Belmont Club

Belmont Club:

The Belmont Club today offers a couple of useful pieces of analysis on the current state of Iraq.

Welcome to Castle Argghhh! The Home Of One Of Jonah's Military Guys.

Spirit of America:

A reminder: today begins the Spirit of America campaign among bloggers. I'll update through the day, but be sure to check out The Fighting Fusileers for Freedom, HQ Company.

UPDATE: Hmm. At the last minute and without warning, the kickoff has been postponed to tomorrow. This really does remind me of the military.

New War

Big and Small Wars:

It appears that the war has entered a new phase. My conclusions are that things are about to escalate sharply; that the Bush administration is aware of it, and has decided to support escalation; and that we should expect to see, in the near future, much higher rates of casualties and an enlarged scale of warfare. There are two roads for such warfare, which I will outline below. I will conclude with some remarks on the upcoming election, and how we need to change the debate.

I. Drums at Night

The story on the Syrian firefight appears to be wrong on a critical point. The news media is claiming that the attackers were breakouts from Ramadi and Fallujah. That is highly unlikely, for two reason:

1: The numbers involved in the attack on the border were as large, or larger, than the total forces we've seen committed to battle anywhere else. With a cordon around Fallujah and Marine Recon in Ramadi, it is highly unlikely that this number of forces escaped without our notice, assembled unwatched with their mortars and equipment, and attacked in surprise. It is much more likely that these are infiltrators rather than exfiltrators, from Syria rather than from deeper in Iraq.

2: The attack was majestically coordinated, with three waves of surprise attacks carried out almost flawlessly. This is not the work of a cobbled-together force of breakouts, but of a unit that has trained together for some time.

This should not be surprising. Enemy statements and recovered evidence have suggested increased collusion between the non-state actors in the region: consider the statements, cited below, by Hezbollah's leadership and al-Sadr which are mutually reinforcing; consider also the extended tribal ties that bind so many in this region, but particularly al-Sadr and the leadership of Hezbollah; and consider the expansion of coordinated bombing of bridges on caravan routes. According to a letter published in National Review Online, 82 truck convoys have been hit in the last ten days.

The stakes in the region likewise suggest collusion, both between state and non-state actors: al-Sadr, as mentioned frequently on this page, has to win or die. The stakes are also very high for Iran, which is on the list of "Axis of Evil" nations, suffering domestic unrest against the mullahs, and which has standing border issues with Iraq and will continue to under any new government. The stakes for Syria are also high, and the reverence with which Assad regards Hezbollah suggests that he would be amenable to joining an expanded war on their side. There is every reason to believe that the war in Iraq has unified certain domestic militants with foreign opposition, which is providing (Iran, Lebanon) or at least not restricting (Syria?) overland routes, training bases, and havens for guerrillas.

II: Small Wars

If the analysis is correct--and I have seen no reason to doubt it, but could spend three days pulling up more OSINT to reinforce it--we should expect to see a wider, and harder, guerrilla war. When considering how to respond, it is not enough to look at the static situation. We have to consider not just how to respond to the threats faced today in Iraq, but to the threats likely to be faced in the future. Steps taken to address the current attacks will be met with responses from the enemy. That said, we need a strategy that isn't based on reaction to threats as they occur, but rather an overarching strategy to win this kind of war, regardless of the particular new threats which arise. "Action beats reaction" is a standing piece of military wisdom. What actions are possible? How do you beat a guerrilla war? There are two answers available, the first of which needs little argument, and the second a great deal.

The first--the standard--answer is to engage in "clear and hold" tactics. In American military history, the USMC pioneered this technique, and used it with great success in Vietnam, in contrast to the Army and air campaigns:

In Vietnam, the strategic concept of the Marine Corps emphasizes small wars. As the legendary Marine general, Victor H. Krulak, noted in his book, First to Fight, the Marines employed an approach in Vietnam -- the Combined Action Program -- that the Marines had first used in Haiti (1915-34), Nicaragua (1926-33), and Santo Domingo (1916-22). "Marine Corps experience in stabilizing governments and combating guerrilla forces was distilled in lecture form at the Marine Corps Schools...beginning in 1920," Krulak wrote. The lectures appeared in Small Wars Manual in 1940 and later adopted as an official publication.

