AVI poses a question: When did Europe become Christian? Arguably never, he says.
If you want to debate that topic, please do it at his place because he deserves to enjoy the discussion there. What I want to do here is discuss a model that explains just why we can't really answer that question in a fully satisfactory way. I think it's a good model to have in your mind for a lot of purposes, one that many of you will find helpful.
The model belongs to Timothy Williamson. He came up with the basic approach in his work on vagueness, but later realized that it could serve as a revolutionary model for epistemology (which, I assume everyone knows, is defined as 'the study of knowledge,' but really is mostly a 2,000+ year debate about what exactly knowledge might be).* He wrote a book called Knowledge and its Limits that explains the epistemic model. It's become a big hit in the philosophy world because everyone hates the idea, but it's hard to show exactly where he goes wrong (if indeed he does).
The basic idea works like this: you can know things, and you can sometimes also know that you know them. Other times, however, you are close enough to a border such that you can't really be sure that you know what you know (so that you know, but don't know that you know). Accepting this explains both vagueness and why we sometimes can't be sure about question's like AVI's.
The example on vagueness is also an example about knowledge, so I'll just borrow it. Say that on a given day, day n, you are a child and you know that you are a child. Childhood lasts a long time, so presumably tomorrow (day n+1) you will also be a child. Since there is no obvious limit on that, you should remain a child forever: but somehow a day comes, say by day n+10,950, are not a child and you know that you are not a child anymore. Clarity exists on both ends of the spectrum.
So which day was the exact day on which you stopped being a child? There wasn't one, of course; somehow it happened, during a period of time in which you weren't really sure anymore. Sometimes you felt like a child, sometimes you could see yourself taking adult steps and becoming more adult as a consequence. Exactly when it happens is not clear.
Williamson's answer, in other words, is to dispose of certainty and embrace vagueness. I'm cold at 32 degrees F, and I know it; I'm warm at 75 degrees, and I know I'm not cold anymore. But as the temperature rises, there might come a point that even with careful reflection I couldn't say whether I was still cold. We could probably narrow that down with experiment, but it might vary a lot depending on weather conditions. A bright sunny windless day might no longer feel cold at 34, whereas a windy, wet, rainy day might feel quite cold even at 60 (hypothermia, in fact, is possible). But there will be a moment at which I'm plausibly not really sure.
That doesn't mean that we lose knowledge. We can not only know but know that we know at the ends of the spectrum. We lose that second-order certainty as we get closer to the border conditions; we might know but not know that we know. Very close to the border, we might not know.
So when did Europe become Christian? If the answer really is 'arguably never,' then we still are close enough to the border condition that we can't say we know it ever did. But I think we could say that we know that we know that European civilization was Christian in the 19th century. That seems like a flower of clarity. It may well be, as Eric Blair has often argued, that this civilization received its death blow in WWI and has been dying ever since. At some point we can't still say that we know that Europe is Christian at all, even if once we knew that it was and knew that we knew it.
* I'm leaving out a discussion of Williamson's argument that knowledge isn't analyzable, and focusing here on the vagueness aspect of knowledge, which I think is the more useful concept.
11 comments:
This is just Zeno's Paradox written up as "knowledge" instead of distance. And sorry, it fails to be "true" for the same reason Zeno's Paradox doesn't prevent races from being won, or arrows to never strike their targets.
You cannot point to the specific date Europe became Christian? That doesn't mean that it is not true, only that you don't know the date (and possibly that the "exact moment" can never be knowable). Add to that the fact that we're given no metric to "measure how Christian Europe must be in order to be considered truly Christian".
Lack of a definitive date that can be pointed to doesn't mean it never was Christian anymore than the lack of a specific date you ceased to be a child means you have never become an adult. For example, I am sure you can find someone who will, with great certainty, point to a particular day and say "on that day I became a man." And it may even be true for them. But it would almost certainly be a very different "n+1" for someone else.
I understand that we're firmly in the realm of philosophy in this discussion, and that I'm ill-suited to discuss it (lacking, as I do, the proper education to write with any authority), but this is kind of why I dislike philosophy as a "science". Because, in my opinion, it's a subjective way of dealing with the subjective while trying to apply mathematical (objective) principles to the discussion. This is why (again, to me; I make no claims on anyone else) philosophy will always be an "art" with pretensions of being a science. An unpopular opinion in the Hall, no doubt.
