Philadelphia Inquirer | 04/29/2004 | No guns for contractors in Iraq, Pentagon is proposing

Morons:

Lest anyone think that I am an unmitigated defender of the Pentagon, allow me to point out that occasionally the brass suggests something really dumb. Today's entry: Contractors in Iraq Should be Unarmed.

As the insurgency in Iraq remains strong, the Department of Defense has proposed a new rule for most of the estimated 70,000 civilian contractors working in the region: They cannot carry guns.

Deidre Lee, the Pentagon's director of procurement and acquisition policy, whose office proposed the rule, said it was designed to settle one of the biggest questions facing contractors: "to arm or not to arm."

It is a life-or-death issue because "we don't have the military providing security for our contractors," Lee said.

This is the same logic at work in gun control proposals everywhere:

1) There is too much crime.
2) Guns cause crime.
3) Therefore, we should reduce the number of guns.

The problem, in Iraq as everywhere else, is that the only people whose guns the government can readily reduce are the people who respect the government's authority. This is true even in American cities, where there are not and can't be enough police to be everywhere and search every home; it is far more true in an unstable foreign nation, where a large number of persons are actively warring against the government. All that can be accomplished by this is to disarm the people on our side, leaving them prey to all our enemies.

Imagine trying to drive a supply convoy across a hostile foreign wilderness. You know that there are raiders who want to destroy your convoy, and kill you personally, in order to hurt the war effort that your convoy is supplying. Your employers say, "Oh, one more thing--you can't carry guns, and there will be no military security." What do you suppose you're apt to do?

[T]op department official acknowledged that the war effort was suffering a "brain drain" of civilian workers who were fleeing Iraq because they did not feel safe.

Truck convoys in Iraq are "more like a journey through the wild, wild west," Gen. Darryl A. Scott, director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, told a conference of government and corporate contracting officials in Orlando.

"That's a reality there," he said this week. "People leave every day... . It does make operating in that environment more difficult."

Really. Imagine that. What could they be thinking?

Many workers in the region are former military personnel and prefer to be armed, said Cathy Etheredge, a manager for BAE Systems, which provides information technology in Afghanistan.

The problem with the proposed rule is that it tells contractors that they are responsible for their security, but then says they cannot be armed, said Nick Sanders, who leads the contract finance committee for the National Defense Industrial Association, a trade group for traditional defense contractors.

"It doesn't appear to be a well-thought-out, coherent policy," Sanders said. "It appears to be a one-way door where contractors will have all the responsibility and cost."

There you go. Supporters of the plan offered three reasons in favor of banning weapons:

Armed contractors would be more likely to be shot at or kidnapped. Second, as civilians, they do not follow the same strict rules of force as the military. And by picking up weapons, contractors could lose any death- and accident-insurance coverage they may have.

The first suggestion is astonishing. Armed persons are more likely to be kidnapped? Armed convoys are more likely to be attacked? If there is any lesson that should have been learned in fighting the mufsidoon, it is that they prefer unarmed targets. They prefer them very much.

As to the second reason, it is wise to have clear guidelines, and to enforce them. If such guidelines don't exist, they should be created and enforced. Making the contractors into hostages to the goodwill of guerrillas and terrorists is not the answer.

The third reason is the kind of thing that ought to be addressed through legislation or contract bargaining. Here's a proposed negotiating point: an insurance company is much less likely to have to pay out a death benefit for these contractors if the contractors aren't asked to walk unarmed through a war zone filled with people who consider kidnapping and killing American citizens to be a prime tactic.

There is hope:

Lee said the proposed rule could change, depending on contractor reaction. The official comment period ends in late May, but there is no timetable for a final regulation. In the meantime, some contractors are carrying guns.

The rule can be read here. Comments may be directed via the DPAP website. The proposal in question is "Contractors Accompanying a Force Deployed." The rule does create an exception whereby combatant commanders may, on their personal authority, issue government-owned arms to contractors if they feel it is absolutely necessary. As with all such bureaucratic "exceptions," of course, the tendency will be not to make the exception--if you follow the rule you are protected by the institution if there is a tragedy, but anyone who breaks the rule is personally responsible. Bureaucracies (of which the military is certainly one) tend to be risk averse for that reason.

This risk aversion puts brave men at terrible risk, and will make it harder to find such contractors in the first place. Please do what you can to help protect these men, and the interests of the Republic.

