Anabasis XII

The lack of cavalry tells on the first day, in which the Persians send cavalry to spy upon and then harass the Greeks. The mounted bowmen and slingers that the Persians employ inflict significant damage on the rear guard during the march to the villages. Xenophon decides to break formation and charge them, but on foot his men cannot reach the enemy before they can withdraw; and the Persian archers (raised to 'shoot straight and speak the truth') are pretty good shots even while retreating. 

The Greeks reach the villages they mean to plunder, and spend some time refitting some of their pack horses as cavalry mounts. They identify about fifty men who are fit to serve as cavalry, and also some slingers, in order to disrupt future such attempts by the Persians who are following them. 

The Persians return with a thousand cavalry instead of a few hundred, but the Greeks have crossed a ravine before they arrive. The new Greek force is able to deploy against the Persians during their own crossing, striking the vanguard and driving it into retreat. They kill a few Persians and mutilate the bodies to make clear that they're not interested in playing nice any more. 

After this the Ten Thousand march through a set of ruins of cities and fortresses where the Medes -- the same ones who provoked the building of the Median Wall -- had been contesting the area with the Persians during their short-lived empire. Tissaphernes arrives with a very large force, but he shows the typical Persian desire not to risk any lives in the fighting, so he tries to bombard them again. Their new force repels him successfully with disciplined and accurate return fire from the slingers.

The Ten Thousand begin to recover enemy bows and arrows, which are different from the ones they knew at home but which they are able to employ successfully. They also discover in their raids of villages additional bowstrings and lead that can be cast into bullets. Their slingers prove to be better than the Persian ones, having a longer range. The Persians continue to follow, but they are having the worst of the skirmishes.

The hollow square formation, which again is novel I think in this era, proves to have some practical difficulties for traversing bridges, valleys, etc. The Greek generals begin making adaptations on the fly to address these difficulties: 

The generals accordingly, having recognsied the defect, set about curing it. To do so, they made six lochi, or divisions of a hundred men apiece, each of which had its own set of captains and under-officers in command of half and quarter companies. It was the duty of these new companies, during a march, whenever the flanks needed to close in, to fall back to the rear, so as to disencumber the wings. This they did by wheeling clear of them. When the sides of the oblong again extended, they filled up the interstices, if the gap were narrow, by columns of companies, if broader, by columns of half-companies, or, if broader still, by columns of quarter-companies, so that the space between was always filled up. If again it were necessary to effect a passage by bridge or otherwise, there was no confusion, the several companies crossing in turns; or, if the occasion arose to form in line of battle, these companies came up to the front and fell in.

As they leave the plains and begin to rise into the hills they discover another problem, which is that their formation is easily attacked if the enemy is able to cover it from an elevated position. The first day this happens they suffer a large number of wounded among their light infantry. After this they make an additional modification and assign a division of the force to hold the heights while the bulk marches on the roads below. This is slow, though, as the heavy infantry so assigned have to struggle in their armor up to the hills and then along the crests. 

They have the advantage that the Persians do not wish to fight at night, being a large collection of strangers rather than a disciplined and unified force. Thus, the Persian cavalry withdraws each night some miles away to camp, catching up to raid the Greeks the next day. The Greeks begin just occupying villages during the fighting hours, so that their superior marksmanship can tell on the Persians; then they begin marching at night after the Persians withdraw, gaining a few days of peace in this way.

On the fourth day of this strategy, however, the Persians force march themselves to a mountain overnight and occupy the heights of one of its arms, which the Greeks have to pass. Xenophon leads a charge up the heights of the arm, which the Persians abandon to retreat to the summit: they do not wish to come to direct blows with the heavy infantry. The climb is very difficult for the hoplites, but they eventually win the summit as well, the Persians withdrawing before them. 

The Persians now switch tactics as well. They have learned that they cannot win against the Greeks in a stand up fight -- they have superior numbers and combined arms, but lack the unity and morale. Thus, they switch to the extraordinary remedy of burning their own Persian villages in advance of the Greeks, in the hope of starving the Greek army. 

Anabasis XI

The new generals post picket guards and call a general meeting of the Ten Thousand.  Xenophon attends in his finest fighting clothes, saying that he intends to look his best whether conquering or dying. This sentiment has been repeated many times since: consider the men of the French Foreign Legion Régiment étranger de parachutistes shaving before they jumped into Điện Biên Phủ, already surrounded by artillery on the high ground. 

