This is great. Max knows how to do his history.
Maybe MREs aren't all that bad.
Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."I answer that, As stated above (Article 2,Article 3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Later Protestant traditions walk away from this ancient but pagan heritage to some degree, preferring to return to Scripture alone. And indeed, Aristotle's ethics and the classical ethics that follow from it differ substantially from, say, the Ten Commandments. There is no prohibition against murder, though there is a virtue of justice and a vice of lawlessness. There is no prohibition against having other gods, but there is a virtue of piety and a vice of blasphemy.
The two come down very similarly on the duty to respect one's father and mother, and not to bear false witness against one's neighbors, however, as well as on many other points.
Incontinence and anger,* today. Who among us hasn't lost their temper and said or done some things they knew they shouldn't? Perhaps some of you; I have definitely given way to temptation on this one. Fortunately:
That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to see. (1) Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge.
Of the countless words expressed by friends and foes since the shocking killing of conservative provocateur Charlie Kirk, the young husband and father who dared express opinions in the crowded public square, only two matter: free speech.
Hopefully some of it is sincere, and not just occasioned by the moment. Arguments against interest are usually assumed to be sincere, so people challenging Trump and Bondi from the right probably are:
Both [FCC Carr's and AG Bondi's] statements were badly out of line as a matter of law and policy. But they were also politically damaging. Republicans in general, and Trump in particular, have fought an endless battle to preserve freedom of speech and to claim the high ground of being the protectors of free speech. They need to keep this high ground.
It's better than the usual mode in which people are trying to compete to see how much speech they can rule out of bounds, I guess. At least it's a short break.
(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are so without qualification...
Existence itself, for example; almost without qualification beings of all sorts will try to continue to exist, either through themselves or through having children or creating great and memorable works that will survive them.
...and (b) others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of originally bad natures.
If you've ever tried Jagermeister, "a drink that was once used as a field anesthetic by doctors in World War II," you probably didn't like it the first time.
This being so, it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those recognized with regard to the former; I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight-in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon-or of the story told of Phalaris.
The reference is to his cannibalism, not to his innovative torture and execution device, the brazen bull.
These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit.
Yes, it's that kind of a day in the study of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Note that this provides Aristotle's assessment of our contemporary 'born this way' controversy, in which he takes both horns of the dilemma: in his opinion, some people are born inclined to pederasty ("by nature") but others because they were victimized from youth and became accustomed to it ("from habit").
(2) We must next discuss whether there is any one who is incontinent without qualification, or all men who are incontinent are so in a particular sense, and if there is, with what sort of objects he is concerned. That both continent persons and persons of endurance, and incontinent and soft persons, are concerned with pleasures and pains, is evident.Now of the things that produce pleasure some are necessary, while others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess, the bodily causes of pleasure being necessary (by such I mean both those concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse, i.e. the bodily matters with which we defined self-indulgence and temperance as being concerned), while the others are not necessary but worthy of choice in themselves (e.g. victory, honour, wealth, and good and pleasant things of this sort).
We often say that wealth can be pursued excessively. This is usually put in a Christian context, but the pagan Greeks understood the idea as well. The character of a man for whom wealth is unreasonably important admits of many bad things, even though there's nothing per se wrong with wealth. Simply not valuing the several goods of life in the right order is damaging to one's character.
Yet it is much harder to see how one can go to excess in pursuing victory. Perhaps in unimportant matters, as when it might be praiseworthy to let someone else have a turn rather than having to win all the time; but in the ancient world especially, a great deal hung on victory. Even today it can. Remembering the Charmides' introduction, the failures of Athenian virtues that led to their defeat in the Peloponnesian War led to their loss of power, their subjugation by Sparta, and a period of rule by the Thirty Tyrants over them. For Troy it led to the destruction of their city, the death of almost all of their men and boys, and the enslavement of their women. Victory in that sense surely has to be pursued with a whole heart.
And honor, we have said repeatedly in this commentary, defines how one identifies the best and most worthy of actions and lives. How can one go wrong with that?
That is, pen & paper RPGs / table-top RPGs, to be exact. One free, one Arthurian, one Viking.
If you liked the early editions of Dungeons & Dragons (pre-AD&D or AD&D) or you like free RPGs, let me recommend the free and open Basic Fantasy RPG.
It's based on early D&D and was started when Wizards of the Coast created the Open Game License (OGL). The creator, Chris Gonnerman, keeps it "open source" and free -- you can download PDFs of all of the books, adventures, etc., for free on the website as well as the LibreOffice files if you want to edit them and create your own version of the game. You can also order print versions for cost from Amazon, DriveThru RPG, and Lulu.com. Gonnerman makes almost nothing on these, e.g., the softcover 208-page core rulebook is only $10 on Amazon as of this posting and since it's print-on-demand, that mostly covers printing.
