Mujahedeen:
The National Review on the Arab warriors coming to fight the Jihad against Americans in Iraq. Outraged by our destruction of an Arab state, these men are swarming by the hundreds to join the war against America.
This was the anti-war argument fielded by the most intelligent doves. It was unfairly scorned by some hawks, who scoffed that doves were simultaneously arguing that Saddam had nothing to do with terrorists, but also that we daren't fight him because it would inflame terrorists. But the hawks who stopped with such scoffing were not playing fair, as they were themselves arguing that Saddam -was- in league with terrorists, but dismissing the danger of enhanced terrorist recruitment for war in Iraq.
The proper hawkish response was, and is, this: The time has come for fighting terrorists. We need to break these terror groups now, before weapons of mass destruction--particularly radiological/nuclear weapons--become more commonly available. It is therefore a benefit of the Iraq war that it will bring those who are ideologically disposed to terrorism into the fight now, while they are fighting at a disadvantage, so that they will be dead later, when weapons of mass destruction might be ready to hand. This is the proper time for the conflict. If we are to remake the Middle East, eliminating the subset of the population that is willing to commit terrorist acts is necessary.
Yes, it greatly increases the danger of the struggle to our soldiers in the field. They understand about danger. It is time for this fight. We cannot go on like we have, treating terrorists as criminals, and limiting our responses to law enforcement. By all means, let's call up the enemy to his fullest, and fight him down. We have thousands of special-operations qualified troops in the region. Breaking these terrorists is part of making America safe--the most important part, in fact. Anyone who wants to fight, let's fight now.
Rejoice:
The Daily Telegraph on the fall of Basra. Registration may be required, but it's free. The Telegraph reminds us of one way in which the offensive is very different from Medieval battles:
The Daily Telegraph on the fall of Basra. Registration may be required, but it's free. The Telegraph reminds us of one way in which the offensive is very different from Medieval battles:
In medieval and early modern times, cities that resisted siege could expect havoc and slaughter when they fell.
Even today, armies are sometimes prepared to raze urban areas rather than risk house-to-house combat, Grozny being the most recent example. Yet British troops managed to fight their way to the centre of Basra with miraculously few casualties, either to themselves or to the civilian population.
From William Raspberry:
William Raspberry is my favorite liberal columnist. (My favorite conservative columnist, if you are curious, is Mark Steyn). Raspberry's piece today is on affirmative action. He and I do not agree, but his take is, as always, thoughtful.
William Raspberry is my favorite liberal columnist. (My favorite conservative columnist, if you are curious, is Mark Steyn). Raspberry's piece today is on affirmative action. He and I do not agree, but his take is, as always, thoughtful.
Maybe if you ask them nicely:
Some additional business for the war summit in Northern Ireland. Since he's going to be there anyway, the BBC asks, couldn't Bush devote a little energy to getting the IRA under control?
Some additional business for the war summit in Northern Ireland. Since he's going to be there anyway, the BBC asks, couldn't Bush devote a little energy to getting the IRA under control?
North Korea:
The DPRK has tested an antiship missile this week, the third such test of the KN-01 system. Meanwhile, the BBC is having some fun with Bush administration officials, who can't seem to decide whether the DPRK or Iraq has the worse human rights record. The DPRK has suggested that, actually, it's the US who is the worst. But certainly one can't fault the US for being insufficiently interested in human rights... almost over-interested, really...
The DPRK has tested an antiship missile this week, the third such test of the KN-01 system. Meanwhile, the BBC is having some fun with Bush administration officials, who can't seem to decide whether the DPRK or Iraq has the worse human rights record. The DPRK has suggested that, actually, it's the US who is the worst. But certainly one can't fault the US for being insufficiently interested in human rights... almost over-interested, really...
Elements of the State Department report have been viewed with some derision by commentators - in particular its 16-page exposition of human rights in largely trouble-free Canada, and its noting that the Palestinian Authority has failed to install ramps at public building entrances to allow disability access.