The Marine Corps approach in Vietnam had three elements, according to Krulak: emphasis on pacification of the coastal areas in which 80 percent of the people lived; degradation of the ability of the North Vietnamese to fight by cutting off supplies before they left Northern ports of entry; and engagement of PAVN and VC main-force units on terms favorable to American forces.

The basic approach is sound, but the particulars--especially the definition of "terms favorable to American forces"--need to be updated for the war in the Middle East. Such warfighting is done with an eye toward the medium and long term, and can result in heavy casualties at times. Nevertheless, there is a century of success behind the policy.

The key features of USMC "Small Wars" as it would apply to Iraq are: keeping the regular military confined to Iraq; using special operations and air forces to eliminate training camps and supply depots inside Syria, Iran, or elsewhere; trying to maintain control of major population centers rather than trying to engage the enemy; and patrolling the regions we need to protect to secure supply lines, but leaving the areas we do not need to control to the enemy. Control the towns, let him have the deserts. In this way, you reduce the amount of damage that the enemy can do to small-scale bombings and sabotage, which kills some but leaves the majority of the population and economy untouched. Protecting the population, over time, denies the guerrillas the 'sea in which they swim,' to paraphrase Mao Tse-Tung. It also gives you time to train local forces that will be loyal to the new government, who can prosecute the war after your withdrawal.

III: Big Wars

This does not appear to be the route the Bush administration has chosen. In accord with the "Bush doctrine," they appear to have decided to fight not a small war but a big one. The underlying philosophy for such a war is sound, but it is a risk. It is genuinely dangerous, though "dangerous" does not mean "bad." Sometimes great danger is worth daring if there are great rewards. As Tolkien reminds, in the voice of Gandalf the White Wizard, "Dangerous? And so am I." So is the US military.

The Bush administration has a different answer to the question, "How do you fight a guerrilla war?" They appear to be drawing, not on the American model, but the Israeli one. Negotiation fails: guerrillas who are fighting a successful campaign use negotiation only to extort concessions while they rearm and strengthen. In addition, the guerrillas and terrorists opposed to the U.S., like those opposed to Israel, have very large goals. A negotiated settlement with someone whose goal is to see the last Western soldier (or the last Jew) out of the Middle East is unlikely to prove fruitful: withdrawing half the soldiers just means they feel they can fight harder; withdrawing from half the territory just gives them more havens from which to fight.

The West has an option that Israel does not have, which is to withdraw. The unity of our enemies would collapse if we did not provide them with a common enemy. Once that collapse occurs, much or all of their strength is wasted on infighting. After the groups have wrecked each other and the last one standing rules, in a decade or in fifty years, the West can return and fight only the straggler--you return, ally with a few of the survivors from among the opposition, and make them kings. Consider Afghanistan, where the Taliban were the strongest remnant of a shattered Mujahedeen, which once destroyed the Russian army. By allying with the Northern Alliance, tenuously holding a fraction of Afghanistan, we quickly eliminated the government and have been able to move to antiinsurgency operations with less than a tenth of the forces used in Iraq.

The problem with this approach in Iraq is that it is the approach. We could withdraw, but we just did. Fifty years back the place was under British rule. We've let the opposition sort itself out, allied with the exile and Kurdish groups, and are now making them the kings. Withdrawing again doesn't fix the problem, it just puts it off. There is a second problem, which may be called the China problem, again after Mao--once a guerrilla army has beaten its opposition, it is ripe for overthrow only until it develops nuclear weapons. Recent events have shown how close we are to seeing that even in Iran.

If negotiation and withdrawal are not options, what remains in this Israeli model is escalation. Guerrilla fighters must be forced off their game by creating situations in which time is not on their side. Instead of letting them "strike and fade," you have to force them either to attempt to hold ground, or to engage in conventional fighting. The usual two methods for this are assassination of leadership agents, which reliably causes reprisals; and an assault on a region that they feel bound, out of honor or religion or for pure practicality, to defend. By forcing the guerrillas to take the field in a conventional war, you eliminate their advantages and make them fight on the terms least advantageous: a stand up fight against a regular army. You dare them to do their worst--indeed, you force them to do it--and then you fight them down.

