From the Federalist's
excerpt
of the DoJ FBI report, a couple of charts of leak paths (at the link), and this
finding by the IG:
Second, although FBI policy strictly limits the employees who are authorized to speak to the media, we found that this policy appeared to be widely ignored during the period we reviewed. We identified numerous FBI employees, at all levels of the organization and with no official reason to be in contact with the media, who were nevertheless in frequent contact with reporters. The large number of FBI employees who were in contact with journalists during this time period impacted our ability to identify the sources of leaks.
The USAF has PAOs—Public Affairs Officers—who are the only
persons authorized to speak to the public, not just the press, about USAF
official business. There are sever
penalties for violating the regulations laying out that authority. USAF members are, of course, allowed to speak
to the public, including the press, but those members must be at pains to be clear
that they're speaking only for themselves, and they cannot under any circumstance
speak of official business—those questions are to be explicitly referred to the
PAO. I think the other services have
similar requirements.
And this:
FBI employees received tickets to sporting events from journalists, went on golfing outings with media representatives, were treated to drinks and meals after work by reporters, and were the guests of journalists at nonpublic social events[.]
While the IG team acknowledged that the difficulty of identifying
the leakers, as I've commented once or twice, "difficult" means
"possible." The only way the
FBI and the DoJ can regain credibility is for the effort to be expended, the
leakers identified promptly and publicly, the leakers fired for cause, and
where appropriate (the bribe receptions of the second cite), the leakers
brought to criminal trial.
It's especially important to do this promptly because the
large majority of line agents and DoJ personnel are honest and above board, but
their reputations are badly smeared by these…miscreants'…misbehaviors.
Eric Hines
7 comments:
The IG report, sadly, strongly suggests that the IG can’t correct the DOJ/FBI. It is disheartening to see them conclude, in spite of the evidence of their eyes, that there was no improper political influence.
That's a thing about the DoJ's IG report that really bothers me. They spent the last six months letting the subjects of their investigation review and comment on drafts of the final report--sanitize the report, I say, which is why the report shied away from saying "improper political influence" and why it said Lynch exercised "poor judgment" and not "Lynch behaved unethically," just like one of the subjects of the IG's investigation said Clinton was "careless" instead of "negligent," a term in the law that would have forced that subject to refer Clinton for prosecution.
My units in the USAF were subject to annual IG inspections and ORIs and subject to IG inspections in response to complaints, and I led a number of annual IGs on other USAF units. When a USAF IG inspection, annual or otherwise, was completed, the practice and requirement were to outbrief the subjects and tell them the findings, and then everyone went home and published the reports, complete with findings. Until then, there was, by design, no opportunity for the subjects to comment other than to correct obvious errors of fact. On publication, the subjects were free to concur or nonconcur with the IG report or with the finding individually. The IG then would accept or reject their nonconcurrences. All of this was out in the open--transparently done in today's jargon. I suspect the other services are substantially the same.
I really don't like letting the subjects edit the report before it's been published.
One of the House committees has called on DoJ to deliver all drafts of the IG's report. I think they need to subpoena all correspondence related to each of those drafts, too.
Eric Hines
I could not agree more.
Grim, this is only the first part. There are successive reports yet to come out. I'm not giving up hope yet.
I think I hold on to hope because of my belief that you can generally count on people to do what is in their self interest, and I think the Republicans (or some of them anyway) have been lining this up to ratchet up as we approach the election.
Oh, I'll add one more thing- I think the lack of professionalism we're seeing isn't only a DOJ or FBI or even government problem, I think we abandoned the premise of professionalism a long time ago. Casual Fridays, minor as they seem, were a big hint of what was to come, or should have been. When you forget why you do something, you think it's unimportant, until you realize that there was a purpose to that thing after all.
It isn't just DoD/the services that have designated PAOs--PAO is a specific job title within the Department of State, as well. We are also reminded repeatedly that it is only the PAO who can speak to the press on official business (or can authorize someone else to do so, for example, if you're the subject matter expert).
Still, that hasn't stopped leaks from State, much to the detriment of its ability to conduct foreign policy.
Of course, this is all me speaking, and does not reflect the official position of my Department.
This seems to me to be a particular case of a general pattern that I've been yapping about off and on for years.
Historically, there are a lot of things that governments (and protogovernments, like war bands and pirate crews) do to increase trust. Ordinary standards that even apply to individuals, like not flagrantly lying, or leading from the front, or tolerating and responding sensibly to sensible criticism and opposition. At a scale larger than the individual, public trials with known laws instead of capricious actions and decrees. Having prestige in-group standards and activities that show that the key people really do have something on the ball. (Not just having your nose counted as present at an expedition devoted to training Nicaraguan transgender abortionists to wash crude oil from waterfowl without paying any attention to whether it's effective, but knowing a diplomatic language, hunting dangerous big animals with spears, or even arbitrary things like quoting traditional philosophers in a dead language, or playing Go, or elaborate courtly dance or music.) Having powerful officials subject to standards, not just attacks by equally powerful political rivals. Et cetera...
A lot of those tend to erode as a mature government judges --- often correctly --- that it has become secure enough that it can rule routinely without much popular support and respect. It is pretty hard to organize a credible rival for a government for even a small nation, and it is pretty easy for an incumbent government to clear the bar "likely better than a civil war". It is not surprising to me how much of this erosion has gone on in the USA, and for how long. It is surprising to me, however, quite how much it has escaped notice and been forgotten. E.g., who remembers that it used to be possible for ordinary citizens to bring government officials (and other criminals) to trial for crimes, rather than prosecutorial discretion being in effect a complete pardon when government agents unjustly kill or imprison people, or otherwise abuse powers like search. Even when people are publicly arguing about various toothless modern ersatz institutions in the place of the old institutional safeguards --- exclusion of evidence acquired by flagrantly illegal searches, or new review boards for the police --- only folks well outside the political mainstream seem to know about the actual historical safeguards, or even conceive of actual safeguards with teeth, and it is seldom brought up.
As I read history, it will be historically unusual if the current regime does much to limit abuses (with the kinds of corrective actions and openness that have enough teeth to be effective, and are now unthinkable). The more usual deal is that a strong regime gets away with abuses, including increasingly smelly ones, for a surprisingly long time --- paying various prices in inefficiency and perceived illegitimacy, but successfully leaning on the difficulty of creating a sufficiently powerful rival to a government of a large political entity. Then (commonly) you get the government eventually falling from something not directly related (e.g. falling to an external threat, like the many regimes whacked by the Mongols or Napoleon), or (sometimes) the government receives a sharp lesson in how legitimacy sure would have been handy back when it was disintegrating. The second kind of outcome has been pretty common in the history leading up to the USA (I count the Reformation, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, and to a considerable extent the American Revolution as well) but in broader history it doesn't seem like a terribly common outcome.
...who remembers that it used to be possible for ordinary citizens to bring government officials (and other criminals) to trial for crimes, rather than prosecutorial discretion being in effect a complete pardon when government agents unjustly kill or imprison people, or otherwise abuse powers like search.
One used even to be able to challenge them to duels, which they would have to fight if they did not wish to end their career in politics by demonstrating themselves a coward. But that was long ago.
The second kind of outcome has been pretty common in the history leading up to the USA (I count the Reformation, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, and to a considerable extent the American Revolution as well) but in broader history it doesn't seem like a terribly common outcome.
That is the subject of my Independence Day piece, which I repost every year. Good 'treason' is oft the best medicine.
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