false pretenses.
While strictly correct in one sense, I argue, given the profligate use of this kind of phrasing to mean dishonest, that the more accurate criticism was that that war was fought on an erroneous understanding of the facts.
My own book on Just War disagrees some with Walzer, but I'm not comfortable arguing that further since the Hall is not my advertising broadsheet. I'm also too lazy to go back into that book to reconstitute and summarize my arguments.
Eric Hines
Any of my co-bloggers is welcome to post whatever they want; especially something on the topic we've been discussing is perfectly welcome. Now if you don't want to spend your Christmas doing it, that I do understand!
I think that most of us were, as you say, guilty merely of misunderstanding the facts -- facts that very strongly suggested that Saddam was hiding a WMD program. I'm not sure if I still believe that (say) Colin Powell was merely guilty of misunderstanding the facts. I look back on my younger self with wonderment that I was, in those days, willing to take the US government at its word.
I'm not convinced, for all his later dudgeon, that Powell did not misunderstand. I think events have proven that the intelligence on which he relied was mistaken. I say, still, mistaken because quite a number of European intelligence services had drawn much the same conclusions, from their own sources, not only from relying on our intel.
I'm appreciative of the freedom to post in the Hall, still it's as much on us co-bloggers to not abuse the privilege as it is on you, our host, to enforce limits. I do tend to get stiff-necked about ethics, so there it is.
Eric Hines
Iraq was the aggressor. They invade Kuwait in 1990 and we came to Kuwait's aid. In 1991 we (the allied forces aiding Kuwait against Iraq's aggression) defeated Iraq's military and they agreed to a ceasefire which was conditioned on getting rid of any WMDs and WMD programs they had as verified by UN weapons inspections.
Despite severe sanctions in place until that verification, Iraq played a shell game w/ the inspectors for 12 years, violating the ceasefire agreement in just about every way and preventing verification. In 2003, we decided not to go along with their shell game anymore.
The ceasefire was in lieu of regime change; the regime violated the ceasefire agreements; we removed the regime. Iraq was the aggressor throughout, if the law matters.
- Tom
That's a really nice illustration of why the law doesn't matter. In 2003, there either was or wasn't going to be a war. We had the option of starting one or not starting one, and we chose to start one. But you're right -- all those arguments were trotted out to craft a legalistic defense of a new aggression, just as Trump is now pointing back towards the nationalization of American oil companies' property. There's no court that can adjudicate any of this with authority, and if it goes to the UN Security Council, both sides have vetoes. It's a complete joke and a waste of time to treat this as a matter of law.
The philosophy does matter, I think; again, I don't mean to endorse Walzer's take on it -- and at the time, he and I disagreed about how to apply his philosophy in any case. There is something important about the idea that you shouldn't start a war if you don't really have to, though; nor one you can't win, as Hamas did; and perhaps not other than in self-defense or defense of a third party (like Taiwan?) that is going to otherwise be subjugated by a dominant power.
We didn't have to have a war with Iraq in 2003, and we don't have to have one with Venezuela now. It's our decision whether or not to wage this war as that one. Thus, in the crucial sense, we either will or won't be the aggressor.
In 2003, there either was or wasn't going to be a war. We had the option of starting one or not starting one ...
No, in 2003 there was the option of either ending the one we got into in 1991 or continuing it. We could have ended it by just saying we didn't care anymore, dropping the sanctions, ending the inspections regime, and ending the patrols. But we chose to end it another way.
It was the actions of the international community during that long and increasingly absurd ceasefire that convinced me that international law was at least highly questionable, and which also made me increasingly skeptical of US actions abroad, so I'm not entailing any kind of "we should / should not have" into my statements. This is just how I see the facts of the matter.
As for Venezuela, you are right that it is our decision on whether or not to wage war there. I'm not debating with you about that.
I don't currently have an opinion on aggression in war; I'm still sorting out my views on proper domestic politics. However, if we begin with sovereignty and take the philosophy expressed in the Declaration of Independence seriously, no government is legitimate without the consent of the governed, and it seems that the Maduro regime does not have that consent. From that standpoint, it is an outlaw regime, as are probably most of the world's governments.
That seems meaningful for deciding the morality of international actions, but I haven't sorted out all the implications of it. So, even there, I'm not saying we should / should not do this or that. I'm just introducing what seems to be to be a reasonable principle to work with.
- Tom
"...if we begin with sovereignty and take the philosophy expressed in the Declaration of Independence seriously, no government is legitimate without the consent of the governed..."
