Plato and Aristotle on Exemplary Justice

In the Laws, Plato has his three strangers turn their attention to the matter in Book IX. Plato recommends for theft a proportionate equality, by which he means you must restore what you stole, and exactly that much again over it (thus, twice what you stole). This is purely retribution, and as I noted in the commentary it wouldn't have much deterrent effect. 

Plato hopes deterrence won't much be needed, as the book had opened with: the Athenian stranger was embarrassed even to admit that so well-ordered and virtuous a people would require criminal punishments at all. The whole structure of the work of the Laws is to try to deter crime by structuring a society so well that virtue will be the inevitable result. In Book X, for example, he lays out the mythological structure that will keep the people aimed in the right direction without the need for punishments. The myth reinforces the law, and makes all sorts of lawbreaking a sort of blasphemy -- which was punishable by death. The example is in the myth, though, not the punishment: blasphemers were to be executed not to set the example but to punish their blasphemy. It was the myth that set the example.

It was curious to me at the time, and remains so, that the Athenian later proves very interested in military punishments in Book XII. Anyone who has been associated with the military understands that regular disciplinary actions are part of the life; and being so regularly necessary, capital punishment can't be the normal course of action. Thus, we can't view military punishments as a sort-of blasphemy requiring execution every time. In fact, military punishments in the model city are notably milder than the punishments recommended for civilians, which is an interesting feature of the Laws' model. That is not normally how military justice has worked, although I guess there are some exceptions -- everyone knows of the guy who was allowed to join the Marines instead of prison. (I did in fact know a guy like that growing up. He turned out great after the Marines.)

For Aristotle, justice divides between distributive and rectificatory. The latter is most like Plato's 'proportionate equality' in revenging theft in that it repays those who have suffered damage, and it does so on lines of arithmetical equality. Aristotle's version doesn't worry over the question of whether a good man or a bad one defrauded the other, or whether the fraud was an accident or by intention: what is owed is to make the defrauded one whole. 

Now this was the EN, not the Politics, so we aren't looking at crime as such; more like a divorce settlement, I mentioned in that commentary, where it matters which spouse was the adulterer and which one not; it doesn't really matter which one was the better person, or how justified or not the adultery might have been because of neglect or hard feelings, just which one broke the agreement. 

What isn't advocated for here, though, is either revenge or example-setting. It would be wrong to punish the adulterous husband (or wife) a whole lot more just to send a message to other spouses; what is just is to recognize the harm done in the specific case, and address that and only that.