The BFRPG community is great and has created all kinds of supplements for the game. Want more character races or classes? There are free supplements for that. Want more monsters? There is a free 3-volume field guide for that. Want a ton of ready-made adventures? Free supplements. Want to write some free supplements? The community is happy to look at your work and give feedback. If you come up with something you think others would like, you can share it on their website. (Check out the downloads page for most of the free PDFs and LibreOffice files.)
Want to play an Arthurian RPG? Chaosium's Pendragon is the best I've seen.
In addition to the Arthurian setting, there are two features that are particularly interesting. The most interesting to me is that it has rules for virtues and vices which come into play, as well as passions (loves and hatreds). These don't control the character, per se, but encourage the player to play to the character's virtues, vices, and passions. Like such things in the real world, the character's actions can improve or worsen the scores for these. E.g., one's character becomes more courageous by doing courageous things. Although maybe it's not a common use for RPGs, I thought this virtue / vice aspect could be a fun way for a group of youngsters to learn about virtue ethics.
The second feature I found interesting is that the player will play several generations of a family. Rolling up a character begins with rolling up the feats, battles, and deaths of the character's father and grandfather, events that can result in passions if, e.g., one's father was killed by Irish raiders which could result in a hatred of the Irish. This gives the family a history. The player's first character is the heir of a knight with a manor which he will inherit, and marriage and family are part of the game. When the character dies, the player takes up the character's heir as a new PC.
I played the 5th edition and have a couple of small complaints, although these may have been fixed in the 6th edition. First, there is a huge amount of material, which is great, but it's not entirely well-organized and I spent too much time looking at the table of contents and index to see where the rule for one thing or another was. Second, I don't know why, but it seems that every medieval story I have read lately has to have the local priest shacking up with some young woman and Pendragon's starter adventure carried on this sordid tradition. But that can be easily changed by the GM.
I only played it for a few months, but it was engaging and I really hope I get the chance to play more sometime. It would be fun to do the entire campaign from Uther to post-Arthur.
Here's the product blurb:
Age of Vikings covers the history of mythic Iceland in minute detail. The book outlines the life of a Viking, laws and government, religion, and the wild and wondrous creatures of legend. Take to the frigid seas with extensive rules for ships and seafaring, including naval combat—No other roleplaying game so effortlessly thrusts you into one of the most fabled cultures and time periods in history!
If you play, let us know how you like it.
After Charlie Kirk's assassination and the resulting sense of outrage on the right and rejoicing on the left, I was concerned that the violence would escalate. The number of leftists celebrating was shocking. It was possible, I thought, that left extremists might be encouraged to step up attacks and right extremists might retaliate. I am very relieved that hasn't happened and impressed that the right has broadly responded peacefully, both in remembering Kirk and in their recognition that there is an extreme element of the left that hates them. I sense a stiffening of the spine on the right which is nonetheless peaceful.
In the comments here soon after Kirk's assassination I said that, while I didn't think it probable, for the first time I felt there was the chance of a civil war. I used the term "civil war" just because it's been floating around for some years now and that's what came to mind. However, it's a particularly good time to use language clearly. I do not at all fear a civil war like the US war from 1861-1865. What I fear is more of a low-intensity conflict, like "Bleeding Kansas" in the five years leading up to the Civil War or like the Troubles in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s to 1998. The 1960s and '70s here in the US had more violence as well with riots and the Weather Underground bombings, etc. Maybe a return to that as Angela Davis and other leftist terrorists are now leading lights on the left. That said, I am much relieved by the right's reaction over the last week. We'll see how it plays out.
Of some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth. (1) We must consider first, then, whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then (2) with what sorts of object the incontinent and the continent man may be said to be concerned (i.e. whether with any and every pleasure and pain or with certain determinate kinds), and whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly with regard to the other matters germane to this inquiry. The starting-point of our investigation is (a) the question whether the continent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their objects or by their attitude, i.e. whether the incontinent man is incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects, or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead of that, by both these things; (b) the second question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not.
Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange-so Socrates thought-if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best-people act so only by reason of ignorance.
This sort of ignorance would be a special sort, a thing where you often think you know that something is wrong, but don't really know. Is that plausible, enough that a man like Socrates could take it seriously?
It seems like it might be. We all know people who get involved with someone whom they know to be a bad person, suffering the obvious consequences eventually. Or we can think of Charmides, who must have known after a while that hangovers would follow the drunken nights. Or even ourselves: I doubt any of us is without some habit that doesn't have predictable negative consequences, yet we keep doing it.
Since leaving I’ve been grappling with how best to describe what I saw and heard. It was a far-right rally, yes, but many people attended unperturbed by the fact it had been billed as such by many media outlets, including the Guardian. They did not feel alienated by such an extreme, and previously fringe, label.
The shields are failing, Captain.