One Year On

A year ago this morning I started five hours of chainsawing my way out to the highway and two weeks without power. Even a year on the worst effects of the hurricane are still visible. Parts of the Blue Ridge Parkway will need another year of repairs; I-40 is kind of open for limited traffic with major delays. 

It was quite an experience. The main thing I learned was to look to your community and not to the Feds for help in such times. Help each other and stick together, and have faith in the people but not the government. An amazing amount of charity effort came flowing in through roads that were barely open, or flown into tiny airfields some of which didn’t formally exist. 

Hopefully the two storms forming off the coast blow back to sea. We don’t need them. 

A Little Truth Finally Outs

I suppose we knew this all along, but it's nice to see it finally come out.

The FBI finally acknowledged to Congress that 274 plainclothes agents were embedded in the January 6 crowds in Washington.

As the years have scrolled by since that momentous day, we've learned that Buffalo Shaman here was actually allowed in by the police, with whom he spoke on several occasions during the adventure; he was nonviolent and allowed to enter without force. I learned from a friend on hand that day that the Park Police were understaffed if anything; we've learned that the National Guard was requested but denied by Congress; we've learned a great many similar things. There was some rioting on the one side of the building, but a lot of the people were let in: there is video of police opening the barricades and the doors. 

We had already received an admission from the FBI that dozens or hundreds of their informants were present in the crowd. Now we know it actually had agents* in plainclothes in large numbers in the crowd. "The news comes in the wake of claims by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General that the FBI had no undercover personnel in the Jan. 6 crowds."

That changes the flavor of the whole thing, doesn't it? Not an insurrection any more: an information operation designed to leverage popular anger and protest at legitimate election tomfoolery in several states, and turn it into a cause for the Federales to consolidate power. As late as the 2024 election season the DOJ was still lying to us all about this in official reports. I recall that they walled off the Congress and deployed the National Guard afterwards for months. 

* The FBI and the CIA use the term "agent" very differently. An "agent" for the CIA is not a CIA officer, but a foreign national they've recruited to execute their plans within the host country. This term is almost wholly misused by Hollywood accounts of what the Agency does, where a 'secret agent' is supposed to be the James Bond type of CIA officer: these are in fact called "operations officers." An "agent" for the FBI is an officer and employee; an 'agent' in the CIA's sense is called a "confidential informant" by the FBI. Thus, the admission here is that the FBI had actual secret police agents throughout the crowd on 6 January 2001.

The Age of Arthur

AVI posted this site earlier this week, but it belongs at the Hall as well. This entry, which AVI also noted, is a good starting point because it validates the exercise of trying to study the historicity of Arthur. After that there's just a wealth of good information about the era. 

It is an era about which good information is difficult to discern. I believe it was Chesterton who wrote, though I cannot find the reference, that the era was one in which legends were born out of history: one generation was suffused with bureaucratic notes on the logistical shipments from Rome, and within a short time there were the disciplined chronicles of the Anglo-Saxons. Yet for a space, for a while, we have only stories of men striving with giants and dragons: and there among them is Arthur, with the cross pinned to his shoulder, holding against the tide. 

Anti-Revolutionaries

Today Vodkapundit has an article for subscribers that is based on a play on the name of the famous Beatles song about revolution. I don't subscribe so I didn't read it, but I did read something interesting about the Beatles not long ago. It was some remarks by Lemmy Kilmister, the founder, lead singer, and bass player of Motörhead. I won't censor his remarks, which would be very much against the spirit of the man.

“[T]he Beatles were hard men,” he wrote in his 2004 memoir White Line Fever. “[Manager] Brian Epstein cleaned them up for mass consumption, but they were anything but sissies. They were from Liverpool, which is like Hamburg or Norfolk, Virginia – a hard, sea-farin' town, all these dockers and sailors around all the time who would beat the piss out of you if you so much as winked at them. Ringo's from the Dingle, which is like the fucking Bronx.”