Xenophon gives exactly the right speech to win the men; he then counsels exacting discipline, burning the wagons and their tents so they can match faster and lighter, and living off the enemy’s villages through plunder. They adopt a hollow square marching structure to protect their vulnerable enabler units, and start the fires. 

One interesting feature of Xenophon’s talk is his explanation of why they shouldn’t worry about the enemy having cavalry while they don’t. Xenophon was a cavalryman himself, and probably understood that he was greatly exaggerating the advantages and downplaying the weaknesses of infantry versus cavalry. Yet we can look forward more than a generation to Alexander using Macedonian phalanx to conquer the world; or the Roman hollow square formation; or more than a thousand years to the schiltrons at the Bannockburn pushing Edward’s knighthood into the river to drown; or the Spanish tercio of the Thirty Years War. Xenophon hit upon a viable solution to the problem, and I believe he did so at a time when it was novel. 

Americana

My sister is up in Seattle for some reason, and she sent this photo that she took yesterday afternoon. 

Congratulations Tulsi

Tulsi Gabbard, just confirmed as Director of National Intelligence, has the qualifications of having been abused by the system and driven out of the Democratic Party for ideological reasons. In this, she is like the President himself. I trust that her personal experience of being subjected to the system will be a strong driving force in reform.

Good hunting.

Anabasis X: Xenophon Steps Forward

In the end of the eighth part I said that "in some respects this is the real beginning of the story of the Ten Thousand[.]" This next chapter shows some signs of actually being the beginning of the story in the sense of being the first thing Xenophon wrote down, with the earlier parts written later to fill in the story. 

For example, Xenophon introduces himself and explains his role in the adventure and how he has come to be here. 

Now there was in that host a certain man, an Athenian, Xenophon, who had accompanied Cyrus, neither as a general, nor as an officer, nor yet as a private soldier, but simply on the invitation of an old friend, Proxenus. This old friend had sent to fetch him from home, promising, if he would come, to introduce him to Cyrus, "whom," said Proxenus, "I consider to be worth my fatherland and more to me."

We've met Xenophon several times already in the story, so it is weird for him to introduce himself as if he were an unknown character. If this was where he started writing, though, it makes sense. 

Xenophon tells us that he had some concerns about going on this expedition. He doesn't tell us what his qualifications to go were. He seems to have been a cavalryman -- his book on horsemanship is good reading, though we often do things quite differently now -- and to have fought in the Athenian civil war following the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. He was an Athenian, but tended to support the Spartan side and to admire their way of life over that of his home city. So he was no stranger to war, even if he accompanied the army as a friend of Cyrus' rather than as a member of the soldiery. 

We now are introduced to Socrates, whom Xenophon admires and looks upon as a trusted counselor. Socrates tells him to soothe his concern about whether to go by visiting the Oracle of Delphi, which Socrates did himself. Xenophon constructs a question for the Oracle along the lines of 'which gods should I sacrifice to in order to help this be a successful expedition?' Socrates is aghast when he learns the nature of the question, having meant that Xenophon should ask whether to go on the expedition, not how. Still, perhaps he got good advice; Xenophon made the sacrifices, and as we know he came through it in the end.

The army is greatly depressed, morale shattered, by the loss of its generals and many of its captains. Finding that he can barely sleep, except for a telling dream that drives him to action, Xenophon gathers the remaining captains he can find for a midnight council. There he speaks very wisely, according to contemporary military science: just as we teach soldiers to attack into an ambush, so too he counsels that action is the only reasonable choice. Let us not wait, but attack!

"Now, however, that they have abruptly ended the truce, there is an end also to their own insolence and to our suspicion. All these good things of theirs are now set as prizes for the combatants. To whichsoever of us shall prove the better men, will they fall as guerdons; and the gods themselves are the judges of the strife. The gods, who full surely will be on our side, seeing it is our enemies who have taken their names falsely; whilst we, with much to lure us, yet for our oath's sake, and the gods who were our witnesses, sternly held aloof. So that, it seems to me, we have a right to enter upon this contest with much more heart than our foes; and further, we are possessed of bodies more capable than theirs of bearing cold and heat and labour; souls too we have, by the help of heaven, better and braver; nay, the men themselves are more vulnerable, more mortal, than ourselves, if so be the gods vouchsafe to give us victory once again.

