Nicomachean Ethics VI.8

This is an important chapter. Today is an inauspicious day for it because of the political murder of the early afternoon, but the wisdom it speaks of is eternal.

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom'; this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to 'take part in politics'; for these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do things'.

So too we don't assign to legislators but to the bureaucrats who execute and define policy the idea of action. In our system, legislators are mostly fundraisers who delegate authority to bureaucrats. It's the bureaucrats who decide; and the police who execute the decisions not of the legislature, but of the bureaucracy.

Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which is concerned with a man himself-with the individual; and this is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds one is called household management, another legislation, the third politics, and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial.

This is Aristotle carefully avoiding the fallacy of composition. It is commonly and wrongly assumed that knowing how to order one level of human activity -- being a good businessman, for example -- ought to transfer to governance, family leadership, etc. It does not. Many a good businessman is a terrible husband; many a politician couldn't run a business to save their lives.

Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides, [Grim: Shocklingly to English speakers, that is pronounced euro-PEE-dees, as Socrates is soh-KRAT-ees.]

But how could I be wise, who might at ease,

Numbered among the army's multitude,

Have had an equal share?

This Movie Has a Sad Ending

It was a good shot. I didn't know Charlie Kirk from Adam before somebody took that shot and made him famous. The only reason I ever heard his name is that somebody decided to kill him; now I know he was a prophet, apparently.

I guess we've been here before; America has a very bloody political history. The whole world does. Maybe it's only violence that ever solves anything. What a shame.

UPDATE:

Havamal 38. 

Cyberpunk Revolution

The saying he is trying to think of is: "The internet interprets censorship as damage, and routes around it." The internet was designed to keep information available by routing around damage to the network, expected to be caused by nuclear weapons on key nodes, so that we would know enough to keep fighting. Turns out that's what it does, thanks be to God.

Marines & Mules

 

The Glories of Nepal

Every day is a great day for burning down Communist governments, but they picked a beautiful one.

More Luke Bell

Since the first one got such a heartfelt reaction, here's some more.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.7

Book VI continues with an exploration of wisdom.

Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but (2) we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,

Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman

Nor wise in anything else. Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

The "highest objects" as Aristotle discusses them are immaterial things of great importance: the soul, the unmoved movers (of which there are several, not one only as with Avicenna and later theological Aristotelians), the Forms as they exist in themselves instead of in things. In fact Aristotle isn't convinced that forms do exist except as immaterial additions to material things; the form of the table is in the table, because the parts have been put into the order of a table. If they were in a heap on the floor, they wouldn't be a table even though they'd still have all and only the same material parts. 

So there is at least an idea of what the form of a table might be, separate from actual tables. It exists, perhaps, in our minds. Perhaps -- Plato wanted to say -- it exists as a feature of reality, that such things as tables are possible and this is what they are like. Aristotle is not convinced of that.

Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.

True, but remarkable given that Aristotle has already praised political science as the highest human good.  

Now if what is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will entrust such matters.

It's difficult to know if 'white' or 'straight' is indeed the same for fishes, or bats.  

He's Right, Boys

"When you have horrible killings, you have to take horrible actions."

That's one of those truths I really hate. That doesn't make it less true.

Sometimes you just have to ride it out. That line at the end finishes, “The best thing you can do with death is ride off from it.”

Georgia 2020

It was stolen, obviously. That's around ten times the margin of victory.

Technology Continues to Outstrip Our Philosophy and Ethics

 "Brain in a Box"?  Yes, available for purchase (aimed at researchers).  What are the implications?  We'll figure that out as we go, I guess- onward into the void.

Let's hope that doesn't turn out poorly, but I guess as a species, we are not a patient lot.

Focus & Attention

It can be overdone. 

I’m trying to make weight for a Strongman competition in October, so I got this calorie-counter app.  It helps me make sure that I’m cutting weight in a reasonable manner, so that I’ll hit the target weight without losing muscle. 

For some reason, it is insanely concerned with sodium. If I eat a tortilla, it warns that this is a high sodium choice. If I eat a can of beans, it warns about the sodium. 

But tequila on a Saturday night? Good job, buddy! What a responsible decision!

El tequila blanco.