UPDATE: IraqNow has a post up on this topic. He suggests some additional measures that might be mentioned in the public comments:

The measure is supported by Kellogg, Brown and Root officials, who argue that they'll lose insurance coverage on employees when they pick up weapons.... The insurance for the workers is a nonissue. They can be adopted into the same risk pool as American servicemen, and pay SGLI premiums--probably elevated premiums, to reflect the brief time of their service in Iraq (military personnel pay premiums during peacetime and wartime as well, spreading the risk out over many years), but that can be figured out by actuaries, and the cost passed on to the US government.

The liability factor for Halliburton is a slightly more difficult issue. If they allow their contractors to carry firearms, over the objections of retarded bean counters in air conditioned offices who have no conception what the risk tradeoffs are in Iraq, then they potentially expose themselves directly to bank-breaking lawsuits on the part of aggrieved families.

Hey--ever hear of purchasing a rider?

Ever heard of reinsurance?

And if the insurance industry gives them a hard time, Insurance regulators could weigh in and force the issue.

It wouldn't be that hard, since supporters of the bill are proposing that we create an additional layer of expense to hire private security firms to protect KBR convoys. And presumeably someone insures them.

Fusileer Pundit also has a post, as does A Collection of Thoughts.

Spirit of America

SOA Challenge:

Just to remind everyone, the Spirit of America challenge is winding up. We of the Fighting Fusileers have been ahead, but that's no reason to stop. Remember the Tortoise and the Hare! It's not over until it's over, &c., &c. Give today!

Grim's Hall

Tip for Bloggers:

A contact of mine suggests that the correct word for referring to Islamist terrorists is "mufsidoon." This is the Arabic for "evildoer," and can be prefixed by "Saddam's" or "Osama's" as appropriate.

The idea is that Mujahedeen and Mahdi Army (Army of the Messiah) cast the enemy as soldiers of God. That makes Coalition forces the opponents of God, soldiers of the devil. Mufsidoon more correctly identifies them, and therefore, our forces likewise.

Mehr News Agency English

Helping Out:

We can thank the Honorable Clinton for giving an interview to the Arab press--Asharq al-Awsat, out of London. One of the challenges in a counterinsurgency is convincing people that yours is the winning side. Senator Clinton was helpful indeed:

The democrat Senator stressed that the U.S. is trapped in the quagmire of Iraq. It can not free itself from the country.

Referring to the Bush Administration policies as arrogant and insolent, the wife of the former U.S. president further added that Bush is not willing to admit his mistakes in Iraq, the grave mistakes that have endangered the lives of both the Iraqi people and the U.S. servicemen alike.

The mistakes have also threatened peace and stability in the region, she further explained.

Clinton said the Bush Administration did not have a plan for Iraq and did not have a full understanding of the situation there.

She said the United States was in trouble because it could not abandon Iraq, nor provide enough manpower to run the country, nor gather world allies willing to provide the necessary assistance for the gigantic task.

Thanks, doll. It'll be a lot easier now.

North County Times - North San Diego and Southwest Riverside County columnists

Echo Company:

There's a good writeup on the battle in Fallujah by reporters with the North County Times, embedded with Echo Company, 2nd Bn, 1st Marine Regiment, I MEF.

[Navy Corpsman] Duty and [1st Sgt.] Skiles said the Marine killed and most of the wounded Monday were hit with shrapnel from grenades tossed by rebels into open windows. At least two of the Marines were also shot, said Duty, whose boots were black with the blood of his comrades as he recounted the fight.

Duty said he had to fire his pistol at gunmen just to get into the building where Marines lay bleeding, still fighting off insurgents, some of whom were only 10 yards away.

"I walk into a place like that -- everyone's down -- and you just don't know where to start," he said. "You just have to calm down and think, and then it all comes to you."

Skiles said Duty saved several of the Marines, and worked to save a fatally wounded Marine by continuing CPR in the back of a humvee as it sped through enemy fire over a jarring ride to a field hospital.

Marines cited the bravery of a lance corporal who was wounded in a rebel mortar attack nearly two weeks ago in which two other Echo Company Marines were killed, and was wounded again by shrapnel in Monday's fighting.