It’s not Zeno’s paradox because it’s not presented as a proof that motion is impossible. Williamson doesn’t deny the change; he’s really wrestling not with Zeno but with Sorites. If you’re interested in the philosophy the article linked under “vagueness” above is the one to read.
Philosophy is neither an art nor a science, but the mother of all of the arts and sciences except arguably mathematics. That, at least, is historical fact.
Mike D, I think you're reading something into Grim's argument that may not be there. He does not say that Europe is not Christian (in fact, he says that it clearly was at one point), but he largely leaves that question aside in order to talk about an interesting aspect of knowing. (This is an inherent hazard in dealing with philosophers - you may begin by discussing question x, only to find that they want to spend all of their time using question x to illustrate and dither over some other question that they find more interesting, or perhaps that they are just preoccupied with that day.*)
*That philosophers are prone to this is well-known, but they are nowhere near as bad about it as econ professors.
In fact I did warn you right at the top of the second paragraph that I was going to leave the more directly relevant stuff for AVI, and instead digress into models from philosophy. You can still discuss the practical question at his place though!
It’s not Zeno’s paradox because it’s not presented as a proof that motion is impossible.
True in the strictest sense, untrue in what I had meant. It is not presented as proof that motion is impossible, merely that knowledge is impossible. And I still maintain it's an apt comparison, because Zeno's Paradox holds motion to be impossible because the exact moment of completion is not determinable due to infinitesimals. This knowledge paradox holds that because we cannot point to a specific "n+1" date/time when we ceased to be a child, or that Europe became Christian that the answer is "arguably never". I merely posit that for the same reasons that Zeno's Paradox does not (in fact) prevent motion from happening, this knowledge paradox does not prevent children from growing up or Europe being Christian.
Philosophy is neither an art nor a science, but the mother of all of the arts and sciences except arguably mathematics. That, at least, is historical fact.
I value philosophy as a means of attempting to codify and give structure to thinking. However, like art, I think it's far too subjective to use to draw conclusions about objective reality. I'm about to butcher this... but in my mind it's similar to a computer climate model. It can be very useful to predict trends and spark discussion on potential hazards (or organize a way of thinking in philosophy's case), but since it cannot account for unknowns in the real world its utility as the basis for decisions is dubious to say the least.
Mike D, I think you're reading something into Grim's argument that may not be there. He does not say that Europe is not Christian (in fact, he says that it clearly was at one point), but he largely leaves that question aside in order to talk about an interesting aspect of knowing
I'm not so sure I am. Grim posits:
So when did Europe become Christian? If the answer really is 'arguably never,' then we still are close enough to the border condition that we can't say we know it ever did.
Now, he's not definitively saying it never was, but his is saying that it is not knowable if it was Christian due to this knowledge paradox. And that's where I was going. I think it is "knowable" in the same sense that I "know" I am no longer a child, in spite of being unable to point to the date that I ceased to be one. Can I prove it to you (or indeed, even myself)? No. Because life is not a mathematical proof. And I maintain that trying to fit "life" into some form of logical structure is always doomed to fail. It's attempting to apply objective measurements on a subjective experience.
And I still maintain it's an apt comparison, because Zeno's Paradox holds motion to be impossible because the exact moment of completion is not determinable due to infinitesimals. This knowledge paradox holds that because we cannot point to a specific "n+1" date/time when we ceased to be a child, or that Europe became Christian that the answer is "arguably never".
So that's not the claim that Williamson is making. Zeno's use of infinite divisibility was meant to prove the impossibility of motion. Williamson isn't attempting to prove the impossibility of knowledge; in fact, he believes we have a very high degree of clarity in our knowledge at the ends of the spectrum. We not only know, we know that we know.
What Williamson is trying to address is a tricky question about the middle of the spectrum. We don't know exactly when a child becomes an adult, though we know that it happens. (In the classic Sorites problem, you have a grain of salt or sand, and then add another, and another; when does it become a "heap" of salt? Well, sometime! But when exactly?)
There are lots of answers to that problem that have been proposed, but I like Williamson's approach here. There just is a point at which we know it's a heap, even though we can't say how we know or maybe even that we're sure that we know. Later, as it gets even bigger, we are sure that we know. We just have to accept that there are these vague cases.