Happy Birthday, DAC

The most Outlaw of the Outlaws is 86 today. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.5-6

I'm moving faster through Book VI than I did through the previous book, but what is being said is quite important. We are talking about how it is possible for a human being to know the truth, and what the practical limits of this are. 

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it.

That, for example, is an interesting choice. How would we know who is practically wise? (The word in Greek is phronesis; there's a lot of Greek today so I'm going to skip the accent marks) We might look at something empirical, like how well their decisions work out. We can't observe their reasoning process unless they describe it to us, since the mind is not visible; and they could be wrong about it anyway. Many people, asked to justify their decisions, will rationalize what they did. They may not really know why they did what they did, not understand it, or know but be embarrassed by it. We want to know about wisdom, but we have to try to infer what it is like. (This is another place where a good upbringing helps, which meant as you will recall having been raised with good examples and stories. Who was practically wise? Odysseus, for Aristotle; Gandalf was, perhaps for us.) 

Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.

Practical wisdom is about successfully achieving the good life.  

This is shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art.

Art is concerned with making, we learned yesterday, so what this means is that we aren't talking about things like breadmaking, or house-building. This kind of knowledge, again, is techne in the Greek; it was Socrates' favorite candidate for real knowledge because it could be reliably explained, taught, and practiced. For Aristotle it is one of the intellectual virtues, but not phronesis. Techne is concerned with making things; phronesis is concerned with making a good life. Phronesis is the intellectual virtue of applying the moral virtues to craft a complete and honorable life. It is about taking specific actions in individual contexts, but also about placing them in the larger context of a vision of what such a complete life looks like.

The Bullfighter

Sadly that young man is already dead, at 32, reportedly from fentanyl. It’s a deadly poison that makes all illegal drugs unsafe these days. I was never inclined to them, but many musicians have been including many good ones. It’s a tragedy to lose a good one. 

The Second is for all Citizens

However clever it may be politically, I'm not going along with this push to strip American citizens of their Second Amendment rights just because some government bureaucrat rules that they have debatable 'mental health' issues. 

There are people who do have mental health issues, certainly. Yet some of you are old enough to remember when homosexuality was considered a mental illness; the trend has not been to make the 'science' more conservative. There is nothing at all stopping the revision of the categories of psychology to fit present fashion -- usually the fashion of the elites, psychology being the most popular major in the United States and a special predilection of Blue America. That road is going to end up paved with "your prejudices, which I have diagnosed in you whether or not they can be practically demonstrated, make you dangerous to others and in need of being disarmed."

We saw how readily psychology and psychiatry could be weaponized in the Soviet Union, where it was a standard practice to determine that opponents of the state were mentally ill (and thus in need of protective imprisonment, lobotomies, and/or drugging). It can do good in the right hands, on a voluntary basis. I have grave concerns about using it anywhere in the law, especially criminal law, and most especially as an excuse for the restriction of basic rights. 

So no, absolutely not. 

Rights in Iran

In a post at ChicagoBoyz, Mike quotes Tim Kaine (whom, you may well have forgotten, was once a candidate for Vice President). 

The notion that rights don’t come from laws and don’t come from the government, but come from the Creator — that’s what the Iranian government believes. It’s a theocratic regime that bases its rule on Sharia law and targets Sunnis, Bahá’ís, Jews, Christians and other religious minorities. And they do it because they believe that they understand what natural rights are from their Creator. So the statement that our rights do not come from our laws or our governments is extremely troubling.

Ah yes, those noted champions of the idea of rights, the Ayatollahs. 

It is true that Sharia law endows Muslims with rights (or at least powers) that are not possessed by others. Taking slaves, for example, is part of the double-goodness of jihad:

...the conceptual roots of 'jihadism' are in the faith, and will come to be known to anyone who studies it closely; and anyone who studies the great scholars of Islam will find much support for the idea. Avicenna, that great philosopher, describes jihad as a kind of double good in his Metaphysics of The Healing, because it brings one closer to God's will while also providing you access to practical goods like slaves captured in the war. The philosopher Averroes, in a reflection on Plato's Republic, agrees with Plato that the best kind of women should be admitted to a kind of equality with the best kind of men, and that this equality means that they should be allowed to join in jihad and the taking of slaves and wealth. The Reliance of the Traveler, one of the great medieval works of Islamic jurisprudence, is a favorite example of Andy McCarthy's (who came to know it while prosecuting the World Trade Center bomber, an earlier example of mass killings by bomb).