Does this sound familiar? It is exactly what the Marines have been doing to Saddamite elements in Fallujah. It is what Israel is doing by assassinating Hamas leadership targets with a new prejudice. Bush has changed two major policies this week as regards Israel, both of which move the US out of the "honest broker" role, and into a partisan role: the tacit endorsement of Israel holdings in the West Bank, and the rejection of "right of return." Now project forward: the Coalition has surrounded Najaf and Karbala with thousands of troops. Both Iranian and Iraqi insurgents--as well, it might be noted, as more responsible voices in Iraq--are warning that an assault on those cities would be intolerable. It is territory that the enemy has to defend.

Conclusion

As this is an election year, there is an opportunity to have this debate among the citizenry and force the politicians to adhere to what we decide. Currently no such debate is engaged. The Bush administration is not forthcoming as to their intentions, and the Kerry campaign appears to lack serious military thinkers necessary to address the question. Kerry's recent "plan" for Iraq addresses exactly none of these points, nor outlines which strategy he might use in the war. Calling for reinforcements--which is essentially what he does by asking for UN guidance and NATO forces--is not a strategy. I have seen nothing to suggest that his campaign contains anyone who understands the issue, which is exactly what is to be expected from a man whose career, inspired by his antiwar protests, has been run for two decades against "the military-industrial complex" and the intelligence community. Nevertheless, there are strategists on the Left, both inside and outside of the Democratic party. The party needs to engage them.

I said at the beginning that there are two options in Iraq, but in fact there are three. The first is the American model, "Small Wars" campaign. The second is a broader, Bush-doctrine campaign that will aim to widen the war and eliminate terrorist havens--first Fallujah, then perhaps Najaf or Karbala, Iran, Syria. The third is to fail to adopt an overall antiguerrilla strategy, attempting to bring stability through the use of military forces in a police action, or engaging in a withdrawal. Any such non-strategy will result in defeat in the medium to long term.

As it stands now, I believe a vote for Bush is a vote for option two, and a vote for Kerry is a vote for option three. We need a candidate for option one. If enough people understand the issue and can bring it forward in the campaign season, we may get one--either Bush or Kerry may move to that position if pressure is brought to bear. Ideally the election should be a referrendum on whether the Global War on Terror is fought as a series of small wars, or one big war.

What we don't need is to have a choice made by default. This is a free Republic, and we are here considering the largest of questions. It is proper to consult the citizenry, and I see no evidence that anyone in the government wishes to do so.

Firefight on the border

Firefight on the Syrian Border:

Big news from the Syria-Iraq border. As usual, the Marines killed--either five or six, depending on the source--were slain in the surprise attacks that opened the battle. There's an hour-by-hour account of the battle through the link.

The attack was well designed, with a decoy bombing followed by small-arms and machine-gun fire to pin responding forces. When they called for reinforcments, those were met with a coordinated mortar assault from two dozen positions. It sounds as if the number of enemy KIA and captured will provide some good intel. Once they'd worked through their surprises, they were steadily eaten up by the Marines, with the final kill ratio being somewhere in the neighborhood of ten or twelve to one, again depending on the source. The captures, at least as important, were over twenty.

Just in case anybody reading this thinks the Marine are being heavyhanded, do take special note of these two paragraphs in the story:

At one point, many of the insurgents reportedly had gathered in a local mosque, and Marines were preparing to bomb the building. They pulled back the attack, however, when they couldn't not get positive identification of the occupants of the mosque....

"We're trying to get the snipers in position for a shot," Major George Schreffler told the other commanders through tactical radio communications. "They're looking at guys in blue uniforms and others with black clothes and black masks. Some are using children to shield themselves. We will not take shots in which we could possibly hit children."

With one hand tied... It continues to astonish me what these young men can do.

The Onion | New Negative Campaign Ads Blast Voters Directly

Negative Ads:

Honestly, we're not far from this:

The Bush people initiated this volley of negative ads, but we won't be lured into a reactive campaign against the Republicans," Kerry campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill said Monday. "It's time to redirect the cheap name-calling away from Bush and toward those Americans who might be idiotic enough to vote for him...."

