The Summa Theologica is written in a style that intends to help those who are studying to become priests or other religious ministers to the people. Its intent is to help them understand not just what the Catholic doctrine is, nor even just why it is what it is. Rather, it intends to make certain that they understand the substance of objections against that doctrine, good reasons why people might raise the objections, and why those objections have been refuted.
For that reason, it follows this form: It begins by questioning some aspect of doctrine (e.g., "Does God Exist?"). Then it breaks that question into several relevant forms. Then it offers evidence and argument in favor of the proposition that the Summa later intends to disprove. Generally these arguments are very good; in fact, we will be looking at one argument we may think is better than the response Aquinas gives.
Having raised very specific objections, Aquinas gives the doctrinal answer ("on the contrary....") and then explains the position of the Church. This detailed explanation is called the "corpus," or body of the response; here it is the part that begins "I answer that...." Then, finally, each question has specific responses to every one of the arguments raised against the doctrine.
So, let's look at two specific questions. The first one has to do with marriage as an element of natural law. (As most of you probably know, "Tully" here is Cicero; "The Philosopher" is Aristotle; )
Whether matrimony is of natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because "the natural law is what nature has taught all animals" [*Digest. I, i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.
Objection 1: Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), "at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 3: Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 4: Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony is not natural.
On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: "The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law."The parts in both bold and italic are my highlights.
Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that "man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political society." But "man is naturally a political and gregarious animal," as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.
I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely "existence," "nourishment," and "education." Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12).
Reply to Objection 1: Man's nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) "human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is." Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things Divine nowise vary.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.
Aquinas says that there are two ways of being in accord with nature. The first is simply to be beholden to things like physics -- determination, in other words, by the laws of nature such as gravity. (Gravity is the most obvious example to us today, but was not to Aquinas; the example of fire's 'natural motion' upwards is taken from Aristotle's Physics.)
The other way is to direct your freely-chosen actions at the perfection of nature. Therefore virtue, and the virtues, are not only natural but the perfection of your nature. This is correct, because the virtues are virtues for everyone:
No matter what your goals, or your other moral values, courage is a virtue for you: it will help you achieve them. An ability to understand your duty and to command yourself to fulfill it will be useful to every man, and every woman, and every child. This moral reality is embedded in the structure of the world.Thus, for example, it is perfectly natural (in the first sense) for a man to desire to sleep with as many women as possible; there are certain physical drives, such as the operation of pheromones, that drive him to it. It is also very much in accord with natural law (in the second sense) to regulate the sexual urge so that he instead more perfectly completes it.
Why? Because the foremost point of sexuality is procreation; but the point of procreation is to produce not children but new adults. A man who is loyal to a wife is more likely not only to produce a child, but to raise it and educate it properly.
Notice that Aquinas defines this as the principle end of matrimony, and not just sexuality: thus, marriage is not chiefly about the happiness of the two married persons. This is close to the point I have been arguing -- that marriage is the creation of kinship bonds that unite bloodlines across generations. Aquinas puts more emphasis on the subsequent generation (the offspring) than I do; I think the duties to the previous generations are also very important. One has a duty to one's father, and to one's father-in-law; to one's mother, and mother-in-law; and to the memories and ideals of those who went before.
In any case, this is the foundation for marriage. Marriage is a kind of virtue. It is natural in the sense that it perfects nature.
Now, what about polygamy? Is that in accord with natural law, or not? As we shall see, the answer is, 'In one way yes, and in another, no.'
Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But "it was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom," according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.Notice Objection 8 and its reply. This is the Golden Rule, which Aquinas defends as a general precept of natural law. Yet here he raises it precisely to explain why it shouldn't hold in this case. That's an oddity in several respects. The first is that the argument is irrelevant to his interests -- he is arguing against the inclusion of polygamous beliefs in a Christian community, and therefore why object to an argument from natural law that seems to reinforce his position?
Objection 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment" to have several wives, "because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.
Objection 4: Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.
Objection 6: On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24,"They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.
Objection 7: Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time.
Objection 8: Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself" [*Cf. Tob. 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.
Objection 9: Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of sharing the beloved," it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.
I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other animals "the natural instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.
Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (Q[41], A[1]). And in reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.
Reply to Objection 1: Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.
Reply to Objection 2: As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that "they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."
The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: "Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force." And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle---thus the movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that "the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: "Natural right is what nature has taught all animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.
Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.
Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 7: In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives is not against the first principles of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 8: This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. 4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.
Reply to Objection 9: The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than "vice versa."
It's also unusual because Aquinas often argues against fairly clear Biblical passages that seem to create inequality between man and wife. He devotes an entire question to proving that men and women should be judged equally in cases of divorce due to adultery, e.g., that women should have the same rights to object to it and demand divorce as men. The objectors here have Biblical citations on their side, and not just Cicero! (Indeed, they do on this occasion as well -- the citation proving the Golden Rule is to the Book of Tobais, "Quod ab alio oderis fieri tibi," i.e., 'Don't do to others what you hate').
Aquinas isn't quite right to say that wives having many husbands has never been sanctioned by any law; and it's not clear that he's right to say that the education of the offspring is done away with in these cases. The Picts allowed women to take several sexual partners, and dealt with the resulting confusion about the fathers of children by deciding inheritance issues based on matrilineal lines, and raised the children in something like a communal fashion.
However, Aquinas might be right in saying that the practice is out of order with natural law, in this sense: it was exactly this custom of the Picts that led to their subjugation and destruction. The Scots (Scotti, in those days) coming from Ireland to places like Dal Riada, intermarried with the Picts, with the result that their daughters sent the family's wealth and position to the Scots; but their sons did not obtain any similar benefit from the Scots, who passed wealth and position to their sons. Therefore, by the time of Kenneth MacAlpin, the Picts were in a position to be utterly and permanently subjugated; today there is almost no trace of them.
Now, let's look at the corpus.
We begin again with an analogy to Aristotle's Physics. For most things besides people or animals, what is natural is determined by the form that inheres in the matter, e.g., the form of fire (which has the natural motion of going up) or the form of a magnet (which attracts or repels). For animals, there is similarly a natural instinct that directs them, without very much judgment on their part.
Human beings are different in that they are capable of learning from the forms they encounter, so that they can understand the purpose behind the form. Once they understand that, they can perfect nature. This is a particular capacity of human beings -- you might say it is the essential nature of human beings. What makes us men and not beasts is that we can order our lives toward virtue and the perfection of nature.
So, what is the end of marriage? Aquinas says there are three, but that they are not equally important.
The first is what we have already called "the principle end." Notice that this is the most important, even though the third end will prove to be about service to God as a member of the Christian world. Why is that the case? It is so because God made nature, and we are the only creatures that can understand the creation and perfect it: and therefore it is, you might say, our first duty to be perfectors of nature, sub-creators as Tolkien puts it.
Thus, anything that robs marriage of its 'principle end' is banned by natural law; but the secondary and tertiary ends are not banned by natural law. They are banned by religious law, which is also very important for Aquinas! The Medieval thinker believed that religious law should also be binding on us, so that for him there is no difference in outcomes; but in America, where we believe that religious law can only be accepted as a free choice, there might be.
That takes care of the first and third end, then. The principle end is undisturbed, and therefore polygamy in the sense of having several wives (or polygyny, as Elise likes to put it) is in accord with natural law. It is out of order for Christians, however.
The question, though, was about the Georgia school assignment related to Islamic polygamy. They don't have the problem that it is out of order with their faith; in fact, Islam is very specific in providing an order for it.
That leaves us with the second end, which is where we will have to decide the matter. Let's repeat it:
For its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (Q[41], A[1]).... Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. ... [While polygamy] does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband.There are really two objections here. The first one is that the community within the household will not be as well ordered with a multitude of wives; it will be out of order as they quarrel or strive against each other. (This was Cassandra's objection, although she phrased it in terms not of the women quarreling, but of the man gaining undue power within the marriage by freedom to pit the wives against one another.)
