Rights in Iran

In a post at ChicagoBoyz, Mike quotes Tim Kaine (whom, you may well have forgotten, was once a candidate for Vice President). 

The notion that rights don’t come from laws and don’t come from the government, but come from the Creator — that’s what the Iranian government believes. It’s a theocratic regime that bases its rule on Sharia law and targets Sunnis, Bahá’ís, Jews, Christians and other religious minorities. And they do it because they believe that they understand what natural rights are from their Creator. So the statement that our rights do not come from our laws or our governments is extremely troubling.

Ah yes, those noted champions of the idea of rights, the Ayatollahs. 

It is true that Sharia law endows Muslims with rights (or at least powers) that are not possessed by others. Taking slaves, for example, is part of the double-goodness of jihad:

...the conceptual roots of 'jihadism' are in the faith, and will come to be known to anyone who studies it closely; and anyone who studies the great scholars of Islam will find much support for the idea. Avicenna, that great philosopher, describes jihad as a kind of double good in his Metaphysics of The Healing, because it brings one closer to God's will while also providing you access to practical goods like slaves captured in the war. The philosopher Averroes, in a reflection on Plato's Republic, agrees with Plato that the best kind of women should be admitted to a kind of equality with the best kind of men, and that this equality means that they should be allowed to join in jihad and the taking of slaves and wealth. The Reliance of the Traveler, one of the great medieval works of Islamic jurisprudence, is a favorite example of Andy McCarthy's (who came to know it while prosecuting the World Trade Center bomber, an earlier example of mass killings by bomb).

It isn't true that the Iranian government is or ever has been concerned with rights in the Western sense. Nor is it true that government can or should be conceived of as the origin of rights, since it is the chief danger to the human dignity that is found in nature. What government gives, government can take away. What nature gives, no man may rightly:  not even many men with many guns. 

Nicomachean Ethics VI.3-4

Book VI continues with an examination of science and art. We'll get through two chapters again today.

Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more.

"These states" being what we develop out of our sensation, reason, and desire: the states in ourselves that are connected to the truth we find in the world. 

Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

It's easy to miss that this implies that truth is necessarily connected to wisdom and intuitive reason. We expect it to be connected to scientific knowledge, the first state he will examine, but not necessarily so: we are used to science being mistaken to a certain degree. That is because our science is experimental. Aristotle's was connected with the apprehension of a Form, which guarantees thing coming to be "always or for the most part." 

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.

The classic example is astronomy, the stars being thought at the time to have been ungenerated and eternal, as well as more necessary than we now think that they are. In Aristotle's time, the motions of the stars had been known for generations and generations, and had not changed. Now we know that stars also have a life cycle, and can change for several reasons. 

Mathematics is a purer example. The Forms of points and lines, the postulates and axioms and theorems, that were formulated by Euclid (c. 300) in the generation after Aristotle (384-322) persisted until the 19th century. Though Euclid had not formulated his work in Aristotle's time, the basics of geometry had existed since Pythagoras (570-495) as major entities of Greek thought, and had pre-existed ancient Greece in places like Babylon by perhaps 1,500 years. (All those dates are B.C., and thus reversed in order; lower numbers are later.) You can see how they might be thought to be eternal and ungenerated; indeed, philosophers of mathematics even today argue as to whether or to what degree mathematical truth is created by our conventions about how to handle mathematics, or alternatively are indeed basic features of the reality we inhabit.

Nicomachean Ethics VI.1-2

At this point in the work, we are approximately halfway through the EN. Book VI is going to further examine the meaning of wisdom, different sorts of wisdom, judgment, and other qualities of one's state of character. The first two chapters are short, so we will take them together. 

Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule.

This is in a way a restatement of what has been said, but in another way it seems to introduce the concept of having "the right rule." If you had a rule to follow, what would you need with a state of character? Indeed, the justice discussion of Book V seems to indicate that we should just have laws that require us to obey the rule that will make us behave virtuously. 

That doesn't seem to be what Aristotle meant. Terence Irwin instead translates that phrase as "having the correct reason," but reasoning is a process rather than a measuring tool. H. Rackham gives it as "in conformity with the right principle." The principle is going to admit of clear cases that look very rule-like, e.g., 'Don't throw down you shield and flee in the face of the enemy'; but also there are going to be vague areas, where you are determining if it is more courageous to die holding your ground or to conduct a fighting withdrawal to where you might be able to hold the ground and not lose the field. Likewise, as we have seen in the distinction between justice and magnanimity, there are lesser and greater ways of doing things that are both permissible: the just will do what the law requires, but the magnanimous will go beyond what is required to seek what is most worthy of honor. Likewise, the 'equitable' may go beyond the rule to do more than what is needed out of a sense of fairness to another.

