This series is both an exploration of the Tea Party and of Aristotle's
rhetoric, so feel free to comment on either. Please don't feel that you
need to discuss the topic through Aristotle.
In Part 1, I explained why I thought the Tea Party had been weakened by a failure to understand and use rhetoric skillfully. As a way of exploring this, and how to correct it, I used Christof Rapp's SEP article, Aristotle's Rhetoric. The main points from that post and the resulting discussion are that Aristotle believed the best use of rhetoric was to persuade people with the truth, that a form of syllogistic reasoning called the enthymeme was an excellent way to do that, and that the Tea Party needs to find common ground with the public and other movements from which to begin pursuing their goals. In Part 2, I will begin exploring the technical aspects of rhetoric and how the Tea Party could improve.
Aristotle's Rhetoric claims that there are three technical means of persuasion. That is, these means depend on a method, and the method depends on knowing what is and isn't persuasive. In addition, 'technical' implies that these are things provided by the speaker, not pre-existing conditions.
These technical means are "(a) in the character of the speaker, or (b) the emotional state of the hearer, or c) in the argument (logos) itself." The speaker wants to seem credible by displaying practical intelligence, a virtuous character, and good will, all in his speech. Emotions can change our judgments, so the speaker must arouse the hearers' emotions, and to do that he must have a good understanding of human emotion. Finally, the speaker should demonstrate to the audience what the situation is, persuading by argument.
Of the three, Aristotle emphasizes the argument, and he gives two methods for it. Induction works from particulars to a universal, using examples. Deduction works from things already believed to something different being necessarily true because of those presuppositions. In rhetoric, deduction uses the enthymeme, a form of syllogism, but one in which, because we lack complete knowledge, is of necessity somewhat less formal than the logical syllogism. Typically, they take the form of 'if - then' or causal 'since' or 'for' clauses.
E.g., 'If X is the case, we should do Y,' or 'since X is the case, ...' or 'X is the case, for Y results in X and we know Y is true.'
From this discussion, it seems to me that the Tea Party could do better in all three technical areas. One problem with coming to grips with the problem, however, is that everything the Tea Party says or does is distorted by the lefty media (i.e., most mainstream media). For example, the media and the Tea Party's political opponents (but I repeat myself) have done a good job of character assassination, so has the Tea Party failed to do what it could to establish its good character, or has its massive opposition simply outshouted it? It's hard to say, but I certainly think the Tea Party could do a better job with all three techniques.
Probably the Tea Party's single biggest rhetorical failure is in understanding the emotional state of the audience. Actually, I believe the Tea Party has seriously erred in understanding who the audience is. The proper audience is that great middle of the electorate who are not already politically opposed and who could be persuaded. Too often, Tea Partiers publicly speak as if they are talking to other Tea Partiers or to their acknowledged political opponents. This is why, I think, their rhetoric is too often extreme: they are stoking the fires of the base, or they are attacking their enemies. There's a time and place for both of those, but mostly the Tea Party needs to understand those who are unaligned and persuadable and adjust their rhetoric to persuade them. Those are the emotions it is important to understand and work with.
31 comments:
Aristotle focuses on the argument in part because he treats the problem of what it is to be a person of good character elsewhere (especially the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics). But another reason he doesn't focus on it is that there wasn't much disagreement about what it was to be a person of good character.
So, one problem we have that he didn't have is that there's a fundamental disagreement about just what it means to be a good person. Take Dr. Ben Carson: he's a man of apparently unstained character according to the ancient standard. But he's treated as a terrible man precisely because he holds philosophical views that are out of order with the left's agenda.
Now, not everyone who carries the flag is a person of unstained character, of course. But the example of Dr. Carson suggests to me that there's a new necessary (and possibly sufficient) condition of "holding the right political and philosophical views." If that's the case, then you're unable to achieve good character simply by virtue of the disagreement you were hoping to express in argument.
On the other hand, we see people like Bill Clinton -- a man of very stained character, according to the ancient standards -- who are treated as worthy of honors exactly because of the political/philosophical views they advance.
That's a huge structural problem, and I think it's the problem from Republic VIII we were talking about before. Just as the ancient states that went down this path before, our public has adopted a view that the only good is being willing to let us do what we want. Just because Dr. Carson is a man who upholds the old standards -- and just because Bill Clinton wants the government to support Julia, philosophically and financially, in pursuing her every bliss -- the first part of the argument is settled. Carson is a bad man, intolerant and hateful, though by every old standard he is a shining example of humanity; Bill Clinton is a statesman, the most respected political figure in America, and that is all that is (or ought to be) important about him.
