Requiescat in Pace Graham Greene
Two from the NYT
But if Mr. Trump has a political imperative, so do his targets. States need to balance their budgets, unlike the federal government. The federal government is covering the cost of more than 2,000 National Guard troops sent to Washington from six states, at an estimated cost of $1 million a day. That serves as a reminder that such resources could also be available in other cities, if requested.
Federal support for local policing has also had a long history of bipartisan support. Ms. Bowser is one of many Democratic politicians who have sought to put more police on the beat but have run up against budget constraints. Democrats in Congress have been the primary champions of federal assistance for local police forces through the Community Oriented Policing Services — or COPS — program, first passed as part of President Bill Clinton’s crime bill in 1994.
Federal-local partnerships have always shown promise, said Thomas Abt, founding director of the Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction at the University of Maryland. Working with mayors and local officials, the center has become involved with policing in Memphis and Knoxville, Tenn., as well as St. Louis and Boston.
In all four cities, police reforms have emphasized intervening with the people and places at the highest risk of violence, balancing law enforcement accountability with empathy for the difficulties the police face, and maintaining legitimacy and credibility in high-crime communities, said Mr. Abt, who wrote a book on policing, “Bleeding Out."
Knoxville, St. Louis and Boston have seen violent crime rates decline faster than the national average, he said, and Memphis — the newest city to partner with the center — is on track to join them.
Secondly, they're wondering if there's an exploitable divide between Second Amendment Trump supporters versus Law and Order Trump supporters. This is also said to be a news story.
President Trump’s political appointees rolled back Biden-era regulations and diverted officials assigned to weapons cases to immigration raids. The White House has also proposed steep cuts to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and installed disengaged, inexperienced leaders to oversee its increasingly marginalized work force.
While these moves have not exposed major political divisions, they have caused some uneasiness among gun-rights supporters who are concerned that law-and-order officials like Ms. Pirro, who once supported restrictions on assault rifles, will create a chilling effect on legal gun owners in the district and in the surrounding area.
“It sends a message we don’t like,” said Luis Valdes, the Florida director of Gun Owners of America, an influential gun rights group that has pushed for the repeal of most federal gun laws.
It is not clear how many of the guns confiscated by the city’s Metropolitan Police Department or federal law enforcement agencies have resulted in prosecutions, or how many cases were later dropped. In at least one case, Ms. Pirro’s office withdrew firearms charges against a person found to possess two guns after the search was determined to have possibly violated Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure.
What is clear, however, is that gun cases are a central component of the federal government’s push into Washington.
As I understand the Second Amendment maximalist position, it is roughly this: eliminate the ATF; eliminate the National Firearms Act and the Reagan-era ban on newer automatic weapons; constitutional carry; nationwide reciprocity. As far as I know, it has never embraced eliminating the ban on violent felons possessing or carrying guns.
There probably is a point at which enforcement of DC's ridiculously unconstitutional gun laws crosses a line for sensible Second Amendment thinkers, even perhaps short of maximalists. But to exploit that divide, you'd have to have an alternative. What's the alternative on offer from Democrats?
Nicomachean Ethics V.8
We had a break while I was off on travel, and will now resume with Book V. We are going to examine the justice or injustice of particular acts. This is different from what we have been interested in so far, which was the character of the actors rather than the justice of any particular action. Recall that in V.6 Aristotle makes this distinction plainly: “He was not a thief, but he stole.” It’s important that the character is not that of a thief, even though technically stealing even once does make the person a thief in a way. In the more important way, perhaps he is a physician who has saved man lives and regularly helps people who stole something in a moment of weakness or drunkeness; his character is basically good in spite of the one bad action.
This is why it took until V.8 to get to the question of actions rather than the virtues and characters of people.
Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust.
That is another 'in a way/but in another way' move, which I have already pointed out as something that is characteristic of Aristotle's thought. Some philosophers are critical of that kind of move, which can introduce ambiguity into discussions. Remembering from I.3 that strict logic does not belong in the field of ethics, but only probabilistic and analogical thought, I take it to be the mark of correct thinking. It allows for sophisticated discussion and avoids trying to treat ethical categories as if they were categories of strict logic.
Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well.
This is a point frequently lost in contemporary socio-political commentary.
Book by its Cover
Country Music Lethality
There seems to be some interest in country music in the Hall. Herewith, the leading causes of death, per that genre. With a hat tip to Power Line.
The Devil’s Courthouse Restored
Preparation to Compete in AI World
“You’re going to want to be creative,” Garman said to CNBC last month. “You’re going to want to be [good at] critical thinking. And you’re going to want to be flexible.”I think the ability to learn new things and adapt is going to be just as important as any particular skill that you learn,” he added.It’s something that even AI leaders agree with too, including OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.“I think critical thinking, creativity, the ability to figure out what other people want, the ability to have new ideas, that in some sense that’ll be the most valuable skill of the future,” Altman told students at Howard University last year.
How should they accomplish this goal of making themselves more critical, yet more flexible and creative?
Part of this recipe includes ditching social media algorithms and seeking out new sources of information, he says—which should include a focus on questioning history and philosophy. Studying the works of those who lived more than 2,000 years ago—like Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle—is what he recommends.
“Always ask why, and then go one level below double click, triple click, to the sources. Why? Why? Why? Why? If you do that, you’re going to develop a mind that’s going to be able to beat anybody else and be more valuable in the workplace,” he said.
Send your kids here, I guess.
Home Again
Last Night in Babylon
There was a lot of cop activity, but they seemed to be protecting the late night crowds at the clubs. I didn’t see any harassment.
The crowds are thick in places. The bouncer at the Camelot “gentleman’s club” offered to let me in with no cover charge, for which I thanked him but passed by. The bouncer at a bar called Recessions stopped me to compliment my beard and discuss beard care for a while.
It’s definitely been an interesting trip. I’m out of here on a dawn flight, and should be back in my mountains before noon.
Buck Rogers
Columbia Heights by Night
The South Has Risen Again
DC By Night
DC Report: Urban Hiking
RETVRN
The University’s Best Weapon Against A.I.: The 14th Century...In 1355 the arts faculty at the University of Paris forbade masters to lecture at a slow speed that would have allowed students to copy their words verbatim.You can still see traces of that old academic culture in Ph.D. programs, in which students have to pass oral exams and defend their thesis in a viva voce (“with the living voice”) in conversation with their examiners. Cambridge and Oxford, the inspiration for most early U.S. colleges, did not meaningfully adopt written exams until the 18th and 19th centuries, half a millennium after they were founded. The shift to original, written student work was partly in response to instruction in increasingly technical fields and partly due to the fact that written work made it easier to teach more students.Even in the U.S. our earliest colleges followed the tradition of oral examinations. Emphasis on students writing compositions did not spread until we started copying German research universities in the 1870s. Freshman comp, the standard U.S. writing class, shifted to expect more unique and expressive content from students after World War II.All of which is to say that our current practices around student writing are not part of some ancient tradition. Which assignments are written and which are oral has shifted over the years. It is shifting again, this time away from original student writing done outside class and toward something more interactive between student and professor or at least student and teaching assistant.Though the return of the blue book exam is one sign of this change, a number of older practices for assessing student learning are being revived....
There's still a chance they might learn something, but only in a harder school.
Nicomachean Ethics V.7
Another short chapter today, still on justice. We're about two-thirds through Book V after this.
Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that...
The "natural" here refers to human nature. What Aristotle is saying is that human nature is such that certain things have to be done a certain way no matter who or where (or when!) you are. Human beings come to be in a certain way, and they reliably have certain needs and certain capacities. These have to be answered.
The alternative is that things are merely conventional, things that a society does in a certain way because of traditions or laws or cultural values. Often critical theorists today call these "social constructs."