It isn't true that the Iranian government is or ever has been concerned with rights in the Western sense. Nor is it true that government can or should be conceived of as the origin of rights, since it is the chief danger to the human dignity that is found in nature. What government gives, government can take away. What nature gives, no man may rightly:  not even many men with many guns. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.3-4

Book VI continues with an examination of science and art. We'll get through two chapters again today.

Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more.

"These states" being what we develop out of our sensation, reason, and desire: the states in ourselves that are connected to the truth we find in the world. 

Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

It's easy to miss that this implies that truth is necessarily connected to wisdom and intuitive reason. We expect it to be connected to scientific knowledge, the first state he will examine, but not necessarily so: we are used to science being mistaken to a certain degree. That is because our science is experimental. Aristotle's was connected with the apprehension of a Form, which guarantees thing coming to be "always or for the most part." 

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.

The classic example is astronomy, the stars being thought at the time to have been ungenerated and eternal, as well as more necessary than we now think that they are. In Aristotle's time, the motions of the stars had been known for generations and generations, and had not changed. Now we know that stars also have a life cycle, and can change for several reasons. 

Mathematics is a purer example. The Forms of points and lines, the postulates and axioms and theorems, that were formulated by Euclid (c. 300) in the generation after Aristotle (384-322) persisted until the 19th century. Though Euclid had not formulated his work in Aristotle's time, the basics of geometry had existed since Pythagoras (570-495) as major entities of Greek thought, and had pre-existed ancient Greece in places like Babylon by perhaps 1,500 years. (All those dates are B.C., and thus reversed in order; lower numbers are later.) You can see how they might be thought to be eternal and ungenerated; indeed, philosophers of mathematics even today argue as to whether or to what degree mathematical truth is created by our conventions about how to handle mathematics, or alternatively are indeed basic features of the reality we inhabit.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.1-2

At this point in the work, we are approximately halfway through the EN. Book VI is going to further examine the meaning of wisdom, different sorts of wisdom, judgment, and other qualities of one's state of character. The first two chapters are short, so we will take them together. 

Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule.

This is in a way a restatement of what has been said, but in another way it seems to introduce the concept of having "the right rule." If you had a rule to follow, what would you need with a state of character? Indeed, the justice discussion of Book V seems to indicate that we should just have laws that require us to obey the rule that will make us behave virtuously. 

That doesn't seem to be what Aristotle meant. Terence Irwin instead translates that phrase as "having the correct reason," but reasoning is a process rather than a measuring tool. H. Rackham gives it as "in conformity with the right principle." The principle is going to admit of clear cases that look very rule-like, e.g., 'Don't throw down you shield and flee in the face of the enemy'; but also there are going to be vague areas, where you are determining if it is more courageous to die holding your ground or to conduct a fighting withdrawal to where you might be able to hold the ground and not lose the field. Likewise, as we have seen in the distinction between justice and magnanimity, there are lesser and greater ways of doing things that are both permissible: the just will do what the law requires, but the magnanimous will go beyond what is required to seek what is most worthy of honor. Likewise, the 'equitable' may go beyond the rule to do more than what is needed out of a sense of fairness to another.

We have not, then, fundamentally altered the project. It is still about using your reason to find the right way to behave, so there are rational principles to seek. Yet we must also look to our sense of fairness and honor, and if we are to be the very best sort of people, go beyond what mere rules require of us.

But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.

Nicomachean Ethics V.11

This is the final part of Book V, and the close of Aristotle's lengthy examination of justice. We live in a time when the word 'justice' is frequently invoked by people who haven't closely examined it, and often seem like they couldn't explain what they mean by it; at least all of you will now have had the experience of a close examination of the concept.

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what has been said.

Is it? Before you read on, decide what you think about that question based on what has been said. 

For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g. the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what [the law] does not expressly permit it forbids.