He continued: “The Rolling Stones were the mummy's boys – they were all college students from the outskirts of London. They went to starve in London, but it was by choice, to give themselves some sort of aura of disrespectability."

Hard men they may have once been, for all of the fact that they came to be emblems of the Flower Children thanks to Lennon. I'm prepared to take Lemmy's word on that. It's interest, though, that the song that Vodkapundit is riffing off of contains a cautionary note very appropriate to our own moment. In fact it's repeated three times as variants:

But when you talk about destruction
Don't you know that you can count me out?...

But if you want money for people with minds that hate
All I can tell you is brother you have to wait...

But if you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao
You ain't gonna make it with anyone anyhow...

The hard men from the sea-faring town didn't want to see things burned down. Neither do the working class of today, for whom all this recent celebration of murder and mayhem is unlikely to be a winning stance. 

Even the real revolutionaries had a note of caution.

Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

I think even most people who really are worried about the current administration recognize that it's a passing moment. Trump is nearly eighty and on his last term; the odds of his work surviving him in a recognizable form are not high. Whoever replaces him, which right now might be many people even if the Democrats lose the next election, that person will be of a very different character. 

It's not the time for blood right now, no more than after the election of 2020. Prudence, often like phronesis being defined as "practical wisdom," indeed dictates. 

This being more of a Motörhead sort of blog, I'll close with them instead.

Incontinence and Alcohol

We've just finished Aristotle's long inquiry into the problem of incontinence. Probably the clearest case of human incontinence lies with alcohol, where very often we have known that another drink isn't the best choice and that we have to get up tomorrow, but we're out with friends or listening to moving music and decide that just one more won't hurt. There are many similar cases, so many that it has filled libraries with folk songs and country music, and hardly any blues music fails to mention 'the whiskey.' 

Readers know that I do an annual alcohol fast of 30 days, which I used to do in January but decided this year that I would move to another time of year. (January is miserable enough.) This time I chose to do it now, and am a week into it as of today; the reason is that I am combining it with training for a Strongman competition that is coming up on the 18th of October. 

To help myself with it this time, I decided to try one of the several apps that claim to be of use on the point of reducing one's drinking. Some of these use hypnosis; I didn't want one of those both because I doubt the efficacy of hypnosis. Others had social groups you could join, but I don't like socializing nor people all that much. There were several other options, alcohol as mentioned being one of the chiefest of human trials and many people having issues with it. 

I picked one called Reframe, which promised that it would "use neuroscience" to assist. What it turns out to mean by that is that it explains the neuroscience to me, a bit at a time and day-by-day. This is actually an excellent approach for me personally, even if it isn't the right one for everyone; I enjoy learning new things and find the information persuasive in a way that other things might not be for me. 

What I have learned so far is that alcohol has both immediate and long-term effects on several important hormones and receptors that affect the brain and have follow-on effects on your emotional state. It causes spikes in dopamine and seratonin, affects glutamate and GABA receptors. The effects of all of these interactions are to increase your sense of happiness and well-being, while reducing your ability to feel troubled about things. Over time, the natural production of all of these things can be affected such that your body adapts to what had been spikes by producing less of its own feel-good things. 

That provides a ready explanation for how something like 'incontinence' can develop. The right rule that was developed out of youth's good upbringing and study runs into what is in fact an altered reality: the brain is no longer capable of generating the world of youth, and has come to rely upon alcohol at some level to carry part of the weight of creating what was once a natural sort of happiness and well-being. 

This of course underlines the importance of things like these 30 day fasts in order to allow the brain to trend back to normal, and to give the self another opportunity to redraw the lines and enforce proper limits. 

It's information that also might have made the puzzle of incontinence less troubling to the Greeks, had they known of it. To put it in Aristotle's terms, alcohol makes the brain into something like the Lesbian Rule, because the brain as the measuring device ends up being bent and adapted to the world. 

This doesn't disqualify Aristotle's general approach, however: it remains true that one's habit ends up informing and even defining one's character. We understand the mechanism better now, and can make better decisions thereby. 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.10

Finally, the last chapter on incontinence.

