Nicomachean Ethics IV.6

The next several sections are on how to be socially virtuous. It is key to Aristotle's view of the human good that we have positive interactions with each other. I have already mentioned once in this commentary Aristotle's explanation from Politics III of his ideal for a good state: "a community [of] family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements [which] are created by friendship.... The end of the state is the good life, and.... the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life." That provides us with a standard against which to judge any state. 

Thus, how to be the kind of person who can build and maintain friendships is an important ethical concern. It is also a political concern. (It is one of the places where our current politics is suffering some difficulty.) It is important that good men know how to make and keep friends.

In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their duty 'to give no pain to the people they meet'; while those who, on the contrary, oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain are called churlish and contentious. That the states we have named are culpable is plain enough, and that the middle state is laudable- that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will resent, the right things and in the right way; but no name has been assigned to it, though it most resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle state is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. 

It is not surprising to learn that a friend will put up with you; but only so far! It is surprising to learn that a friend is meant to resent things you do to them -- but only the right ones. Yet in this way honor is maintained, and the friendship can thus be between men of honor.  

Aristotle goes on to distinguish this from true friendship:

But the state in question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that such a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a certain kind. For he will behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of these cases he will behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for intimates and for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to give pain to them.

He more explicitly makes clear the relationship of honor to this sort of relationship, which is like friendship in the way that the Politics claims that social relations are a species of friendship.

Now we have said generally that he will associate with people in the right way; but it is by reference to what is honourable and expedient that he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life; and wherever it is not honourable, or is harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's action would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on that other, while his opposition brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but will decline. He will associate differently with people in high station and with ordinary people, with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class what is befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency. For the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.

The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described, but has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the direction of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer; while the man who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish and contentious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each other because the mean is without a name.

I can't help but notice the similarity to the first section of the Havamal, the Gestabáttr or 'guest house.' Not only Aristotle but Odin raises these concerns as significant considerations for good men. It is an interesting exercise to compare and contrast the advice given in this and the following sections, but as this is a commentary on the EN I will leave that as an exercise for the reader. 

O, Nova Scotia

Apparently Nova Scotia, which is about the size of New Hampshire, has simply ordered its population not to go into the woods to hike or camp this fall. There's a fine of twenty-five grand if you do so and get caught. 

Continuing the Discussion on the Perils of Government

The discussion on the Melodrama post below has grown to 52 comments as of this morning, and since some of them are threaded it can be hard to find what the new comments are. Since it's so interesting to all of you -- as judged by the far-greater-than-usual number of comments -- I thought we might continue it this week in a new space. 

I'm going to start by trying to pick up on a thread of comments where Thomas D. and I were discussing Mexico and some historical analogs. I will lightly edit these comments for length and content; you can see the originals if you like in the original thread, but please respond here instead of there to ease the discussion.

As we enter the discussion, we were discussing a list of massacres in Mexico. It was part of a longer exchange on whether it is true that government is always the biggest threat; I think it always is potentially, and therefore should be restrained even when there are other key threats. Thomas was unsure about this and fielded spirited rebuttals. 

Grim: When we see actual genocides and democides worldwide, it is not criminal organizations but governments that carry them out. As I've said before, in the bloody 20th century your own government was more likely to kill you than its enemies. The Nazis killed more Germans (and German nationals who didn't qualify as 'German enough') than even the Soviets did; the Soviets starved more of their own citizens than even the Nazis killed. The Japanese militarist government did horrible things to the Chinese people, but not nearly so many Chinese died in all of the horrors of the Japanese occupation as died in Mao's "Great Leap Forward."

There are some limit cases where we can debate whether the organization is a sort-of government, as you noted before. The Rwandan militias were sort of government, sort of a riot that the government allowed to go on rampages. Hamas is a currently relevant example; they are in some sense both a government and a terrorist organization that engages in criminal activity (but, to be honest, so does everyone's government -- the United States was tied up in some of those Mexican military murders, and even in some of the cartel ones...).

A criminal organization is organized for the purpose of crime, which is to say money and power; a government is organized for the same purpose, except that they also claim the power to define what counts as crime. Sometimes they might slip one into the other, but government has by its nature more potential to harm, which is why the worst actual harms come from them.  

By the way, not on the list of Mexican massacres is the largest massacre in American history: the Goliad massacre by Santa Anna's forces. More than four hundred prisoners were executed by what claimed, at that time, to be their government; it shows up on our list instead because of one of those successful revolutions you were mentioning. 

Thomas Doubting: Your point about the 20th century democides and genocides is well-taken, but let me point out the private violence that brought much of that about. The Soviet Union and China were both the result of successful Marxist revolutions. The Nazis and Italian fascists had their private armies, the SA & SS and the Blackshirts, who helped them attain political power. The Japanese militarists were assisted by young men who assassinated successful businessmen for promoting capitalism and any politician who openly advocated for democracy. In all of these cases, these nations were pushed toward totalitarianism and militarism by private violence.

In addition, the new governments of the USSR, China, and Nazi Germany came about in part as political movements focused on internal enemies by private powers, which, once they could, took on the mantle of government to continue their pursuit of their internal enemies. It is no wonder such governments killed so many of their own. Given the strong-man totalitarianism, these governments acted much like the private organizations of individual men: Stalin, Mao, Hitler. I don't know if their examples can be generalized to all governments.

Grim: Likewise, your point about the private armies striving for control of the government -- the Nazis versus the Communists in Germany is a good example -- demonstrates that they themselves understood the value of coming to control it instead of being a private army. Coupled with the further proof of the additional harm such forces were able to accomplish after winning control of the government, I think it is a compelling argument for my position.