In general our contemporaries agree with this distinction, although some few deny that there really is any sort of thing that might be called "human nature." (Transhumanists, for example, believe that we will shortly be able to transcend many traditional limitations like death or illness; in principle, we could with technology become totally different sorts of beings than have ever existed before.) Where we disagree with Aristotle and each other is often in drawing the line between what is natural and what is socially constructed. When we moved to China in 2000, I had many ideas about things that I thought were human nature that proved to be conventional, for example, that men naturally recognized that women deserved protection and care due to their smaller size and in recognition of their great value as actual or potential mothers. It turns out that was a value that the American South had trained into me; in China women were seen as less valuable and targets for exploitation because of their relative weakness.
Aristotle is calling the conventional the "legal," although that implies a formalization that isn't necessary.
...legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees.
Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable.
Again, it is less evident than he suggests because this is often where disputes arise. Of the moment, how much of sex and sexuality is natural and how much is 'a social construct' like gender has been hotly debated.
And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous.
Obviously not quite right, but the point holds even if we allow that some people are left-handed. By nature one hand is stronger because it is favored and more frequently used, etc.
The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.
That's an interesting claim about constitutions. It seems to reduce the legal/conventional sphere to zero ideally, leaving just one way to order human life that would -- by nature, i.e. our nature, human nature -- be best for everyone. Aristotle does not give that prescription anywhere that has survived, not even the Politics. There we get a typology of types of states, each of which has a corrupt form that it is likely to pass into and each of which has instabilities that make it likely eventually to transition to one of the others via revolution or collapse.
He has a few clear recommendations, but this ideal constitution may simply be theoretical: it ought to be true that a constitution exists that ideally fits our nature, which is the same everywhere as fire burns both here and in Persia. I rather suspect it is not true that such a constitution exists, though I can see the attractiveness of the idea that it should.
There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust, and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done, is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the general term is rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is applied to the correction of the act of injustice).
Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which it is concerned.
That will be the subject of the next chapter.
Nicomachean Ethics V.6
Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief, an adulterer, or a brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly in all other cases.
This is a place where Christianity offered a real shift, I think. If a man steals he is a thief, but only among all the other things he is, including beloved by God. In any case Jesus was hung between two thieves, one of whom he invited to accompany him to heaven.
Even in that story, you can see the effect of the ancient world's moral code. The thieves were condemned to death, and condemned precisely for 'being thieves'; and the penitent thief admits the justice of that condemnation, for they had committed the crimes for which they were being punished. There is thus a serious question involved in whether 'a man is not a thief, though he stole,' or whether in fact his character is thus defined.
Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just without qualification but also political justice.
We normally speak of justice in terms of political justice, so it's nice to see this distinction drawn out. Aristotle now gives an account of political justice that happens, by the way, to spell out the difference between just states and unjust tyrannies.
This [i.e. political justice] is found among men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy.
We've already seen that 'equality' means 'proportional equality' in most senses, but can mean 'arithmetical equality' when we are trying to balance the effects of crimes and other injustices. Aristotle points out that the reason we need such laws is that, in fact, these free and equal men treat each other badly:
For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though there is not injustice between all between whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.
There is then a warning against letting any man have too much power, and instead trusting to the laws and the courts to find what is really just. (An interesting reflection for the present moment.)
This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he* is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that he labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege; but those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.
The "he*" there is ambiguous. Structurally it looks like it should point to the magistrate as its antecedent, but the sentence doesn't make as much sense as if "he" is the ruler. Irwin goes ahead and translates this line as, "If a ruler is just, he seems to profit nothing by it." If he does not profit by his rule, he is just and deserves honor and privilege; but if he does profit from ruling, he is a likely to become a tyrant.
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself).
There are many highly debatable assertions in that sentence. They are obvious enough that I will leave them as an exercise for the interested reader.
Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this is different from political justice.
The idea that family business is not resolvable in the public political courts is Aristotle's more than it is ancient Greece's. A wife could initiate a divorce if she wished, apparently without the state having the power to contest her decision; but the state would be involved to ensure the proper return of her dowry and other matters. Thus, the Greeks had clear ideas about political justice as it applied to the dissolution, at least, of marriages; and a notion of what it would mean for her to receive (proportionately) equal and fair treatment.




