So, having said that, what does it imply about the kinds of arguments you can make effectively?
Well, one kind of argument that seems to be having a moment is to concede the Republic VIII point. Rand Paul -- whom I think is the most likely Republican figure to succeed -- is leading this front at the moment. The argument is that we will simply let people do whatever they want, just as they want, both at home and abroad; all we will do if elected is to focus on financial problems. This may possibly work, if you can convince people that you really do not harbor any moral principles you would want to see guide the society.
The question for social conservatives is whether there is another road. You can't make principled arguments and win, because principled arguments about moral conduct are "intolerant" (insofar as they exclude those who don't share your moral principles).
You could make arguments that are built around expressions of support and love for those with whom you disagree, refusing to engage the ground of disagreement. This seems to be Pope Francis' major tactic. The idea is to advance the ball by avoiding the areas of conflict, while moving to do good works (the kind of thing which which he and Dr. Carson are both famous). But this seems to work for the Pope mostly because he isn't a political figure: he still comes under significant criticism for not adjusting his moral principles to fit the agenda, but rather less since there's no danger of him "imposing" them on anyone.
As a rhetorical strategy for politics, then, it doesn't seem workable.
A third mechanism might be divide-and-conquer. This is the strategy that Romney attempted with his remarks on the 47% in the recent election. You can talk to those who are really harmed by the current system about ways in which it is harming them, but this requires painting those on the receiving end of the system as not just opponents but in a sense as enemies. It was not well received the last time, and I suspect it can't be made palatable in the current environment.
A fourth possibility is to talk about corruption and incompetence in government per se. Like the British Tories, you wouldn't contest the worthiness of doing all these things, you'd contest the competence of your opponents in doing them. This has allowed them to win elections on occasion, but at the cost of losing everything they really believed in over several generations.
A fifth alternative is to go outside of politics entirely, and try to spark a change in values in the culture. Roger Simon was talking about swaying Hollywood. You might also try to sway people back to religion (here we meet the Pope again). That seems to me to be most likely to succeed, but it is a very long term strategy in terms of political gains: a generation at least.
True, and good examples as well. That's something the Tea Party (and anyone who wants to argue against the left) will have to address with their rhetoric.
Aristotle makes establishing a good character a technique, however, because it can't rely on an already established reputation. The speaker needs to establish his or her good character in the speech itself. I think here, too, establishing common ground is the way to start.
Sorry -- I didn't see your third comment before I posted mine.
In your analysis, I think whatever we do in the short term, your fifth alternative is the long term solution.
I'll have to think more about the rest.
I think one starting point is to recognize that there is no unified public; there are many different ideological demographics, and we need to appeal to the ones where we do have common ground.
Also, there are weaknesses in the lefty world view; we need reliable, conservative, intellectual media sources we can refer people to for more; conservative equivalents of 'The Economist,' 'Foreign Affairs,' etc.
PJ Media, righty blogs, etc., aren't clearly credible. I sympathize with them, and I think they perform valuable services, but even so they don't strike me as more credible than lefty popular media and blogs.
We need intellectually powerful media where the Victor Davis Hanson's engage the issues. Such a thing could begin changing minds now.
As to the point about a lack of a u unified public, it goes to the point that Cassandra keeps making about arrogance in rhetoric. Aristotle gets there too, in a kind of utilitarian way: the reason to avoid arrogance is that you don't want to alienate the people you are trying to convince.
But it might be worth searching into the question of what arrogance is, rather than focusing on the outcome (alienating the audience). One definition is the functional one -- 'arrogance is not showing respect for the interests and values of people you need.' Another is Kant's (from section 42 of the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals):
"Arrogance (superbia and, as this word expresses it, the inclination to be always on top) is a kind of ambition (ambitio) in which we demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us. It is, therefore, a vice opposed to the respect that every human being can lawfully claim. It differs from pride proper (animus elatus), which is love of honor, that is, a concern to yield nothing of one's human dignity in comparison with others (so that the adjective "noble" is usually added to "pride" in this sense); for arrogance demands from others a respect it denies them. -- But pride itself becomes a fault and an offense when it, too, is merely a demand upon others to concern themselves with one's importance."
