Nicomachean Ethics IX.11

On the value of friends in good times and bad.
Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought after in both; for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they need people to live with and to make the objects of their beneficence; for they wish to do well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary in bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it is more noble in good fortune, and so we also seek for good men as our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and to live with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in bad, since grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden, or-without that happening-their presence by its pleasantness, and the thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some other that our grief is lightened, is a question that may be dismissed; at all events what we have described appears to take place.

That is a striking observation: all things being equal, people wish to do well by others and give them gifts if they are able. "Give your friends gifts -- they're as glad as you are / to wear new clothes and weapons; frequent giving makes friendships last, if the exchange is equal." (Havamal 41) 

We tend to talk about human nature as being basically good (as Rousseau), or basically evil (as Hobbes does). Aristotle treats humanity as basically social; in the Politics he quickly deduces that 'man is a political animal,' and thus that formation of polities is basic to our nature. This is because humanity arises in families, and while families have a natural hierarchy families need politics to assure fair treatment when they have to interact with members of other families. (It is thus all the more striking that he finds that the friendship of husband and wife is even more natural to humanity than this civilization.) 

Is it true that, given a degree of prosperity, human beings will wish to do well by others and give each other gifts? If so, that says something fairly positive about us; it is over against the idea that humanity is basically selfish, which has a lot of empirical weight behind it. 

But [friends'] presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors. The very seeing of one's friends is pleasant, especially if one is in adversity, and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to comfort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our character and the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained at our misfortunes is painful; for every one shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as friends and companions in sorrow. But in all things one obviously ought to imitate the better type of person.

When my father died, I remember that I hid my grief away from everyone as completely as possible. Was this the better mode? I have no idea. I know it seemed right to keep it hidden and to myself. 

On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies both a pleasant passing of our time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure at our own good fortune. For this cause it would seem that we ought to summon our friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough is my misfortune'. We should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to do us a great service.

One of the ideas about friendship Aristotle has been pursuing is that part of the value of friendship is the ability to 'do virtue together.' Happiness is an activity, specifically the exercise of virtue (ἀρετή, or excellence) with our vital powers. Doing great service to your friends is, then, an excellent thing to do: it is an exercise of virtue. Being a good friend implies letting your friends practice their excellence on you once in a while.

Yet this here is counterbalanced against not being a burden to those friends. If they can do you a great service at small inconvenience, great: but if it will be costly for them, perhaps it is most excellent to suffer quietly than to ask for help. 

What, though, if you discover that your friend is in need? 

Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them; such action is nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends are prosperous we should join readily in their activities (for they need friends for these too), but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing them; for that sometimes happens.

The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.
Not being a kill-joy is a very worthy ethical principle. 

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