We have not, then, fundamentally altered the project. It is still about using your reason to find the right way to behave, so there are rational principles to seek. Yet we must also look to our sense of fairness and honor, and if we are to be the very best sort of people, go beyond what mere rules require of us.

But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.

Nicomachean Ethics V.11

This is the final part of Book V, and the close of Aristotle's lengthy examination of justice. We live in a time when the word 'justice' is frequently invoked by people who haven't closely examined it, and often seem like they couldn't explain what they mean by it; at least all of you will now have had the experience of a close examination of the concept.

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what has been said.

Is it? Before you read on, decide what you think about that question based on what has been said. 

For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g. the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what [the law] does not expressly permit it forbids.

Thank goodness that is not true, at least for laws as practiced in our own time. It would have to be an extraordinarily long and detailed legal code that expressly permitted everything, so that anything not considered could be assumed forbidden. Military law sometimes approaches that level of detail: I recall that at the Baghdad Airport there was a signpost that read, approaching the airport, "No Hat Area," but leaving, "Hats Mandatory Past This Point." Everything not forbidden was required.

An account of justice that leaves so little room for liberty is wanting. I suppose it would be possible to construct express permissions that were very broad, e.g., "As long as you don't hurt anyone with your action, do whatever you want." Here we are asking if you can be unjust to yourself, so that would have to include you in 'don't hurt anyone.'  

Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another (otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his action and the instrument he is using; and he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly.

He is acting unlawfully, not unfairly. 

But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly.

Is it possible to treat the state unjustly? Socrates is supposed to have claimed that the state had the rights over its citizens that a master has over his slaves, because the state arranged for your safety and upbringing, food and shelter. Certainly many states exercise tyrannical powers over people, denying them their basic rights and freedoms in a manner analogous to slavery. Can a slave be unjust to his master, given the basic injustice of that relationship? 

Even in a healthy relationship between citizen and state, the state is not in a position of equality; and the state is not a person, having no feelings to be hurt and no dignity to be insulted. Burning the flag doesn't actually injure anyone, for example. 

If justice is lawfulness plus fairness, as Aristotle says, the law can certainly establish standards that citizens have to abide by with regard to the state; then, violating those laws is injustice by definition. Yet if justice is the virtue of respecting the interests of others, the state isn't properly an 'other.' It's a fiction, a legal but not an actual entity. I'm not convinced that you can be unjust to the state. 

Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which the man who 'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense; the unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round, so that his 'unjust act' does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i) that would imply the possibility of the same thing's having been subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time; but this is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more than one person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (for the man who because he has suffered does the same in return is not thought to act unjustly); but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same things at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife or housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,

Recall that justice was said to be, 'in a way,' complete virtue. Being unjust seems as if it is at least a failure to achieve complete virtue; but here we are talking about a sense in which one can be unjust without being generally wicked. The failure to achieve the whole doesn't mean that you haven't gotten anything right.  

In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly?' is solved also by the distinction we applied to the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly?'

(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more than the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice and is blameworthy-involves vice which is either of the complete and unqualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative, because not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of character), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad, but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to your being taken prisoner or put to death as the enemy.)

I think Aristotle answered the question 'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly' with both yes and no, as for example the virtuous man might take less than he really deserves: this is a proof of his virtue (because it displays his generosity), rather than a charge against it (because he doesn't insist on his rightful share). The drunkard is suffering something he freely chose while he had the power to choose; but now he doesn't have the power to reject it any longer. So, typically, 'yes, but at the same time also no.'

Nicomachean Ethics V.10

There are two more chapters in Book V.

Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same.

Terence Irwin translates this "equitable" language as "decency." Decent, he says, "is cognate with eikos, 'likely,' and means 'plausible, reasonable, respectable,' (as we say 'a likely lad' or 'a reasonable candidate for the job'). Hence it is used more generally for a decent person, and hence interchangeably with 'GOOD' in the right contexts, as Aristotle remarks[.]" You may or may not find it helpful to substitute 'decent' for 'equitable' as you follow along in this section; equity has some connotations in modern English that may not be relevant. On the other hand, fairness is a core component of justice, and equity suggests treating people with fair consideration for their stake in the matter.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice.