Kant seems to me to make the core mistake of the Enlightenment here, which is assuming that everyone is in fact entitled to some sort of equality of respect by virtue of being human (as opposed to for religious reasons, which locates their equality in God's love -- and which therefore places limits on that equality, so that we do not end up arguing about just how much respect is due to someone qua human being, i.e., must we respect their every intensely-held desire as a part of their authentic humanity?).
But it's useful in a democratic context even if it's a mistaken position. A lot of these TEA Party types are afflicted by pride, because they are coming from ordinary backgrounds -- educated to a lesser degree than the wealthier classes more often involved in politics, for example. They may not have college degrees, or if they do, they may be technical degrees rather than studies in the arts (such as rhetoric!). They are conscious of being looked down upon, and they resent it and strike back.
That's a very fine line to walk, because you want that 'elevated spirit' Kant is describing -- you must, and ought, to resent being looked down upon, and insist on being treated with due respect. But you can easily slide into the wrong kind of pride, if you insist that the people from whom you are demanding respect should show it by debasing themselves. You have to recognize their worth, even where they differ, without yielding to submissiveness because of your lower class, or lower education.
Interesting distinction between deserving respect for simply being a human and for religious reasons. I hadn't thought about that before.
Also, I agree that much Tea Party anger is striking back at the arrogance of much of the opposition and, to a certain extent, the culture that has made the opposition the elite. I'm not sure what to do about that, though.
However, it may be one of the places my analysis of the Tea Party is going, which is to recommend that it adopt the attitude of the joyful warrior, much like 'The Last Hero': As merry as the ancient sun and fighting like the flowers.
Whether we win or lose is out of our hands: All we can do is maximize our chances of victory, and love the fight.
That joyfulness itself is attractive, I think, and speaks to the character of the warrior.
Some Tea Party demographics:
Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated
It's only one poll, so take it for what it's worth, but I thought it was interesting.
There's an ambiguity in language at work that makes it sound like the NYT and I disagree about the facts, but I don't think that's the case. The NYT poll is comparing the TEA Party to the general public, and finding them wealthier and more educated; whereas I was comparing them to the ruling elite, and finding them less wealthy, and educated more likely in a technical or non-elite way.
It's usual, when you see a revolutionary situation developing, that it pits the existing elite against the existing middle, not against the poor. The poor almost never lead revolutions, even though they are often the ones with the best reason. When you see a revolution of the poor, you will almost always find a middle class movement that organizes and leads them (as the mulatto and freed class during the Haitian Revolution, or the United Irishmen -- middle class, and Protestant as well as Catholic -- who led the Catholic poor in Ireland's 1798).
Whether this is a pre-revolutionary situation depends on a few things we aren't discussing right now, but I tend to think that it is. This is one reason why it is.
Now, let's talk about something else. You give the two traditional forms of reasoning: induction and deduction. Both of these turn out to be problematic for the enthymeme. Based on our discussion in part 1, can you say why?
Well, again, we don't know enough to use formal deduction or the more scientific form of induction. It seems that we have to reason from an insufficient number of examples (for induction), or from one particular to another (for deduction), and as you pointed out, the analogies are bound to fail somewhere along the line.
Right. Induction is dubious by nature, even mathematical induction (which is used in strict logic), for reasons we find in Hume. Until we fully understand the causal principles (which Hume doubts we can do at all, because we have no direct access to the principles, just to the observed effects), we can't be sure that our previous observations will continue to govern future events. In mathematical induction we presume to understand the principles, but I don't think we really do -- there are still some serious questions about why numbers work the way they do, and indeed just what numbers are (e.g., whether they are real in the sense of belonging to the world, and not just our conceptions of the world).
In terms of induction from political events, there aren't just too few examples, there aren't any examples of the same kind. All the examples you take as being 'of the same type' are actually unique events that, if you look at them closely enough, differ from current events in important ways. Deciding what to include in the category of 'similar particulars' has a lot to do with the result you'll get out of the induction process.
In terms of deduction, we don't have true universals the way we have in logic. We can't therefore be sure that the truth will be preserved from the opening principles to the conclusion, even if we obey strict logical forms. There's always a chance that the analogy will break down before the conclusion arises.
So, now we've talked about the logical problem in making a rhetorical argument. What we find is that it's chiefly a logical problem in terms of making a political decision. It's very hard to know what to do with certainty: induction is even more suspect than usual, and deduction is unavailable.