In both incidents, they said, he ignored his own wounds to help other wounded Marines. In Monday's battle, he fought off insurgents and ran back to the Marines' lines even while wounded in three places.

Happy Birthday Sgt. Hook!!!

Belated:

Happy Birthday, Sgt. Hook. It appears I missed the big day while I was away, but now that I have returned, please accept the congratulations of the Hall.

DefendAmerica News - Profile Article

Travels:

First, a small update: I'm going to be out of pocket until Tuesday. Should be back by then.

Before I go, I would like to draw your attention to this story from the Defense Department. It is the tale of a Marine pilot who was POW in Iraq for 37 days. He's currently assigned to one of the most underreported, but highly important, units in operation: Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

CRS

CRS:

The Congressional Research Service has a new report out on the role of security forces in peacekeeping operations, including Iraq. It can be found here (.pdf warning). If the topic interests you, you'll find this to be a brief (58 pages is brief for the government) history lesson, coupled with lessons learned.

One of the most interesting sections is the "problem areas," which identifies gaps that show up regularly in operations of this type:

The second problem area is the presence of three security gaps in the ability of the international community to establish law and order in peacekeeping and other
post-conflict situations. (Deficiencies in recruitment and training systems can contribute to the first two of these gaps.) These gaps can be particularly troublesome in situations where not all parties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken root, and where local authority has been removed or
replaced by an international intervention.

*The first of these security gaps is the deployment gap, or the failure or inability to deploy police forces as quickly as needed, or in adequate numbers to perform the mission assigned to them. This was noted in the U.S. unilateral intervention in Panama in 1989, and subsequently in some of the earliest international missions of the 1990s, for example in Cambodia. There, the UNCIVPOL mission could not perform some of its mandated tasks because it took several months to deploy CivPol components and some 10 months for the mission to reach its authorized size. In Somalia, it took nearly a full year to deploy the first dozen UNCIVPOL. In other cases, such as Bosnia in the mid-1990s, the United Nations was able to recruit only about half of the number authorized for the mission. Although deployment time apparently has been somewhat reduced as missions have become more complex, it still is not considered optimal. In addition, a gap remains in the U.N.'s ability to deploy a sufficient number of people with specialized skills.

* The second is the enforcement gap, or the inability of deployed police forces to assure the level of security needed to provide the necessary climate to conduct normal policing operations. In these cases, the police deployed often lack the necessary skills to handle the situation, in particular the military skills needed to carry out constabulary functions in hostile situations, and investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime. When military forces have not been available to assist police in handling hostile situations, either because they were in short supply (as occurred in Somalia in 1993-1995) or because their mandate did not include law enforcement functions (as in Bosnia in 1996), peacekeeping operations have been compromised.

* The third is the institution gap, where the indigenous law enforcement system lacks adequate numbers of honest and efficient judicial and penal personnel, as well as sound judicial and penal institutions, and thus are unable to effectively follow-up to police work with prosecution and punishment necessary for sustainable security. In many post-conflict situations, understaffed (if not partially intimidated or corrupted) judiciaries and penal systems, lacking even basic resources, have not been able to handle effectively the increased workload that results from more efficient policing.

We have, of course, seen all of these kinds of problems again in Iraq, though one or two of the specific examples has been avoided. Unfortunately, as often is the case with government--and especially Congressional--bureaucracies, the paper is much better at identifying problems than positing workable solutions. Indeed, predictably, the suggested reforms generally involve the creation of large, new bureaucracies.

The State Department comes in for some criticism in having attempted a market-based solution:

In what was intended as a major innovation in the U.S. CivPol system... the Department of State has issued contracts (as mentioned above) for the establishment and maintenance of a reserve cadre of up to 2,000 U.S. law enforcement personnel, who would be available for international police service on short notice....

As envisioned by the bidding proposal, the new cadre of U.S. civilian police would "eliminate the requirement to conduct from scratch, recruitment, selection, and training activities each time the U.S. contributes police to an international CivPol operation." The RFP also called for the contractor to identify technical advisors, who are not police officers, who could be called upon to assist with establishing institutional capabilities in police, judicial, and corrections systems.

The State Department's decision to award contracts for the new CivPol cadre program to multiple companies, rather than one as originally envisioned, has raised some questions about whether the process will be as expeditious as originally planned. While there may be some advantages to be gained by continued competition for CivPol deployments, and the greater number of applicants from which to choose, which some may judge necessary because of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, some analysts fear that these advantages will be offset by additional costs and delays.