It is more than the law requires, in other words; going beyond what is mandatory because you recognize that the other person deserves more than what is required. Thus, treating a person equitably may go beyond the 'lawfulness' requirement of justice in pursuit of the 'fairness' requirement. Yet not 'fairness' in the sense of 'treating relevantly similar cases similarly,' but in the sense of 'ensuring just deserts.' This may indeed be more than what is average, not only more than what is required; it might be the case that equity in this sense requires exceptional payments or rewards in exceptional cases.

The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.

There's an interesting bit of architectural history! The Lesbian rule has been used by several philosophers since Aristotle to capture the idea of a thing that is both a reliable standard, but one flexible enough to make appropriate adjustments for circumstances.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character.

What's Going On in Germany?

According to the NY Post:

Four candidates and two reserves from the right-wing AfD political party in Germany have dropped dead within 13 days of each other — just before elections, according to reports.

The Alternative for Deutschland candidates were set to appear on ballots in North Rhine-Westphalia on September 14.

Officials said no foul play is currently suspected in any of their deaths, the BBC reported.

Um, "dropped dead"? I sense that the NYP doesn't particularly care for the AfD.

Ralph Lange, 66; Wolfgang Klinger, 71; Stefan Berendes, 59; and Wolfgang Seitz, 59, all kicked the bucket within two weeks of each other, the European Conservative reported. Two reserve candidates also died over the same period.

Kicked the bucket? Do they have editors at the NYP?

While 6 candidate deaths looks suspicious, there are 20,000 candidates up for election in September, and according to the more measured BBC reporting there have been deaths among the candidates of other parties as well. Still, six from the most hated party in Germany seems suspicious.

Requiescat in Pace Alexander "Tank" Armor

This one will be known to none of you, I imagine, although he had some celebrity within the sphere of Strongman athletics. He was a personal friend of mine. His military service left him in a wheelchair, which he took as a challenge; he was kind and encouraging to me when I was developing as a Strongman athlete even though he was a decade younger. He himself won awards and recognition, and helped the sport develop a category for those faced with challenges like his own.

One hopes King Charles II learned something from this exchange.

I will simply quote his father's remarks.

In Loving Memory of My Son, Alexander Armor

June 6, 1986 – August 30, 2025

With deep sorrow and immense pride, we honor the life of Alexander Elliot Armor, who passed away on August 30, 2025, at the age of 39 quietly in his sleep. A man of rare depth and boundless talent, Alexander lived a life that defied limits and inspired all who knew him.

Although born in Calgary, Alberta on June 6, 1986, Alexander moved to boarding school for his last 4 years at Hargrave Military Academy in Virginia where in his senior year he served as Band Major. 

Alexander served his country with distinction in the United States Army, earning the rank of Corporal before being medically retired. His service was marked by courage, integrity, and an unwavering commitment to others. 

Learning was very important to Alexander, and as such he holds a Doctorate in Military and Strategic Studies,  a Ba in Philosophy and a Bs in Neuroscience.  His life was filled with research of new subjects and expanding his horizons.

After his military career, Alexander became a trailblazer in the world of adaptive athletics. He broke numerous world records in adaptive Highland Games and adaptive strongman competitions, and in 2018, he introduced adaptive Highland Games to the International Highland Games Association (IHGA) at the historic Mey Games, in the presence of the now King Charles. His pioneering efforts earned him the title “Father of Adaptive Highland Games,” and his legacy continues to empower athletes across the globe.

But Alexander’s strength extended far beyond the field. He was a gifted musician, known for his artful guitar playing and mastery of multiple instruments. His original recordings—still available online—reflect a spirit that was both fierce and tender, capable of expressing the full spectrum of human emotion. Music was not just a hobby for Alexander; it was a language he spoke fluently, alongside many others. A polyglot, he could converse in several languages, bridging cultures with ease and curiosity.

In quieter moments, Alexander found joy in crafting custom knives by hand, blending artistry with precision. Each piece he created was a reflection of his patience, skill, and reverence for tradition. 

He also served his community as a proud member of the Hermitage Springs Volunteer Fire Department, always ready to lend a hand or risk his own safety for the well-being of others.  In an attempt to further serve his community Alexander Armor for TN House - District 38 ran for State Representative of Tennessee in 2024.

Alexander is survived by his devoted father, Dale Armor, and his beloved son, Jonah Lee Danger Armor, who inherits not only his name but the indomitable spirit of a man who lived with purpose and passion. His uncle Bruce Armor and his grandmother Maureen Armor.

Alexander’s life was a symphony of service, strength, creativity, and love. He lifted stones, saved lives, wrote songs, and forged steel—but most of all, he lifted hearts. His legacy will live on in every athlete who dares to dream, every melody that stirs the soul, and every flame of courage that burns in the face of adversity.