So why do you care enough about any given course of action to want to sway people? What's the reason to engage the process at all? The political life is one of the good lives, for Aristotle, along with the lives of action and contemplation. What's the point of it?
To be fair, I think it's important to see the Tea Party movement as originating as a rallying point for the embattled conservatives who not only saw unfair treatment of their ideas in the public sphere, but also felt betrayed by their institutional 'allies'. Therefore, they excelled at their first task- rallying the base. That's been done in many ways, and so we look further out, and I think that many in the movement are trying to become persuasive, but it will take some time for this mission shift to become fully functional. Pieces like this, shared around in the true grass-roots way the Tea Parties arose will play a large part, so I commend you for working on this project, Thomas.
Also, I assume we're discussing how to publically message on the large scale, not in one-on-one discussion- as I would approach them somewhat differently.
So why do you care enough about any given course of action to want to sway people? What's the reason to engage the process at all? The political life is one of the good lives, for Aristotle, along with the lives of action and contemplation. What's the point of it?
That's an excellent question, and one I'll have to think about as well. Right off the top of my head, I would say this:
We have to live in some society, and although it is deeply flawed, this one seems best for me. Now, this society in many ways tells me how I must live my life, and if I don't, it at least threatens to punish me, and may well actually punish me. This means I cannot live life as I think best; I must live it as others think best. That seems unjust to me, so I want to change it.
But that leaves out a lot. Why do I want this change instead of that one? What effects do I expect from making this change, etc. All of that should be thought through before getting to work on changing others' hearts and minds, shouldn't it?
douglas,
I think you're right about the beginning, and I hope you're right about them trying to become more persuasive.
I am considering getting back into the Tea Party movement in some way, and so this discussion is a practical one for me. In the first post on the topic, the first failure of rhetoric I talked about was my own failure to persuade other Tea Partiers. When I go back, I want to do better.
Also, you're right that the way we approach an individual is different, but I think the same principles apply. What differences do you see?
But that leaves out a lot. Why do I want this change instead of that one? What effects do I expect from making this change, etc. All of that should be thought through before getting to work on changing others' hearts and minds, shouldn't it?
Of course.
Since you're thinking about the hard question, let me put another question to you that will both inform your thoughts and help you with your project of re-engaging the TEA Party. We've identified a problem of political logic in terms of knowing what the right thing to do might be, and it's a very severe problem.
But it's not a problem that's troubling the TEA Party -- no more than it is troubling the left. (Nor does it trouble the Libertarians.) They are proceeding with the very deductions I just finished telling you were unavailable. Their arguments are principled, following from what are assumed to be universal moral or economic laws.
Of course these laws do not exist, as we have found in our examination. Their certainty -- all their certainties -- are totally misplaced.
Yet they proceed with such great certainty that they can reflexively demonize those who disagree, precisely because those people can't see the truth of the universal moral or economic principles. They are thus assumed to be wicked or ignorant, and either way to be treated as objects of disgust (and not pity, because of course it must be willful ignorance if they've lived in the world so long and not learned these basic lessons).
So what is the status of these deductions, and the universals they are based upon? What kinds of things are these universals? We have a word for it, a word that is closely related to the idea of rhetoric.
Empty? Arbitrary?
Those are adjectives. Whether or not they apply we can discuss when we find the right noun. It's a rhetorical form that is used to serve as a universal from which we can do rhetorical deductions to political conclusions. Now deductions are supposed to be truth-preserving because they proceed from established truths to things that those truths logically entail.
In other words these universals are stories that explain the world, and are thought to do so well enough that they are thought to convey a kind of lasting truth that will be applicable even to new situations. What kind of a thing is that?
Well, endoxa -- 'accepted sentences' -- generally form the universals for rhetoric.
When you talk about stories that explain the world, 'paradigm' (or paradigmatic exemplars / paradigm cases) would fit.
Of course, endoxa probably come from paradigms. Worldview is at the root of all three (Tea Party, liberal, libertarian), and why they reject the other paradigms. The three are incommensurable.
Very good. Those are what we call them in politics and rhetoric.
One more question. What would an anthropologist call it?
"A story that explains the world which, while not strictly speaking true, explains the world and your place in it, and serves as an analogy to show how a member of the tribe should act in a circumstance of a given kind."
Never been an anthropologist, but I'll take a swing: Myth?
Precisely.