Over a series of images of America's senior citizens, the narrator of another 30-second spot says, "The Medicare drug bill is a triumph of right-wing ideology masquerading as moderate reform. The pharmaceutical-drug and insurance industries are tickled pink. Guess who's paying for it? You. Congratulations, moron. I'm John Kerry and I approved this message."

The New York Review of Books: In Search of Hezbollah

Hezbollah:

It is, I fear, time to start talking seriously about the probability of Hezbollah activity in Iraq, and what that means for the campaign in the Middle East. I'm going to try something I've seen on other blogs, and have an "open thread" on the topic--well, open as long as you're talking about Hezbollah. Thoughts welcome, posting encouraged.

The Command Post - Iraq - Marines "Dirty Deeds" in Fallujah

PSYOPS in Fallujah:

Thanks to The Command Post, we have this story:

In Fallujah's darkened, empty streets, US troops blast AC/DC's "Hell's Bells" and other rock music full volume from a huge speaker, hoping to grate on the nerves of the city's gunmen and give a laugh to Marines along the front line.

Unable to advance farther into the city [...because of orders, not enemy action... -G], an Army psychological operations team hopes a mix of heavy metal and insults shouted in Arabic--including, "You shoot like a goat-herder"--will draw gunmen to step forward and attack. But no luck this night.

Not all the operations affecting the enemy's psyche are done by soldiers attached to the Marines. Some of the most effective are these:

Laying on his stomach on a rooftop and wearing goggles and earplugs, a Marine sniper keeps an eye to his rifle site.... In his position--reachable only by scaling the outside ledge of a building--he sits for hours with his finger poised on the trigger of a rifle that fires .50-caliber armor piercing bullets with such force that the muzzle flash and exiting gasses from the weapon have blackened the bricks around the gun.

Now that's intimidation.

FreeSpeech.com

A Piper, Piping Away:

Del ovear at FreeSpeech has an article on the USMC's use of bagpipes in Fallujah. It's from CNN, which means that there has to be a bit of foolishness:

When he is not on the front-line, Farr wears a kilt when playing, and some Marines have been skeptical about a member of one of the toughest fighting forces in the world donning what looks like a skirt.

Nonsense. But if a heavy-weight wool kilt in the Leatherneck tartan isn't right for Fallujah, try the Survival Kilt.

DefenseLINK News: General: Marines Not Hampered by Rules of Engagement

Marines Cut the Rat Line:

Major General of Marines John Sattler, USCENTCOM, spoke about I MEF operations:

The general also said that coalition forces in the area are comfortable with the level of intelligence information they're getting in the area and are content to let the Iraqi Governing Council work to negotiate an end to the tense situation in Fallujah.

He noted that he feels it's important to give the negotiations a chance to succeed. "Keep in mind, our goal is not to capture the town of Fallujah," Sattler said. "Our goal is to go and free the town of Fallujah, to go in and eliminate those fighters, foreign fighters, those extremists that are in the town that have taken it away from those who reside there."

Garnering far less publicity than operations around Fallujah, Marines have stepped up efforts to shut down Iraq's border region with Syria as a throughway for foreign fighters and smugglers.

Sattler said efforts are particularly focused in an area known as "the rat line," where foreign fighters were traveling through the countryside around Qaim, near where the Euphrates River passes from Syria into Iraq.

"We had an extreme amount of success on the front side, meaning that we did find, fix, and ultimately finish a number of cells that were out there, that were facilitating this type of movement," he said.

This seems to be the result, in part, of good recon and planning:

Part of the Marines' success in tightening the border region can be attributed to their forethought in upping the number of troops they brought when they replaced the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in the region.

"When (the Marines) went out and did their reconnaissance (before assuming control of the region), they made a conscious decision to bring more so they could, in fact, work that border region very hard," Sattler said.

Ooh-rah.

Guardian Unlimited Books | Extracts | First, skin your squirrel...

Squirrel Problems?

The historian Roger Scruton explains a simple solution to the plague of squirrels troubling many places. I have to attest that his solution works perfectly--I myself had an infestation at my cabin two years back, when I was still resident in Georgia. We resolved it entirely using the method he recommends.