The second is that "the community of works" in general may be disrupted. Aquinas doesn't go in to detail here, probably because he assumed that there was no chance of an outcome in which polygamy was really going to be licensed; but it is important for us. A common understanding of what a family is, and how it ought to be structured, is surely a key part of civilization. We need to know how to react to our neighbors, and we need the form to be well-ordered in this way as well. Not only does the marriage need to produce offspring, and perfect their upbringing (the end inasmuch as we are animals), it needs to provide a stable building block for our society (the end inasmuch as we are human beings). Inasmuch as we are Americans, we cannot stand on the third principle; whether or not that is a flaw in the American project, it is certainly at the core of that project.
It seems like it should be possible to build a rational argument on the ground provided by the second end, for those who wish to do so. Aquinas has been very helpful in laying out just what the principles are that underlie marriage. Let's discuss them, and see what we come up with from here.
57 comments:
Aquinas puts more emphasis on the subsequent generation (the offspring) than I do;
That could be due to the fact that life-expectancies were different when TA was writing his stuff.
Now that I've read your entire post (can't you find something larger than 6-point?), thanks!!! for doing the heavy lifting.
Seems to me that, net-net, TA would allow polygamy only on the second, IFF the first (and subsequent) wives permit it. Umnnnhhh....
That migrates the question to whether that permission can be revoked, doesn't it? If Wife 1 discovers that having Wife 2 around is inconvenient, can Wife 1 be forced to live under the contract? Or vice-versa? (Not if she's armed.)
Hmmmm.
As I've said before, I am not convinced one man with multiple wives can do as good a job raising children as one man with one wife. If I understand Aquinas correctly, this means I believe polygyny (sorry for the y's) robs marriage of its principal end of raising children to adulthood. Or, if it doesn't rob it totally, it makes it less likely the end will be achieved.
If I understand the secondary end correctly, it has to do (1) with a peaceful, well-run household and (2) with the need for society to understand what is meant by marriage and what rights and responsibilities it imposes on those who are in it.
I suppose my response to Aquinas on (1) would be that women who *choose* to be multiple wives may well manage not to quarrel and to order the household quite well. I imagine Aquinas' response to me would be that however much we may choose to do so, we cannot escape our natures: jealousy and what I would call territoriality will always rear their heads. ("Yet man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward" seems appropriate here.)
On (2), it is not clear to me that allowing polygamy would defeat that secondary end. So long as the parameters were clearly defined, it seems to me that the form of marriage would still be well-ordered - there would just be multiple well-orderings. I would draw an analogy with the multiplicity of religions - or the various forms of Christianity - as examples of multiple well-orderings - but I am not sure that analogy would pass muster with Aquinas.
D29 -- Let me know if the new font is suitable.
Elise -- If you could convince Aquinas that the principle end was disrupted to any serious degree, he would hold that polygamy was against natural law. You'd have to explain why, for example, a man and a woman might have eight or twelve children together in a monogamous marriage (as used to be fairly common), and still be better able to raise them than a man with two wives who had eight or twelve children in total.
I think you yourself raised the point that an Americanized polygamy might include two wives, both of whom wanted children, but only one of whom didn't also want a highly competitive career. That would seem to provide a more perfect environment for the principle end, insofar as the children of that arrangement would have a full-time caregiver and educators (whereas in two monogamous marriages, even with the extra man and therefore 4 parents instead of 3, none of them might be full-time caregivers/educators).
Still, if you can demonstrate that the principle end is disrupted in any serious degree, that would be quite sufficient to prove that polygamy was out of order with natural law.
As for the second end, I think you're right to say that we would like to believe that reasonable adults could avoid jealousy and disputes. You may also be right to suppose that this is more hopeful than probable, though; and it was, in fact, precisely the complaint of my acquaintance from al Kut. According to him, his wives got along great as long as he was on the road, but jealousy when he was home made life very unpleasant.
That would seem to be a good second-end argument against the practice.
Oh, one more thing: D29:
"(Not if she's armed.)"
That's an interesting point. I might be tempted to agree that the Western tradition of arming women was relevant to our development of monogamy -- it was quite normal for wives to be left in charge of the defense of property by the knightly and noble classes during the husband's travels at war, and for women to do quite well in that regard.
However, there's a strong counterexample that I can think of: Muhammad's wife Aisha. She raised an army and led her side of the battle of Basrah (which, as it happens, she lost).
You may remember my recommended method for interpreting the Bible from a few discussions back. If you wanted to apply that same method to interpreting the Koran, it might be worth noting that the Koran bans anyone from marrying Muhammad's widows after his death. Surah 33 says, "Nor is it right that you should annoy the Prophet, nor marry his widows after him."
That's exactly the kind of verse that ought to trigger the interpretive technique!
As I've said before, I am not convinced one man with multiple wives can do as good a job raising children as one man with one wife.
I am not convinced one man with multiple wives will do as good a job raising his children.
I doubt that one man with multiple wives will do as good a job at being a husband either, and if one of the goals of marriage is the creation and maintenance of stable, healthy families that has to matter.
If polygamy is such a great deal for women, where are the throngs of uncoerced (or unsocialized) women clamoring for it? If it is such a great deal, why do societies that practice it also practice honor killing? Why the disparity in legal rights? If it is a good deal, the benefits should be obvious even to women who *weren't* raised in cultures where polygamy is accepted. If women supposedly want it, why does it only flourish in cultures that demonstrably treat women as property (bride smuggling, underage brides, inheriting wives like property, etc.)? If women want this, no force or coercion should be needed to induce them to enter into such marriages.
And yet.... we argue that it's *possible* that this might happen. Nevermind that we can't really point to any examples in the real world.
A lot of the arguments I have amounted to, "Well, it's not clear that the negative externalities cited were caused by polygamy." (note that I have repeatedly said I wasn't arguing that I had any such proof - I pointed out correlation, which is different)
How do we explain the fact that where women have anything approaching equal rights, polygamy is illegal and where polygamy is widely accepted/practiced or legal, women clearly do *not* have these rights?"
We're never going to be able to prove conclusively that A *causes* B, but I would argue that in the larger sense that's really irrelevant. What matters is the reality before us, and if I saw societies where women had freedom and still chose polygamy voluntarily, perhaps I'd be more receptive to the notion that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
The problem with "unsocialized" is that the frame omits anyone from a society in which polygamy is accepted. Thus, the only sort of evidence that would be acceptable is someone who is attempting to establish such a form in the teeth of their family and society -- which is, itself, problematic for the 'second end' of marriage. We won't be able to consider an example of the type that proposed by the state of Georgia, of a woman who is happy with her culture, because you're rejecting any women from a polygamous culture as acceptable evidence.
Nevertheless, D29 provided the kind of example you are asking for just last week. It's in this article from Wisconsin. None of the people involved are coerced, and they aren't socialized to it either -- in fact, they asked that their names be changed for the article to avoid embarrassing their families at church. They're not poor immigrants or child brides, but tech-oriented folks who are employed and have other options.
The article makes it sound pretty complicated and a lot of work, but not obviously miserable either -- and of course, they're all free to leave. The article also seems to indicate that there's a large enough number of them that there's a support group for them, which is interesting.
Grim -
One problem with the D29 example example is that it's not talking about polygamy - it's talking about open marriage. That's a whole other ballgame.
I think the book Love Times Three is probably a better example of chosen polygamy. I haven't read it but I did read a couple things up at Huffington Post. The people involved were raised in polygamous families and chose to re-create that in their own marriage. Er, marriages. They do not sound down-trodden and do not appear to have been child brides.