So it turns out that the process of deductive political reasoning is possible if and only if you have a strong mythology. Now we call it by other names -- including the ones you gave, plus "ideology" -- but this is what explains the huge hostility (and complete certainty) generated by these political deductions. The part of the human brain that 'does' myth is what 'does' this kind of reasoning. And that part of the brain attaches to the results of this process a sense of belonging, which comes from this concord about what the good man and the good life look like, which Aristotle calls "political friendship."
Now Aristotle says over and over again that political friendship is a necessary condition for a successful state, and that man is a political animal who belongs (and can truly flourish only) in a successful state. So the fact that this proves to be a mythic process doesn't mean that it's bad. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't do it. We need to do it, and to do it well.
It does mean we should be mindful about what we're doing, however, including about the strong feelings that it will generate. These are powerful forces that we should deploy only where they belong.
So where is that?
A paradigm is primarily useful within the group who shares it. It is senseless to those outside the group.
Externally, we move to pragmatism and have to refer much more to facts and processes of establishing facts recognized by both insiders and the specific outsiders we are communicating with.
Optionally, we can try to create new myths that include both, thereby forming a new in-group, but that's always an iffy prospect. In the end, though, I think our previous discussions of "what next?" have led that direction. Certainly the discussion in your 'Republic VIII' post did.
Also, if we believe Kuhn (and I do on this point), it's impossible to simply do without a paradigm. No matter how many anomalies your paradigm has, you can't ditch it until a better one is available. So, again, that leads to the conclusion that we need a new, better myth, if that's possible at this point.
Here's a quote from the Politics:
"It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange…. Hence arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life."
Aristotle would say, then, that self-sufficiency -- that is, a society that can continue itself -- depends upon this common core of friendship. We've been talking about the conditions for self-government, for not coming to be subject to others. Here is a pretty clear statement from Aristotle as to what he takes the necessary conditions to be.
First, they have to have this will to live together, which he calls friendship. (In the N. Ethics, he calls friendship a kind of "concord," i.e., a set of common values and agreements about what justice is and how people should live).
Because there is this sense of shared values, too, you can live happily -- to be happy is to live the good life, which is a life in accord with what you value. The society will be structured to support such a life precisely because it has common values.
And it produces an honorable life, because honor is sacrifice. You can live in a way that you will gladly sacrifice of yourself for this society, and its members -- because they value the same things -- will honor you in return for your sacrifices.
This core set of values -- this myth -- is thus a necessary condition for the best kind of life. We shouldn't want rid of it.
We should, rather, be devoting our effort to making sure it's the right myth, the best myth.
How do we do that?
The question is a little ambiguous because Aristotle's view of the good society is itself a paradigm, one that requires an additional paradigm to work. I assume you are accepting Aristotle's paradigm as a given, and asking about what "set of common values and agreements about what justice is and how people should live" we should adopt.
If that's what we're looking for, then how do we make sure a particular myth is the right, best one?
That's rather a briar patch of a question right there. I have two responses off the top of my head.
One: I can decide what the best one is for me, but not for everyone else. I don't believe it's possible to convince everyone, or even every intelligent, educated, open-minded person, in a large society that one particular myth is best.
Two: It's the myth that satisfies the needs of the people, regardless of what they think. (Although, there we have the problem of defining 'need.')
I'm more interested in the general question -- how do we go about making sure that a myth is good -- but we can start with the Greeks here too.
Shift gears for a minute, though, because Aristotle may not be your best guide to the content of good mythology. (Even the Philosopher had a few limitations!)
Try Plato. Take a few minutes to read Book II of The Republic -- it's not hard reading -- and then skip to the back, and read the "Myth of Er." You can actually skip on toward the end of that if you want to focus on the political aspects, when Plato is talking about the soul being judged and whether it's good for people to believe that.
Grim, can you be a little more specific for this dense head? I read book II (and III- couldn't help it) and book X the other night, but I'm not quite sure where you're pointing us.
I agree; there wasn't anything here that explicitly talked about what makes a myth good or not.
But, I see we've fallen off the front page. Maybe I (or Grim?) should post an update to this.
Well, I get that in the story of Er (and where the argument is leading before that) the myth is one that sees an eternal justice that makes right that which was unjust on Earth, in our mortal lives. Which is where we were traditionally. The moderns and post-moderns have been pulling us away from that- to a place of no truth, relativity, no eternal justice, man is the arbiter of value...
So, is that the point? I guess I was thinking there was more to that question when originally asked.
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