It sounds to me like State's on to something, for a change.

SOAII

Spirit of America:

The contest has begun! You'll find the donate button to the right, just below my shield, or you can follow this link.

The Fighting Fusileers, HQ company, is the place to report for updates.

ROE

ROE:

I've had an email question I can't answer on the Rules of Engagement in Iraq's Marine area of control. If any of you feel competent to shed some light on it, drop me an email and I'll pass along the query.

Belmont Club

Belmont Club:

The Belmont Club today offers a couple of useful pieces of analysis on the current state of Iraq.

Welcome to Castle Argghhh! The Home Of One Of Jonah's Military Guys.

Spirit of America:

A reminder: today begins the Spirit of America campaign among bloggers. I'll update through the day, but be sure to check out The Fighting Fusileers for Freedom, HQ Company.

UPDATE: Hmm. At the last minute and without warning, the kickoff has been postponed to tomorrow. This really does remind me of the military.

New War

Big and Small Wars:

It appears that the war has entered a new phase. My conclusions are that things are about to escalate sharply; that the Bush administration is aware of it, and has decided to support escalation; and that we should expect to see, in the near future, much higher rates of casualties and an enlarged scale of warfare. There are two roads for such warfare, which I will outline below. I will conclude with some remarks on the upcoming election, and how we need to change the debate.

I. Drums at Night

The story on the Syrian firefight appears to be wrong on a critical point. The news media is claiming that the attackers were breakouts from Ramadi and Fallujah. That is highly unlikely, for two reason:

1: The numbers involved in the attack on the border were as large, or larger, than the total forces we've seen committed to battle anywhere else. With a cordon around Fallujah and Marine Recon in Ramadi, it is highly unlikely that this number of forces escaped without our notice, assembled unwatched with their mortars and equipment, and attacked in surprise. It is much more likely that these are infiltrators rather than exfiltrators, from Syria rather than from deeper in Iraq.

2: The attack was majestically coordinated, with three waves of surprise attacks carried out almost flawlessly. This is not the work of a cobbled-together force of breakouts, but of a unit that has trained together for some time.

This should not be surprising. Enemy statements and recovered evidence have suggested increased collusion between the non-state actors in the region: consider the statements, cited below, by Hezbollah's leadership and al-Sadr which are mutually reinforcing; consider also the extended tribal ties that bind so many in this region, but particularly al-Sadr and the leadership of Hezbollah; and consider the expansion of coordinated bombing of bridges on caravan routes. According to a letter published in National Review Online, 82 truck convoys have been hit in the last ten days.

The stakes in the region likewise suggest collusion, both between state and non-state actors: al-Sadr, as mentioned frequently on this page, has to win or die. The stakes are also very high for Iran, which is on the list of "Axis of Evil" nations, suffering domestic unrest against the mullahs, and which has standing border issues with Iraq and will continue to under any new government. The stakes for Syria are also high, and the reverence with which Assad regards Hezbollah suggests that he would be amenable to joining an expanded war on their side. There is every reason to believe that the war in Iraq has unified certain domestic militants with foreign opposition, which is providing (Iran, Lebanon) or at least not restricting (Syria?) overland routes, training bases, and havens for guerrillas.

II: Small Wars

If the analysis is correct--and I have seen no reason to doubt it, but could spend three days pulling up more OSINT to reinforce it--we should expect to see a wider, and harder, guerrilla war. When considering how to respond, it is not enough to look at the static situation. We have to consider not just how to respond to the threats faced today in Iraq, but to the threats likely to be faced in the future. Steps taken to address the current attacks will be met with responses from the enemy. That said, we need a strategy that isn't based on reaction to threats as they occur, but rather an overarching strategy to win this kind of war, regardless of the particular new threats which arise. "Action beats reaction" is a standing piece of military wisdom. What actions are possible? How do you beat a guerrilla war? There are two answers available, the first of which needs little argument, and the second a great deal.

