Euclid to Einstein

Come for the math, stay for the dueling.

Nicomachean Ethics V.2

 We continue the discussion of justice today, and indeed through the whole of Book V.

But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain. Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word 'unjust' which answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary to the law'. Again if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act.

This is a strange example. I suppose we are meant to imagine someone committing adultery with a rich married person who bestows presents upon the adulterous lover; or perhaps the adultery is meant to break up a marriage so that the lover can then marry the rich person, thereby increasing their access to wealth. If the adultery is done only out of a desire for the presents and wealth, it is a sort of injustice because it is greedy.

Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice in the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within the same genus; for the significance of both consists in a relation to one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour or money or safety-or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while the other is concerned with all the objects with which the good man is concerned.

It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp its genus and differentia.

This is a challenge that Socrates raises regularly in the Platonic dialogues. Socrates usually presents it as a problem: can you say what a virtue is that is not just 'virtue entire,' but that closely defines what that virtue is that is separate from others? Usually in the Platonic dialogues the discussion proves incapable of doing so; for example, in the Laches they prove incapable of defining courage even though the discussion is among men who have demonstrated courage in battle (including Socrates, who fought heroically at times).  

What Did You Just Read?

Adobe has inserted an AI assistant I didn't ask for into the blog. I let it summarize 'the document,' by which I think it just means what you can see. Here's what it told me about what I wrote.

The document primarily explores the following themes:

Philosophical Analysis of Justice and Virtue: The document delves into Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, particularly Book V.1, discussing justice as a virtue, its relationship to fairness and lawfulness, and its role in societal harmony. ​ It also critiques modern interpretations, such as those by John Rawls, and contrasts Aristotle's views with contemporary ideas.

Ethical Reflections and Personal Philosophy: The author shares personal ethical guidelines inspired by John Wayne movies and Stoic philosophy, emphasizing individual autonomy, respect, and personal growth. ​

Historical and Cultural Achievements: The document highlights notable accomplishments, such as Hannah Linzay-Wade's completion of the Húsafell carry, marking a significant milestone in strength sports for women. ​

Contemporary Social and Political Commentary: The document includes reflections on current events, such as the deployment of National Guardsmen in Washington, D.C., and broader societal issues like censorship, free speech, and the role of government in addressing inequality. ​

Critique of Modern Trends and Ideas: The author critiques modern societal behaviors, such as performative progressivism, the influence of progressive ideologies in academia, and the challenges of addressing humanitarian crises. ​

Literary and Cultural Appreciation: The document references and appreciates various literary works, music, and cultural traditions, including Americana music and philosophical texts.

Personal Observations and Anecdotes: The author shares personal experiences, reflections, and opinions on a range of topics, blending philosophical insights with everyday observations.

These themes collectively reflect a blend of philosophical inquiry, ethical reflection, cultural appreciation, and commentary on contemporary issues.

It's weird how subtly inaccurate that is. For example, I wasn't 'highlighting notable accomplishments, such as Hannah Linzay-Wade's,' I was honoring her particular accomplishment. There's a whole set of little things like that which aren't quite right. It's not exactly wrong, but it's not exactly right. That adds up over time.

My work uses Slack, which now has a similar AI summary of what has happened in a given channel over the last day. No way: you'd better go read it yourself, or you'll miss something crucial. 

Nicomachean Ethics V.1: Justice

These next few sections have gotten a great deal of attention from philosophers.

With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of two contraries does not produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for (A) if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and (B) good condition is known from the things that are in good condition, and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary both that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be ambiguous; e.g. if 'just' is so, that 'unjust' will be so too.

That's a lot of preamble given how deep we are into the EN, but I trust it's easy to follow given the time we took with the earlier sections. 

Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but because their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point, then, the various meanings of 'an unjust man'. Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair. 

This is a bit surprising. Normally we want a balancing point between two extremes, but here we have two completely different qualities that are ways of going wrong. The unlawful isn't necessarily unfair at all; nor vice versa. One can imagine a mafiosi cutting you a very fair deal, if he were well inclined to you; one can imagine, and indeed regularly encounters, a legitimate businessman who takes maximal unfair advantage of his position in the market.