War's Finest Weapon:
The Black Watch took Basra today, devoting their Challenger tanks. Those tanks are rated by some experts as the best in the world, better even than our M1A1 Abrams, though personally I suspect the Abrams is more likely to survive a battle. Air support was provided by US Marine Air, using Super Cobra attack helicopters that, excepting updated munitions and avionics, date to Vietnam. It's hard to imagine a more irresistable force than the Scots and the Marines fighting together. The Scotsman provides here a very thorough account of the battle.
This battle also saw, for the first time in the war, the British army using its most feared and awesome weapon.
The Black Watch took Basra today, devoting their Challenger tanks. Those tanks are rated by some experts as the best in the world, better even than our M1A1 Abrams, though personally I suspect the Abrams is more likely to survive a battle. Air support was provided by US Marine Air, using Super Cobra attack helicopters that, excepting updated munitions and avionics, date to Vietnam. It's hard to imagine a more irresistable force than the Scots and the Marines fighting together. The Scotsman provides here a very thorough account of the battle.
This battle also saw, for the first time in the war, the British army using its most feared and awesome weapon.
As he began to play, the sound of Scotland the Brave drifted across the bridge towards the city, competing with the clatter of rotor blades as four Cobra helicopters raced in to join the attack.The Highland pipes were declared weapons of war after 1746, when Bonnie Prince Charlie's last Jacobite uprising was defeated by an army of Lowland Scots and a few British gentlemen. The prohibition didn't take: soon the Highlander regiments carried those pipes around the world in service to the Crown. These regiments included the Black Watch, also known as the "Gallant Forty-Twa," or 42nd Regiment--they had been the 43rd, but one of the older regiments was "reduced." The Highlanders made the sound of the pipes feared by Britian's foes, from Napoleon's Eurpoe to India and China. They'd had the same effect upon the English in their day:
"There are those who when the woollen bagpipe sings i'th nose/ cannot contain their urine."
William Shakespeare, "Merchant of Venice"
Vive les chevauchees!
More "war rides" along the perimeter, provoking enthusiastic but uncoordinated resistance. Via the W. Post. If you don't know what a chevauchee is, page down to yesterday's entries.
More "war rides" along the perimeter, provoking enthusiastic but uncoordinated resistance. Via the W. Post. If you don't know what a chevauchee is, page down to yesterday's entries.
Two from the Post:
Today's Washington Post has two good articles on the use of American power in the war: one on ground forces, and one on the use of air assets.
Today's Washington Post has two good articles on the use of American power in the war: one on ground forces, and one on the use of air assets.
DPRK News:
From the Washington Post. The DPRK says it plans to rely upon a "tremendous military deterrent force," and will regard any sanctions as an act of war. I wonder if that applies to a PRC oil embargo? The Chinese Army on one side, and the US Military on the other--that's not a vice I'd want to put myself in.
Still, the language today is worrisome. It's not really new--the DPRK has been saying for a while that preconditions for negotiations with the US would be that we (a) sign a nonagression pact, and (b) accept them becoming a nuclear power. Today's language says the same thing, but in uglier terms:
From the Washington Post. The DPRK says it plans to rely upon a "tremendous military deterrent force," and will regard any sanctions as an act of war. I wonder if that applies to a PRC oil embargo? The Chinese Army on one side, and the US Military on the other--that's not a vice I'd want to put myself in.
Still, the language today is worrisome. It's not really new--the DPRK has been saying for a while that preconditions for negotiations with the US would be that we (a) sign a nonagression pact, and (b) accept them becoming a nuclear power. Today's language says the same thing, but in uglier terms:
"Even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the United States would not help avert a war," said the statement, distributed by the official Korean Central News Agency."Experts" seem to be divided on whether or not the DPRK is "pushing to become a recognized nuclear power[.]" Well, you've read their statement: what do -you- think?
"Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation," the statement said.
