Fairies

On Fairies:

Joe recently made a remark on the subject of fairies. As he raised it in a memorial post to someone he admired, I didn't wish to raise the issue at the time, but after a decent interval I'd like to dispute something he said. That was this:

Or, as I might say to Chesterton, you may like the freedom to believe in fairies - but the fairies lose their magic if you do. And what a shame - because, in their rightful state, how beautiful they are.

Now, that is a serious claim. Chesterton wrote quite a bit about the fairies. His chapter in Orthodoxy called "The Ethics of Elfland" is among the finest things ever written. Elves are not fairies, of course; the root for elf is the Old Norse alfar, meaning "white," and they seem to be the honored dead, or those who belong to the Otherworld to which we go (or from which we come!) when we are not living here. Fairies are beings of a type unlike us; the root word is ultimately from the Latin, relating to the Fates. Elves are like us, but in another state; fairies are, whatever their other nature, genuinely alien beings.

The old tales about this are quite clear, if you care for old tales as I do. The problem in dealing with fairies is that they don't really understand us, and vice versa. In a fairy story, what seems amusing to them may destroy a man entirely; or bounce him hundreds of years out of his timeline, losing to him forever everyone he loved. We aren't really able to know if the 'revenge' our heroes take on them in these stories doesn't destroy them, or otherwise distort them in horrible ways. There is a sharp disconnect; and if you're of a literal mind about your literature, you might say that it is one of the rare attempts by humanity to imagine a completely different kind of intelligence.

Chesterton wrote quite a lot about these things, but the thing he wrote that I'll quote here is on another subject. It is still on point:

The disbelievers in miracles deny them (rightly or wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them. The open, obvious, democratic thing is to believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a miracle, just as you believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a murder.... If you reject [the "choking cataract of human testimony in favor of the supernatural"], you can only mean one of two things. You reject the peasant's story about the ghost either because the man is a peasant or because the story is a ghost story.

This is the problem I have. I have never seen a fairy; I don't know that I could see one. Yet I believe in them, because I know a woman who tells me that she has seen them. This woman is one whose testimony on any other subject I would not question; I have known her for years, and I have observed her to be a woman of unusually strong moral character. She is faithful to what she thinks is right even when it is to her own disadvantage. I am quite certain of her honesty.

That gives me compelling reason to assert, at least: "I know that she really believes that fairies exist." What would stop me from asserting, "I am prepared to believe that fairies exist"? Chesterton tells us: I have his two options. The first one, though, will not do. I cannot reject her testimony because of who she is, because I know she is just the kind of person whose testimony I should rely on if I rely on anyone's at all.

That leaves, then, only the second option. If I reject her testimony, it must be because I have a doctrine that fairies cannot exist; that fairy stories are never true.

I don't have any evidence, however, for that proposition. If I say I am being rational in rejecting her testimony, then, I am fooling myself. I have no rational reason to doubt her testimony merely because I haven't had the experience myself, any more than I could doubt her testimony to a murder because I didn't see it happen too.

The modern way of dealing with this is to push it into psychology; to say, in short, that there is something wrong with her. That is wrong in two senses. First, I have never observed anything wrong with her; genuine disorders are usually evident along a broad line of problems. She has always held a job, works hard, has strong and steady friendships and relationships to others, doesn't drink (let alone to excess) and uses no drugs, etc. So, it would be strange for me to impute some sort of disorder to her. She shows every evidence of being well ordered.

Second, I can no more see her mind than I can see a fairy. To make a positive judgment about her mind (that it is disordered) in order to avoid a positive judgment about a fairy (that it might possibly exist in some way we don't yet understand) is merely to prefer one sort of untestable theory over another. There is no lab test that can approach either question. I'm really making an aesthetic claim, not a scientific or a rational one. I'm saying that I prefer a world in which people who believe in fairies are insane, or that I prefer a world in which fairies might exist.

Of the two, aesthetically, I prefer the second. This happens to line up with the evidence of the woman being well-ordered in all other observable aspects; and with a vast wealth of similar testimony, dating over centuries and across cultures. So: I honestly believe that the rational position is that there likely are fairies. That also happens to be what I'd prefer to believe. I am aware of the potential for confirmation bias, then; but anyone who asserts the contrary had better be equally aware of their own aesthetic preferences, and resulting biases.

Does that mean that fairies lose their magic? I don't know that it does; they are quite mystical to me, since I have no way of seeing them, yet believe that somehow they exist.

What it definitely doesn't mean, however, is that I'm denying them their rightful place. If indeed they do exist, their rightful place is in the realm of things that exist. We should conceptualize our world in a way that leaves room for them.