Venezuela had a Russian-supplied integrated system focused on protecting Caracas and strategic sites. This included long-range, medium-range, short-range, and point-defense systems, supplemented by anti-aircraft guns and fighter interceptors.
They had around 12 batteries of S-300VM (approximately 1–2 divisions sapid effective against aircraft, cruise missiles, and some ballistic threats up to 200–250 km. Medium-range: Buk-M2E (SA-17 Grizzly) systems, with 9–12 batteries up to 45–50 km. Medium/short-range: S-125 Pechora-2M with dozens of units for low-to-medium altitude threats. Short-range/point defense: Tor-M1/Tor-M2E (up to 10 systems in some reports) and possible Pantsir systems. They had 5,000 MANPADS Russian Igla-S for low-flying threats like helicopters and cruise missiles.
Anti-aircraft artillery: Over 400 pieces, including 200+ ZU-23-2 23mm twins and 114+ 40mm Bofors L/70 (some modernized).
Aerial component: Su-30MK2 Flanker fighters (around 20–21 operational) for interception, with limited F-16s (few airworthy due to maintenance issues).
All that proved useless or was neutralized on January 3, 2026 practically instantaneously.
He is always worth reading.
4 comments:
As a couple of commenters on Wretchard's Facebook post said, that night was not a good look for Russian technology, nor was it a good look for the personnel manning those installations.
I think, too, it was not a good look for Russia's training in the use of those items, nor a good look for the Venezuelan managers enforcing that training. Even within the Venezuelan manager framework, though, I put more emphasis on Russian training, given the performance of Iraq's then-near top line Russian tanks and crews against US forces in that kerfuffle.
Eric Hines
Yeah, that’s a point I have been thinking about regularly for years. We keep hearing that this stuff — and China’s— is the equal, more or less, of American generations of tanks or fighters. But there’s really only one way to test that. When it gets put to the test, the Russian stuff disappoints.
On the other hand, even Abrahams aren’t reliably surviving in Ukraine. The wheel has turned on that technology, another thing you don’t really learn until you try it out.
*Abrams.
I like "Abrahams." [g]
The biggest problem with the Ukrainian tank offensive attempt, in those days prior to anti-tank drones, was their use of them (under how much pressure from the US, NATO, or both, I don't know) in a Western doctrine manner, but with the the US and NATO members withholding the Critical Item of that doctrine: air cover. The Ukrainians were denied that cover, having been denied the aircraft necessary for it. Their Russian MiGs were never up to that task.
Today, everyone's tanks are going to have to evolve, armored units generally are going to have to evolve, and combined arms doctrine badly needs to evolve.
Personally, I favor EMP anti-air missiles, both from "armored" platforms and shoulder-fired missiles. Along with HiMARS-type EMP launchers to blanket exposed infantry, C&C nodes, and communications centers.
Eric Hines
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