Nor can the same man have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for it has been shown that a man is at the same time practically wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the incontinent man is unable to act-there is, however, nothing to prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our first discussions, and are near together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in respect of their purpose-nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or drunk.

Indeed, the incontinent man is likely to be drunk; excessive drinking is the clearest case of incontinence, though not the only one.  

There's a slight ambiguity there that I think is helpfully cleaned up: the incontinent man isn't unable to act per se, but unable to act in accord with what he knows is the right rule. He does act, just not well. 

And [the incontinent man] acts willingly (for he acts in a sense with knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it), but is not wicked, since his purpose is good; so that he is half-wicked. And he is not a criminal; for he does not act of malice aforethought; of the two types of incontinent man the one does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberation, while the excitable man does not deliberate at all. And thus the incontinent man like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them, as in Anaxandrides' jesting remark,

The city willed it, that cares nought for laws; but the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked laws to use.

Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the continent man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than most men can.

Strictly applied, that makes "most men" neither continent nor incontinent in what Aristotle likes to call 'the unrestricted sense' of the terms; most men therefore vary between the states, rather than being defined by either state. 

Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is easier to change a habit than to change one's nature; even habit is hard to change just because it is like nature, as Evenus* says:

I say that habit's but a long practice, friend,

And this becomes men's nature in the end.

So this is a version of what will end up being a core doctrine for Aristotle, the idea of 'second nature.' I have spoken of this already, in the commentary on VI.13; the idea is going to be that you have a 'first nature,' i.e. the nature you are born with, and also a 'second nature,' that which your habituation builds into a permanent character. The second nature will end up being dominant over the first nature, training and guiding it, yet will be as difficult to defy as your first nature can be. 

We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and softness are, and how these states are related to each other.

This is one of the longer inquiries in the EN, and not the most pleasant. The inquiry into friendship will be of more interest to most of you, I think. 

* I'm not sure which Evenus is intended by Aristotle here; probably not the river god, but perhaps one of the other two associated with the Iliad. However, my guess is it really might be Evenus the poet, whom Socrates mentions in the Phaedo and to whom Socrates ascribes the character of a philosopher. 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.9

Bull-headed readers, should any be found in the Hall, will find themselves discussed in this section. 

Is the man continent who abides by any and every rule and any and every choice, or the man who abides by the right choice, and is he incontinent who abandons any and every choice and any and every rule, or he who abandons the rule that is not false and the choice that is right; this is how we put it before in our statement of the problem. Or is it incidentally any and every choice but per se the true rule and the right choice by which the one abides and the other does not? If any one chooses or pursues this for the sake of that, per se he pursues and chooses the latter, but incidentally the former. But when we speak without qualification we mean what is per se. Therefore in a sense the one abides by, and the other abandons, any and every opinion; but without qualification, the true opinion.

So, properly speaking, it is not incontinent to abandon a bad decision or a stupid rule. You could say so in a way, since it's similar to the most proper ('without qualification') use of the term in that it means not living up to your rule. But if it was not a good rule, probably because your upbringing misled you as to what the most worthy thing to do was (as sometimes it does, as for example when the young are taught to admire antiheroes instead of heroes), the wise man will reform the rule and adjust his behavior accordingly. 

There are some who are apt to abide by their opinion, who are called strong-headed [or bull-headed --Grim], viz. those who are hard to persuade in the first instance and are not easily persuaded to change; these have in them something like the continent man, as the prodigal is in a way like the liberal man and the rash man like the confident man; but they are different in many respects.

Yes, for example, the rash man has a vice rather than a virtue; the prodigal likewise. Thus, bull-headed stubbornness is a vice, whereas tenacious continence is a virtue. But not, we shall see at the end of this chapter, as good a virtue as actual temperance, as liberality is not of the scale of magnificence and the love-of-lesser-but-proper-honor is less than true magnanimity. 