So it's not that unfairness is on one extreme and unlawfulness is on the other. Rather, there are two ways of going wrong that seem to be unrelated. 

The most famous inquiry into this problem in the 20th century was John Rawls'; he attempted to cash the whole thing out in terms of fairness alone. As we shall see, the lawfulness component is only intended to compel virtuous behavior under penalty of law; thus, I gather he thought, perhaps if we can get the fairness right the right laws will follow accordingly. That doesn't really eliminate the need for laws: Rawls comes up with a whole list of them, including some fairly extraordinary ones (e.g. because everyone has a need for self-respect, and you can only respect yourself adequately if others treat you with respect, there could be a law commanding you to treat everyone with respect -- even if, in fact, they conduct themselves in ways that don't deserve it). 

To me that doesn't seem plausible. One of the examples will be that the law will compel you to act as if you were courageous in battle; I can't see how that has anything to do with fairness. In fact, it seems to contradict Aristotle's own language about courage itself. You don't get the virtue by being compelled by fear to take certain actions. The virtue is a state of character that is your own, not something compelled from you by fear. Aretḗ: you either got it or you don't. 

Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with goods-not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue these things; but they should not, but should pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the less-in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. And he is unfair; for this contains and is common to both.

So one way to go wrong is greed that leads you to treat others unfairly. 

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just.

I don't think anyone still says this. It's a surprisingly naive view of legislatures, which Aristotle had reason to doubt: he once fled Athens under some danger of death, as Socrates had been put to death himself. He claimed that he could not let Athens sin twice against philosophy; but it was a fully democratic action that voted Socrates' murder.  

Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society.

So: laws are either just (because they aim at the common advantage of all) or unjust (because they do not). Thus, lawfulness can only really be aligned with justice if there are just laws. Unjust laws seem to be a basic contradiction; obeying them leads to greater injustice. Laws that violate justice aren't, as it were, lawful; but since they are still the law, we end up with a serious problem that isn't adequately addressed here. 

And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and 'neither evening nor morning star' is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in justice is every virtue comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue.

This highlighted passage (emphasis added) is what people tend to focus upon. 

The completeness of virtue that is had in the just isn't real virtue at all, as we have discussed. The brave man is brave; the just man only does what the brave man might do because he is compelled. That isn't real courage even by Aristotle's own standard. The temperate man who forgoes public drunkenness only because of the legal penalties isn't temperate, he is fearful.

Confer with magnanimity, where the internal sense of honor drives the actor to do the virtuous thing it the greatest and fullest way he can imagine. Justice is a very weak virtue by comparison with that.

It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that 'rule will show the man'; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society.

"Bias," as a Greek name, means "violence." It was the name of many mythological figures; I'm not sure which one Aristotle intends, but probably the Trojan because of Aristotle's affection for Homer and the Iliad. 

For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner.

Does the magnanimous not also benefit others by doing the greatest and most virtuous acts? It seems so; but it is true that the other isn't really a consideration. The reason to do the best thing is because it is worthy of honor, and honor is personal. Justice as a virtue considers others first, both in terms of treating them fairly and also in terms of avoiding their punishments at law. 

Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to one's neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without qualification, virtue.

This seems like a close equivalent to "love thy neighbor as yourself," except that the neighbor here is the chief consideration. Given that self-love is often thought to be the root of immorality -- Kant calls it "radical evil" -- here is a reason why many philosophers have chosen to focus their attention on this particular virtue. 

Two Rules

I realized due to an issue that came up recently, one that required some reflection, that I really only have two rules to guide me; and, on further reflection, that they both appear in John Wayne movies. That should probably be embarrassing for someone who has spent so much time with philosophy; I endorse Stoicism and obviously Aristotelian ideas about virtue. Still, in practical action, it comes down to these two things.

Hondo:

1. "Well, a long time ago I made me a rule. I let people do what they want to do."

The Shootist: 

2. “I won't be wronged. I won't be insulted. I won't be laid a-hand on. I don't do these things to other people, and I require the same from them.”

I had two rules for my son, too, when he was coming up. They were easier to remember. 

