On the Future of the Marine Corps:
The Adventures of Chester (hat tip Mudville's Dawn Patrol) has a summary of AEI's blockbuster seminar on the Future of the Marine Corps. Some extraordinary talent came out to discuss the question -- a question that never dies, I might add, because the larger services are always after the Marines' budget. We know that the Marine Corps has a future (I believe there are still about four hundred and fifty years on the lease), but the nature of that future is always up for debate.
Chester ably summarizes the debate, so I will refer you to his summary rather than reproduce it. The things that interest me are the discussion about "seabasing," versus a more Army-like approach with heavier equipment and more firepower in exchange for losing the ability to be sea-based; and the role of the USMC in special operations.
It's a big issue that has to be solved soon because, as Max Boot says, some major capital outlays need to be made soon one way or the other:
I remember, a few years ago, visiting Camp Lejeune and seeing a big demonstration for VIPs of amphibious warfare in action. It was all very impressive with the Amtraks and hover craft and landing craft, and Cobras and Harriers. It was a terrific demonstration and just watching it, I thought it was glorious, but I also wondered, Was this a glorious anachronism? Was this like watching the cavalry on parade in the 1930's?...
It seems to me the problem with any kind of amphibious vehicle is that you're inevitably going to sacrifice firepower and armor for the sake of being able to swim. Hence, it's going to be less useful to Marines patrolling Iraq or Afghanistan, where there's not a lot of swimming to be done.
I wonder if it wouldn't make more sense, as an interim step, to buy more armored vehicles that are available on the world market, that might provide greater protection to Marines from IEDs and RPGs. You could buy vehicles like the Israeli-made Rhino Rhiner or the South Carolina-produced Cougar, which I know is being bought already, but in very small quantities.
And in the longer term, perhaps, the Marine Corps should work with the Army to develop Marine variants of the future combat system vehicles, rather than making this big buy of the expeditionary fighting vehicle.
Boot is suggesting that the USMC needs to make a commitment to an entirely different mindset -- a return to the days of being an imperial, colonial force, a refocusing on "small wars" and nationbuilding concepts. "I suspect that in the future, a core mission of the Corps will be doing the kind of things that it did in the past," Boot said, "such as setting up foreign constabularies, such as Smedly Butler's Haitian gendarmerie, or "Chesty" Puller's Nicaragua national guard."
It's certainly possible that a core mission of the US military may be that. The USMC, however, is not the right service to handle it.
Nation building exercises strongly benefit from two things that the USMC is not ideal to provide: very long term deployments, and the ability to draw on a large reserve/National Guard which is composed of people who have developed medical/police/technical skills over the course of a longer civilian life. The civilian capabilities and experience is obviously invaluable. The long-term deployments are valuable because they allow the formation of personal relationships in-country. The formation and maintenance of those relationships is the most effective strategy in counterinsurgency warfare. Finally, the Army already has a fully developed and effective special operations wing to this kind of low-intensity, relationship-forming warfare: the Green Berets.
All of these things can be better provided by the Army. The Army's far larger size means that it can more easily detail a unit to remain in an area for long periods of time. It's reserve size and access to the National Guard likewise far outstrip what the Marines can offer. Long term occupation and nation building should not be the USMC's core mission, simply because of economies of scale.
The shift away from mobility that Boot suggests is tied into the move to nation building. The Army's equipment stands up better to long term fighting. It's heavier, it's less mobile, but because we have a Marine Corps that is seabased and devoted to being expeditionary, the US military is not without rapid-entry capabilities. The Marines can secure what the Army may need to hold.
This brings us to the question of special operations. As noted, the USMC has only a small presence at SOCOM, although that may be changing. If it changes, however, it seems to me that it ought not to redefine what the USMC does in terms of special operations. The most effective thing that the USMC can do, for future special warfare, is not commando raids. The Navy SEALs are excellent commandos, and if more commandos is what we need then we need more of them -- if many more such men can be found.
The USMC's special operations competence, unmatched by anyone else, is the MEU(SOC) (pronounced, "Mew-sock"). That stands for "
Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable." It is a Marine fighting unit of about battalion strength, with integrated air support and transport capability, trained to special operations standards, capable of deploying with extraordinary speed.
The MEU(SOC) is the extension of expeditionary warfare to the special operations field. Its capabilities were on display early in the war in Afghanistan, which I think beautifully illustrates how the Marines ought to support special operations and low intensity conflicts. The Green Berets and CIA SOG made contact with Afghan units, and provided logistics, intelligence, and air support. The Northern Alliance did most of the fighting. But when it was necessary to suddenly close a route to the enemy, the 15th MEU
seized control of an area to the south of the Taliban.
They were able to deploy from the Persian Gulf to southern Afghanistan -- a victory for the concept of seabasing, for until their deployment they were out of the range of enemy attacks, yet could be on the ground in hours. Had it been desirable, they could have been back off the ground again hours later, returned to the bases at sea.
This, I think, is the role the USMC can best serve in terms of fighting future small wars. They shouldn't be the primary forces on the ground -- the Army's strengths play to that area, and if anyone is going to redesign with that in mind, it's the Army who should assign some units to doing it. They shouldn't be doing commando raids, in imitation of the SEALs or the Deltas. They shouldn't be trying to replicate the Green Berets.
