On Human Nature

A professor of psychology writes on studying 'human nature,' as she calls it, in the LA Times. It may be behind a paywall, but here is the part I wanted to discuss.

In the past months, a growing choir of popular media has voiced impassioned concerns with the so-called innateness dogma. These critiques question the possibility that females are instinctively maternal, that biological sex (a notion distinct from gender) is binary, and that biology shapes society... At the root of the anxiety, however, are not the technical scientific merits of these proposals but their social consequences — their potential to elicit harm and perpetuate injustice.

...these concerns have moved to curbing the scientific process itself. In a recent editorial in the journal Nature Human Behavior — one of the leading scientific outlets — the editors have stated that they may request modifications or, in severe cases, refuse publication of “content that is premised upon the assumption of inherent biological, social or cultural superiority or inferiority of one human group over another.”

...Indeed, the notion of inherent cultural differences is not only morally objectionable but also conceptually bankrupt. But inherent biological differences — the topic of much active research — is a different matter. In fact, there is evidence that individual differences in IQ and reading and musical skills are heritable. In the eyes of some, however, this research is socially harmful.

Will restricting investigation into the science of human nature effectively prevent harm and cure the social ills that propagate injustice and prejudice?

Now, her answer to this assumes materialism, which directly defies the largest part of the 'human nature' discussion over the centuries. The Greek version is hylomorphic, with an assumption that there is some kind of form (or Form, for Platonists) governing and organizing the matter. For Christians and similar religious thinkers from the other Western monotheistic religions, this form takes on a spiritual context: it is a God-made or -shaped soul of some description. The author identifies in the piece as a Jew, but her answer dismisses the religious character of the form or the possibility of anything immaterial at work. 

It appears that people wrongly consider the psyche as ethereal, distinct from the body. So, they assume that psychological traits cannot be inborn, coded in our bodies from birth. To anyone operating with that assumption, the notion of inborn psychological differences seems frivolous — it smacks of discrimination. It is no wonder, then, that the very talk of human nature seems offensive....

But science says no such thing. First, science tells us that our bodies and minds (or psyches) are one and the same; so, the possibility that a woman’s genes shape her personality ought to be no more controversial than acknowledging their role in shaping her body. 

 Nor is she willing to go all-in on the idea of seeking the truth wherever it leads in any case:

First, when science directly inflicts harm on people, there is no question that science must yield. Second, talk of inborn group differences can inflict harm. Claims about human nature have been misused to hurt, discriminate and exterminate people... [f]or example, when abortions are curtailed, it is natural for women to fear that talk of “maternal instincts” can be exploited to further limit their reproductive rights.

I suppose it's a baby step in the right direction, at least. It still excludes the bulk of the philosophical tradition, which underlies the whole field that gave rise to the sciences she is interested in -- not merely psychology but biology. I think, and have defended in a paper, that hylomorphism is a better solution than many to many current problems in science from chemistry to biology. That there might be a set of forms inherent in reality that matter is inclined to adhere to would explain, for example, why crabs seem to have evolved multiple times. It makes sense of the relatively rapid timeframe for evolution in general: it's hard to credit a purely random process of occasional mutation with such rapid evolution.

Still, there remain "HERE BE DRAGONS" areas of things that cannot be thought, or at least not expressed -- not even in journals of scientific research. Well, one step at a time.

10 comments:

Assistant Village Idiot said...

I also don't know whether to rejoice that something is getting through or to worry that the small amount will let too many people breathe a sigh of relief that they have done their bit and need look no further.

I think there is a diminishing basic store of knowledge about heredity because adults no longer have as much contact with children. Fewer people have children, and those have far fewer children. Parents survive longer, so fewer people take in the children of deceased siblings or neighbors. We had two in the usual way and that taught us a good deal about genetics; then we adopted two were not even ethnically that close, and that taught us more; then we took in a nephew, which allowed us to compare him to his parents and many half-siblings. It didn't make us experts, but so many people lack even this level of experience with children now.

Christopher B said...

Leaping directly to the assumption that anyone who notices differences is establishing a theory of inferiority and superiority tells me more about you than it does about them.

Tom said...

Farmers who raise animals learn a lot about heredity as well, and there too urbanization has impoverished our collective store of knowledge.