Technically, not quite. The test the Declaration set up for government legitimacy is whether it does or doesn't defend the natural rights of the people, rather than whether or not they consent to it. If a government does so, the people don't have a right to replace it; if it becomes hostile to that purpose, they gain the right but are not obligated to do so (even though they might not consent to its abuses, they are allowed to tolerate them for a while in the hope of improvement). It's only when the government, by a long train of abuses, becomes a clear enemy of the natural rights of the people that the people have both the right and the duty to replace it.
They do; we don't. We do not in any sense constitute the people of Venezuela.
Consent of the governed is explicitly there:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ..."
Without the consent of the governed, government is illegitimate: Such a government has no "just powers." However, even if we disregard consent and go with your argument, then, again, the Maduro regime has failed and is illegitimate.
Whether we are the governed or not is irrelevant to the legitimacy of any particular government.
And, my argument stops there. I'm not saying we should overthrow the Maduro regime, and it would be ridiculous to think that we have any duty whatsoever to overthrow a regime just because it is illegitimate, not to mention impossible to do given that I think most governments in the world today are illegitimate.
That said, the people of the United States appealed to France for aid against the British in our revolution, so I do not think outside help is out of the question. The problem is, in a tyranny such as Venezuela, how could we ever know what the people truly want?
- Tom
It's true that the words "consent of the governed" are present, but they aren't part of the logic of when the right of revolution is valid -- not unless we assume (as perhaps they did) that consent would evaporate exactly in coherence with the government's protection or violation of the natural rights of the people.
That, as well as the latter thoughts on how one would know what the people of Venezuela want, is very much in line with the issue of dangerous empathy.
https://grimbeorn.blogspot.com/2025/06/sympathy-vs-empathy.html
We said that the Iraqis would greet us as liberators; I thought for certain that must be true. And indeed, some of them did, for a while. But we were wrong in our empathy; we didn't really know how they felt. We just imagined that we must.
Are you talking about the timing of a revolution?
As for whether a revolution is justified or not (my main concern above), consent is at the heart of it. Without consent, the government is illegitimate and may be overthrown whenever the people decide to do so.
Naturally, the people have no duty of revolution; like other rights, the right of revolution can be exercised or not.
You are right about the Iraqis. Indeed, what happened in Iraq should have disabused all Americans of the notion that we understand what other peoples in the world want or value. We can't even seem to sort out what other Americans want or value.
- Tom
Consent isn't at the heart of the Declaration's logic about revolutions; it's only mentioned in terms of establishment of a government, not removal of it. It's only one paragraph; let's walk thorough it.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed..."
So there's where consent matters; a government can't be established absent the consent of the governed.
"That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."
So the People may not still consent; but, while they have the right to rebel (granted by the government's becoming destructive to the end of securing their natural rights), they aren't obligated to do so. A failure of consent doesn't obligate revolution, it only permits it.
"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."
It becomes the duty of the People to rebel only here, where the government clearly intends to continue violating their natural rights in an enduring fashion. Note that this duty also doesn't ask after their consent; maybe a particular people LIKES having their rights violated. (One might imagine a gun-control loving populace that wants the government to keep them disarmed and helpless in the name of 'safety.') The duty applies where the rights are being destroyed, regardless of popular consent.
Two points:
One: "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed..."
So, this seems to be both the purpose for establishing a government and where the legitimacy of government comes from. That second part is ongoing, I think. When a government that had the consent of the governed when it was established loses that consent, it no longer has any just powers.
Two: It's difficult to imagine a duty to rebel when the people don't want to rebel. I wonder: What is it that obliges the people to rebel?
- Tom
That last, at least, is a very good point. There is an unstated assumption hiding there. What might it be?
A duty to one's lineage, ancestors and descendants both, but I'm transposing Confucianism into the key of Locke. It doesn't naturally seem to come from Locke.
This seems to be a regular problem for me.
- Tom
Just since this is on my mind, I'd like to put it down here before the conversation moves on.
I think the Declaration sets up two general principles, that of the proper ends of government and the proper justification for a government, and then moves to the particular, the right of revolution. The right of revolution, as a particular instance, is derived from the two general principles. That seems the most reasonable way to read it to me.
Notice how many of the specific grievances are about the Crown interfering with assemblies, which represent the consent of the people.
Notice also that it is a declaration of independence, not of revolution. It is a notice that the people of the colonies have withdrawn consent from the British government.
Notice the final declaration: "We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States," a declaration which does not depend on any right of revolution but rather on the authority of the people to consent or not to any particular government.
The right of revolution is just one of our many natural rights. It comes into play when a government fails to pursue its proper ends and the people withdraw consent.
- Tom
Post a Comment