"Howbeit, for I doubt not elsewhere similar reflections are being made, whatsoever betide, let us not, in heaven's name, wait for others to come and challenge us to noble deeds; let us rather take the lead in stimulating the rest to valour. Show yourselves to be the bravest of officers, and among generals, the worthiest to command. For myself, if you choose to start forwards on this quest, I will follow; or, if you bid me lead you, my age shall be no excuse to stand between me and your orders. At least I am of full age, I take it, to avert misfortune from my own head."

The captains are stirred by this, very much needing a direction at this moment, and so they gather additional men they trust from their units and advise them to begin preparing. A non-Greek among them tries to argue against it and finds himself expelled from the army. The rest pull together a hundred of the top men left alive to vote on new leadership. 

Xenophon gives another version of the speech counseling action, and telling them that it is up to them to save the morale of the army. If they themselves seem afraid, the army will collapse. If they show themselves bold, the men will fall in on bold action. 

He then makes a point that Chesterton also famously makes, Chesterton defending the verse about 'he who will lose his life shall save it.' Xenophon gives the pragmatic version rather than the mystical one: 

This observation, also, I have laid to heart, that they, who in matters of war seek in all ways to save their lives, are just they who, as a rule, die dishonourably; whereas they who, recognising that death is the common lot and destiny of all men, strive hard to die nobly: these more frequently, as I observe, do after all attain to old age, or, at any rate, while life lasts, they spend their days more happily.

The army's best men then vote five new generals to replace the five lost, Xenophon among them. 

Anabasis Interlude II: Plato's Meno

In the very next chapter Xenophon will introduce us to Socrates, not the general but the philosopher. Socrates was a man that Xenophon liked and trusted. We mostly know Socrates through Plato's presentation of him, and it is interesting that Xenophon presents Socrates as being somewhat different from the Socrates we get in Plato. 

An honest man, Xenophon was no trained philosopher. He could neither fully conceptualize nor articulate Socrates's arguments. He admired Socrates for his intelligence, patriotism, and courage on the battlefield.... Like Plato's Apology, Xenophon's Apologia describes the trial of Socrates, but the works diverge substantially and, according to W. K. C. Guthrie, Xenophon's account portrays a Socrates of "intolerable smugness and complacency"....In Memorabilia, he defends Socrates from the accusations of corrupting the youth and being against the gods; essentially, it is a collection of various stories gathered together to construct a new apology for Socrates.

This is thus a good time to point out that Socrates also knew one of the generals just under discussion. As mentioned in the comments to the post below, the general Menon is the same as the Meno that is the namesake of one of Plato's dialogues, the Meno. It is nothing but an account of a discussion Socrates and Meno had about the nature of virtue. Meno had been a student of Gorgias, one of the more infamous Sophists, and Socrates engages Meno in a discussion about virtue -- whether it is a sort of knowledge, whether it can be taught, and what its basic nature might be. 

This foray into philosophy instead of adventure story won't be of interest to everyone, but it fits the theme here well enough that I would feel remiss not to include it. After the jump, we'll do a very quick run through the Meno.

Anabasis IX: In Praise of the Generals

Xenophon interrupts his story, as he had following the death of Cyrus, to describe the murdered generals. These should really be read in full rather than summarized. Clearchus in particular is praised as a man who was devoted to war the way some men are devoted to love affairs, always ready for adventure, tough and brave both by day and by night. 

The descriptions of the men includes also analysis of their weaknesses. Clearchus' incomplete virtue was justice: he believed (quite rightly) that an undisciplined army was useless, and thus imposed strict punishments for violations of order. Yet he acted sometimes in anger, and this imperfection in his administration of justice caused him to feel regret afterwards. That is itself a sign of an internal commitment to the virtue of justice, that one can feel bad about failing to achieve it properly.

The best proof of the worth of an officer is the confidence of his men, who did not love Clearchus but had faith in his leadership. They took confidence in his courage and in the fact that he held their fellow soldiers to account, so that they could rely on the discipline of the army. Men forced into his service during the wars due to poverty or as punishment came to be disciplined soldiers and good fighting men. 