Wrong Again, General:
From Al Jazeera:
From Al Jazeera:
"The occupation of the airport is not of major military value. The advancing forces cannot use this airport, which is 15-20 kilometres off Baghdad unless they occupy the capital. The victory is more a political or media success than a military one," said General Mohammed Bilal, commander of Egyptian forces during the 1991 Gulf War.From CNN:
The first U.S. military planes landed at Baghdad's international airport Sunday night as U.S. forces tightened their control over the Iraqi capital, U.S. military officials said.
Army officials told CNN's Walter Rodgers that two C-130s and a C-117 cargo planes were flying into the city under the cover of darkness, two days after U.S. troops captured the facility.
Political Correctness:
That USMC manual I cited in the last post has an amusing bit of PC garbage toward the end.
That USMC manual I cited in the last post has an amusing bit of PC garbage toward the end.
(3) Wetting Down. After a promotion, it is customary toOne suspects a civilian editor.
celebrate by spending your first pay raise on your fellow Marines
at your favorite tavern. Tradition has it that the new grade
insignia was placed in the bottom of a glass of spirits, and the
Marine drank the glass dry. Remember... alcoholic beverages must
be consumed with moderation.
Not All Outlaws Are Merry Men:
InstaPundit today links to an article from the Jerusalem Post on U.S. successes against guerrillas. Not convinced? Did you know that the United States Marines fought guerrillas every year from 1898 to 1934, excepting only 1905? Well, there's a reason it's not commonly taught in schools--it wasn't, really, a big deal. The Marines even had forces to spare for the First World War, when they earned their epiteth "Devil Dogs".
InstaPundit today links to an article from the Jerusalem Post on U.S. successes against guerrillas. Not convinced? Did you know that the United States Marines fought guerrillas every year from 1898 to 1934, excepting only 1905? Well, there's a reason it's not commonly taught in schools--it wasn't, really, a big deal. The Marines even had forces to spare for the First World War, when they earned their epiteth "Devil Dogs".
To Dwell in the Greenwood with a Butt of March Beer:
The Daily Telegraph reports on the balmy weather of the Early and High Middle Ages. For the Telegraph, it's about global warming:
The Daily Telegraph reports on the balmy weather of the Early and High Middle Ages. For the Telegraph, it's about global warming:
According to Prof Stott, the evidence also undermines doom-laden predictions about the effect of higher global temperatures. "During the Medieval Warm Period, the world was warmer even than today, and history shows that it was a wonderful period of plenty for everyone."Well, of course. This makes sense of something I have wondered about since my boyhood. How could Robin Hood and his Merry Men live such fine lives with no better shelter than the Greenwood and a skin of March beer?
So Little John gave Arthur the money, and the others stepped to the thicket, there to await the return of the Tanner.Now I know.
After a time he came back, bearing with him a great brown loaf of bread, and a fair, round cheese, and a goatskin full of stout March beer, slung over his shoulders. Then Will Scarlet took his sword and divided the loaf and the cheese into four fair portions, and each man helped himself. Then Robin Hood took a deep pull at the beer. "Aha!" said he, drawing in his breath, "never have I tasted sweeter drink than this."
Congratulations:
It will not be thought unfit, I think, to celebrate even as we mourn: that is the lot of men in times of war. Congratulations to the Agonist and his lovely bride, with thanks for their many sacrifices and much hard work during these days of fighting.
It will not be thought unfit, I think, to celebrate even as we mourn: that is the lot of men in times of war. Congratulations to the Agonist and his lovely bride, with thanks for their many sacrifices and much hard work during these days of fighting.
Hail the Heroes:
What Richard Blaine said cynically, I say with conviction: Today they are the honored dead.
What Richard Blaine said cynically, I say with conviction: Today they are the honored dead.
From the NY Post:
A critique of Donald Rumsfeld. The complaint seems to focus on two central points, which are supported by evidence. His two main complaints are:
1) The Secretary of Defense, and others at CENTCOM, have made implausible statements about the war going "according to plan."
2) The Secretary of Defense, and his civilian advisors, did not allocate sufficient troops for the war.