For it is to passion and appetite that the one will not yield, since on occasion the continent man will be easy to persuade; but it is to argument that the others refuse to yield, for they do form appetites and many of them are led by their pleasures. Now the people who are strong-headed are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish-the opinionated being influenced by pleasure and pain; for they delight in the victory they gain if they are not persuaded to change, and are pained if their decisions become null and void as decrees sometimes do; so that they are liker the incontinent than the continent man.

But there are some who fail to abide by their resolutions, not as a result of incontinence, e.g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes; yet it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not stand fast-but a noble pleasure; for telling the truth was noble to him, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not every one who does anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent, but he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure.

In the story Neoptolemus is a boy, and Odysseus persuades him to lie to Philoctetes, who was given the bow of Heracles, in order to obtain access to that bow. Neoptolemus does so under the persuasion of his famous elder, but eventually is overcome by guilt and admits the truth. Thus, here he did not obey his 'rule,' or choice; but it was a bad rule. Aristotle cashes this out as a sort-of persuasion by pleasure, since the boy hasn't achieved the right age to have fully-formed first principles from which to reason (i.e., his noble upbringing is not complete and, indeed, it is being deformed a bit by Odysseus here). 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.8

More on incontinence and repentance. 

The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he stands by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation of the problem, but the self-indulgent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent, the latter an intermittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence is not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily beside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others); for the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e. on less than most people.

This last analogy is a little ironic, because the kind of person who gets drunk quickly and on little wine is most likely to be the one who usually abstains completely. A tolerance is generally the product of practice, and the heavier the practice the greater the tolerance is likely to become.

Fat Bear Week

The National Park Service is having some fun. 

Call them whatever you like while they’re far away. You have to be delicate, though, if the bears are close enough to hear you. 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.7

Still more examination of incontinence and softness. We are about halfway through this book after today.

With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and temperance were formerly narrowed down, it is possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated; among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are incontinence and continence, those relating to pains softness and endurance. The state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more towards the worse states.

Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains, the man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-indulgent; for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore incurable, since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured.

Necessary pleasures include sex for the purpose of procreating children, without which society and civilization would cease to exist; eating and drinking; and certain other necessary bodily functions. The unnecessary pleasures include fine wines and silken sheets and so forth. So you can go wrong by pursuing an excess of unnecessary pleasures, but also by pursing to an excess the necessary things. 

This is the first mention of repentance as a concept, and a core concept: those who cannot repent cannot be cured. The object here is not to save them, as in their souls; it is to fix them in the present life, so they become virtuous rather than vice-ridden people.  

3-Year Ninja Recipe

This is great. Max knows how to do his history.

Maybe MREs aren't all that bad.

The Natural Law and the EN

A point that came out in the discussion below is one that will be of interest to any of you following the discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics. How does Aristotle's ethics fit into what you believe today? 

Well, for those of you who are Catholics, Aristotle's ethics were adopted into Catholic ethics as the Natural Law as it applies to human beings. Because Aristotle derived the virtues and vices without benefit of scripture or Judeo-Christian tradition, but from reason applied to nature, Aquinas adopts them and the later traditions about them into the model on the terms of natural theology: things we can know about God's intent by knowing about God's works.

Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 2,Article 3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Later Protestant traditions walk away from this ancient but pagan heritage to some degree, preferring to return to Scripture alone. And indeed, Aristotle's ethics and the classical ethics that follow from it differ substantially from, say, the Ten Commandments. There is no prohibition against murder, though there is a virtue of justice and a vice of lawlessness. There is no prohibition against having other gods, but there is a virtue of piety and a vice of blasphemy. 

The two come down very similarly on the duty to respect one's father and mother, and not to bear false witness against one's neighbors, however, as well as on many other points. 

Nicomachean Ethics VII.6

Incontinence and anger,* today. Who among us hasn't lost their temper and said or done some things they knew they shouldn't? Perhaps some of you; I have definitely given way to temptation on this one. Fortunately:

That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to see. (1) Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge.