However, the three wives have about 20 children among them. The wives appear to do all the domestic tasks although two of them usually also work outside the home. Both of which facts support Cassandra's views on what actually goes along with polygyny rather than what it could look like.
Let's see if Blogger will let me post the links to the Huffington Post items:
Excerpt
Why I Chose Polygamy
You make a good point, Elise, that 'open marriage' is not precisely the same thing. I think the example of why women might want to share a man is still telling, since actual polygamy is illegal; but I respect the objection, which does have some force to it.
Your links work fine.
What matters is the reality before us, and if I saw societies where women had freedom and still chose polygamy voluntarily, perhaps I'd be more receptive to the notion that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
I don't think the benefits outweigh the drawbacks but that's not the ground on which the battle will be fought. It will be fought on the issue of whether there are enough drawbacks to prevent people from doing whatever they darn well please. Or, possibly (although I think less likely), whether there are enough drawbacks to justify continuing to prevent people from living as their religion dictates.
When I see something like Love Times Three, I see one of the opening salvos in the "polygamy isn't weird - we're just like you" campaign. Citing the ills that go along with polygyny will be countered with people like the family in this book. And the women in the book can say they chose this life freely. Yes, they were raised in polygamous families but it will be hard to argue they had it forced upon them given they have a world of options open to them.
I may think that any woman who chooses polygyny needs her consciousness raised. But there are a lot of people out there who would claim that any woman who - like me - decided not to have children needs the same. We have made it very, very difficult in this country to argue against society (which is now synonymous with the legal system) putting its stamp of approval on people doing what they want.
"You'd have to explain why, for example, a man and a woman might have eight or twelve children together in a monogamous marriage (as used to be fairly common), and still be better able to raise them than a man with two wives who had eight or twelve children in total. "
Let me count the ways? I have a hard enough time (and I know I'm not the only one) agreeing with one wife about how to raise the kids- not in some overarching sense, but in the tactical decisions one makes all the time. I cannot imagine trying to keep two or three or four systems lined up in my head, and I can't imagine any man would be so lucky as to have wives so in tune with each others values, ethics and how to apply those tactically as to have a smooth running household- at least not one where the wives opinion mattered. That would seem to blow up the primary purpose of union- child rearing.
Looking at one individual case or a few cases rather than systematically looking at large groups of people is problematic from a public policy standpoint, Grim. That's why I deliberately said not, "Where is *an* example of... or even one or two examples of X" but "where are the throngs of uncoerced (or unsocialized) women clamoring for X?" Where are women - in any real numbers - asking for this?
That's how societies and laws get changed - when a critical mass of people demand it. I see no evolving societal consensus wrt polygamy. We may well be slouching towards it out of laziness/refusal to think, but that's a separate issue.
When the benefits of something are clear to them, people agitate for change. A lot of them agitate for it. I don't see that happening with women and polygamy. For that matter I don't see that happening with *men* and polygamy, except online where conservative men seem weirdly fascinated with the notion that we ladies secretly desire to share alpha males, the notable dearth of women actually doing so (let alone clamoring for this wondrous new civil right) notwithstanding :p
It's not as though feminists have been shy about demanding all sorts of glorious rights for women (including the right to be sleep around like men and the right to ignore traditional societal mores about modesty, chastity, and sexual fidelity). Oddly though, I can't recall feminists agitating for the legal right to share a "high quality" alpha male, though :p
In a way I really wish they would. The entertainment value would be considerable. I can almost hear the exploding heads!
Boy do I wish I had time to write about this - it's frustrating.
We won't be able to consider an example of the type that proposed by the state of Georgia, of a woman who is happy with her culture, because you're rejecting any women from a polygamous culture as acceptable evidence.
No, I'm rejecting one or two.. or a few women from polygamous cultures as evidence because that's just not enough. And I am pointing out that if women really benefitted from polygamy - if they were clearly better off in polygamous marriages, or even if a significant number of there were - then we'd see women who weren't raised in such cultures wanting it too.
And we don't. Not in any numbers.
You have often cited that Chesterton quote about not sweeping long established traditions aside until you understand the reason they were established in the first place, but here you seem to be arguing exactly the opposite: that unless we can prove that polygamy is always harmful (and even if there is no real widespread demand to change the status quo), it should be allowed.
I have attempted to show some reasons why the West, which is really unique in its insistence on individual rights and dignity, moved away from polygamy. What you seem to be arguing is something on the order of, "Look! I can find one or two examples that are different!"
You have also argued many times that some people are natural slaves, and that women seem to be especially vulnerable to this mindset. FWIW, I happen to agree with you. But here you seem to be arguing that since feminists have championed the notion of false consciousness, we should discount observable reality.
Again, there is more than a grain of truth to the theory of false consciousness: people can be socialized to hate Jews and passively accept watching them exterminated even when they weren't raised to that from birth. Cultural pressure is a huge force in shaping human behavior and beliefs. Who are we to say that hating and exterminating Jews is wrong/bad? Aren't we foisting our own morals on those hapless Nazis who only want to go their own way (given, of course, the proper lebensraum)? :p
When an idea or practice secretly satisfies the desires of our lower nature, it becomes particularly pernicious and dangerous. I think that's a big part of the allure of polygamy - it's emotionally seductive and so people... OK, men in the main... set about finding reasons to legitimize it.
I think you were on the right track with the argument about perfecting nature. Polygyny is an inherently unequal bargain whereby one woman pledges all that she is and all that she has and in return gets part of what her husband is and has. No amount of argument can erase that fundamental fact, just as no amount of argument can erase the fact that every time a man in a polygamous marriage takes a new wife, he has less to give to his existing wives and their children.
Most human institutions and relationships don't improve as we put less time/effort/money into them. In general reward is proportional to effort and investment. I can't see anything in marriage or child rearing that raises a plausible exception to that general rule.
New font is wonderful!!! The "Old Farts' Club" approves....
Seems that Cassandra and TA agree with your observation on 'the unequal bargain.' And TA also stated that 'the Church is one, as is Christ.'
Cass:
You make two claims toward the end here that are strong, and I want to explore those.
However, I don't want to ignore or dismiss your points about evidence, though I find them questionable. For one thing, we do seem to be dismissing the very cases we were asking about -- the ones sparked by the Islamic example in the Georgia school project. In that case, we may simply be a decade too soon for the 'throngs' you're looking for, particularly in Europe where Islam represents far more than the two-percent that it represents of our own population. The fact that we haven't gotten to the crisis point yet, so that no one is quite yet yelling in the streets, isn't that telling.
The second reason for questioning this approach is the false consciousness problem. This is not to say that nurture is or should be taken to be irrelevant. It is to say that you can't fairly adopt a standard of discourse that says something like "Only free people have a part in this discussion of what is right; and no one is free who comes from a culture that disagrees with us."
So in this case, we end up saying that we want evidence of a desire for polygamy, but it has to be evidence from a culture that is opposed to polygamy; and it can't be just outliers, it has to be evidence of a broad movement.
In other words you're asking for evidence of a culture that supports X, drawn from a culture opposed to X. That's going to be a rare bird by definition.
Nevertheless, I happen to know of a case like that. Still I'm not sure how telling it will be, because it's not at all what was interesting to us -- what was interesting was the case of the Muslim woman, who is happy with her own culture and likes the form of marriage she finds in it.
Now, with your permission, I'd prefer to focus on the strong points you raise. There are two, one of which seems to me to be slightly problematic, and the other one fairly solid.
I'll reverse your order, in order to put the more problematic one first.
Most human institutions and relationships don't improve as we put less time/effort/money into them. In general reward is proportional to effort and investment. I can't see anything in marriage or child rearing that raises a plausible exception to that general rule.