Personal Data Feed:

Regular readers probably know more about me than they want to know already. Still, I thought I'd mention for the interested that there's a picture of my son Beowulf in Sovay's "cat blogging," today. The caption mentions my wife, who can be seen (and read about) on her own website. She doesn't do politics or milblogging, though--just painting, sculpture, and other artwork. The photo there is a good picture of her, but be warned: like Doc Russia's wife, she is a dangerous woman.

Wouldn't have it any other way.

Spirit of America

Spirit of America:

By now probably all of you know of the Spirit of America campaign, whereby the US Marines are raising money to spend in Iraq, most especially on television stations. The idea is to help the Iraqi people get the truth, and to help the Marines make allies among the populace. Grim's Hall will, of course, participate.

Since this is taking the form of a competition, we'll be assuming a role in the Milblog brigade. Donate early and often--the competition starts Monday.

Captain's Quarters

The Rough Riders:

A contractor writes from Fallujah. I won't excerpt it; it's worth reading in full. I've been considering the question of the legal status of contractors since KOS made an issue out of people who do our kind of work. If we aren't mercenaries--as has been established--just what are we?

I think I may have sorted it out. Article 4, Section 1 of the Geneva Conventions provides that P.O.W. status applies to:

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

Section two:

2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:

(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

(c) That of carrying arms openly;

(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Either of these terms would seem to apply. A militia is a possibility, as it is also composed of civilians under arms, directed by military authority. A Volunteer Corps, like Theodore Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" may even be a better explanation of the status of contractors. Like Roosevelt himself--who was too blind to gain service in a regular army regiment--the "Rough Riders" were men who demanded to serve their country in her wars, regardless of the demands of the bureaucracy.

I'll leave it to the lawyers to hash out which one is correct. Either way, I prefer "militiamen" or "volunteers" to "contractors," which tends to suggest that the contract, rather than patriotism, is the motivating factor. I'd like to propose that we adopt "Rough Riders" as a nickname for such contractors. I have to imagine any of them would feel honored by the name, and it shows the real spirit behind the movement.

Sgt Hook: Rooney Asks

A Partial Answer to Rooney:

Sgt Hook answers Andy Roony, based on a poll of soldiers serving with him in Afghanistan. Rooney was really asking about Iraq, of course. Maybe JarHeadDad will pass the questions on to "Arms" the next time they talk, and we can get a reply from al-Anbar province.

TVNEWS

TVNews:

I see via Doc Russia that Fox has posted an interview with our boys in Ramadi in video form on the internet.

Mailbag

Mailbag:

I'm going to post out of a couple of the letters I've seen, one of which is being passed around and has been posted elsewhere; the other, as far as I know, hasn't. I'm informed both are OPSEC safe, but I've held them another 24 hours just to be certain.

[T]he Ramadi front is designed to take heat off Falluja.... [A Moblie Assault Platoon] was called to provide relief to ' X.' XXXX says that as they moved up, the rags were performing disciplined, as he calls it, "bounding fire and movement---they knew what they were doing---even when we knocked them back, they were 'bounding.'"

The relative military discipline being shown in Ramadi has been one of the more interesting points of the war. Three "good news" points of analysis: 1) This is almost certainly the best that the enemy in Iraq has at the ready. 2) There are not many of them--a surprise attack on a rearward station is all they could manage, and they were repulsed there by a platoon of reinforcements. Confer with the often-cited Tet offensive, which threw into the fray guerrillas across South Vietnam, and even had trained sappers to dig inside the US compound. 3) These guys are not, in any sort of immediate sense, replacable. It takes months of secure training to produce a coherent unit, disciplined under fire, of a size capable of carrying out an assault like this one. The VC never recovered from the Tet Offensive. After that, the war had to be carried by NVA units, even though the VC had a relatively secure training area in North Vietnam and the underground support of China and the USSR. There are no players of that strength in the region, though possible supporters include, Syria, and Hezbollah.

Whether or not they will contribute replacement forces, or whether or not there are are foreign training areas that will be left secure because of US policy, remains to be seen. Reuters carried a story today that Iran has sent 'thousands' of such fighters. However, there are two strong caveats to believing this story: first, they were supposed to back the Shi'ite uprising, not the Sunni one. There appears to be some coordination between these, but the Army isn't reporting any sharp increase ('maybe two percent') in foreign fighters in the areas where you'd expect Iran to focus. Second, the source for the claim is The National Council of Resistance in Iran. They are an exile group that has an interest in manipulating US policy, a factor which can't be ignored when deciding whether or not to trust their reports.

