Graham Priest has this idea that there can be true contradictions that some contradictions are true. His view is not that all contradictions are true, but just some, and he thinks that we should only accept contradictions to be true if we have no other options in thinking. He, for example, thinks the liar paradox is a good example of a true contradiction. So, if you say, ‘this sentence is false’. If ‘this sentence is false’ is true, then it's false, but if ‘this sentence is false’ is false, then it’s true, so it's always contradictory.
I wanted to point this out because the principle of non-contradiction that we inherited is an artifact of the debates of Aristotle's time; he is often credited with at least the version of it that became such a bedrock of our inheritance. Yet it didn't always exist; in Socrates' day it was open to debate, and has recently become so again (as the interview goes on to note, most philosophical debate is back open again, some of it for the first time in ages).
14 comments:
Does the fact that "This sentence is false" is also non-sensical matter at all in determination of truth? I mean, we all understand the point of the sentence to create a logical short circuit.
That’s an alternative view, approximately Wittgenstein’s later theory. He developed an account of nonsense that could be interpreted to fit it, in any case.
If I say to you, “I could open up this door if only I had a struvven,” you might think that you had almost understood me. You only need to know the exact referent of one word, which you already partially understand from the context. Once you work out what this struvven is, you’ll understand perfectly.
Yet there is no referent to “struvven,” so in fact the sentence is nonsense. It’s destroying meaning, in fact, by deceiving you into looking for it where meaning can’t be found.
In the case of the sentence said to be false, we know what all the referents are, but it’s analogous. The sentence— on this view— simply can’t convey any meaning, and is deceiving us that it could.
So it’s two different ways to look at the same phenomenon.
I just published an edited volume on the Kyoto school, which is a Japanese philosophical tradition in the 20th century, that looks at the legacy of German philosophy and German idealism in the Kyoto school. That came out with Cornell University Press a couple weeks ago.
Uh, I may have to read this ... But not until summer, if then.
- Tom
Total amateur philosophy here, but with a statement like "This sentence is false" can we deal with it by saying it's just a claim? Doesn't logic have to include premises as well?
So, would saying, "That's not really a logical contradiction because it has no premises" work as an answer?
- Tom
One of the things that Greg is saying here is that there are a lot of different approaches that are considered viable right now, or at least as worth discussing as approaches. What you're pointing to is similar to what the logical positivists were doing in the early-mid 20th century, essentially ruling the claim to be meaningless because it can neither be proven empirically, nor is it a tautology whose truth is self-evident. (Indeed, it's the opposite of a tautology.)
One could respond to that in a couple of ways. One way would be to provide a better example that isn't so easily refuted; if this was just a way of illustrating the idea rather than making the point in a disciplined fashion, one could construct a full-scale argument that performed the same contradiction.
Another way, though, would be to analyze the statement so as to list out its assumptions as premises. Unstated assumptions are often spelled out when arguments are formalized, yet left unstated until then for reasons of brevity or because people were, you know, assuming their assumptions. The assumptions are all one would need to do derivations, though; they are often an adequate set of premises for that.
The problem from a logical perspective is that the criteria for "false" are one of the unstated assumptions. If the empirical is not a candidate -- as it doesn't seem to be, given that there's nothing we could go and look at in the world that would determine the falseness of the sentence -- what is the truthmaker of that sentence? It's not logic itself, since logic is only a truth-preserver, not a truth-granter. So if the sentence is true (meaning false), there has to be something making it true (and therefore false); or else there has to be something making it false (and therefore true). It's not clear what that would be.
Well, if you do and you want to talk to Greg about it after, let me know.
Thanks. I'll keep that in mind.
Does he read Japanese?
- Tom
That makes sense, although it's mortifying to be placed alongside the logical positivists, even briefly. Egads.
I'll have to read more about this.
- Tom
This strikes me as very much what leftists do as they corrupt and twist language to suit their needs of the moment- you think you understand what they are saying, but in fact they are saying something different than what you thought they were. I suppose that means there is, at least in some views, a purpose to destroying meaning- so perhaps it's not entirely nonsensical in that example.
I asked him and he says he doesn’t, he is partnered with a native speaker. I have some more for you. I’ll try to post it tomorrow.
That's what I would do, too, although I can read Japanese fairly well. It is a very nuanced language.
The 18-20th century German philosophers and intellectuals were widely read and their frameworks employed by Japanese intellectuals in the 20th century. To understand Japanese intellectual history, you have to study German philosophy. Even if you want to study medieval philosophy / religion / history, you'll often be reading Japanese scholars employing German frameworks to the medieval period. So, this book would seem to be a very useful one.
- Tom
After reading the blurb on Moss's book, it occurs to me that Nishida and some Japanese philosophers seem to accept something like dialetheism. It makes more sense if I think about it through a kind of Buddhist lens, maybe.
Also, is dialetheism actually just adding a third status? There's true, false, and both? I guess 4, if "neither" is included for situations where you have a contradiction but it doesn't qualify for dialetheism.
This reminds me of The Treachery of Images, but of course, a painting of a pipe is not a real pipe, so it's not the same.
Since you can read Japanese, you might want to consider this:
https://www.chikumashobo.co.jp/product/9784480077226/
Greg wrote the conclusion, and it has a lot on the Kyoto school.
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