That seems like a fairly reasonable argument, but with a pretty bright exception that comes to mind: division of labor. Division of labor in any human relationship has proven to allow us to improve our institutions' performance while devoting less time, energy and money to them.
Thus, the principle end of a automobile company is to pay for the benefits of labor unions... er, I mean, to produce cars. Before division of labor, this was the hugely expensive work of individual craftsmen, who must spend a vast amount of time shaping and creating an individual car. Once Henry Ford was done with it, even though many more men were involved in the process, each of them was individually much more productive.
If the principle end of marriage is the production of offspring educated to adulthood, there is no reason in principle that marriage shouldn't also benefit from division of labor. And, indeed, to some degree it does so benefit: it's very helpful to the child if his or her parents have widely different interests that are fully developed, vice the same interests less fully developed. (Indeed, that is the case even if the same interests were quite fully developed, as it offers the child a wider range of skills and abilities they can learn.)
Insofar as we are looking at the second end of marriage -- the community of work -- this is an even better case for division of labor. A household that includes a blacksmith, a potter and a veterinarian will be stronger than one that includes only two of those three things.
I don't think you're asking after these ends, though, but rather about what the husband is giving to the wife. That's not one of the ends of marriage, for Aquinas, but one of the "goods" of marriage -- and that brings me to your second point.
I think you were on the right track with the argument about perfecting nature. Polygyny is an inherently unequal bargain whereby one woman pledges all that she is and all that she has and in return gets part of what her husband is and has. No amount of argument can erase that fundamental fact[.]
I dropped the last part of that final sentence, because it seems to me to be dealt with under the 'division of labor' business above. This is the fundamental point, and the best argument you've raised yet.
Aquinas is very interested in this aspect of marriage, although he mentions it only in passing in the section I quoted here. He says: And in reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage.
I think you're in danger of making the error of considering "fidelity" as if it were the principle end or purpose of marriage. Fidelity is a virtue, the development of which helps perfect your nature; but it is neither necessary to join a marriage to develop it, nor is its development the point of marriage.
(An aside, chiefly for D29: it's also the case that Aquinas considers sex -- another marriage 'good' that is not the purpose of marriage but a good attached to it -- to be a venal sin if it is done for the purpose of making your spouse happy rather than for the purpose of generation. Thus, under the religious law, making yourself or your spouse happy not only isn't the purpose of marriage, it is a sin to make the error of believing that it is.)
Aquinas talks about this in question 49, where fidelity -- fides in the Latin -- is the virtue of faith, as in "Faith, Hope and Charity." This is not, he is clear, the religious virtue: it is exactly the virtue that you are citing, the giving of yourself entirely to another.
Aquinas' idea is that this is a very similar process to the religious virtue of Faith, wherein you give yourself entirely to God. As with any Aristotelian virtue, practice is the way that you habituate yourself to the virtue, and thus the way that you perfect nature.
Thus, it does seem to be the case that polygamy interferes with the development of fidelity.
Nor is this subject to the criticism that it's only the third-end involved here, which would cause us to dismiss it (for Muslims, not for ourselves!) on First Amendment grounds. Aquinas is clear that this is not the religious virtue of Faith, but a kind of lower-level analogue, which we might call small-f 'faith' (or fidelity -- you'll see that the translator does both).
Is faith/fidelity a true virtue, a virtue for everyone regardless of religion? If so, there are very good 'perfection of nature' grounds for holding to it from the second end.
where conservative men seem weirdly fascinated with the notion that we ladies secretly desire to share alpha males, the notable dearth of women actually doing so (let alone clamoring for this wondrous new civil right) notwithstanding :p
:+)
Unfortunately, it's not actually hard to find evidence of that at all.
One of Walsh’s pet observations pertains to what she calls the “soft harem,” where high-status men (i.e., the football captain) maintain an “official” girlfriend as well as a rotating roster of neo-concubines, who service him in the barroom bathroom or wherever the beer is flowing. “There used to be more assortative mating,” she explained, “where a five would date a five. But now every woman who is a six and above wants the hottest guy on campus, and she can have him—for one night.”
This, though, like the Siberia case isn't really what was interesting; and it's more like your 'open marriage' (on the part of the 'official' girlfriend) than polygamy. The reason it's not interesting is that it's plainly unprincipled behavior: it's not clear why the 'soft harem' would submit themselves, freely and willingly, to such treatment; but it's clearly not because they have a principle underlying a rational decision.
This isn't the case we're interested in either -- but it's certainly behavior much in evidence. It's not very interesting, though, because it's plainly wrong.
In any case, these eternal issues will have to wait until Monday. I'm off to the Stone Mountain Games! See you then. :)
Well, have a good weekend. When you get back, here's a thought:
Fidelity is to Truth (honesty) as Charity is to Love- the thing in practice, isn't it? Given that, whereby a marriage seems to be one of the highest forms of practicing fidelity (perhaps only surpassed by the practice of celibacy), it would seem to be an action that brings one closer to truth- both in the sense of honesty, and in the sense of truth/beauty/Godliness. The only things that require anywhere near the level of fidelity that my marriage does are God and my children. I would think brothers in arms would also be close, but can't say from experience.
it's also the case that Aquinas considers sex -- another marriage 'good' that is not the purpose of marriage but a good attached to it -- to be a venal sin if it is done for the purpose of making your spouse happy rather than for the purpose of generation.
Do you have a cite on that?
Church teaching is often misunderstood; it's possible that he was referring to 'happy sex' which is NOT 'open to transmission of life', i.e. mutual mast'b'n.
The 'fidelity' issue is part/parcel of the 'marriage of Christ and His Church' analogy--or for that matter, the antecedent O.T. "Yahweh and His people" analogy.
Seems to me that those analogies point the way to NON polygynous marriage, no?
***Afterthought on 'happy sex' above: it's also possible that TA considers 'mental separation' of the progeny/satisfaction unity to be a sin. That was at least indirectly re-affirmed by JPII in his 'theology of the body' essays, where he stated that 'mere lust' (not his precise words) is sinful, even between married couples. THAT caused a good deal of controversy.***
You make a good point, Elise, that 'open marriage' is not precisely the same thing. I think the example of why women might want to share a man is still telling, since actual polygamy is illegal; but I respect the objection, which does have some force to it.
I walked right by this yesterday. The reason I say D29's story is about open marriage is not because polygamy is illegal: it's because both partners in the opening story are having sex outside the marriage. The fact that Dad (Phil) has a girlfriend (Grace) who comes over to the house and may someday share a duplex with them while Mom (Kate) has "dates" doesn't change the fact that we're not talking about anything approaching mutiple faithful two-person unions.
And with regard to the idea that there will be no peace in a house with multiple "wives" (whether in quotes or not):
At one time, there was talk of her [Grace] moving in with the family, of co-parenting, even of Grace and Phil forming a kind of marriage. But a recent rift between her and Katie has nixed that. "We have different ideas about raising kids," Katie says. "We have different values, I think," Grace offers. There is an awkward silence.
Grim -
In my view, the soft harem isn't really about women wanting to share alpha males in the sense that polygyny is. Sharing an alpha male in polygyny is more like what the peasant women in Siberia are talking about: having the right to a man's financial and physical strength (which includes, these days, his government benefits). The soft harem girls don't have a right to anything from the football star. And the primary girlfriend isn't "sharing": she's putting up with a situation she probably doesn't like but turning a blind eye to hold onto the football star while telling herself that's the price for having the guy all the other girls want.
Once upon a time, the football star would have been dating one girl and other girls would have been making it clear they'd like for him to date them instead. They would have flirted, helped him with his homework, baked him brownies, whatever. He would have accepted this as his due. His steady girl would have been unhappy about him accepting these attentions but aware she couldn't complain without losing him and consoled herself that it's the price she pays to have the guy the other girls wanted.