What they should do is focus on their seabased, expeditionary concept, but extend it. The ideal should be for a quick-strike force with rapid deployment and withdrawal capability -- a force who can follow on Sun Tzu's advice, "When you move, fall like a thunderbolt."
The ability to deploy in sustainable force, rapidly and in an unexpected sector, is invaluable in maneuver warfare. It serves the country well against opponent states, but also in insurgency warfare such as we see in Iraq. A Corps that focused on being rapidly deployable in that fashion, and which avoided being tied down with occupation duties, would be able to support Army units with sudden surges in manpower and firepower, as well as closing off at the last hour routes that the enemy was counting on for escape.
Special operations of this type would only be part of the Marine Corps' role, of course. The other missions of the Corps will require units of other types -- including the MEFs, whose power is unmatched by any similarly sized unit of infantry. Still, insofar as the Marines are going to be more involved in special operations and low-intensity warfare, I think this is the role for them: MEU(SOC) deployments in the support of nonconventional or conventional units, and also the same ability put to use in the service of Army nation-building units.
If I were betting on the future of the Marines, that's the way I'd bet.
UPDATE: The famous
"Sheik Marine", Captain Joel Leggett of
Southern Appeal sends this analysis:
Grim,
I agree with most of what you said. Having said that I think you are
wrong when you say that the Marine Corps is not the force best suited
for small wars occupation duty. In fact I think we are ideally suited
for that mission. As the Small Wars Manual makes clear such duty
requires a high degree of flexibility and mobility, as well as an
institutional ability to operate in a vaguely defined operational environment.
With all due respect to our brothers and sisters in the Army, that branch
of the service does not posses the institutional culture necessary for
success in that setting.
My service with the Army in joint environments has demonstrated that
the Army is very insistent on people "staying in their lanes." In fact,
I heard that phrase used repeatedly as both a command and compliment by
Army personnel. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to me that
much of the Army leadership that I dealt with would rather see a
problem go unsolved than have a person step out of the narrowly prescribed
duties of their billet to fix the problem. Such an institutional culture
is spectacularly ill suited for small wars occupation duty.
Consequently, since Marine Corps culture is the complete opposite (i.e. every
Marine a rifleman, fill in where needed, etc.) it should come as no
surprise that we are the service that produced the Small Wars Manual in the
first place.
The Marine Corps posses the necessary institutional culture to
successfully carry out such duties. The important thing to remember is that
due to our size we can't carry out much more than one or two such duties
at a time. Furthermore, such duties require time. We have to be
allowed the time to finish the job.
I think Mr. Boot has a point to a degree when he says that we might
want to examine getting some heavier vehicles for such duties. The
amtrakers I have talked to indicate that their vehicles have been used
incorrectly in situations that would require heavier vehicles.
Let me be clear. I don't think the Marine Corps should surrender its
expeditionary role or nature. However, I think that role will require
us to be the primary counterinsurgency/small wars force.
I will agree that the USMC's institutional culture is an advantage -- in this as in every mission it undertakes. One of the things the panel was talking about, which I think is really true, is that the Marine Corps is the thinking man's service (although I've also argued, and do believe, that the military officers' corps as a whole is sufficiently intellectual as to serve as a parallel structure to academia for the life of the mind). Regardless of that claim, the USMC is certainly more flexible and able to embrace new ways of doing things, from the squad level up to the level we're seeing here, where it's possible to debate taking the entire service in a new direction.
The question for me isn't that, but rather, "To what missions should we be applying that particular advantage?" And I think that the three things mentioned above -- the need for longer deployments, the benefit of drawing on a larger reserve and the Guard, and the integration with the Special Forces -- make the Army better suited for these kinds of long-term occupation / nation building duties.
Now, the USMC Reserve has its own citizen soldiers, whose quality I certainly don't mean to denigrate. LTC Coulvillon spoke glowingly of them at the dinner he held for the brothers of
Iraq the Model. It's not their quality, but their size, that is is the issue.
To maximize effectiveness in nation building and counterinsurgecy, you need to be able to combine three elements:
1) A professional class of warriors who will not mind to stay in-country on a prolonged basis. They will have to manage the reconstruction and fight most of the battles. To be effective, they will need to be able to build family-like relationships within existing tribal/social structures, whether in Iraq or Thailand. The Regular Army can do this because it has the manpower.
2) A large reserve, which can be rotated in and out on shorter deployments to maintain its viability as a volunteer force. The need to move them in and out is a disadvantage, but it is balanced and offset by the expertise that the (usually older) citizen soldiers have learned in private life. This is well served by the Army Reserve and National Guard; the USMC Reserve is not large enough to manage rotations faster than the regular units.
3) Special units that can penetrate into harder to reach areas and make initial contacts with groups "beyond the pale." These contacts can be integrated into regular units as the "pale" expands, assuming an "oil stain" model of counterinsurgency. The Green Berets are specially trained for exactly this, for example being selected based on their score on the DLAB artificial language test as well as the physical attributes. The USMC has no parallel model, and would have to devote a lot of resources to developing one or do without.
I don't dispute that the Army would be improved by developing a culture more like the Marines'. (Rather, I shall let Eric dispute it. :) I do think, though, that the Marine Corps' culture is as useful an advantage in any sort of warfighting. It ought to be reserved to where it can do the most good, given the realities of force structure.