Rest well my son, Alexander. 

You were—and remain—unforgettable.

Nicomachean Ethics V.9

 Today's is a fairly long chapter.

Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in Euripides' paradoxical words:

I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?

Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all suffering of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust action is voluntary?

Since yesterday's reading was on involuntary injustices, we must take that last remark as setting aside involuntary injustice as a genuine instance of "unjust action."  

And is all suffering of injustice of the latter kind or else all of the former, or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary? So, too, with the case of being justly treated; all just action is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar opposition in either case-that both being unjustly and being justly treated should be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it would be thought paradoxical even in the case of being justly treated, if it were always voluntary; for some are unwillingly treated justly.

This is obvious in the case of criminals, who do not wish to receive justice. 

(2) One might raise this question also, whether every one who has suffered what is unjust is being unjustly treated, or on the other hand it is with suffering as with acting. In action and in passivity alike it is possible to partake of justice incidentally, and similarly (it is plain) of injustice; for to do what is unjust is not the same as to act unjustly, nor to suffer what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and similarly in the case of acting justly and being justly treated; for it is impossible to be unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly, or justly treated unless he acts justly.

We treated why this is so in yesterday's reading. Some injustices are not willed -- although 'the will' is a concept that Aristotle seems to lack, speaking instead of choice and decision informed by reason, or passion that is suffered involuntarily, or desire that arises naturally but is not itself decisive. The will with its sometimes irrational force is a modern conception.

Requiescat in Pace Graham Greene

He was a talented actor who featured in many good movies. Of them all, by far my favorite was Maverick (1994), a comedy based on an old (and surprisingly good) 1950s comedy. Greene played in this movie a fairly honest version of himself, someone of genuinely American Indian background who was acting out the Hollywood version for profit. 

It was a pretty good movie all the way around. He will be missed.

Two from the NYT

I read the Times partly to know what the 'conventional wisdom' among the left is about various things; it's helpful to know what people are thinking. 

Today they're worried that this National Guard deployment might be working, so they ran a "news" piece on how crime is being allowed to "fester" in Republican states because their Guardsmen are fighting crime in DC.

But if Mr. Trump has a political imperative, so do his targets. States need to balance their budgets, unlike the federal government. The federal government is covering the cost of more than 2,000 National Guard troops sent to Washington from six states, at an estimated cost of $1 million a day. That serves as a reminder that such resources could also be available in other cities, if requested. 

Federal support for local policing has also had a long history of bipartisan support. Ms. Bowser is one of many Democratic politicians who have sought to put more police on the beat but have run up against budget constraints. Democrats in Congress have been the primary champions of federal assistance for local police forces through the Community Oriented Policing Services — or COPS — program, first passed as part of President Bill Clinton’s crime bill in 1994. 

Federal-local partnerships have always shown promise, said Thomas Abt, founding director of the Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction at the University of Maryland. Working with mayors and local officials, the center has become involved with policing in Memphis and Knoxville, Tenn., as well as St. Louis and Boston. 

In all four cities, police reforms have emphasized intervening with the people and places at the highest risk of violence, balancing law enforcement accountability with empathy for the difficulties the police face, and maintaining legitimacy and credibility in high-crime communities, said Mr. Abt, who wrote a book on policing, “Bleeding Out." 

Knoxville, St. Louis and Boston have seen violent crime rates decline faster than the national average, he said, and Memphis — the newest city to partner with the center — is on track to join them.

Secondly, they're wondering if there's an exploitable divide between Second Amendment Trump supporters versus Law and Order Trump supporters. This is also said to be a news story.

President Trump’s political appointees rolled back Biden-era regulations and diverted officials assigned to weapons cases to immigration raids. The White House has also proposed steep cuts to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and installed disengaged, inexperienced leaders to oversee its increasingly marginalized work force.

While these moves have not exposed major political divisions, they have caused some uneasiness among gun-rights supporters who are concerned that law-and-order officials like Ms. Pirro, who once supported restrictions on assault rifles, will create a chilling effect on legal gun owners in the district and in the surrounding area.

“It sends a message we don’t like,” said Luis Valdes, the Florida director of Gun Owners of America, an influential gun rights group that has pushed for the repeal of most federal gun laws.

It is not clear how many of the guns confiscated by the city’s Metropolitan Police Department or federal law enforcement agencies have resulted in prosecutions, or how many cases were later dropped. In at least one case, Ms. Pirro’s office withdrew firearms charges against a person found to possess two guns after the search was determined to have possibly violated Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure.