The soft harem is the same dynamic except now sex is expected rather than flirtatious looks, a ghost-written paper, or a plate of baked goods. Sex has become flirting to these poor children. To go back to a discussion at Villainous Company, the women in the harem have no clue there even is a "sweet spot" in regard to chastity, much less any idea that maybe they need to find it for themselves. And neither does the football player or his steady girl.
ZZZZZ....extremely boring.
Then why are you reading, Mark? When I run across a post I'm not interested in, I simply don't read it but I don't feel the need to insult the host or his readers.
I'm with Elise - in Grim's example there's no sharing going on, nor is there any kind of agreement. The 'soft harem' have no claim on the boy - Elise nailed it when she said that sex has become the new flirting.
As for the girlfriend, mates of famous or high status men have had to worry about infidelity from time immemorial. Those who have self respect won't tolerate it, but then people with self respect don't need someone else's status to feel good about themselves, so being with the BMOC would be insufficient recompense for being committed to a jerk you can't trust.
D29:
I'm thinking of this set of questions, particularly:
The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin.
And also:
[I]f pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.
There's some good advice in that last one! However, I must also draw from it that seeking pleasure alone is sinful, even if it is done "within the bounds of marriage," i.e., while thinking of one's wife as a wife and not merely as a woman.
Cass & Elise:
I'm willing to be persuaded that this is the right understanding; I have just one reservation that I will explain.
I can see an argument that this does not imply an endorsement of 'sharing,' because none of the women involved actually want to share the man with another woman: each wants him to herself. Thus, each would prefer his loyalty; failing that, his 'official' loyalty combined with his keeping infidelity in the closet; and openly having two 'principle' girlfriends would be the least preferable option.
If we extract from that a general model, though, we seem to be saying that adultery would be likewise preferable to polygamy: and that seems wrong. For in the case of polygamy, some provision is made at least for the offspring and their education; whereas with adultery, normally none would be. Likewise, a polygamous relationship includes at least some respect for the second and subsequent wives; and adultery generally does not.
Certainly the footballer would probably also prefer adultery to polygamy -- he might well prefer to avoid responsibility toward the 'other' girls, or any children they engender. In that sense, both he and his principal girlfriend are united in their opinion; but just as with marriage, it cannot be the two people alone who determine the good because other people are involved. Anyone he becomes involved with ought to have a claim on him, and indeed does, in the law, if she can prove paternity: thus she can demand the support reserved for wives and children, but is only forbidden the title of wife and the son or daughter having their father's name. That seems to be a greater wrong than polygamy would be under these circumstances.
Anyone he becomes involved with ought to have a claim on him, and indeed does, in the law, if she can prove paternity: thus she can demand the support reserved for wives and children, but is only forbidden the title of wife and the son or daughter having their father's name. That seems to be a greater wrong than polygamy would be under these circumstances.
I'm confused here. Current law provides for the support of minor children for children conceived out of wedlock but not for financial support of the mother as though she were a wife.
In my mind, if two people who are not married have sex and a child is conceived, the woman has zero claim upon the man but the child has a legitimate claim on both his or her parents. Marriage is not needed for this - only paternity/maternity.
A woman can surrender a child for adoption b/c in that case supposedly someone else will take responsibility for the child's support but if she abandons the child she has violated both the law and her parental duty.
I don't understand why guys confuse child support with spousal support - they're not the same. The duty actually exists regardless of which parent has physical custody. Both parents have a fiscal duty, the custodial parent fulfils his/her fiscal duty AND parental duty and the non-custodial parent (usually the father) fulfills only the fiscal duty.
It's nice of you to claim to be confused, when indeed you must more probably think that I am confused. And indeed I may be -- my knowledge of divorce is blessedly limited, and I have likewise almost no knowledge of what happens when one sires a child out of wedlock.
Nevertheless, granting that I may not correctly grasp the nature of the legal claim that can be made, my point is that she ought to have a claim. And indeed, it may be that she ought to have a better claim -- a claim to the right to be treated as what she is, i.e., the mother of his child (rather than some sort of governess entrusted with seeing that his money is properly directed to his child's education). It may be that the child should have a better claim.
The problem I'm asking after is that this model seems to create a worse evil than the one we're endorsing. It's convenient for the man and, perhaps, better for his principal girlfriend; but it is apparently worse for the child, and any other women involved. It seems to violate the principal end of reproduction-and-education moreso than would polygamy.
FWIW, I was legitimately confused :) ... as in, "not sure I understood what you were driving at". That said, you are far more generous to women than I, Grim.
I've been quite annoyed with conservative kvetching about the poor man having to actually pay attention to whether he gets women pregnant or - Heaven Forfend! - to the character of women he has casual sex with :p
FWIW, I do think adultery is worse than polygamy. Adultery often breaks up two families and leaves two sets of existing children feeling as though they've been struck by lightning (and wondering whether love can last or promises mean anything?). I truly do appreciate your willingness to hold the father accountable, but I can't get past the sense that it takes two to create an unintended pregnancy and I hate to see the man held *more* accountable than the woman is. Both should be held equally accountable to the extent that is possible.
I don't know how one legally encourages fathers of out of wedlock children to fulfil their parental duties. This is one instance in which I suspect coercion is not the answer and I worry about incentivizing false accusations or ones made in bad faith.
In any event, I don't see the 'soft harem' and polygamy as alternatives to be evaluated against each other - they're too fundamentally different. And adultery is simply a refusal to honor one's commitment, so I don't really buy off on polygamy as a way of preventing adultery either.
Interesting question there: wouldn't women in a polygamous marriage have *more* incentive to cheat than women in a traditional marriage? After all, they're already only getting 1/nth of their husband's time/attention/sexual attention - in a world where women actually had freedom, I would think that polygamous marriages would create quite an incentive to stray.
Nor do I quite buy that a man in a polygamous marriage would be *less* inclined to cheat. So I'm not convinced polygamy is a remedy for that particular problem, at least from a logical standpoint. A guy who can't stand a light yoke will chafe even more under a heavy one.
Neither loving nor boinking are rational activities; they're both primarily emotional and/or not conscious. Trying to parse them with logic is a violation of the Rules of Magic, or something. People are not rational creatures, they're rationalizing creatures. That's why Rimmer's, and Heinlein's, multi-member things seem possible and yet foolish. Most people are not as rational as those characters in fiction are. We're Kirks, not Spocks (having is not as good as wanting....) That's part of why the football captain and the cheerleader have such melodrama-filled high school and college years (and for some of them, the excitement doesn't end there.) Males and females compete differently for who they consider to be their "best" mates.
We (humans) have not tried most of the possible arrangements, at least not in any fashion that would yield reliable results. Looking at my own life, I can see where Spice and I could be in one of RAH's line marriages (which has to be considered a form of poly-marriage) with several couples we know very well. In some ways such could have made our lives better; in some ways things could be worse. Decreeing that such should never be tried strikes me as foolish; let those who want to try such write the rules they want to follow, and how to admit and expel members, how to cope with children and assets, and let them try -- without the rest of society nattering at them about it. We're not rational enough to do that, though, so it won't happen.
We (a culture) need to learn to be more forgiving of error. Demanding that others be perfect sets them up to fail.
Grim, it appears that both quotes you offer is the standard RC argument against contraceptive sex.
In addition, both are admonitions against merely satisfying lust, IOW, both underline that husband should treat his wife as much more than a 'woman'.
Interesting that both can also be read as a faint argument against polgamy, too.
Decreeing that such should never be tried strikes me as foolish; let those who want to try such write the rules they want to follow, and how to admit and expel members, how to cope with children and assets, and let them try -- without the rest of society nattering at them about it.