1. No whining.

2. Grow stronger.

Maybe it's helpful if an ethical code is distilled. 

Female Fullsterkur

As a rule I find the 'first woman to X' thing to be a little dated; at this point, there's almost nothing that women haven't done. Increasingly those headlines are 'first woman to X while also Y and Z and Q' to get to a genuinely unique accomplishment. 

Yet there remain a few things that truly are worthy of notice. For the first time in recorded history, a woman -- Hannah Linzay-Wade -- has completed the Húsafell carry.

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She is thereby rated "full-strength" according to the old test, which dates to Viking-era Iceland. 

Some New Americana

The young people working in this genre, which seems to include a lot of what we used to call country music as well as some other things, produce some good stuff. Sometimes it's covers of old Hank songs. Most of them are original, though. There's some good writing. 


Hank Jr. always had good writing.

The Lord and cold beer/
You can find both 'round here/
They'll take you, just as you are...

She asked me to dance, I could see/
She let 'em all think I could lead.

Well I lost my job today because the bossman's out of pay/
He said the price of life has gone astray and he just can't afford my cowboy wage/
I've got a wild horse, and a wild woman/
I'm gonna load 'em up in my pick-em up truck/
And head back down to the Land of Luck.

Bless his liver and his honky-tonk heart...
UPDATE: I like this one; she reminds me of Loretta Lynn.

National Guardsmen Won't Be Armed

Both the WSJ and the WaPo are reporting that there might be armed Guardsmen deployed to DC. I'll wager heavily that, if this proves true at all, there are sharp limits on that.

Defense officials had previously said the 800 National Guard soldiers deployed to the city wouldn’t be armed, unlike many federal law enforcement agents sent to the capital. They also weren’t to have weapons in their vehicles. “Weapons are available if needed but will remain in the armory,” the U.S. Army said in a press release Thursday. 

Late Friday, some Guard members deployed to Washington were told to expect an order to carry weapons, according to people familiar with the planning. However as of Saturday morning, no formal order had been given, a Defense Department official said.  

A Pentagon spokeswoman referred questions to the Army. An Army spokesman didn’t return a request for comment.

That sounds like a warning order went out, which may not be followed up with a fragmentary order to that effect later. I would guess these 'some' are very few, perhaps a military police unit that is going to be kept armed as a quick reaction force in case anyone attacks a Guard position. There won't be hundreds of armed Guardsmen roaming the city.

In Iraq, we didn't carry loaded rifles or handguns until and unless we were actually going outside the wire. Even the regulars did not. The National Guard units I was with very regularly shot their clearing barrels on the way back in. They're just not used to carrying loaded guns all the time. Their NCOs know that and will be putting maximal allowed restrictions to try to stop problems. The officers know that, and will be trying to give their sergeants as free a hand as possible to stop problems. 

My trip to DC has been moved up to this month, so I guess I'll see for myself soon enough. I'm expecting noisy protests but not any real violence. 

What Feminists Like in a Man

Let me give any youngsters hanging around here a bit of advice. 

The Performative Male curates his aesthetic in a way that he thinks might render him more likable to progressive women. He is, in short, the antithesis of the toxic man. “It’s men who are trying to cater to what they think women who are feminist like,” said Guinevere Unterbrink, 24, an art teacher who was one of the contest’s hosts.

Having known many feminists all my life, I can tell you what they want from you. They want you to be honest with them, upright in your habits, faithful in your word. It'll help if you ride a motorcycle, but only if you clearly do it because you love it. 

They're just women. You don't have to bend yourself into a pretzel. Honor and honesty is what they want to see from you; if you're true to yourself and you're true to them, they'll probably make accommodations for your philosophical disagreements. 

And if they won't, you'll be happier without them. As the old song says, "If you don't like me, then leave me alone." 

By the way, my respects to whomever named her "Guinevere." What a fine choice. 

Burn it Down

The NYT published a barn burner yesterday: "Abolish the Senate. End the Electoral College. Pack the Court: Why the Left can't Win without a new Constitution." That link should be a gift link that lets anyone read it; everyone should, probably. Here's the archive version.