The first--the standard--answer is to engage in "clear and hold" tactics. In American military history, the USMC pioneered this technique, and used it with great success in Vietnam, in contrast to the Army and air campaigns:

In Vietnam, the strategic concept of the Marine Corps emphasizes small wars. As the legendary Marine general, Victor H. Krulak, noted in his book, First to Fight, the Marines employed an approach in Vietnam -- the Combined Action Program -- that the Marines had first used in Haiti (1915-34), Nicaragua (1926-33), and Santo Domingo (1916-22). "Marine Corps experience in stabilizing governments and combating guerrilla forces was distilled in lecture form at the Marine Corps Schools...beginning in 1920," Krulak wrote. The lectures appeared in Small Wars Manual in 1940 and later adopted as an official publication.

The Marine Corps approach in Vietnam had three elements, according to Krulak: emphasis on pacification of the coastal areas in which 80 percent of the people lived; degradation of the ability of the North Vietnamese to fight by cutting off supplies before they left Northern ports of entry; and engagement of PAVN and VC main-force units on terms favorable to American forces.

The basic approach is sound, but the particulars--especially the definition of "terms favorable to American forces"--need to be updated for the war in the Middle East. Such warfighting is done with an eye toward the medium and long term, and can result in heavy casualties at times. Nevertheless, there is a century of success behind the policy.

The key features of USMC "Small Wars" as it would apply to Iraq are: keeping the regular military confined to Iraq; using special operations and air forces to eliminate training camps and supply depots inside Syria, Iran, or elsewhere; trying to maintain control of major population centers rather than trying to engage the enemy; and patrolling the regions we need to protect to secure supply lines, but leaving the areas we do not need to control to the enemy. Control the towns, let him have the deserts. In this way, you reduce the amount of damage that the enemy can do to small-scale bombings and sabotage, which kills some but leaves the majority of the population and economy untouched. Protecting the population, over time, denies the guerrillas the 'sea in which they swim,' to paraphrase Mao Tse-Tung. It also gives you time to train local forces that will be loyal to the new government, who can prosecute the war after your withdrawal.

III: Big Wars

This does not appear to be the route the Bush administration has chosen. In accord with the "Bush doctrine," they appear to have decided to fight not a small war but a big one. The underlying philosophy for such a war is sound, but it is a risk. It is genuinely dangerous, though "dangerous" does not mean "bad." Sometimes great danger is worth daring if there are great rewards. As Tolkien reminds, in the voice of Gandalf the White Wizard, "Dangerous? And so am I." So is the US military.

The Bush administration has a different answer to the question, "How do you fight a guerrilla war?" They appear to be drawing, not on the American model, but the Israeli one. Negotiation fails: guerrillas who are fighting a successful campaign use negotiation only to extort concessions while they rearm and strengthen. In addition, the guerrillas and terrorists opposed to the U.S., like those opposed to Israel, have very large goals. A negotiated settlement with someone whose goal is to see the last Western soldier (or the last Jew) out of the Middle East is unlikely to prove fruitful: withdrawing half the soldiers just means they feel they can fight harder; withdrawing from half the territory just gives them more havens from which to fight.

The West has an option that Israel does not have, which is to withdraw. The unity of our enemies would collapse if we did not provide them with a common enemy. Once that collapse occurs, much or all of their strength is wasted on infighting. After the groups have wrecked each other and the last one standing rules, in a decade or in fifty years, the West can return and fight only the straggler--you return, ally with a few of the survivors from among the opposition, and make them kings. Consider Afghanistan, where the Taliban were the strongest remnant of a shattered Mujahedeen, which once destroyed the Russian army. By allying with the Northern Alliance, tenuously holding a fraction of Afghanistan, we quickly eliminated the government and have been able to move to antiinsurgency operations with less than a tenth of the forces used in Iraq.

The problem with this approach in Iraq is that it is the approach. We could withdraw, but we just did. Fifty years back the place was under British rule. We've let the opposition sort itself out, allied with the exile and Kurdish groups, and are now making them the kings. Withdrawing again doesn't fix the problem, it just puts it off. There is a second problem, which may be called the China problem, again after Mao--once a guerrilla army has beaten its opposition, it is ripe for overthrow only until it develops nuclear weapons. Recent events have shown how close we are to seeing that even in Iran.