A short response, then we'll do point by point:
1) One does not hold a press conference during a war and say, "Our plan has failed, and we're improvising," even if it has and you are. We know that the Pentagon had a number of options on the table; and, further, that wars don't run according to plan. "The plan" in war is always a construct of contingencies--it's a chain of "if they do this, we'll do that, unless they do this, in which case we'll do the other, unless..." To hold any war plan to a standard of "it can't be said to be a success if you changed it" means no war plan has ever succeeded.
2) Horseshit.
Now to the man's own words:
As for the ground troops taking the lead, several strategems positing that were available in the public eye by early March. Look here particularly at the "Fast Roll," and see if it doesn't sound similar to what we've seen. The Pentagon probably had ten potential versions rather than a handful, all of which understood that adjustments would be made according to what cards the enemy played.
And as for this statement--"the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure"--how's this for an honest measure: Baghdad in 17 days with fewer than a hundred US fatalities? Sure, things could have been worse. War is fluid. But honestly: the troops committed have shattered the opposition with astonishingly few losses. That's a fair measure that the troops committed were sufficient to the task.
If you aren't convinced, try this thought experiment: first, think of what would have been different if the Guard had been twice as tough as they were. Answer: we would still have won, though we would have taken either longer to do it, or suffered more casualties, depending on whether we chose to invest them and take them with airstrikes, or fight through them. Now, consider what we might have done to make things easier. What would an extra division have really meant to our frontline forces? If we'd moved a bit more slowly, we might have protected our supply lines from guerrilla raids, which could have saved a few American lives--but not very many, because we haven't lost very many to start with. War is dangerous, but it doesn't get much safer than this. Baghdad may yet prove bloody, but as for facing the Iraqi army--we had more than adequate forces even for a tougher foe than we faced.
Dangers remain before us, let's not kid ourselves. The ones in Iraq don't have to do with force levels, though, they have to do with counterinsurgency. The fall of Baghdad and Tikrit will mark the end of the war, and the start of the occupation. We've got a surplus of troops for the war, and more arriving for the occupation. The situation is well in hand (and remember how that statement traditionally begins?). If you want something to worry about, turn your thoughts to North Korea. That way lies peril.
A critique of Donald Rumsfeld. The complaint seems to focus on two central points, which are supported by evidence. His two main complaints are:
1) The Secretary of Defense, and others at CENTCOM, have made implausible statements about the war going "according to plan."
2) The Secretary of Defense, and his civilian advisors, did not allocate sufficient troops for the war.
A short response, then we'll do point by point:
1) One does not hold a press conference during a war and say, "Our plan has failed, and we're improvising," even if it has and you are. We know that the Pentagon had a number of options on the table; and, further, that wars don't run according to plan. "The plan" in war is always a construct of contingencies--it's a chain of "if they do this, we'll do that, unless they do this, in which case we'll do the other, unless..." To hold any war plan to a standard of "it can't be said to be a success if you changed it" means no war plan has ever succeeded.
2) Horseshit.
Now to the man's own words:
As far as events proceeding according to plan, well, if your plan is vague enough, with a sufficient number of "branches and sequels," as the military puts it, even defeat might be presented as having been anticipated.War plans are vague, involving branches and sequels. Journalists who don't like that ought to write about something other than war.
The much-heralded initial airstrikes failed and are now conveniently forgotten. The ground campaign assumed the lead from the first days of the war - which definitely was not according to the plan. And the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure.The intial airstrikes did what now? The first occasion when a coordinated military response hit our troops was when we got to Baghdad. Iraqi command and control is so degraded that we haven't seen any kind of coordination farther from the Baghdad Bunker than you can drive a pickup without being shot at by Apaches. The Republican Guard units ringing Baghdad were reduced, officially, to 50% strength, 65% strength, but in fact were reduced almost to no strength--both the 3rd and the 1st Marine plowed through what was left.
As for the ground troops taking the lead, several strategems positing that were available in the public eye by early March. Look here particularly at the "Fast Roll," and see if it doesn't sound similar to what we've seen. The Pentagon probably had ten potential versions rather than a handful, all of which understood that adjustments would be made according to what cards the enemy played.