It's an interview with Osita Nwanevu, whom you can read more about here. I expect this is going to solidify a lot of opinion on the American left. 

UPDATE: As I continue to think about this interview, I've decided the really radical suggestion wasn't any of the things they put in the headline. What would really constitute a significant change is this application of "democracy":

The background intuition that people have in mind about democracy, even if they don’t know it consciously, is that we are entitled to an amount of say, a basic level of say, over the conditions that shape our lives. We’re not mere victims of circumstance helplessly thrown about by the universe. We’re not the peons of particular hierarchies of people who are more powerful than us or more privileged than us. That’s a basic democratic intuition. 

One of the things that has gone around progressive circles over the last decade or so is you have people like Elizabeth Anderson, for instance, who make the point that we are governed in more spaces than just the political sphere. We spend about a third of our time at work. The decisions that are made at the top of corporations we work for often affect us more directly, intimately, and immediately than decisions made in Washington, D.C., or in our statehouses or in city hall. And yet we feel that we’re not democratically entitled to any kind of voice in those spaces, except for maybe hoping that we can act through government to regulate the economy. When we try to do that, we find that Washington, D.C., and political institutions are often dominated by wealthy people — our bosses. 

When it comes to solving the concrete problems of inequality, worker power — the absence of worker power, the absence of worker voice — is one of the things that’s contributed to our current economic situation. That is a democratic problem, and I think it suggests democratic solutions as well.

The 'democratic' solution being, obviously, to subject corporations to worker 'democracy' over how their resources are distributed. People will vote themselves more: higher wages, better working conditions, ownership of the company and its property. It is, in other words, 'democratic' in the sense of being Democratic Socialism. It's not just structural changes about how the existing constitutionalism works; it's not even a new constitution, as the subhead suggests. It's putting everything in a pot and letting the majority do whatever it wants with it. 

There are a number of problems with that approach, even if one is perfectly willing to accept that this constitutes a moral action rather than just theft on a grand scale. 

Lying for a Living

This is definitely not how America, the land of the free, should operate. 

Between 2023 and 2025, we conducted 1,452 confidential interviews with undergraduates... We asked: Have you ever pretended to hold more progressive views than you truly endorse to succeed socially or academically? An astounding 88 percent said yes....

Students know something is wrong. When given permission to speak freely, many described the experience of participating in our survey not as liberating, but as clarifying. They weren’t escaping responsibility — they were reclaiming it. For students trained to perform, the act of telling the truth felt radical.

I assume like other psychology studies there will be a problem with replication of this, but that's an astonishing finding. I wonder how well that holds up across disciplines? I would think philosophy students more honest about what they think, for example, because how could you hide it when engaged in so many deep discussions of ideas?

Winter Can Come

After yesterday’s labors I feel that we are ready for the cold weather to come. 

A Demonstration of the Streisand Effect

Apparently, the UK censors didn't enjoy this Coinbase ad as much as I did.

Technically, it was only rejected for broadcast TV, which is different from a ban, so everything is fine.

Nicomachean Ethics IV.9: On Shame

This final chapter of Book IV is so short I'll go ahead and do it today, even though we've already had a post about an interesting topic of contemporary interest. 

Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character.

It won't surprise contemporary thinkers that shame should not be described as a virtue, but it probably does surprise that it might have ever been mistaken for one. In our age we have tended to reject it as a proper guide at all. Confidence in embracing yourself as you are is instead our age's watchword for virtue. Shame is considered something like a negative product of anxiety, used probably as an enforcement mechanism by oppressive actors, inculcated through practices that were probably abusive: an overbearing mother, conservative Christians, patriarchy, all of which have strongly negative connotations. 

Nevertheless if a sense of honor is the most reliable guide to not merely keeping to what is permitted but striving for the very best, then fear of dishonor could seem like almost a parallel sense. What separates them so cleanly for Aristotle? 

First, notice that his remarks on shame make it a kind of passion like fear of danger. The virtue is not a passion, but a state of character that allows you to act properly regardless of passions. 