If negotiation and withdrawal are not options, what remains in this Israeli model is escalation. Guerrilla fighters must be forced off their game by creating situations in which time is not on their side. Instead of letting them "strike and fade," you have to force them either to attempt to hold ground, or to engage in conventional fighting. The usual two methods for this are assassination of leadership agents, which reliably causes reprisals; and an assault on a region that they feel bound, out of honor or religion or for pure practicality, to defend. By forcing the guerrillas to take the field in a conventional war, you eliminate their advantages and make them fight on the terms least advantageous: a stand up fight against a regular army. You dare them to do their worst--indeed, you force them to do it--and then you fight them down.

Does this sound familiar? It is exactly what the Marines have been doing to Saddamite elements in Fallujah. It is what Israel is doing by assassinating Hamas leadership targets with a new prejudice. Bush has changed two major policies this week as regards Israel, both of which move the US out of the "honest broker" role, and into a partisan role: the tacit endorsement of Israel holdings in the West Bank, and the rejection of "right of return." Now project forward: the Coalition has surrounded Najaf and Karbala with thousands of troops. Both Iranian and Iraqi insurgents--as well, it might be noted, as more responsible voices in Iraq--are warning that an assault on those cities would be intolerable. It is territory that the enemy has to defend.

Conclusion

As this is an election year, there is an opportunity to have this debate among the citizenry and force the politicians to adhere to what we decide. Currently no such debate is engaged. The Bush administration is not forthcoming as to their intentions, and the Kerry campaign appears to lack serious military thinkers necessary to address the question. Kerry's recent "plan" for Iraq addresses exactly none of these points, nor outlines which strategy he might use in the war. Calling for reinforcements--which is essentially what he does by asking for UN guidance and NATO forces--is not a strategy. I have seen nothing to suggest that his campaign contains anyone who understands the issue, which is exactly what is to be expected from a man whose career, inspired by his antiwar protests, has been run for two decades against "the military-industrial complex" and the intelligence community. Nevertheless, there are strategists on the Left, both inside and outside of the Democratic party. The party needs to engage them.

I said at the beginning that there are two options in Iraq, but in fact there are three. The first is the American model, "Small Wars" campaign. The second is a broader, Bush-doctrine campaign that will aim to widen the war and eliminate terrorist havens--first Fallujah, then perhaps Najaf or Karbala, Iran, Syria. The third is to fail to adopt an overall antiguerrilla strategy, attempting to bring stability through the use of military forces in a police action, or engaging in a withdrawal. Any such non-strategy will result in defeat in the medium to long term.

As it stands now, I believe a vote for Bush is a vote for option two, and a vote for Kerry is a vote for option three. We need a candidate for option one. If enough people understand the issue and can bring it forward in the campaign season, we may get one--either Bush or Kerry may move to that position if pressure is brought to bear. Ideally the election should be a referrendum on whether the Global War on Terror is fought as a series of small wars, or one big war.

What we don't need is to have a choice made by default. This is a free Republic, and we are here considering the largest of questions. It is proper to consult the citizenry, and I see no evidence that anyone in the government wishes to do so.

Firefight on the border

Firefight on the Syrian Border:

Big news from the Syria-Iraq border. As usual, the Marines killed--either five or six, depending on the source--were slain in the surprise attacks that opened the battle. There's an hour-by-hour account of the battle through the link.

The attack was well designed, with a decoy bombing followed by small-arms and machine-gun fire to pin responding forces. When they called for reinforcments, those were met with a coordinated mortar assault from two dozen positions. It sounds as if the number of enemy KIA and captured will provide some good intel. Once they'd worked through their surprises, they were steadily eaten up by the Marines, with the final kill ratio being somewhere in the neighborhood of ten or twelve to one, again depending on the source. The captures, at least as important, were over twenty.

Just in case anybody reading this thinks the Marine are being heavyhanded, do take special note of these two paragraphs in the story:

At one point, many of the insurgents reportedly had gathered in a local mosque, and Marines were preparing to bomb the building. They pulled back the attack, however, when they couldn't not get positive identification of the occupants of the mosque....

"We're trying to get the snipers in position for a shot," Major George Schreffler told the other commanders through tactical radio communications. "They're looking at guys in blue uniforms and others with black clothes and black masks. Some are using children to shield themselves. We will not take shots in which we could possibly hit children."

With one hand tied... It continues to astonish me what these young men can do.

The Onion | New Negative Campaign Ads Blast Voters Directly

Negative Ads:

Honestly, we're not far from this:

The Bush people initiated this volley of negative ads, but we won't be lured into a reactive campaign against the Republicans," Kerry campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill said Monday. "It's time to redirect the cheap name-calling away from Bush and toward those Americans who might be idiotic enough to vote for him...."