Returning to the letters:

[A Marine Sergeant] got an AK round through shoulder and disobeyed LT's order for MEDEVAC. Remained with MAP for 4 hours and used an M-203 to continue fight.

Probably get a reprimand for that, but brag about it for the rest of his life. Good on him.

As MAP was entering Ramadi on Wed minaret loudspeakers were pronouncing, "This is the day you die, come forward and we will kill you in name of Jihad, bla, bla." Wpns Company Commander grabs interpreter, puts him on OUR loudspeaker and begins, "Come out and fight you goddamn pussys and fight us in the streets like fucking men!" XXXX relates that some did and, "We mowed them down."

There's the news from the Ramadi front. From Fallujah:

Early in the morning we exchanged gunfire with a group of insurgents
without significant loss. As morning progressed, the enemy fed more men into the fight and we responded with stronger force. Unfortunately, this led to injuries as our Marines and sailors started clearing the city block by block. The enemy did not run; they fought us like soldiers.

Again, these trapped enemy elements aren't replacable.

Your husbands were awesome all night they stayed at the job of securing the streets and nobody challenged them as the hours wore on. They did not surrender an inch nor did flinch from the next potential threat. Previous to yesterday the terrorist thought that we were soft enough to challenge. As of tonight the message is loud and clear that the Marines will not be beaten. Today the enemy started all over again, although with far fewer numbers, only now the rest of the battalion joined the fight. Without elaborating too much, weapons company and Golf crushed their attackers with the vengeance of the righteous.

This above letter is from a Lt. Col. Kennedy, addressed to the wives of Marines in Fallujah. Doubtless he's sugarcoating a little, but probably not too much--Marine wives are extremely tough.

If the enemy is foolish enough to try to take your men again they will not survive contact. We are here to win. The news looks grim from back in the States. We did take losses that, in our hearts, we will always live with. The men we lost were taken within the very opening minutes of the violence.... We can never replace these Marines and Sailors but they will fight on with us in spirit. We are not feeling sorry for ourselves nor do we fear what tomorrow will bring. The battalion has lived up to its reputation as Magnificent Bastards. Yesterday made everyone here stronger and wiser[.]

The Marines Have Landed, and the Situation... and indeed, it appears to be. If the politicians don't flinch, we should be able to deal the serious insurgents a blow from which they may not be able to recover.

Fallujah Gains Mythic Air (washingtonpost.com)

Mythic Fallujah:

Been reading letters from Fallujah today--I'm going to sit on them a while longer, although some of them (thanks, JHD) are said to be in the clear. Still, it sounds like the Marines agree with the casualty figures being reported out of Fallujah, except with the percentages of noncombatants--the Marines report confidence of 95% combatant kills or better, whereas the AFP is reporting statements from doctors inside Fallujah that post a worse percentage. The Washington Post, meanwhile, has this conversation:

"The fighting now is different than a year ago. Before, the Iraqis fought for nothing. Now, fighters from all over Iraq are going to sacrifice themselves," said a Fallujah native who gave his name as Abu Idris....

"Our brothers who went to Fallujah and came back say: 'Oh, God, it is heaven. Anyone who wants paradise should go to Fallujah,' " Abu Idris said.

They came back, did they? If it's heaven, what are they doing back in Baghdad? The Marines are still around.

War Reporting

Battlefield Journalism:

Another Russian piece, from the Sage of Knoxville. Why can't we get war reporting like this? From The Moscow Times:

The Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah outnumbered the Marines and were armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles, RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and mortars. Chechen fighters used the same weapons in Grozny in 1995, 1996 and 2000, killing thousands of Russian soldiers and destroying hundreds of armored vehicles.

Just like the Russians in Grozny, the Marines last week were supported by tanks and attack helicopters, but the end result was entirely different. U.S. forces did not bomb the city indiscriminately. The Iraqis fought well but were massacred. According to the latest body count, some 600 Iraqis died and another 1,000 were wounded. The Marines lost some 20 men.