Some other generals don't come off as well. Proxenus is described as having been motivated by a desire for personal greatness and glory, although also as always pursuing that greatness through fair means and not foul. Menon is described as motivated only by a desire for wealth, pursuing honors and friendships with the great only as means to the end of enriching himself. 

Agias and Socrates, the two remaining generals -- young men of about thirty-five -- receive only a brief joint comment. 

No one could speak slightingly of their courage in war, nor accuse them of lack of consideration for a friend.

That is far from the worst epigram to receive from a fellow soldier. 

Happy Superb Owl Viewing!

I overheard at a local cafe that a lot of people were enjoying viewing superb owls today. I, too, am a fan of owls and thought I would share this superb owl with any other enthusiasts who might be at the hall.

Anabasis VIII: Treachery

By the time they reach the Great Zab river (the notes in my edition claim this is the ‘Zapatas’ mentioned last time), the Greek commander decides to try to address the mutual suspicion that he has been noticing growing between his army and the Persians. Clearchus asks for an interview with Tissaphernes, who readily grants it. Clearchus points out that, in spite of the oaths they have exchanged not to do each other harm, the two sides are watching each other like hawks. He thinks they might avoid trouble if they addressed this mistrust directly, in order to avoid the mutual suspicion sparking a conflict. 

Clearchus points out that the oaths, which were taken before the gods, prevent them from being enemies, and that neglect of such oaths is deeply destructive to one's conscience. Therefore, he suggests, the two sides should trust the gods and each other's oaths and dispose of the suspicion. He gives further pragmatic arguments as to why Tissaphernes can trust the Greeks not to betray him.

Tissaphernes declares himself delighted with the proposal, praises Clearchus' reasoning, and gives several arguments about why the Greeks can also trust him (especially, that he might want to hire mercenaries someday). Tissaphernes then offers to host Clearchus and his captains at a feast at which he will reveal who has been slandering them and causing all this mistrust. Clearchus promises to attend, and to reveal any similar slander that comes to his attention. Tissaphernes then hosts him for dinner as his guest, creating a hospitality bond between them. These are honor bonds not readily broken, especially in the Middle East (Saladin would not harm a Crusader who had received even a cup of water from his hands; one time when a tribal leader in the Mahmudiyah Qada didn't offer us a drink of water or tea or coffee on arrival, I was very much on guard).

The next day Clearchus and his generals and captains went to the feast. The generals were invited inside Tissaphernes' tent, with the captains and other Greeks who had accompanied the group (to ferry back supplies) waiting outside. At a signal, the generals were all seized and a unit of cavalry rode in and slaughtered the captains all all of the other Greeks who had come with the party.

Tissaphernes executed Clearchus (for perjury, indeed on the claim that Clearchus had broken his oath to keep the peace), and then sent the other generals to the King of Persia who beheaded them. The native Persian allies who had marched with Cyrus alongside the Greeks now turned on them completely, and joined Tissaphernes to try to extort a surrender from the Ten Thousand. They were, again, refused. 

In some respects this is the real beginning of the story of the Ten Thousand. From here on they have lost both their political leader, Cyrus, and their military leadership. What they do from this point is different, as they must now govern themselves rather than simply exercise military discipline. 

Panic in the blue rooms

From the NYT, which incautiously allowed conservative-ish Bret Stephens to join in a round-table discussion:

Voters, including conservative ones, don’t want an authoritarian state. But liberals and progressives consistently failed to recognize the way in which their own side violated those norms, or sought to impose their own forms of authoritarianism.

Do any Democrats understand that trying to throw your opponent in jail, or bankrupt him with doubtful suits, or strike his name from the ballot, isn’t democratic? Do they understand that they can’t credibly talk about Trump’s threats to our governing traditions when they also are calling to pack the Supreme Court or end the Senate filibuster? Do they comprehend that trying to strong-arm Facebook into suppressing “misinformation” violated the spirit of the First Amendment?

Do they understand that lying about Joe Biden’s health was reminiscent of Soviet propaganda during the reigns of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko? (Nothing to see here but a “cheapfake”!) Do they recognize the chilling effects of the progressive speech police? One of the reasons Trump won is that Democrats all but erased the difference between them and Republicans when it came to the question of adhering to “democratic norms.”