Second, recall that receipt of honors -- which is the actual parallel to fear of receiving dishonor -- was dismissed as a proper end of ethics in I.5 because it depends too much on others to give it to you or withhold it from you. Shame is the same way: you are motivated by things you don't control. The proper attitude of the virtuous to honor and dishonor are the same, as we learn in the chapters on magnanimity: you should behave in the manner that is most worthy of honor, but disdain whether or not you receive honor or dishonor for doing so. If you receive dishonor but know you behaved honorably, you disregard it because you know it does not rightly attach to you.

The feeling [of shame] is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling...

This is a good concept because you can see the relationship between shame and a proper upbringing. The young, who have not fully understood how to reason yet and are driven by feeling, will find in being fearful of dishonor at least a road to the right starting point. Once they understand to avoid the base and seek the noble, and have some working examples of what those things are from which to reason, they should lay aside shame as 'when I became a man, I put away childish things.' (Cor. 13:11) 

...but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions. 

Here Aristotle says something a little different than in the chapters on magnanimity: here he says that a good man needn't fear disgrace because he won't do anything bad -- neither bad things in fact, nor bad things in the common opinion. He may be speaking only of 'good' men here, and not of the 'great,' as when he was speaking of magnanimity. When seeking the best, it may sometimes be the case that common opinion is against it; it may often be that common people don't see why it was right. The best do what they know is most worthy, and disregard the common opinion about it.

The more ordinarily good, of course, avoid scandal as well as actual wrongdoing. Like our former Vice President refusing to dine or meet alone with any women not his wife, he avoids even the possibility of scandal. However: "The wicked flee when no one pursues, But the righteous are bold as a lion." (Proverbs 28:1)

But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification. And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss justice.

Book V will thus begin with one of the most compelling virtues to subsequent philosophers: justice.

The fate of Ukraine

Spoiler: it doesn't include getting back the Eastern provinces. This HotAir article embeds a useful videographic of European boundaries over the last 1,000+ years.

Nicomachean Ethics IV.8: A Night at the Pub with Aristotle

We have a vision of what Greek wine-drinking parties were like among the lively philosophers and playwrights of the era in Plato's Symposium. That vision has been so pleasing to generations of academics that it has become synonymous with an academic gathering to discuss any topic in detail; certainly the philosophy conferences I attended usually (though not universally) included a celebratory visit to a drinking establishment at some point. This is another chapter of the EN that compares and contrasts nicely with the Havamal, which also discusses the dangers of drinking parties and of drink generally.

Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying- and again listening to- what one should and as one should. The kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a difference.

We turn, however, specifically to the sort of joking that is most virtuous, as well as to the defects. 

Evidently here also there is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and in jesting, and so even buffoons are called ready-witted because they are found attractive; but that they differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.

Aristotle doesn't give the impression that jesting was especially dangerous, which it has been in many times and places. Many a duel has begun over a jest over wine, or ale, or mead, or whiskey, and all these thousands of years. That this is not one of his concerns here is remarkable. 

Past the jump break, we get a judgment that is of potential contemporary relevance.

Wouldn't Want to Hurt Feelings

There's a paywall, but here's the relevant bit: 

Police officers told a shopkeeper to take down a sign calling shoplifters “scumbags” because it could cause offence, sparking a free speech row. 

Rob Davies put up a handwritten note in his shop after repeated thefts that read: “Due to scumbags shoplifting, please ask for assistance to open cabinets.” But officers from North Wales Police attended his retro shop in Wrexham and told him to take down the sign as it could cause offence. 

The free speech row comes after JD Vance, the US vice-president, told David Lammy, the Foreign Secretary, that the West had become “too comfortable with censoring” and warned the UK not to go down the “very dark path” of censorship.

I suppose proper scumbags might take offense at being compared with such petty criminals. Not likely to sue over it, though.

DC Takeover Likely to be Popular

My work takes me to DC several times a year -- indeed, I'll be back there next month. I imagine it will be a much more peaceful place than previously, with somewhat less of the aroma of marijuana. 