What is clear, however, is that gun cases are a central component of the federal government’s push into Washington.

As I understand the Second Amendment maximalist position, it is roughly this: eliminate the ATF; eliminate the National Firearms Act and the Reagan-era ban on newer automatic weapons; constitutional carry; nationwide reciprocity. As far as I know, it has never embraced eliminating the ban on violent felons possessing or carrying guns. 

There probably is a point at which enforcement of DC's ridiculously unconstitutional gun laws crosses a line for sensible Second Amendment thinkers, even perhaps short of maximalists. But to exploit that divide, you'd have to have an alternative. What's the alternative on offer from Democrats?  

Nicomachean Ethics V.8

We had a break while I was off on travel, and will now resume with Book V. We are going to examine the justice or injustice of particular acts. This is different from what we have been interested in so far, which was the character of the actors rather than the justice of any particular action. Recall that in V.6 Aristotle makes this distinction plainly: “He was not a thief, but he stole.” It’s important that the character is not that of a thief, even though technically stealing even once does make the person a thief in a way. In the more important way, perhaps he is a physician who has saved man lives and regularly helps people who stole something in a moment of weakness or drunkeness; his character is basically good in spite of the one bad action.

This is why it took until V.8 to get to the question of actions rather than the virtues and characters of people. 

Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust.

That is another 'in a way/but in another way' move, which I have already pointed out as something that is characteristic of Aristotle's thought. Some philosophers are critical of that kind of move, which can introduce ambiguity into discussions. Remembering from I.3 that strict logic does not belong in the field of ethics, but only probabilistic and analogical thought, I take it to be the mark of correct thinking. It allows for sophisticated discussion and avoids trying to treat ethical categories as if they were categories of strict logic.

Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well.

This is a point frequently lost in contemporary socio-political commentary. 

Book by its Cover

“In the early morning hours on Sunday, Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan…”

Judge Sparkle?!? 

Look, I’m a reasonable man. But come on. 

Country Music Lethality

 There seems to be some interest in country music in the Hall. Herewith, the leading causes of death, per that genre. With a hat tip to Power Line.

 

Eric Hines

The Devil’s Courthouse Restored

The Devil’s Courthouse. This section of the Parkway has been closed since the hurricane. It just reopened yesterday.

Preparation to Compete in AI World

I don't watch television, but I am vaguely aware of what "Shark Tank" is. This guy who is from that show, and therefore is a celebrity but one with some entrepreneurial experience, has some advice for the young on the world they are going to face when trying to find work.

“You’re going to want to be creative,” Garman said to CNBC last month. “You’re going to want to be [good at] critical thinking. And you’re going to want to be flexible.” 

I think the ability to learn new things and adapt is going to be just as important as any particular skill that you learn,” he added.

It’s something that even AI leaders agree with too, including OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.

“I think critical thinking, creativity, the ability to figure out what other people want, the ability to have new ideas, that in some sense that’ll be the most valuable skill of the future,” Altman told students at Howard University last year.

How should they accomplish this goal of making themselves more critical, yet more flexible and creative? 

Part of this recipe includes ditching social media algorithms and seeking out new sources of information, he says—which should include a focus on questioning history and philosophy. Studying the works of those who lived more than 2,000 years ago—like Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle—is what he recommends.

“Always ask why, and then go one level below double click, triple click, to the sources. Why? Why? Why? Why? If you do that, you’re going to develop a mind that’s going to be able to beat anybody else and be more valuable in the workplace,” he said.

Send your kids here, I guess.

Home Again

Immediately better. 

Free beer and sausage dogs at Harley Asheville today.

UPDATE: Oh, look, a Highland Games & Celtic Festival.

I could not feel more at home in my own house.

Last Night in Babylon

I’m told that last week the Park Police backed by the FBI raided this street party and shut it down at ten. This week the National Guard were giving the girls a spin. I asked the boys if they had anything like it in South Carolina. “No, sir,” they laughed. 

Tonight I did find ICE and the FBI staging up for a raid, which they then went off on accompanied by DC cops. No idea what the target was. 

There was a lot of cop activity, but they seemed to be protecting the late night crowds at the clubs. I didn’t see any harassment.

The crowds are thick in places. The bouncer at the Camelot “gentleman’s club” offered to let me in with no cover charge, for which I thanked him but passed by. The bouncer at a bar called Recessions stopped me to compliment my beard and discuss beard care for a while.

It’s definitely been an interesting trip. I’m out of here on a dawn flight, and should be back in my mountains before noon. 