Rest in Peace, Mr Sikorsky

 

A Scene from Lonesome Dove

You can watch the scene here, if you like.

 
The thing is, this scene takes place in what was at the time the Indian Territory; the men carrying out the executions are former Texas Rangers. So they're not only not in Texas, they're not still Rangers. The territory wasn't subject to Texas law or any state law at the time, and they had no Federal authority former or present. This is pure vigilante justice, without any sort of due process, in which they indulge to such a degree as to kill another fellow former Ranger who didn't himself kill anyone. 
It's a very dodgy example to hang much of a lesson on. A powerful scene, which Lonesome Dove contains in spades, but I'm not sure how good a moral or ethical example this really is.

Equinox

The autumn started about half an hour ago, if you missed it. 

It's usually pretty glorious around here; over the next moth the world will become colorful like no other time. I hope yours is good.

Free Speech: An Opportunistic Defense

As a Free Speech absolutist myself, I'm pleased to see the sudden interest even if I doubt its depth or sincerity.

Of the countless words expressed by friends and foes since the shocking killing of conservative provocateur Charlie Kirk, the young husband and father who dared express opinions in the crowded public square, only two matter: free speech.

Hopefully some of it is sincere, and not just occasioned by the moment. Arguments against interest are usually assumed to be sincere, so people challenging Trump and Bondi from the right probably are: 

Both [FCC Carr's and AG Bondi's] statements were badly out of line as a matter of law and policy.  But they were also politically damaging.  Republicans in general, and Trump in particular, have fought an endless battle to preserve freedom of speech and to claim the high ground of being the protectors of free speech.  They need to keep this high ground.

It's better than the usual mode in which people are trying to compete to see how much speech they can rule out of bounds, I guess. At least it's a short break.

Apparently I Missed Quite a Service

I was busy working on my motorcycle yesterday, which developed an issue with the front tire after the Dragon run. It's a brand new tire -- literally that was its first ride -- so I'm hoping the shop can figure something out without having to replace it. Still, as with other things of first importance, whatever it costs is what it costs. 

Having never known of Kirk during his lifetime, I wasn't inclined to a lengthy celebration of his life; but I can tell that many people were moved in different ways by it. The hatred has resumed on my social media feeds on the one side, and the hagiography on the other. I suppose the truth of the man's life was somewhere in the middle, as it is for most of us. It remains striking to me how very different this movie looks to the two groups of people I know on either side.  The experience of watching him murdered brought joy to the hearts of many -- a literal version of Conan's dictum (actually Genghis Khan's) that the best thing is to watch your enemies crushed -- and horror to the hearts of others. I can't imagine this bodes well for a peaceful future of mutual kindness and understanding. 

Words hitting my gut

J.D. Vance at the Kirk memorial: "It is better to die a young man in this world than to sell your soul for an easy life with no purpose, no risk, no love, and no truth."

Erika Kirk to the NYT a few days ago: she imagines Jesus asking her, "An eye for an eye? Is that how we do it?"

Elon Musk on X: "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us."

And the many stillshots of Musk sitting with Trump at the memorial, with the caption "For Charlie."

Nicomachean Ethics VII.5

A rather juicy section today that treats several topics that readers are likely to have strong opinions about. 

(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are so without qualification...

Existence itself, for example; almost without qualification beings of all sorts will try to continue to exist, either through themselves or through having children or creating great and memorable works that will survive them. 

...and (b) others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of originally bad natures.

If you've ever tried Jagermeister, "a drink that was once used as a field anesthetic by doctors in World War II," you probably didn't like it the first time.

This being so, it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those recognized with regard to the former; I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight-in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon-or of the story told of Phalaris.

The reference is to his cannibalism, not to his innovative torture and execution device, the brazen bull.

These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit.

Yes, it's that kind of a day in the study of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Note that this provides Aristotle's assessment of our contemporary 'born this way' controversy, in which he takes both horns of the dilemma: in his opinion, some people are born inclined to pederasty ("by nature") but others because they were victimized from youth and became accustomed to it ("from habit").