A few comments :)
First of all, I haven't seen anyone here arguing that alternative arrangements "should never be tried". That's really not the question, since if one or more people want to have some kind of polygamous living arrangement they are completely free to do so. There is currently no law that I know of forbidding a man for living with two women, nor for having children with two women. And in most jurisdictions, laws against adultery either don't exist or are not enforced.
Where the law comes into it is when these folks want *society* and the government to protect what they consider their rights. If you want to voluntarily enter into an agreement but want society to enforce the terms of that agreement, society has the right to decide whether there's any benefit to the larger community in doing so and - if the answer is yes - whether the benefits outweigh the costs/risks.
This is what divorce law and marriage laws are all about - creating enforceable rights for each partner against the other and for both partners against the rest of society.
So long as these folks aren't asking me to protect their rights under an arrangement I don't happen to think is terribly wise, they are entirely free to do as they please. They can make any arrangements or rules they please too. But their right to do so stops when it imposes duties and costs upon people outside the relationship.
Grim -
With regard to you comment at 12:49pm -
I would argue first that you are trying to extract a general model from what should be considered aberrant behavior. Neither the football player nor the harem girls should be doing what they’re doing. (And neither should the “official” girlfriend if she knows what’s going on.) The fact that they are in - perhaps - sufficient numbers to warrant discussion at a major magazine means something has gone very wrong.
I would argue second that allowing someone who behaves the way the football player does to have multiple wives (or multiple “official” girlfriends) is not going to satisfy whatever is driving him to this behavior (which is part of the “aberrant” thing). He does not want to have sex with a stable group of however-many women; he wants women who will:
service him in the barroom bathroom or wherever the beer is flowing
This is not adultery in the traditional sense: a husband who has a girlfriend on the side. This is also not the “polyamorous” relationships described in an earlier link, where the various pairings - however brief or lengthy - are motivated by mutual love or a mutual desire for sexual adventure or even mutual lust. This is something else entirely. It is, to use an out of fashion but perfectly appropriate term, unfresh.
There is a discussion to be had on whether adultery is preferable to polygamy but the football player and his soft harem are not the example on which to hang that discussion.
Elise,
I'm not sure that's quite right. Notice that we have moved on from discussing whether polygamy is right according to Aquinas -- that is, in accord with natural law -- to whether it is a better or worse deviation from perfection than adultery.
To have that discussion, it is necessary to look at what you are calling "aberrant" behavior. That is, after all, what "aberrant" means -- from the Latin, literally, 'to wander away from the path.'
It's possible to wander a little way from the path, or off into an entirely different country; but we ought to be able to find general principles to guide us. Indeed, they should be the same principles that mark out the path.
So, we have several we've come up with from Aquinas: the chief one being the 'principle end,' but also the secondary and tertiary end; and in addition to that, the marriage goods, especially fidelity or faith. Those should be just as useful in explaining what is wrong with aberrant behavior -- or why one kind is worse than another -- as they were in marking out what would be the best kind of behavior.
By the way, htom, I think this is also relevant to your point. You may say, 'We should let people try stuff,' but it's helpful (for them as well) if you can give an account of what the institution is about as a guiding lamp.
They may decide they don't want some of the goods. We speak of faith, for example, which is a good that may be more important for Christians than for, say, Lakota (to use my wife's favorite example). Even though it's not the religious virtue of Faith, it's an analogue to it; and developing that particular virtue may simply not be as important to them as it is to us.
Interfering with the principal end, though, will end badly. It may not start out badly, but natural law is the one kind of law that doesn't need enforcement. Sooner or later, like Kipling's Gods of the Copybook Headings, it shall 'with terror and slaughter return.' Until our nature changes, that will be true. (Of course, some people expect our nature to change pretty quickly now due to genetic engineering and other scientific advances. As to that, I shall wait and see: the New Soviet Man was supposed to change our nature, too.)
Personally I don't really care whether adultery or promiscuity are worse deviations from perfection than traditional marriage or polygamy. Marriage is an institution: a formal cultural arrangement with rules, norms, and the intention of fostering long term commitments between human beings.
Adultery and promiscuity are not cultural institutions and they are nothing like marriage (with one or many wives). They have no formal rules or norms and they represent an escape from or unwillingness to enter into long term commitments.
Different beasts entirely.
It's interesting that you say that, Cass. Aquinas certainly would not have agreed with you -- he is quite clear that the sacrament aspect of marriage is that it is what helps you avoid the stain of those very sins. (A 'sacrament,' he notes, is "a sanctifying remedy against a sin.")
So Aquinas (and Paul, for that matter) saw marriage as directly related to -- and indeed the remedy for -- these ills.
Part of the problem (as I see it) is that government is going to stick its nose in. A & B are married, C joins them as a spouse (in all three's opinion.) Something happens, say an auto accident. C expects to take care of the children, but they're taken by the state and given to someone else, since C has no legal (in the State's eyes) attachment to them. Or C isn't allowed to give medical directives, because the parents of A & B don't want C interfering. Or ... the list is long. Adultery would be straying outside the bounds set by the group, just as it is now. Promiscuity, too, doesn't change much; those who are promiscuous do not seem to exercise normal amounts of self-control in sexual behavior.
Faithfulness, in this context, is avoiding adultery. It might not always be a bright line, differing even from couple to couple. D & E are happily married. F & G are happily married. D & F used to be married. Due to a horrible accident, D and F find themselves together, spend the night together, and each confesses when they get home. E says to D that due to the circumstances, D is forgiven, not to do it again. G files for divorce. Same rules, same event, different people, different meanings attached.
If the adultery is planned, an ongoing series of planned meetings, I can see a partner having a very different feeling than a one-night event when both were in shock.
I think both adultery and promiscuity are cultural institutions; American culture about such is very different than European. Here, with our "forbidding" and "disgraceful" attitudes about extra-marital encounters, we actively hinder the creation of rules for such "rule breaking" behavior.
I'm happily married and have no desire to have an affair (although in the last year I've learned that I could, indeed, be tempted -- both of the ladies seem to feel exactly the same way as I do, we're all determined that it's not going to happen, I've talked to Spice about both, she says she'd probably eventually forgive me, although I wouldn't like the process, and I know I'd hate myself in the morning before she even knew.) Is this being faithless? Adultery in the heart? Or merely the facing of reality, that temptation must be faced and defeated, with the help of your partner? No answers required.
I'm not sure in what sense adultery or promiscuity could possibly be said to be cultural institutions. An institution is typically some sort of arrangement formally recognized by society as having importance or value.
Adultery and promiscuity are human behaviors (like stealing or lying), but there's no agreed upon set of rules for stealing, lying, adultery, or promiscuity as there is for traditional marriage because none of these behaviors is something society is encouraging or supporting.
As for your example of a married couple living with a 3rd person and wanting that person to raise their kids if something happens to them, the military runs into that sort of situation all the time and it's an unGodly mess caused by the failure of the parties involved to act like grownups.
If two parents want a non-family member to be the guardian of their children, there are existing legal instruments to ensure that and good parents think of these things. My husband and I were formally designated as the guardians of our nieces and nephews by all 3 sets of parents. There were other siblings, and also grandparents. But if you care you don't leave these things to chance.
Absent an explicit agreement between the parties, society has exactly zero basis for arbitrarily setting aside the natural interest of the children involved and of other family members in preserving the family as a unit. Because society recognizes and values marriage and families, it has rules to protect their interests and support those institutions. That is not the case with adultery for very good practical reasons.
In your example, adultery has occurred regardless of the intent of the parties. Adultery is sleeping with someone not your spouse. Doesn't matter whether it was "OK" with your spouse or not. I will accept that adultery in this case is not necessarily a breach of faith but it's still adultery according to the literal meaning of the word.