And as for this statement--"the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure"--how's this for an honest measure: Baghdad in 17 days with fewer than a hundred US fatalities? Sure, things could have been worse. War is fluid. But honestly: the troops committed have shattered the opposition with astonishingly few losses. That's a fair measure that the troops committed were sufficient to the task.
If you aren't convinced, try this thought experiment: first, think of what would have been different if the Guard had been twice as tough as they were. Answer: we would still have won, though we would have taken either longer to do it, or suffered more casualties, depending on whether we chose to invest them and take them with airstrikes, or fight through them. Now, consider what we might have done to make things easier. What would an extra division have really meant to our frontline forces? If we'd moved a bit more slowly, we might have protected our supply lines from guerrilla raids, which could have saved a few American lives--but not very many, because we haven't lost very many to start with. War is dangerous, but it doesn't get much safer than this. Baghdad may yet prove bloody, but as for facing the Iraqi army--we had more than adequate forces even for a tougher foe than we faced.
At this writing, the 4th Infantry is "weeks away from joining the fight in Iraq." Their equipment is in Kuwait, but the soldiers aren't yet, excepting a few lead elements. This assertion that the 4th's arrival was sorely needed is twice false: first, they haven't arrived; and second, no serious disruption of Coalition operations is resulting. The 4th may be used in the battle for Baghdad and Tikrit, which is what they were going to be used for had they been deployed from Turkey. That is to say, on this point the plan has changed only insofar as they are approaching from the south, not the north.
Fortunately, the 4th Infantry Division, denied access through Turkey, unexpectedly became available to rush to southern Iraq, where it has been much-needed. Secretary Rumsfeld may lack humility, but he does have good luck.
Still, Secretary Rumsfeld cannot have it both ways. Either he expected a short war, in which case he did not intend to deploy those heavy divisions from the States, or he expected a long war all along.
At one point in the long planning process, Secretary Rumsfeld's civilian advisers - not one of whom had served in the military - insisted the ground campaign would require less than 10,000 combat troops, who would take a Sunday drive to Baghdad after the regime had been toppled by technology. The generals had to fight bitterly to overcome such madcap notions.Maybe, but what they got was a force of 250,000. The Marines alone number more than double the figure cited here. Obviously Rumsfeld listened to the generals--he just didn't give them everything they asked for. Between the stunning success he's enjoyed and the fact that it's really difficult to imagine a set of circumstances in which this force could have been bested by the Iraqi army, I'd have to say Rummy did all right.
Dangers remain before us, let's not kid ourselves. The ones in Iraq don't have to do with force levels, though, they have to do with counterinsurgency. The fall of Baghdad and Tikrit will mark the end of the war, and the start of the occupation. We've got a surplus of troops for the war, and more arriving for the occupation. The situation is well in hand (and remember how that statement traditionally begins?). If you want something to worry about, turn your thoughts to North Korea. That way lies peril.
Keeping Syria Out:
We've had statements from Colin Powell, Tony Blair, and many others denying that we are planning invasions of Syria or Iran. I believe them. I still wonder what's going on with the Syrian oil pipeline, though. The Gulf Daily News, citing unnamed "analysts" and "economists," says that Syria can absorb the loss of contraband Iraqi oil--thought to have been supplied to the tune of 200,000 barrels a day!--if and only if it engages in market reforms and exploratory drilling:
We've had statements from Colin Powell, Tony Blair, and many others denying that we are planning invasions of Syria or Iran. I believe them. I still wonder what's going on with the Syrian oil pipeline, though. The Gulf Daily News, citing unnamed "analysts" and "economists," says that Syria can absorb the loss of contraband Iraqi oil--thought to have been supplied to the tune of 200,000 barrels a day!--if and only if it engages in market reforms and exploratory drilling:
Syria may miss the extra cash from Iraq, but some economists say it has enough foreign exchange to cushion the fall for now, and its own oil production of about 500,000 bpd can meet immediate domestic needs. "Iraqi oil was a boost for Syria's economy, but is not essential," said Syrian economist Nabil Sukkar.So, my guess at this stage: the administration is after free market reforms in Syria, combined with a drop in revenue available to the government for the purposes of sponsoring terrorism. Since we will soon be in charge of the Iraqi oil fields, at least for a while, access to them on generous terms would be a nice carrot to go with the "or else" stick represented by the I MEF, 3rd and 4th Infantry, 7th Cavalry, and 101st Airborne.