Buck Rogers

In the pilot of the old Buck Roger’s TV show, post apocalyptic freaks signal their impending attack by banging a metal pipe against another. (3:58)

In DC residents currently do this every night at 8 PM to protest the occupation of their city by ICE and the National Guard. 

That was last night near Connecticut Avenue.

A Protest March

Columbia Heights by Night

A heavily Latino neighborhood in northeast DC, it has been the focus of a number of ICE raids. 

No loitering. 

These speedy delivery services are big illegal immigrant employers, so they tend to be found where they can find drivers. 

In the weird way of DC, this extremely nice apartment complex with security is right down the street. 

I saw a lot of cops today, and tons of National Guard. National Guard are everywhere downtown, but I’ve learned that they have very restrictive orders about their weapons. I saw some getting harassed today and they didn’t make any reference to pistol or rifle, they called the police. And the police came, hardcore. They came loud and fast and from every direction but up.

I’m guessing the cops don’t want to run any hazards about the guys with the M4s losing patience. 

On the way to stalk ICE, I walked through Adams Morgan. That’s the trendy neighborhood where “Big Balls” was beaten. 

The Sandwich Guy is a local hero. A Grand Jury refused to indict him. 

“Don’t Bread on Me!”

Self-explanatory. 

There are a lot of them in the Metro.

The South Has Risen Again

I don’t know how many of you clicked the link on the 118th Infantry, but they are an old unit of the Confederate States Army. They were part of the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Longstreet in several famous Rebel victories. They invaded the North under Robert E. Lee, and fought at Gettysburg. 

I find it deeply amusing that they are now occupying D.C. I don’t think anyone has made the connection, but there is definitely tension arising from the fact that all these Southern states are the ones contributing troops to this little adventure. 

All my life I heard old guys saying “The South will rise again,” but I never expected to see DC occupied by a heritage unit of the CSA.

DC By Night

First of all, this place is awesome.

Pleasant meal, quiet until the drum circle got started. We were invited to join, though I demurred.

UPDATE: I stayed out until nearly eleven, extremely late for me. This is the most pleasant DC has ever been. The reason is that it is nearly empty; there’s almost no one on the streets or in the restaurants. 

19th by night. 

DuPont Circle; the picture didn’t come out, but does convey how empty it is. 

Darkened empty streets. 

Even the gay dance clubs, usually triumphant in this city, are quiet. 

This is the famous Subway where “Sandwich Guy” got his sandwich. 

If you don’t like cities or people very much, as I don’t especially, this city is currently optimized for you. Of course it’s because the immigrants are terrified, legal and not, and the population of disarmed people is frightened by the sight of armed soldiers patrolling their streets. 

I did run into some 30th ABCT guys tonight, from the 118th mechanized infantry out of South Carolina. Real friendly guys, armed some with pistols and some with M4A1 carbines. They were somewhat amused by how much the locals are terrified by the very sight of the rifles. Everyone in the Carolinas has guns, but here they seem strange and foreign. 

The mood is not entirely positive, even if I like the absence of traffic, noise, and crowds. 

DC Report: Urban Hiking

It was a beautiful afternoon, especially for late August. Since I had a few hours, I walked across the city to see how it’s doing.

Honestly, with one exception that I will get to directly, I’ve never seen it this nice. 

Reagan Intl., “DCA”

19th & K, a famous street for lobbyists

DC’s unarmed Public Safety

The Old Executive Building in Second Empire architecture 

The White House

The equestrian statue of Andrew Jackson, which BLM protesters tried and failed to destroy because his jealous spirit watches over it

First sign of anything criminal going on (end of street)

The FBI building

Clear evidence of criminal behavior now in view

Outside Union Station

Inside Union Station 

When I lived in Virginia more than twenty years ago, Union Station was nicer. It used to have many more stores and restaurants, some of which I miss. It’s not crime but mismanagement that has caused it to decline; it’s still perfectly safe. 

Otherwise DC seems pleasant and happy in spite of the occasional protesters (which there always are protesters in DC). I talked to several groups of Guardsmen, though not the 150th Cavalry so far; these were from South Carolina and Louisiana, and were all MPs. They were armed with handguns, but I am not surprised to see police units armed. They were all friendly and said most people are treating them well. 

I hiked a little bit more than 20 blocks this afternoon. I’ll keep going and see if the evening brings anything different. So far it looks pretty good. 

RETVRN

Getting medieval with college students:

The University’s Best Weapon Against A.I.: The 14th Century

...In 1355 the arts faculty at the University of Paris forbade masters to lecture at a slow speed that would have allowed students to copy their words verbatim.