Unlike some of the contested stretches of Presidential authority, this one is perfectly within the rules. It will be psychologically interesting; the citizens of DC are unusually opposed to Trump, both in scale and intensity, because of their frequent personal or family relationship with the gigantic Federal bureaucracies that DOGE and other Trump efforts are slightly shrinking or, occasionally, dismantling. However, the collapse of crime rates likely to occur in this 30 day period will be noticeable, and it may have some lingering effects as those arrested for things like firearms possession are kept off the streets (for a few days, probably, as the DC attorney may not be willing to prosecute them; but potentially for five years or more, if they are prohibited felons in possession and the Federal government is able to bring charges).

This action does not constitute martial law, but even outright martial law is often popular for the same reasons -- at least at first. 

In September 1972 Marcos declared martial law, claiming that it was the last defense against the rising disorder.... Initial public reaction to martial law was mostly favourable except in Muslim areas of the south, where a separatist rebellion, led by the MNLF, broke out in 1973....

Under martial law the regime was able to reduce violent urban crime, collect unregistered firearms, and suppress communist insurgency in some areas. 

This one requires Congressional approval once they're back from vacation if it is to go on for more than 30 days after they return to session, so it is in a very different class from Marcos' action. Still, it's likely to achieve similar effects for as long as it lasts. 

UPDATE: Liz Peek: 

The New York Times wrote, “President Trump is not the only elected leader to deploy National Guard troops in response to a supposed crime wave that many have questioned. In March 2024, Gov. Kathy Hochul of New York, a Democrat, announced that she would deploy 750 members of the National Guard to New York’s subway system.” Though the “paper of record” was quick to point out that the circumstances were different, the main conclusion? It worked. Subway crime dropped 27 percent in the 12 months following the troops’ deployment.

The same will happen in DC.

Likelier than not, yes. 

Nicomachean Ethics IV.7

Continuing with the social virtues:

The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere; and this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe these states as well; for we shall both know the facts about character better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the field of social life those who make the giving of pleasure or pain their object in associating with others have been described; let us now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and deeds and in the claims they put forward. The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. Now each of these courses may be adopted either with or without an object. But each man speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is not acting for some ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the truthful man is another case of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise, and both forms of untruthful man are culpable, and particularly the boastful man.

This is a classically pagan approach to the virtues that Christianity will tend to alter in favor of modesty and humility. The advice here is what Chesterton described as 'neither swagger nor grovel,' but speak the truth about what you deserve -- neither more nor less. Chesterton described this as a limit; the Church says, he tells us, "Here you can swagger and there you can grovel," which he describes as an emancipation.

Yet there is something to be said for the Greek position, is there not? Nor is it inconsistent with what our own Texan99 was recently offering as Jesus' advice to 'let your yes be yes, and your no be no."

Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We are not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in the things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is at stake; he will avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own sake; and such a man is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to understate the truth; for this seems in better taste because exaggerations are wearisome.

Not immoral or vicious: wearisome. Yet we are talking about social virtues that enable us to have characters worthy of friendship, which enables the great goods of social harmony, successful politics, and a happy life with friends. It is in fact quite virtuous not to be wearisome.  

He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a contemptible sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted in falsehood), but seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object, he who does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster) not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character (it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose; for it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a man of a certain kind that he is boaster); as one man is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and another because he desires reputation or gain. Now those who boast for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as will praise or congratulation, but those whose object is gain claim qualities which are of value to one's neighbours and one's lack of which is not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a seer, a sage, or a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most people claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities are found.

It's surprising to see 'physician' on that list for us, but recall once again that the Greeks didn't distinguish between 'medicine' and 'poison' in their language. The science was at a more primitive stage; the claimed physician was no better than a claimant to being a seer. (There is a parallel I see very often these days; I know several women I grew up with who are now running businesses claiming to do medium work to talk to your beloved dead for you, or to perform 'energetic healing' whatever that is supposed to mean.)

Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster that seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the worse character.

Whether Socrates was mock-modest or really modest is hard to tell from the sources. He really does seem to have been perplexed about several problems he discussed in detail; and while he appears proud of his ability to defeat Sophists in debate, his account of the people who really impressed him with their knowledge was a shoemaker who wasn't allowed in the Agora. Whatever you wanted to say about Simon the Shoemaker, he only claimed that he knew how to make shoes: and he did! Protagoras and Gorgias and the rest claimed they knew how to make virtuous and successful men, and they couldn't even explain what the virtues were in a way that would stand up to examination. 

