While you're waiting for Tom's next post on the topic, here's something that turned up on Instapundit today. "Is human nature good or bad?" Since we talked about "the good" last week, the challenge (for those of you who wish to accept it) is to try to give an Aristotelian account of the answer. I think last week's discussion gave you enough mental furniture to do it.
I'll leave this for a few days and then come back and reply to any attempts. It's more important to think it through yourself than to have me tell you an answer.
8 comments:
My first thought on this is that, at least in our first discussion, Aristotle's "the good" is not about Good vs. Evil, but about worth. He said that the work of a cavalryman is a higher good than that of a bridle maker, but he's talking about which one is worth more, and evil doesn't enter the discussion at all.
My second thought is that he talking about building character and that character is "etched" by good habits. So, I don't think he would subscribe to the idea that human nature is Good. I think he would say that human nature is wild and must be trained to be Good.
Your second answer is better, but you missed a step that’s crucial. If you want to go back and look for it, I’ll wait a bit so others can try if they want.
AS we did in lesson one, I'd want to go over the terms a bit. What do we mean by "human nature"? That which a man is without the addition of that which is learned from other men through family, history, and civilization? Or is it simply what man is, period? Because I think I'd have rather different answers depending on which it is, or certainly if it's something else.
Well, maybe I should read the linked piece before commenting. Personally, I'm more in line with the Jewish model, with influences from the Christian model in terms of the warnings built into the understanding.
Aristotle might see it differently. If man is seen as better (closer to the perfect good) by being knowledgeable, productive, accumulating wealth, producing offspring and raising them, well, human nature generally pushes one toward those ends in one way or another so it would I think be seen as a good at some level almost regardless. Since it's much more likely that one is prosperous and gathers wealth by having support and security, one would think that to get to those goods more fully, one would have to also be socially adept, and in some way beneficial to those around them- this would promote good citizenship, for instance. We are also, in fact, social creatures, and one presumes for a reason that benefits us and moves us toward that ideal. So, from the Aristotelian perspective, I'd think human nature would be seen as a good, with a broad range of actualizations of that nature.
"I'd want to go over the terms a bit. What do we mean by "human nature"? That which a man is without the addition of that which is learned from other men through family, history, and civilization? Or is it simply what man is, period?"
We haven't gotten to this yet, but will do so. Aristotle's argument on this point is the root of the famous phrase "X is second nature to him."
Aristotle is going to distinguish between the first nature of human beings, which is 'what mans is, period,' as you put it; and the second nature, which is the nature man acquires through training and practice. That's where Tom was going in the second answer, i.e., that it's possible to train one's nature toward higher goods.
But there's still the missing step, which is important enough that I'll make it explicit.
So, from the Aristotelian perspective, I'd think human nature would be seen as a good, with a broad range of actualizations of that nature.
Actualization is a key aspect of Aristotle's thought. It's explored more in the Physics and Metaphysics, but you're quite right to cite it here. A potential is (for Aristotle) also a first actuality: a set of stones and logs is potentially a house in a way that a pile of sand or a bucket of water is not. Neither of them is actually a house, but one of them is actually potentially a house. To say that it is potentially a house is to say something about its actuality, too; but the further actualization remains to be done.
To some degree human (first) nature is potentially good, which is to say that it is actually good. But it is actually good in the way that the stones and logs are actually a house: i.e., not completely, though it is the kind of thing that could be made so. Right now it's actually good only in that sense of having the right kind of potency. It points at things that will be helpful, like 'seeking food' and 'feeling a need to balance between curiosity and caution.' But a dog's nature also has these things.
Unlike a dog's nature, though, human (first) nature also has an inclination toward reason. That is what makes it potentially good: that capacity gives it the ability to be rationally shaped and trained toward perfection.
Now, here is the missing step that I wanted to make explicit: Aristotle has a reverse assumption about the basic question. Instead of asking "Is human nature good or evil?" and trying to answer the question, Aristotle starts with "What is the good?" and answering it in terms of nature.
The Moderns introduced the reversal by abandoning the idea that we could reason to the good from nature (especially Hume, with his 'is/ought' distinction). That cut the good loose from what is actually natural to human beings, which is how you get a lot of the weirdness we see flourishing today. Aristotle's approach is better just because it began with concerns about the first practical realities, and reasoning from them to what might be better for beings of that kind. You get a moral system that is humane, in the sense that it is actually fit for human beings.
Interesting. So, Aristotle takes a look at (well, studies deeply) nature and from that derives what is good? That's something the Hillsdale course has gone around. It's talked about "the good" in terms of human society (the value of different kinds of work, etc.) but not in terms of the natural world so much.
I like Hume's is/ought distinction, but I don't really understand it's implications. Does it really sever the connection between nature and good, or is that just a common interpretation?
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