That's an important distinction. People often use legal terms with distinct meanings interchangeably as though they meant the same thing, but those legal meanings pertain to legal rights recognized by society (and which individuals can reasonably expect society to uphold as its end of the social contract). We don't punish faithlessness but may choose to punish adultery (or not, as the individual may choose not to ask society to protect his/her marital rights).
That's a separate question from whether such rights exist as a consequence of marriage. They do, whether or not they are ever enforced.
One more thing:
Part of the problem (as I see it) is that government is going to stick its nose in.
Actually this isn't true unless someone - almost always someone with standing to make that request - chooses to ask government/society to enforce their rights. Before government can stick its nose in, it has to find out.
I have known of scads of people sleeping/living with someone they weren't married to and government really could not care less. The problems arise when there's a dispute and the parties involved ask government to enforce their rights.
Finally, government (and society, and families) do have a strong interest in protecting the welfare of minor children who are parentless. The presumption is that families share more than casual or even frequent sexual partners: blood ties, family history, love.
As I mentioned before, we see this all the time in the military. A Marine has a girlfriend who (inexplicably) expects to be treated as though she were a wife. Or he leaves his wife (or she leaves him) and he hooks up with another woman who then considers herself to be his wife. He dies.
Guess who gets notified (and gets his death benefits)? Whoever he designates, and if there's no designation there are clear rules (wife first, parents second, and so on). Girlfriends and lovers don't have any rights in this situation, nor should they.
His designee can certainly turn around and notify the girlfriend and even give her the money (IOW, they can choose to honor his wishes if they know what those wishes were). But it's up to him to make his wishes known and if he doesn't there are clear rules for what happens next.
These rules are clear evidence that society recognizes/supports marriage and family in a way that they manifestly do NOT recognize or support promiscuity or adultery.
Government has stuck it's nose in by refusing standing to C. The standing granted by the recognition of the marriage between A & B would trump any documents the three might sign. A fourth party comes along, refusing to recognize C's relationship with A & B, and can contest C's status, where they would be unable to contest A's or B's decisions if it was B & C or A & C who were unconscious.
Yes, there are strong interests in providing for and protecting children. Government can have a proper role in such.
I understand that girlfriends, lovers, and fiances don't have the standing of wives. I'm saying that if society wants to allow other than marriage of twosomes, that's going to have to change. (Just as it is changing to allow homosexuals to marry.) That recognition and support is a demonstration of how other unions are hindered by government; there is no mechanism to gain such legal recognition. (cf Church of Latter Day Saints and their religious belief in multiple wives.)
A couple of years ago there was an uproar in the American press that the President of France had a mistress whom he appeared in public with. The French seemed to think it all a big yawn, and didn't understand why the Americans were bothered by that public, adulterous, relationship. Different cultures, different attitudes.
A fourth party comes along, refusing to recognize C's relationship with A & B, and can contest C's status, where they would be unable to contest A's or B's decisions if it was B & C or A & C who were unconscious.
A & B are the parents. C is NOT the parent, nor is C a family member, nor has C been formally designated as the guardian in the event of A/B's demise.
C's standing was never made explicit by A or B. Government didn't "refuse standing to C" -- A & B did refused that standing by not making their desires plain.
They could have chosen to do so, but they didn't. Your scenario would have government just assuming (on no evidence, I might add) that A & B wanted C to have certain rights (or, more broadly, that if you take a lover then you must want that lover to raise your kids if you die, as opposed to your parents or siblings doing so). In this case, A&B's desires were never documented, formalized or made explicit but somehow government is supposed to decide what they wanted after they're dead just b/c C says so? A logical question would be, "Why didn't they let anyone know?"
That doesn't fly in any court of law I've seen.
Why would/should government do such a thing? I certainly don't want government assuming things on my behalf.
Attitudes have nothing to do with cultural institutions or laws. Laws may be affected by attitudes, but in general until a critical mass of people push for a change in the law, it will remain the same.
The standing granted by the recognition of the marriage between A & B would trump any documents the three might sign.
What is the basis for this assertion? C's "right" to act in loco parentis to the children of A & B is never going to supercede the rights of A & B, but then it was never intended to. It was ALWAYS contingent on the death of A&B. If they intend otherwise during their lifetime then this arrangement should be made explicit by putting their kids up for adoption or voluntary relinquishment of parental rights according to the laws of the state in which they reside.
If they make no arrangement, what evidence is there of their desire to have C assume parenting duties?
It's possible that family members (D) might challenge any documents signed by A, B, and C, but they would do so, not because A&B were married, but because they have the closest blood ties to the children. The marriage is actually irrelevant in many ways.
A, B, and their respective families all have blood ties to the kids. C does not, so in a case of competing claims the rights of D (the family) would be balanced against either the explicit wishes of A&B (if legal arrangements were made) or C's unsupported assertion that A&B "always meant to get around to making me guardian" (which is pretty unconvincing).
And in the end, the standard that would be used would almost certainly be the best interests of the minor children - again, marriage is not the salient factor here: parenthood/blood ties are.
Unsupported assertions combined with merely being a live in lover (unless that live in lover had been the children's primary caretaker, and a court might well consider that) is pretty specious grounds for awarding custody of children. Hard to even prove you're a live in lover unless you want to produce sex tapes...
... and I suspect that last would be unlikely to make a favorable impression on the judge :)
Part of the problem (as I see it) is that government is going to stick its nose in. A & B are married, C joins them as a spouse (in all three's opinion.)
Spouse, not merely lover. Parentage of the children was unspecified, as was/were the trio's gender(s). As mutual spouses, all would be involved in raising the children.
There is no legal mechanism for declaring a third spouse. None. You could make a sham of it, by filing a bunch of power(s) of attorneys, medical directives, ... each specifying that (one) designates the other (two), or the survivor of the other two, to be the person to make such decisions ..., guardianship, etc. -- and having done so, there are a number of people (human, corporate, and state) who would have standing to dispute such documents, and even if they survive the challenges (which can take years if A,B, and C have the funds and access to them) it may be too late.
For a more detailed hypothetical, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5. c1 was adopted by A, a sibling's child. c2 was adopted by B, also a sibling's child. Neither's other parent is known (u1 and u2.) c3, c4 and c5 are the genetic product of A&B, B&C, and A&C.
u1 and u2 are going to have standing to challenge many, if not all, of the documents produced. As will the State, under the supposition that u1 and u2 would have such standing if their identities were known (the State acting in loco parentis in some fashion.)
A possibly useful (and far more relevant than adultery or promiscuity) example here would be that of common law marriage. Many if not most states recognize it.
The common threads in criteria for determining whether or not a common law marriage exists are *obvious intent* and *permanence* - i.e., the passing of some statutorily determined time (as in 10 or 15 or 20 years) during which a couple or the person being sued for relief held themselves out to be married to the community at large. Examples would be referring to X as "my wife" or acting like a married couple does.
Just being a live in lover for a short time would not satisfy this requirement (and in any case it wouldn't supercede the rights of an actual spouse since most states have bigamy laws to protect the rights of married partners and prevent multiple - and confusicating! - claims).
Again, once individuals ask society to invest resources in defending their rights, it's hardly unreasonable for society to demand that they meet certain terms and conditions and that society receive some benefit to balance the duty of defending those rights. The more complex, ambiguous and confusing the arrangement is, the less likely society is going to be to want to support it against challenges.
That strikes me as a pretty darned good reason for society to decide that polygamy is not worth defending ...unless it can be shown that on balance, the benefits to society outweigh the costs.
There is no legal mechanism for declaring a third spouse. None.
That's irrelevant, though. The law says that, having promised 100% of yourself to one partner, you can't revise the original bargain after the fact. You can mutually rescind it via a divorce and then enter into some informal sharing mechanism, but that's a separate issue and society isn't going to defend any "rights" you feel you should have.