I value philosophy as a means of attempting to codify and give structure to thinking. However, like art, I think it's far too subjective to use to draw conclusions about objective reality.
Only some philosophy is even intended to be practical -- generally ethics and politics. You can say, "I refuse to be guided by my ethical conclusions because they're too unreliable," but generally we don't say that. Or you can do like my friend who 'feels' her way along: "That doesn't feel right" or "This feels right to me." That's another way of not being philosophical, but she has a bad track record in her wagers with me about how political events will turn out.
I'm pragmatic in my practical philosophy, as I've discussed here at times. Principles are sometimes to be set aside if the practical results don't work out. For example, I don't approve of big government solutions to anything in principle; in practice, some events like pandemics may require them, at least temporarily.
I'm not so sure I am. Grim posits:
Yes, but read the sentences immediately after the quote. AVI posited that it might be possible to say it never happened; I was suggesting that, in spite of the hypothetical, it seemed clear (in Williamson's sense) that we know that we know that Europe was Christian in the 19th century.
Ah, apologies on the misread then. I am, after all, only human (and fallible, just ask my wife).
For logic systens, first define what is christian grim. Missed a few steps.
I wasn't actually interested in the practical question here, Ymar; that question belongs at the AVI discussion. I do think pretty much any plausible definition is going to capture 19th century Europe.
Still, by doctrine, the decision about who counts as a Christian belongs to Judgment Day, and not (as you often like to say) to human authority.
I do think pretty much any plausible definition is going to capture 19th century Europe.
People need to go back to Constantine at least, which they don't. It's a hidden part of the Western psyche that is repressed and few people talk about, even theologians or scholars. Well, scholars are insular and that is their excuse, but why fake priests and theologians often gloss over this issue is... somewhat mysterious. Even the media doesn't talk about it, even though it is the greatest weapon against organized religion.
Still, by doctrine, the decision about who counts as a Christian belongs to Judgment Day, and not (as you often like to say) to human authority.
That is correct, although from my communications, they don't care what humans call their organizations. Human organizations are human organizations. There's no need for Divinities, negative or positive, to care one way or another. They do care about what people do to themselves, to each, and to Earth however, as that impacts the spiritual progress, which is part of a Divine Plan.
For example, they and I don't care how many people think I am stupid, crazy, or wrong. I see no need to retaliate against that or to defend against it even. Nothing can harm a Son of God or a Daughter of God. Which god is the bigger question...
What I will do is to mention it ad nauseam from now until the end of eternity... which means it never ends. Like that one joke about your school age buddy that you will never let them forget, as you keep bringing it up in stories. First it was anger/embarassment, now it is just fun.
I can call Yeshua a crazy teacher that needs to tone it down, because we're on personal terms and in a relationship, as Peter and the Apostles were in a personal relationship. It is this personal relationship, no matter what human language calls it, that creates the spiritual miracle. I can call myself a Satanist, and so long as I obey the strategic directive to counter Anti Divine Opposition on Earth, my chain of command superiors and need to know intel agents, do not care about what I call myself. It has no meaning one way or another. It only matters what I do and how I think/act.
The Divine HIerarchy and Family, is inherently a meritocracy.
* I'm leaving out a discussion of Williamson's argument that knowledge isn't analyzable, and focusing here on the vagueness aspect of knowledge, which I think is the more useful concept.
To address your point, knowledge comes from a personal relationship with the Divine. It comes from remembering and thus obtaining wisdom. Knowledge can be learned on Earth but as Socrates correctly found out, there are pieces of knowledge that cannot be learned but is nonetheless true: meaning Divine Wisdom which he separated from knowledge.
Basic epistemology. How do you know something is true or knowledge? How do you know your mother is your mother and you are you?
Divine Wisdom: How can you not remember...
The biggest service to other act of Marianne Williamson is not her sacrifice or service to try to out compete Demoncrats on the ticket. WIn or lose, she has already accomplished a big objective.
Which is to bring A Course in Miracles to the attention of the American sleeping public.
That is of course, a far greater strategic objective than me talking online about things nobody understands.
Amongst the Divine Family, We have our Rush Limbaughs. People who if you just listen to, you will get sucked in. And people are afraid of that, heh. Just as Leftists fear listening to Rush.
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