Recently I've run into an argument (though it's old, and European, I think) that the core political value for conservatives is belief in a natural order that justifies social hierarchy or social norms. They view arguments from nature in general, whether it's IQ or sex/gender or race or whatever, as simply normal rhetorical moves for conservatives. So, it's not necessarily that she leapt to that conclusion. She may have learned it.

Tom said...

"First, when science directly inflicts harm on people, there is no question that science must yield. Second, talk of inborn group differences can inflict harm. Claims about human nature have been misused to hurt, discriminate and exterminate people..."

But she gives no example of science directly causing harm. Instead, her examples are people taking scientific ideas and talking about them, nor does she seem to even claim, must less offer evidence, that "claims of inborn group differences" always and everywhere cause harm. They merely can cause harm, in her own formulation.

So, I don't think her argument holds up even as she presents it. Additionally, I disagree that mere "talk of inborn group differences can inflict harm." These arguments seem to always end up talking about speech suggesting action and action causing the harm, but that doesn't warrant a direct link between speech and harm. There's a middle step, and that opens the conversation up to other ways to prevent harm other than limiting speech.

Tom said...

One more point regarding her claim that "Claims about human nature have been misused to hurt, discriminate and exterminate people..." -- so have claims about social justice, so if limiting speech on human nature is so justified, limiting speech on social justice would likewise be justified.

Grim said...

@Tom: "But she gives no example of science directly causing harm. Instead..."

Yes, I think that is a rhetorical ploy on her part. She begins by conceding that "IF" science directly causes harm, "THEN" it must be constrained in its inquiry; but then argues that in fact the science has not caused the harm, only people's poor reasoning about what they are learning from science.

I'm uncomfortable with it even as a rhetorical ploy. There's a principle to defend where free inquiry is concerned, and it ought to be defended rather than conceded for rhetoric.

David Foster said...

"...Indeed, the notion of inherent cultural differences is not only morally objectionable but also conceptually bankrupt"...I don't see this at all. Cultural can vary markedly between two divisions of the same company, two Boy Scout troops in the same town, etc. There were obviously major cultural difference between Seneda Indians and Aztec Indians and between either and a Quaker village.

Not sure what "inherent" would mean in this context...obviously, cultures change over time, and I've never heard anyone argue otherwise. So, don't understand what point she is trying to make here.

Grim said...

Well, that’s the part of her formula that I took to make the idea bankrupt. Cultures don’t have natures, and as such nothing is inherent to them. Humans have natures, and those give us inherent qualities. Cultures are just practices, as you say, change over time. Whatever the Aztec culture or the Quaker one was hundreds of years ago, they’re both quite otherwise now.

Tom said...

Yeah, that's a good question. In the 19th and early 20th centuries (and maybe other times - I dunno), there was a lot of conflation of race, nation, and culture, i.e., Germanic culture was thought to be the product of the inherent (and inherited) qualities of the German people. So, if I'm guessing her meaning correctly, she's talking about the idea that culture is a manifestation of race and nation. In that sense, "company culture" actually isn't considered a culture.

As for the Native American cultures, the old idea of race was tied into inheritance, so while there was a broad idea of race in terms of white, black, Native American, etc., the individual nations were also considered races: the Irish race, the German race, the Scottish race, etc.

For example, the idea that one particular culture is more inclined to logical reasoning while another is more emotionally driven, and that these are inherent in the races of people who belong to those cultures. I think the closest thing today might be racial stereotypes, e.g., the stereotype that Asians have a natural talent for mathematics.

That said, it's not clear to me that's what she's talking about and I'm just guessing.

Tom said...

It turns out I can read the whole article, and her final two paragraphs bring her closer to what we're saying, I think:

"The idea that genes influence some elements of personality ought to be received as a scientific hypothesis like all others. Like atomic energy and gene editing, the scientific study of human nature is open to exploitation. In many cases, however, these harms arise not from science but from human consumers with their own psychological agendas.

"Even if one could prevent such research, those hidden agendas would still be at work in the world. But without science-based answers, society cannot intervene to correct the inequities inflicted by our genetic lottery. Limiting science cannot alleviate our social ills, but it can hamper our ability to understand and address them."