Parenting trumps marriage where children are concerned. If C was the parent but A/B were married, C's parental rights don't just vanish. Two separate questions here.
u1 and u2 are going to have standing to challenge many, if not all, of the documents produced.
You're darned tootin' they will because both parents never consented to reliquish their rights. They don't vanish and marriage between one parent and 3rd party doesn't cancel them either.
Not sure what you're getting at here. It isn't really the marriage that matters but the blood ties, and the closer the better. Parent trumps everything else unless you can show unfitness (and that's hard to do).
Oh, and u1 and u2 will only be able to assert parental rights if they are, in fact, the parents of the children involved.
A court might decide to keep the kids together (child's best interest trumps parental rights).
These are general (common law) rules, as this is all state law and state laws differ. But they're remarkably consistent in their reasoning, if not always in their implementation.
Oh, and u1 and u2 will only be able to assert parental rights if they are, in fact, the parents of the children involved.
A court might decide to keep the kids together (child's best interest trumps parental rights).
These are general (common law) rules, as this is all state law and state laws differ. But they're remarkably consistent in their reasoning, if not always in their implementation.
A & B are married, C joins them as a spouse (in all three's opinion.)
Their opinions are irrelevant here.
What matters is what rights society has decided it wants to defend (marriage rights), not what rights the parties *wish* society would defend.
They have no "right" to impose binding duties on society unilaterally. Nor should they.
So, since poly-whichever isn't supported by both law and society, it can't exist. Or if it does, law, society, or both together, can disrupt it as they wish.
It's interesting that rights, in this context, seem to belong to society or government, and do not belong to individuals as shields against society or government. I think that such "rights" are properly called "powers".
since poly-whichever isn't supported by both law and society, it can't exist. Or if it does, law, society, or both together, can disrupt it as they wish.
Yes, but that would be the case regardless of whether there was a government or not, htom.
Without law or society, you have only that protection against your fellow humans which you can provide by yourself. If your polygamous marriage annoys or vexes your neighbors, they can band together and simply kill you or drive you out. The difference with government is that is that before government can interfere with you, laws must be passed and there's at least an explicit and predictable set of rules as opposed to sheer caprice.
We have become so used to law and society that we no longer recognize the dangers posed by anarchy/human aggression. Those dangers didn't disappear (just ask someone who has served in a country where there is no real law!) but the presence of law and the social compact have made such dangers nearly non-existent here in America. If our neighbor attacks us, we call the police. That's government, protecting your rights.
But this comes at a price. The reason there *are* police in the first place is that the folks in your community have agreed to be bound by a set of laws in exchange for government protecting certain rights. They give up some freedoms to gain some additional security (which in itself offers considerable freedom from fear and the burden of constant vigilance).
Polygamy clearly *does* exist despite laws prohibiting it. On balance, unless polygamists start annoying their neighbors, violating the rights of other people, or imposing unacceptable costs upon the rest of society, society really has very little interest in disrupting it. There are other, far more important threats out there (rape, murder, theft, fraud, etc.)
We see this every day - many laws on the books are not enforced unless and until someone really raises a fuss.
What are your protections against government? Well, you can take up arms and rebel.
You can get involved in lawmaking or persuade your fellow citizens that polygamy is a human right that ought to be protected. People do this all the time and it works, but it requires effort and most folks would prefer to complain.
You can leave and go somewhere where you agree with the laws and find the bargain acceptable.
Either way, government really *is nothing more that a collection of other people*, except in this case they are people who have agreed upon a set of rules they will live by. You can choose to live in anarchy (notably, few people do this b/c they then have zero practical rights that others will defend, theory being distinct from reality) or you can live under some form of government (you have *some* rights others will defend).
You seem to feel that government has a duty to defend *everything* you want to do, regardless of the costs your actions impose on others, and even if they see no value in doing so. How do you justify such a stance?
Government is delegated powers so that it may protect a limited set of your rights against your fellow citizens. You certainly don't have to submit to laws you don't agree with, but I'm not sure on what basis you keep elevating the "rights" of your hypothetical "C" above those of "D" (the family, who have blood ties to the children), or why you would reasonably expect society to do so when the parents could so easily have made their wishes wrt guardianship of their childen explicit and thus gained the protection of society and law for their wishes?
Seems like the Mother of all free rider problems - we should be able to enjoy the benefits of the social compact while refusing to abide by it?
C can join with A and B, then, but cannot expect the government to respect that decision even though the neighbors have not been bothered; A, B, and C can't be a "family" of equals.
"Blood ties"; there was a case in the headlines recently where a pair of teens were discovered to have been switched at birth; nearly graduating from high school, would you put them back with their "blood" families?
I did politics for decades. Seriously, I trust my neighbors more than the politicians.
Grim said something about building blocks in a society; we could build more interesting structures if we had more blocks to use than 1x2s. Some 3x4, some 1x5, some tiles, ... teens are probably 1x1s.
C can join with A and B, then, but cannot expect the government to respect that decision even though the neighbors have not been bothered; A, B, and C can't be a "family" of equals.
I don't know how to express what I'm trying to say without sounding as though I'm trying to be insulting so I'm going to just say it straight out and rely upon you to correct me if I've misunderstood and understand that no insult is meant.
What does "respect their decision" mean? You never spell it out, but it seems to mean "let them do whatever they want to and moreover, defend them against the rest of the world". So long as they (as you say) don't cause problems the government is not going to enter their home and tell them they can't live together. No law gives government that power, and government doesn't just create its own power - in a representative government people have the power to shape and change the law. So there's a concrete limit on government.
So long as no one with a competing (and legally recognized) right comes along - and their actions don't impact others - ABC can pretty much do whatever they wish. The law even provides them a perfectly valid way to arrange for child guardianship. A&B may decline to avail themselves of it, but if they do they shouldn't expect the government to read their minds after they're dead, nor should C's word automatically carry the day.
This has nothing to do with "respect" and everything to do with the ability to solve disputes between people with competing claims. If you shout your wishes into a dark hole, you can't very well expect the rest of the world to know what they are. There is nothing about a live-in arrangement that explicitly indicates you want any person living in your house to raise your children if you die, whether or not you are having sex with that person. There's no formal agreement to tell the world what they've decided. A marriage is just such a formal agreement. So is a guardianship agreement.
The marriage is completely irrelevant - it's a red herring. It does not matter - the situation would be exactly the same for any group of people living together without benefit of marriage because parental rights don't depend upon marriage and marriage does not create parental rights where no parenthood existed before. You seem to want it to, but wishing doesn't make things so.
Reasonable people don't leave important matters like who raises their kids up to chance, nor do they expect the rest of the world to read their minds and then defend their wishes against all comers.
In the case of kids switched at birth, no I would not send the kids back home but neither would I deny the real parents visitation. They didn't stop being parents because the hospital made a mistake. Anyway this is covered by the "best interest of the child" principle I referred to earlier. Few folks would think it was in a child's best interest to uproot him and send him off to live with strangers, but then few folks would deny a child the change to know his or her real parents either.
Neither is reasonable, and as I said earlier if C had been the primary caretaker of the children few courts would fail to consider that important fact.
A, B, and C can be a "family of equals" in all matters that involve only them, but they have zero right to dictate how the rest of the world sees them.
Not insulted, Cass.
Let me try to say it again. There's no mechanism, legal or social, for A, B, and C to declare that the three of them are to be considered one family, and that the loss of one or two of the members does not sever the parental relationship between the other(s) and the family's offspring.
I think we're actually agreed on that.
My complaint is that there isn't such -- if there is desire to experiment with such -- and that proclaiming that there isn't such is not helpful to those attempting the experiment.
I know all about the legal arrangements that can be made, and the problems that they can face. Spice and I tried that for a while, back when I was convinced that marriage was the primary cause of divorce.
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