Over a series of images of America's senior citizens, the narrator of another 30-second spot says, "The Medicare drug bill is a triumph of right-wing ideology masquerading as moderate reform. The pharmaceutical-drug and insurance industries are tickled pink. Guess who's paying for it? You. Congratulations, moron. I'm John Kerry and I approved this message."

The New York Review of Books: In Search of Hezbollah

Hezbollah:

It is, I fear, time to start talking seriously about the probability of Hezbollah activity in Iraq, and what that means for the campaign in the Middle East. I'm going to try something I've seen on other blogs, and have an "open thread" on the topic--well, open as long as you're talking about Hezbollah. Thoughts welcome, posting encouraged.

The Command Post - Iraq - Marines "Dirty Deeds" in Fallujah

PSYOPS in Fallujah:

Thanks to The Command Post, we have this story:

In Fallujah's darkened, empty streets, US troops blast AC/DC's "Hell's Bells" and other rock music full volume from a huge speaker, hoping to grate on the nerves of the city's gunmen and give a laugh to Marines along the front line.

Unable to advance farther into the city [...because of orders, not enemy action... -G], an Army psychological operations team hopes a mix of heavy metal and insults shouted in Arabic--including, "You shoot like a goat-herder"--will draw gunmen to step forward and attack. But no luck this night.

Not all the operations affecting the enemy's psyche are done by soldiers attached to the Marines. Some of the most effective are these:

Laying on his stomach on a rooftop and wearing goggles and earplugs, a Marine sniper keeps an eye to his rifle site.... In his position--reachable only by scaling the outside ledge of a building--he sits for hours with his finger poised on the trigger of a rifle that fires .50-caliber armor piercing bullets with such force that the muzzle flash and exiting gasses from the weapon have blackened the bricks around the gun.

Now that's intimidation.

FreeSpeech.com

A Piper, Piping Away:

Del ovear at FreeSpeech has an article on the USMC's use of bagpipes in Fallujah. It's from CNN, which means that there has to be a bit of foolishness:

When he is not on the front-line, Farr wears a kilt when playing, and some Marines have been skeptical about a member of one of the toughest fighting forces in the world donning what looks like a skirt.

Nonsense. But if a heavy-weight wool kilt in the Leatherneck tartan isn't right for Fallujah, try the Survival Kilt.

DefenseLINK News: General: Marines Not Hampered by Rules of Engagement

Marines Cut the Rat Line:

Major General of Marines John Sattler, USCENTCOM, spoke about I MEF operations:

The general also said that coalition forces in the area are comfortable with the level of intelligence information they're getting in the area and are content to let the Iraqi Governing Council work to negotiate an end to the tense situation in Fallujah.

He noted that he feels it's important to give the negotiations a chance to succeed. "Keep in mind, our goal is not to capture the town of Fallujah," Sattler said. "Our goal is to go and free the town of Fallujah, to go in and eliminate those fighters, foreign fighters, those extremists that are in the town that have taken it away from those who reside there."

Garnering far less publicity than operations around Fallujah, Marines have stepped up efforts to shut down Iraq's border region with Syria as a throughway for foreign fighters and smugglers.

Sattler said efforts are particularly focused in an area known as "the rat line," where foreign fighters were traveling through the countryside around Qaim, near where the Euphrates River passes from Syria into Iraq.

"We had an extreme amount of success on the front side, meaning that we did find, fix, and ultimately finish a number of cells that were out there, that were facilitating this type of movement," he said.

This seems to be the result, in part, of good recon and planning:

Part of the Marines' success in tightening the border region can be attributed to their forethought in upping the number of troops they brought when they replaced the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in the region.

"When (the Marines) went out and did their reconnaissance (before assuming control of the region), they made a conscious decision to bring more so they could, in fact, work that border region very hard," Sattler said.

Ooh-rah.

Guardian Unlimited Books | Extracts | First, skin your squirrel...

Squirrel Problems?

The historian Roger Scruton explains a simple solution to the plague of squirrels troubling many places. I have to attest that his solution works perfectly--I myself had an infestation at my cabin two years back, when I was still resident in Georgia. We resolved it entirely using the method he recommends.