You can still see traces of that old academic culture in Ph.D. programs, in which students have to pass oral exams and defend their thesis in a viva voce (“with the living voice”) in conversation with their examiners. Cambridge and Oxford, the inspiration for most early U.S. colleges, did not meaningfully adopt written exams until the 18th and 19th centuries, half a millennium after they were founded. The shift to original, written student work was partly in response to instruction in increasingly technical fields and partly due to the fact that written work made it easier to teach more students.

Even in the U.S. our earliest colleges followed the tradition of oral examinations. Emphasis on students writing compositions did not spread until we started copying German research universities in the 1870s. Freshman comp, the standard U.S. writing class, shifted to expect more unique and expressive content from students after World War II.

All of which is to say that our current practices around student writing are not part of some ancient tradition. Which assignments are written and which are oral has shifted over the years. It is shifting again, this time away from original student writing done outside class and toward something more interactive between student and professor or at least student and teaching assistant.

Though the return of the blue book exam is one sign of this change, a number of older practices for assessing student learning are being revived.... 

There's still a chance they might learn something, but only in a harder school.  

Nicomachean Ethics V.7

 Another short chapter today, still on justice. We're about two-thirds through Book V after this.

Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that... 

The "natural" here refers to human nature. What Aristotle is saying is that human nature is such that certain things have to be done a certain way no matter who or where (or when!) you are. Human beings come to be in a certain way, and they reliably have certain needs and certain capacities. These have to be answered. 

The alternative is that things are merely conventional, things that a society does in a certain way because of traditions or laws or cultural values. Often critical theorists today call these "social constructs." 

In general our contemporaries agree with this distinction, although some few deny that there really is any sort of thing that might be called "human nature." (Transhumanists, for example, believe that we will shortly be able to transcend many traditional limitations like death or illness; in principle, we could with technology become totally different sorts of beings than have ever existed before.) Where we disagree with Aristotle and each other is often in drawing the line between what is natural and what is socially constructed. When we moved to China in 2000, I had many ideas about things that I thought were human nature that proved to be conventional, for example, that men naturally recognized that women deserved protection and care due to their smaller size and in recognition of their great value as actual or potential mothers. It turns out that was a value that the American South had trained into me; in China women were seen as less valuable and targets for exploitation because of their relative weakness.  

Aristotle is calling the conventional the "legal," although that implies a formalization that isn't necessary.

...legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. 

Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable.

Again, it is less evident than he suggests because this is often where disputes arise. Of the moment, how much of sex and sexuality is natural and how much is 'a social construct' like gender has been hotly debated.  

And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous.

Obviously not quite right, but the point holds even if we allow that some people are left-handed. By nature one hand is stronger because it is favored and more frequently used, etc. 

The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

That's an interesting claim about constitutions. It seems to reduce the legal/conventional sphere to zero ideally, leaving just one way to order human life that would -- by nature, i.e. our nature, human nature -- be best for everyone. Aristotle does not give that prescription anywhere that has survived, not even the Politics. There we get a typology of types of states, each of which has a corrupt form that it is likely to pass into and each of which has instabilities that make it likely eventually to transition to one of the others via revolution or collapse. 

He has a few clear recommendations, but this ideal constitution may simply be theoretical: it ought to be true that a constitution exists that ideally fits our nature, which is the same everywhere as fire burns both here and in Persia. I rather suspect it is not true that such a constitution exists, though I can see the attractiveness of the idea that it should. 

There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust, and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done, is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the general term is rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is applied to the correction of the act of injustice).

Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which it is concerned.

That will be the subject of the next chapter. 

Nicomachean Ethics V.6

Today we examine a question of character.

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief, an adulterer, or a brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly in all other cases.

This is a place where Christianity offered a real shift, I think. If a man steals he is a thief, but only among all the other things he is, including beloved by God. In any case Jesus was hung between two thieves, one of whom he invited to accompany him to heaven. 

Even in that story, you can see the effect of the ancient world's moral code. The thieves were condemned to death, and condemned precisely for 'being thieves'; and the penitent thief admits the justice of that condemnation, for they had committed the crimes for which they were being punished. There is thus a serious question involved in whether 'a man is not a thief, though he stole,' or whether in fact his character is thus defined. 

Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just without qualification but also political justice.

We normally speak of justice in terms of political justice, so it's nice to see this distinction drawn out. Aristotle now gives an account of political justice that happens, by the way, to spell out the difference between just states and unjust tyrannies.  

This [i.e. political justice] is found among men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy.