"Syria has been alright as far as foreign exchange is concerned since it discovered and started extracting its own oil."
But Syria's oil reserves are dwindling and economists and diplomats say it must find new oil or develop its gas sector fast if it is to continue seeing revenue from energy exports.
The War-Ride:
I wrote on the medieval quality of this modern war, with its apparent notions of chivalry and the sanctuary of holy places. Today's heavy cavalry raid has interesting historic resonances. The Iraqi command apparently plans to retreat into underground fortresses designed to be virtually impregnable, while conducting its fights in a house to house fashion to reduce the effectiveness of American technology. One response to this resort-to-fortification in the Hundred-year's war was the development of the chevauchee, a heavy cavalry raid designed to smash the enemy before he could withdraw into the fastness:
Eventually--and probably fairly quickly--Baghdad will have to be brought under formal, full control. As a short term strategem for breaking the large numbers of irregular forces in the Baghdad urban enviornment, however, the chevauchee isn't bad. It keeps us on terms in which American military hardware can be brought to bear, rather than the infantry-to-infantry fighting required of house to house. Once the numbers of these folks have been reduced a bit, the house to house combat will go more easily.
The elite American forces are similar to the English army in one other way: they are second to none on the battlefield, but not well suited to peacekeeping and occupation. Look to see the Marines and 101st Airborne heading to new ground (like, perhaps, East Asia) as soon as the occupation becomes stable. The 3rd and 4th Infantry may remain behind, and we will likely see some of the units in Germany rotated into Iraq as well, perhaps reserve units. Coalition of the willing members who want to supply forces for peacekeeping will probably also make an appearance.
I wrote on the medieval quality of this modern war, with its apparent notions of chivalry and the sanctuary of holy places. Today's heavy cavalry raid has interesting historic resonances. The Iraqi command apparently plans to retreat into underground fortresses designed to be virtually impregnable, while conducting its fights in a house to house fashion to reduce the effectiveness of American technology. One response to this resort-to-fortification in the Hundred-year's war was the development of the chevauchee, a heavy cavalry raid designed to smash the enemy before he could withdraw into the fastness:
The English contract armies of the fourteenth century, at their best composed of mounted retinues of men-at-arms and archers, fast-moving and tactically proficient if brought to battle, were wholly appropriate to a war strategy based upon the chevauchee. They were, however, less well suited to strategic commitments requiring long-term occupation.The American chevauchee--or "war ride," if you would prefer a non-French name under the circumstances--does not target civilians, as the Norman system often did, but irregular combatants. Rather than fight them house to house for control of the city, a quick raid draws out relatively undisciplined forces who can be slaughtered on the hoof.
Eventually--and probably fairly quickly--Baghdad will have to be brought under formal, full control. As a short term strategem for breaking the large numbers of irregular forces in the Baghdad urban enviornment, however, the chevauchee isn't bad. It keeps us on terms in which American military hardware can be brought to bear, rather than the infantry-to-infantry fighting required of house to house. Once the numbers of these folks have been reduced a bit, the house to house combat will go more easily.
The elite American forces are similar to the English army in one other way: they are second to none on the battlefield, but not well suited to peacekeeping and occupation. Look to see the Marines and 101st Airborne heading to new ground (like, perhaps, East Asia) as soon as the occupation becomes stable. The 3rd and 4th Infantry may remain behind, and we will likely see some of the units in Germany rotated into Iraq as well, perhaps reserve units. Coalition of the willing members who want to supply forces for peacekeeping will probably also make an appearance.
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