***

The Democratic Party has, to an astonishing degree, become the party of government workers and union workers. They should try to make inroads with the rest of us.

When someone other than Stephens is speaking, it's mostly an inadvertent confirmation of his thesis. Long may they keep it up.

Meanwhile, all those unaccountable billionaire wrong-thinking geeks are starting to explain why no one can perform a useful audit on federal spending: Treasury just writes a check for whatever the agencies requisition, and the money comes out of thin air--has done since we abandoned the gold standard in 1971. So, as soon as someone successful appeals the New York judge who denied access to the Treasury payment system by the Secretary of the Treasury, the evil billionaires can start figuring out a way to track payments and inform the public what the heck has been going on with the slush funds and the "incurable" national debt.

(This editorial is behind a paywall, and I have no intention of subscribing, but if you hold down "Ctrl" and hit A then C quickly, you can copy the whole thing before the wall slams down, then paste it into a text field somewhere to read it.)

Typoglycemia

 

Desperados Waiting for a Train

This particular train is of the Great Smoky Mountains Railroad, currently blocking the end of the one-way road into Dillsboro, North Carolina. I’m sure it will move on in the fullness of God’s good time. 

Pretty afternoon to sit by the river anyway. 

The deadliest sin

Screwtape warned his trainee tempter of the danger when humans remember that despair is a worse sin than any of the sins that provoke it.

An Israeli hostage's father thanks Trump for inspiring the deal that brought his daughter home alive, and describes how hard he fought for her when he really just wanted to curl up and die:

The hardest lesson I learned was that hopelessness consumes energy you can’t afford to waste.

This is the lesson I keep taking from my nephew's untimely death. He didn't get much time on earth, but his last year was a miracle respite, only because he never gave up trying.

A Useful Reminder

Anabasis VII

In spite of their concerns caused by the lengthy delay, the Greeks abide by the truce and wait to be led out by the Persian forces. This march begins in conditions of mutual suspicion, at least between the Greeks and the Persians. The Persian allies of Cyrus begin to camp with their relatives, mending fences as is the normal way after the war. That only makes the Greeks feel more isolated. 

Nevertheless there have been arrangements made for food, and after a while the Greeks come to the Median Wall. 

This wall was built of burnt bricks, laid in bitumen ; it was twenty feet in thickness, and a hundred in height, and the length of it was said to be twenty parasangs; and it was not far distant from Babylon.

"Not the least remarkable of the discoveries," says the Rev. J. F. Macmichael in the Appendix to his Xenophon, "which of late years have marked the progress of geographical inquiry in this most interesting - but, till of late, unexplored region, is the actual existence at the present time of an ancient wall stretching across Mesopotamia at the head of the Babylonian plain. Mr. Ross, who first examined it at its eastern terminus, in 1836, described it under the name of Khalu or Sidd Nimrud, (wall or embankment of Nimrod,) and as a straight wall 25 long paces thick, and from 35 to 40 feet high, running S. W. :} N. as far as the eye could reach, to two mounds called Ramelah, (Sifairah, Ainswr. p. 81-2,) on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah. The eastern extremity was built of the small pebbles of the country, cemented with lime of great tenacity; and farther inland, his Bedwin guides told him it was built of brick, and in some places worn down level with the desert, and was built by Nimrod to keep off the people of Nineveh, with whom he had an implacable feud. (Journal of R. Geog. S. ix. p. 446.)

So we are north of Fallujah, which is in Anbar province, but somewhere east of it. Xenophon says that the armies "passed over to the other side of it," which is not very adequate detail for a wall a hundred feet wide and maybe seventy miles long. (Remember that a 'parasang' is not strictly a measure of distance, but a rough measure of time spent traveling.) It would be interesting to know more about how one passed this wall, whether by wooden ramps that could be pulled up, or dirt ramps that had to be destroyed if enemies were approaching, or in some other way. By tradition, there were towers constructed and manned at intervals during the era that the wall was a defensive structure.

An 1877 illustration imagines the wall.

We end up learning very little from Xenophon about this wonder of the world, which I might have thought would make a larger impression upon him. I suppose he was focused on the problem of getting out more than the enjoyment of the sights.

There are reports of plotted attacks by native forces, which the Greeks analyze sensibly and don't get too excited about, although they take due precautions. None materialize during this period.