Neither could Socrates, of course; as we have seen, Aristotle thinks that Socrates was basically wrong because of a belief that virtue was reducible to a form of knowledge. Socrates, however, was honest about the fact that he couldn't; his only claim was that he didn't really know anything at all. 

Stark staring madness

I know it's the NYT, but this opinion piece reads like raving lunacy.

For Israelis, the reality is this: Israel, a flawed but real and vital country, is fighting an evil terrorist group that has the power to stop the horror at any time, but hates Israel enough to persist and does not care enough for its own people to stop.

Yes, for me, too.

Yet what is happening in Gaza speaks for itself. People are starving, and as in any other crisis, the most vulnerable in society — the elderly, newborns, people with pre-existing conditions — are harmed first.

That "yet" is carrying a lot of weight. It's a crisis caused by some profoundly evil people. No one else on Earth has any idea how to fix it. And the conclusion is . . . who exactly should self-immolate in an utterly hopeless effort to end it? I know the answer will shock you.

Even after almost two years of war, Israel lacks a coherent humanitarian strategy for Gaza, switching aid on and off based on the calculations of Mr. Netanyahu, who is trying to balance keeping the political support of his right-wing coalition partners, who want the war to continue, and international pressure to stop it.

Of course. Israel has failed to develop a coherent humanitarian strategy to address the insoluble problem of barbarians at its gates desiring Israeli rape and murder more than their own survival.

After several hundred thousand tons of food aid entered Gaza during the second cease-fire, according to Israel — enough for several months, by World Food Program projections — Israel’s decision to cut off all aid in March pushed the strip into the dire crisis it faces today. Israel said that it hoped the blockade would disrupt Hamas’s ability to profit from the goods coming in, weaken the group’s governance and pressure it to capitulate in cease-fire negotiations.

OK, sounds reasonable so far, if the priority is not to end the conflict but to relieve the suffering of the people most devoted to supporting the conflict.

This was not just a morally wrong choice — humanitarian aid should not be a political issue — but a strategically foolish one that misread both Hamas and the international community. A humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza was never going to force Hamas’s hand. The group needs very few resources to operate: just enough to continue to hold the hostages, carry out guerrilla attacks and continue making statements to influence public opinion.

But no, it was morally insufficient, and also feckless, because Hamas is invulnerable to the suffering of Gazans and can easily subsist on what it steals from their aid, not only to eat but to fund its murderous program.

In May Israel sought to sidestep the U.N. assistance system, which it relentlessly criticized as ineffectual and compromised by Hamas with the poorly planned and even more poorly implemented system run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. But after months of no aid, stocks in Gaza had run down and prices had soared; the foundation’s four distribution sites were almost immediately overwhelmed and exploited by profiteers, not to mention dangerous to access, with numerous casualties reported in lines for aid. The lack of aid has led to the death of more than 210 people by malnutrition since the start of the war, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health.

So Israel tried the morally approved route again, but no dice, it wasn't enough, so everything is its fault again.

The Israeli-American plan to quadruple the foundation’s distribution centers will hardly address the grave situation. Even today the foundation faces logistical challenges, and the boxes they issue, both in terms of food quantity and diversity, don’t translate easily to nutritious meals.

Israel and the U.S. try quadrupling the aid. No dice again, because of logistical challenges and quibbles over how easy and nutritious the meals were.

Despite denials of the extent of the grim reality in Gaza, Israel established fixed humanitarian corridors, conducted and facilitated airdrops and allowed in small amounts of commercial traffic and daytime pauses in operations in some areas to allow for aid delivery.

But who cares.

Israelis must look beyond their own prism of pain and trauma, ignore the double standards at play and recognize the harsh reality in Gaza and Israel’s responsibility for it. Israel needs the courage to see what it sees. Then it must act.

No one else needs to solve this crisis. It's up to Israel to look behind its own pain and the evident double standards at play.