Thank goodness that is not true, at least for laws as practiced in our own time. It would have to be an extraordinarily long and detailed legal code that expressly permitted everything, so that anything not considered could be assumed forbidden. Military law sometimes approaches that level of detail: I recall that at the Baghdad Airport there was a signpost that read, approaching the airport, "No Hat Area," but leaving, "Hats Mandatory Past This Point." Everything not forbidden was required.

An account of justice that leaves so little room for liberty is wanting. I suppose it would be possible to construct express permissions that were very broad, e.g., "As long as you don't hurt anyone with your action, do whatever you want." Here we are asking if you can be unjust to yourself, so that would have to include you in 'don't hurt anyone.'  

Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another (otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his action and the instrument he is using; and he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly.

He is acting unlawfully, not unfairly. 

But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly.

Is it possible to treat the state unjustly? Socrates is supposed to have claimed that the state had the rights over its citizens that a master has over his slaves, because the state arranged for your safety and upbringing, food and shelter. Certainly many states exercise tyrannical powers over people, denying them their basic rights and freedoms in a manner analogous to slavery. Can a slave be unjust to his master, given the basic injustice of that relationship? 

Even in a healthy relationship between citizen and state, the state is not in a position of equality; and the state is not a person, having no feelings to be hurt and no dignity to be insulted. Burning the flag doesn't actually injure anyone, for example. 

If justice is lawfulness plus fairness, as Aristotle says, the law can certainly establish standards that citizens have to abide by with regard to the state; then, violating those laws is injustice by definition. Yet if justice is the virtue of respecting the interests of others, the state isn't properly an 'other.' It's a fiction, a legal but not an actual entity. I'm not convinced that you can be unjust to the state. 

Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which the man who 'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense; the unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round, so that his 'unjust act' does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i) that would imply the possibility of the same thing's having been subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time; but this is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more than one person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (for the man who because he has suffered does the same in return is not thought to act unjustly); but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same things at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife or housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,

Recall that justice was said to be, 'in a way,' complete virtue. Being unjust seems as if it is at least a failure to achieve complete virtue; but here we are talking about a sense in which one can be unjust without being generally wicked. The failure to achieve the whole doesn't mean that you haven't gotten anything right.  

In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly?' is solved also by the distinction we applied to the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly?'

(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more than the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice and is blameworthy-involves vice which is either of the complete and unqualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative, because not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of character), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad, but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to your being taken prisoner or put to death as the enemy.)

I think Aristotle answered the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly' with both yes and no, as for example the virtuous man might take less than he really deserves: this is a proof of his virtue (because it displays his generosity), rather than a charge against it (because he doesn't insist on his rightful share). The drunkard is suffering something he freely chose while he had the power to choose; but now he doesn't have the power to reject it any longer. So, typically, 'yes, but at the same time also no.'

Nicomachean Ethics V.10

There are two more chapters in Book V.

Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same.

Terence Irwin translates this "equitable" language as "decency." Decent, he says, "is cognate with eikos, 'likely,' and means 'plausible, reasonable, respectable,' (as we say 'a likely lad' or 'a reasonable candidate for the job'). Hence it is used more generally for a decent person, and hence interchangeably with 'GOOD' in the right contexts, as Aristotle remarks[.]" You may or may not find it helpful to substitute 'decent' for 'equitable' as you follow along in this section; equity has some connotations in modern English that may not be relevant. On the other hand, fairness is a core component of justice, and equity suggests treating people with fair consideration for their stake in the matter.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice.

It is more than the law requires, in other words; going beyond what is mandatory because you recognize that the other person deserves more than what is required. Thus, treating a person equitably may go beyond the 'lawfulness' requirement of justice in pursuit of the 'fairness' requirement. Yet not 'fairness' in the sense of 'treating relevantly similar cases similarly,' but in the sense of 'ensuring just deserts.' This may indeed be more than what is average, not only more than what is required; it might be the case that equity in this sense requires exceptional payments or rewards in exceptional cases.

The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.

There's an interesting bit of architectural history! The Lesbian rule has been used by several philosophers since Aristotle to capture the idea of a thing that is both a reliable standard, but one flexible enough to make appropriate adjustments for circumstances.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.