For some reason, however, they are marching east and not north or west. They come to the Tigris, and eventually to the ancient city of Opis. This is very near to modern Baghdad, but east of it. The reason is hinted at when we learn that the country they are marching through belonged to Cyrus' family, including his mother and his bastard brother. They meet the brother in passing, going with an army to report to the King for service -- doubtless to prove his loyalty after his brother's betrayal. The Persian commander, Tissaphernes, allows them to plunder two villages belonging to Cyrus' mother as a way of insulting his family and provisioning the Greeks. 

They now turn north along the Tigris and march another sixty miles, passing a city called Caenae and then coming to a river called Zapatas. It is not clear to me precisely where these would be from my knowledge of the area.

Guilty Flee When None Pursue

Canada's version of USAID has just deleted "its entire public database of foreign aid spending." 

They don't even have a DOGE in Canada.

Honor to the Fallen

A firefighter and former Marine shows honor, and class.

Fear and Congress

J. Michael Waller suggests that there's a reason the Tulsi/Kash nominations are taking a while: Congress is afraid of vengeance from the agencies if they vote yes.

One supposes that the level of corruption in Congress is high enough that each of them knows what he or she has to lose if the FBI seeks revenge. The only way to put a chain on that wolf, ironically, is to be brave enough to take the vote; but then one's crimes might come out as part of the daylight to follow.

Anabasis Interlude: Foraging

The army has the usual problem for armies of feeding itself. Logistics is going to be a key problem for the rest of the tale; we've already seen some hardships. Now that they are cut off from their benefactor and his resources, they depend either upon their enemies (who are helping them out with an eye towards getting rid of them without a fight) or upon the land.

Proceeding on their way they reached some villages, where their guides indicated to them that they would find provisions. They were found to contain plenty of corn, and wine made from palm dates, and an acidulated beverage extracted by boiling from the same fruit. As to the palm nuts or dates themselves, it was noticeable that the sort which we are accustomed to see in Hellas were set aside for the domestic servants; those put aside for the masters are picked specimens, and are simply marvellous for their beauty and size, looking like great golden lumps of amber; some specimens they dried and preserved as sweetmeats. Sweet enough they were as an accompaniment of wine, but apt to give headache. Here, too, for the first time in their lives, the men tasted the brain of the palm. No one could help being struck by the beauty of this object, and the peculiarity of its delicious flavour; but this, like the dried fruits, was exceedingly apt to give headache. When this cabbage or brain has been removed from the palm the whole tree withers from top to bottom.

There are many species of palm tree; this one is of course the date palm, which produces dates. We have the name 'date' from the Greeks, in fact: it comes from the Greek word for 'finger,' (δάκτυλος) which passed through Latin into English. 

It's incredibly destructive to eat the 'brain' (in this translation; mine has 'crown') and thus destroy for one meal a plant that would have borne fruit for many years. This is one reason the Persians are willing to arrange for their enemies to buy food, even to provide them with food rather than have this army feeding itself off the land. 

We had one of these date trees right outside of one of the many buildings we occupied as a temporary headquarters during my time in Iraq. You could just climb up in it and pick the things. I found them exactly as Xenophon describes. The preserved dates were also readily available.

The wine made from palm dates seems to have passed out of existence during the Islamic period. Probably someone still makes it for himself out back, in the manner of moonshine, but I didn't encounter anything like it during my time in Mesopotamia. 

Anabasis VI

The day after the great battle the Greek generals meet before dawn to decide how to proceed in the absence of orders or clear intelligence. Just before dawn they receive messages from the native troops, who had fled back along the route they had come upon, informing them of Cyrus' death and their own retreat. The Greeks offer to make their leader king; he refuses on the grounds that he is not of sufficiently royal blood, and couldn't make it stick. 

Meanwhile the Persians send an embassy including Tissaphernes and a man named Phalinus who is himself a Greek, who suggests to them that they surrender their arms and seek good terms from the King. This is the year 401 B.C.; the battle of Thermopylae is within living memory for the very oldest Greeks, having been fought in 480 B.C. There is no chance that any Greek army is surrendering their arms to a Persian king just for the asking. They know perfectly well that the Persian forces, however much larger, are not capable of defeating them without severe loss of life. 