The Marines are far better trained, of course, but the Iraqis were fighting in their hometown. The decisive difference between the two sides was the extensive use of a computerized command, control and targeting system by the U.S. military. Satellites, manned and unmanned aircraft collected precise information on enemy and friendly movements on the battlefield night and day.

Modern U.S. field commanders have real-time access to this system, allowing them to monitor the changing situation on the battlefield as no commander in the history of war has been able to do. This technology has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of aerial bombardments in the last decade. And now the nature of house-to-house combat has changed as well.

The more accurate historical analogy to the current war in Iraq is not Vietnam but, say, the battle at Omdurman, Sudan, in 1898, when Horatio Herbert Kitchener, a British field marshal, crushed the Sudanese forces of al-Mahdi by bringing machine guns to bear against the enemy's muskets and spears.

Evidence

Evidence:

Sovay cites Josh Marshall, with her own appended commentary:

The question is whether, when faced with a dire warning and given a few clear hints as to where and when, the president exerted some leadership and got everyone focused on the problem."

Evidence suggests the president failed on both counts.

Today's Secrecy News--lately no friend of President Bush--has this:

In another recent example of politically-driven declassification of ostensibly "top secret" information, the White House has released two partial sentences from the September 4, 2001 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 9 on combating terrorism.

The point of the release was to document that the Defense Department had been instructed to plan for military options against Taliban and al Qaeda targets prior to the September 11 attacks.

According to Clarke's new book, the Clinton administration had made some informal inquiries about military options in Afghanistan:

And the response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff--those beribboned guys who get big jobs at Boeing and General Dynamics when they're done--was unvarying:

*It would take a very large force;
* the operation was risky and might fail, with U.S. forces caught and killed, embarrassing the President;
* their "professional military opinion" was not to do it;
* but, of course, they would do if they received orders to do so in writing from the President of the United States;
* and, by the way, military lawyers said it would be a violation of international law.

The Bush administration put the orders in writing--'ill advised or not, draw up the plans.' That looks like evidence of leadership and focus to me. Pity more of both weren't shown... oh, around 1995.

EurasiaNet Human Rights - To Bolster Stability, Uzbekistan Reins in Press

Uzbekistan:

EurasiaNet carries a Russian report that a "state of emergency" appears to be underway in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan:

An April 6 analysis published by the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta is representative of the reporting by many Russian-language media outlets. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta article suggested that the militant attacks were the product of a domestic insurgency movement. "Many people in this closed and fairly poor country are unhappy with the ruling regime," political analyst Vladimir Mukhin wrote. "Peasants are worn down by officials' tyranny."

"A considerable portion of the inhabitants of the Uzbek capital polled by Nezavisimaya Gazeta describe the perpetrators of the explosions as insurgents," the analysis added. "It also seems incorrect to view the explosions as religious fanatics' revenge for the US base located in Uzbekistan."

The article went on to say that a virtual state of emergency exists in Uzbekistan. The newspaper cited an Uzbek government security source in asserting that "every suspicious individual, vehicle or apartment block was being subjected to blanket inspection in the Uzbek capital."

Articles such as the Nezavisimaya Gazeta piece directly contradict state-controlled Uzbek media accounts of the violence and its aftermath. For example, a poll published by the Vecherny Tashkent newspaper on April 6 claimed that 98.9 percent of Uzbeks believed that "anti-social forces are striving to deprive us of our main values, which are independence, peace and stability." A 99.6 percent margin supported "the actions being taken by the country's leadership, which are aimed at strengthening security and stepping up the fight against terrorism."

Meanwhile, the Uzbek militia in northern Afghanistan has withdrawn from Maimana. There was a skirmish between the militia and local fighters in another Afghan city, Kod-i-Barq, but it appears to have been very low-intensity. It's a simmering issue, and it's hard to know just what to make of it yet.

In other Afghan news, The Times of India has what may be the worst quote from Colin Powell in history:

President Bush's commitment to de-mine and repave the entire stretch of the Kabul-Kandahar highway was fulfilled. The road had not been functional for over 20 years. What was once a 30-hour journey can be accomplished in just 5 or 6 years.

That's progress!