We've already seen that 'equality' means 'proportional equality' in most senses, but can mean 'arithmetical equality' when we are trying to balance the effects of crimes and other injustices. Aristotle points out that the reason we need such laws is that, in fact, these free and equal men treat each other badly:

For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though there is not injustice between all between whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.

There is then a warning against letting any man have too much power, and instead trusting to the laws and the courts to find what is really just. (An interesting reflection for the present moment.)  

This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he* is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that he labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege; but those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.

The "he*" there is ambiguous. Structurally it looks like it should point to the magistrate as its antecedent, but the sentence doesn't make as much sense as if "he" is the ruler. Irwin goes ahead and translates this line as, "If a ruler is just, he seems to profit nothing by it." If he does not profit by his rule, he is just and deserves honor and privilege; but if he does profit from ruling, he is a likely to become a tyrant. 

The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself).

There are many highly debatable assertions in that sentence. They are obvious enough that I will leave them as an exercise for the interested reader. 

Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this is different from political justice.

The idea that family business is not resolvable in the public political courts is Aristotle's more than it is ancient Greece's. A wife could initiate a divorce if she wished, apparently without the state having the power to contest her decision; but the state would be involved to ensure the proper return of her dowry and other matters. Thus, the Greeks had clear ideas about political justice as it applied to the dissolution, at least, of marriages; and a notion of what it would mean for her to receive (proportionately) equal and fair treatment. 

The Cornerstone of Any Nutritious Breakfast

AVI and David Foster were discussing inflation and McDonald's menus at AVI's place. I got to thinking about it. I remember eating those hamburgers as a kid, but I didn't know if they were even still on offer. I don't eat at the place except rarely on a road trip if it's the only option when I stop for gas; but what I remember seeing on offer was Quarter-Pounders and Double Quarter-Pounders with Cheese, Big Macs and specialty burgers of one type or another. Those tiny little hamburgers that used to be the cornerstone of their offerings I don't remember even seeing on the menu.

I looked it up, and they do still offer them if you want one. Depending on the market they're $2.85-$3.99, and 250 calories, 12 grams of protein. The bigger offerings tend to cost more like $7.15-$10.59, but they also offer 580-750 calories. The Double Quarter Pounder with Cheese has 48 grams of protein; the Big Mac 25 grams.

The prices have still gone up more than inflation as calculated by the CPI. The 15 cent burger should cost $1.65, not $3.99. 

If you're like me, the main nutritional concern is adequate protein per meal. Your dollar is buying you 3 grams of protein with the little burger. It'll get you 4.5 per buck with the Double Quarter Pounder with Cheese, or 3.5 grams with the Big Mac. I wouldn't make a habit of eating Double Quarter Pounders, but it's not a terrible bargain: 48 grams of protein is pretty good for a quick meal on the road. 

Grim Nods

Apparently I was wrong; at the direct command of the administration, the National Guard deployed in DC are armed in general, not just MPs. 

That unit insignia is 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team, “Old Hickory,” most of which is here in North Carolina. Now our Democratic governor has not sent any troops to support this deployment; that means these are the West Virginia NG contingent. That means they are the 1st Squadron, 150th Cavalry Regiment. I spent some time with their predecessors 16 years ago in Iraq. Their predecessors were good men, West Virginia hillbillies of course but citizen-soldiers of good character. Hopefully these men are too, because suddenly a lot depends upon that. 

They are armed with M4 carbines in condition Amber — I assume, since it’s cosmetically indistinguishable from Red but Red would be reckless beyond what I can imagine a military commander supporting. 

This is all remarkably reckless in any case. Trump and Hegseth, of course, but it’s already well beyond the risk tolerance of the regular military. 

Now the 1-150th are mostly cavalry scouts and armor personnel. They’re at least not trained infantry whose practiced responses are extremely lethal. Still, this is a perilous decision. The risk they are running here is very high.

On the Current Controversy

A Free Education

If you go for the more expensive sort, you'll read a lot less Aristotle. 

Using Open Syllabus Analytics, Campus Reform tracked the 11-year shift and found that authors like Aristotle and Plato fell considerably in the overall rankings. In 2008, Plato ranked 19th and Aristotle 46th. By 2019, their ranks dropped to 53th and 85th, respectively.

Meanwhile, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler consistently ranked high across U.S. college syllabi.

At least here it doesn't cost you anything. There are also no stressful examinations that you have to pass, although those do have their purpose.  

DEI

I call this photo “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.” (Harley, two Yamahas, and a Kawasaki Ninja.)