I'll quote part of the discussion from the post on the battle:

[The large Persian formations] were analogous to a set of pillows, almost: big and voluminous, but not capable of (or willing to) exert much force. Mostly they fled before the Greeks, and avoided combat everywhere except in the intense fight when Cyrus charged the King. There only were the picked loyalist men of the two leaders fully engaged in brutal combat.

I think the reason for this is that the Persian army has the same loyalty problem that Cyrus has with his native forces. They didn't come to fight; nobody wants to die for the Persian king. They came to show up in order to make a showing of loyalty to their best-guess about who was going to win, or the one they obtained sufficient benefits from that they couldn't not show up for them when called.

The King is not in a very happy position. He knows that the Greeks drove all his forces before them all day yesterday. He knows that his people aren't eager to die for him. He further knows that the Greeks will fight to the knife because they know that the alternative is torture if they happen to survive. So he has a morale problem in spite of his vastly superior numbers; and he has the problem that, if he attacks and is driven off or savaged by them, it will destabilize his rule and the appearance of strength on which it rests. It is so clear to him that this is an unhappy position that he withdraws his forces across the Tigris (thus further emphasizing how close we are to modern Baghdad, so close to both the great rivers). 

The discussion of whether or not to surrender their arms involves some straightforward Greek philosophy, all of which points to keeping the arms. That section is enjoyable reasoning and shows practical wisdom in a state of difficulty.  

"Conquerors do not, as a rule, give up their arms" [Meaning that the Greeks had whipped all Persians yesterday -- Grim]... 

Cleanor the Arcadian, by right of seniority, answered: "They would sooner die than give up their arms." Then Proxenus the Theban said: "For my part, I marvel if the king demands our arms as our master, or for the sake of friendship merely, as presents. If as our master, why need he ask for them rather than come and take them? But if he would fain wheedle us out of them by fine speeches, he should tell us what the soldiers will receive in turn for such kindness." ...

Theopompus the Athenian spoke. "Phalinus," he said, "at this instant, as you yourself can see, we have nothing left but our arms and our valour. If we keep the former we imagine we can make use of the latter; but if we deliver up our arms we shall presently be robbed of our lives. Do not suppose then that we are going to give up to you the only good things which we possess. We prefer to keep them; and by their help we will do battle with you for the good things which are yours." Phalinus laughed when he heard those words, and said: "Spoken like a philosopher, my fine young man, and very pretty reasoning too..."

Clearchus said "The sight of you, Phalinus, caused me much pleasure; and not only me, but all of us, I feel sure; for you are a Hellene even as we are--every one of us whom you see before you. In our present plight we would like to take you into our counsel as to what we had better do touching your proposals. I beg you then solemnly, in the sight of heaven--do you tender us such advice as you shall deem best and worthiest, and such as shall bring you honour of after time, when it will be said of you how once on a time Phalinus was sent by the great king to bid certain Hellenes yield up their arms, and when they had taken him into their counsel, he gave them such and such advice. You know that whatever advice you do give us cannot fail to be reported in Hellas."

Clearchus threw out these leading remarks in hopes that this man, who was the ambassador from the king, might himself be led to advise them not to give up their arms, in which case the Hellenes would be still more sanguine and hopeful. But, contrary to his expectation, Phalinus turned round and said: "I say that if you have one chance, one hope in ten thousand to wage a war with the king successfully, do not give up your arms. That is my advice. If, however, you have no chance of escape without the king's consent, then I say save yourselves in the only way you can." And Clearchus answered: "So, then, that is your deliberate view? Well, this is our answer, take it back. We conceive that in either case, whether we are expected to be friends with the king, we shall be worth more as friends if we keep our arms than if we yield them to another; or whether we are to go to war, we shall fight better with them than without."

So, no. You will not be getting our arms. Nor does the King attempt to do so.

The Greeks withdraw to rejoin their native allies, and then decide to strike off north because they already know the way they came has no food upon it. They shortly come upon the outliers of the King's army, who withdraw further before them. The King is so eager to be rid of them that he sends another embassy to discuss further options. After a further discussion Tissaphernes proposes to lead them safely out of Persia, arranging for them to purchase food along the way in return for their promise not to raid the countryside or wage war upon it. He then keeps them there for 20 days while preparing for his own journey, during which time the Greeks suspect treachery is brewing but choose to wait for the promised escort instead of having to fight all the long way out.