This story is the most hopeful I've heard out of Northeast Asia in a while. I'd say this is the case for optimism: that US power in the region is collapsing, but that security vis. the DPRK might be maintained by an evolving coalition of regional powers. From the standpoint of nuclear terrorism, this is still insufficient--but it's hopeful, at least. No other scenario has been that.
From The Agonist:
"2:25 CST A report from a journalist embedded within the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division indicates that the division has pinned down Iraqi troops against the Euphrates River and is pummeling them with heavy artillery and air strikes. The unidentified Iraqi forces are most likely elements of the 11th Iraqi Division. CENTCOM reported earlier March 22 that the 3rd Infantry had captured An Nasiriyah and a bridge across the Euphrates to the west. It is unclear which side of the river the battle is taking place. It also was unclear what time the journalist filed the report.via Stratfor."
You heard it here yesterday.
"2:25 CST A report from a journalist embedded within the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division indicates that the division has pinned down Iraqi troops against the Euphrates River and is pummeling them with heavy artillery and air strikes. The unidentified Iraqi forces are most likely elements of the 11th Iraqi Division. CENTCOM reported earlier March 22 that the 3rd Infantry had captured An Nasiriyah and a bridge across the Euphrates to the west. It is unclear which side of the river the battle is taking place. It also was unclear what time the journalist filed the report.via Stratfor."
You heard it here yesterday.
Vandenberg Air Force Base:
For a while now we've been hearing about anti-war protestors who want to infiltrate the Vandenburg Air Force base near Santa Cruz. Vandenberg is apparently a major staging area for targeting and communications operations for the US military as a whole. Infiltrators hope to engage in sabotage operations, which they can do even if they are caught: military "force protection" protocols may require a lockdown of some secure areas if infiltrators are discovered. The idea is to disrupt military communications and operations at a time when troops are in the field.
A lot can be said about that. Perhaps the first thing that comes to mind is this: It is precisely the advanced communications that have allowed this war to limit noncombatant casualties as much as it has. The "decapitation" strike we saw in the early minutes of the war show that plainly. Because of our communications capabilities, there is more of that kind of intelligence that is "actionable"--that is, intelligence that you can actually use for military targeting. Thus, a carefully aimed stroke against the murderous leaders of Iraq was possible. Without such communications, we're back to carpet-bombing in the hope of getting our boy.
Protestor Maia Ramnath completely fails to understand this. She says, "If our actions at Vandenberg succeed in delaying or disrupting the use of the world�s most formidable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, in the conduct of a blatantly imperialist war, then we will have acted in good faith, in the interests of the human race." Leaving aside the questions of weapons of mass destruction and imperialism, the fact is that she's acting directly against the interests of the human race, and most especially of the noncombatant citizens of Iraq. By raising the intelligence bar for the US military, she not only endangers the lives of her bravest countrymen, but also the people she thinks she's protecting. Her actions do nothing to protect Iraqi citizens, but rather endanger them: those actions do, though, protect the generals and leaders of the Iraqi regime.
I have a different beef with Elden Boothe, but it is a smaller one. He, protesting the Vandenberg AF Base's policy that infiltrators may be subject to shoot-to-kill orders by base security. "The only time a law-enforcement official should shoot is when his life is in danger," Boothe said. "We are in the peace movement. We are not going to endanger anyone. . . . I suppose they could shoot you, but they would be doing it illegally."
Wrong on all points, sir. First, law enforcement officials--and, in most states, private citizens--are empowered to shoot to kill to protect any life that is in immediate danger, not only their own. The state of Georgia's title 16 describes this as "both [a] right and [a] duty." As mentioned, infiltrators are putting the lives of US military men and Iraqi citizens at immediate peril. Second, base security are not just "law enforcement" officers. Primarily, they are soldiers, and we are at war. Acts of sabotage against military installations have always merited "shoot-to-kill" status under these circumstances.
I still say the best policy would be to turn loose some Marine Corps Scout Snipers on the grounds of the base, with wax bullets and .50 caliber rifles. It would be good training for the Snipers (and good fun for them, too), and a good lesson for the protestors. No need to shoot to kill--a good beating with .50 caliber rounds will change hearts and minds pretty quickly too.
For a while now we've been hearing about anti-war protestors who want to infiltrate the Vandenburg Air Force base near Santa Cruz. Vandenberg is apparently a major staging area for targeting and communications operations for the US military as a whole. Infiltrators hope to engage in sabotage operations, which they can do even if they are caught: military "force protection" protocols may require a lockdown of some secure areas if infiltrators are discovered. The idea is to disrupt military communications and operations at a time when troops are in the field.
A lot can be said about that. Perhaps the first thing that comes to mind is this: It is precisely the advanced communications that have allowed this war to limit noncombatant casualties as much as it has. The "decapitation" strike we saw in the early minutes of the war show that plainly. Because of our communications capabilities, there is more of that kind of intelligence that is "actionable"--that is, intelligence that you can actually use for military targeting. Thus, a carefully aimed stroke against the murderous leaders of Iraq was possible. Without such communications, we're back to carpet-bombing in the hope of getting our boy.
Protestor Maia Ramnath completely fails to understand this. She says, "If our actions at Vandenberg succeed in delaying or disrupting the use of the world�s most formidable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, in the conduct of a blatantly imperialist war, then we will have acted in good faith, in the interests of the human race." Leaving aside the questions of weapons of mass destruction and imperialism, the fact is that she's acting directly against the interests of the human race, and most especially of the noncombatant citizens of Iraq. By raising the intelligence bar for the US military, she not only endangers the lives of her bravest countrymen, but also the people she thinks she's protecting. Her actions do nothing to protect Iraqi citizens, but rather endanger them: those actions do, though, protect the generals and leaders of the Iraqi regime.
I have a different beef with Elden Boothe, but it is a smaller one. He, protesting the Vandenberg AF Base's policy that infiltrators may be subject to shoot-to-kill orders by base security. "The only time a law-enforcement official should shoot is when his life is in danger," Boothe said. "We are in the peace movement. We are not going to endanger anyone. . . . I suppose they could shoot you, but they would be doing it illegally."
Wrong on all points, sir. First, law enforcement officials--and, in most states, private citizens--are empowered to shoot to kill to protect any life that is in immediate danger, not only their own. The state of Georgia's title 16 describes this as "both [a] right and [a] duty." As mentioned, infiltrators are putting the lives of US military men and Iraqi citizens at immediate peril. Second, base security are not just "law enforcement" officers. Primarily, they are soldiers, and we are at war. Acts of sabotage against military installations have always merited "shoot-to-kill" status under these circumstances.
I still say the best policy would be to turn loose some Marine Corps Scout Snipers on the grounds of the base, with wax bullets and .50 caliber rifles. It would be good training for the Snipers (and good fun for them, too), and a good lesson for the protestors. No need to shoot to kill--a good beating with .50 caliber rounds will change hearts and minds pretty quickly too.
On France & French:
Le Figaro discusses the recent find of Ricin poison in the Paris subway system. The amounts were not sufficient, authorities helpfully tell us, to kill hundreds. Wonderful news.
My favorite line from this story: "[D]ocuments estampill�s al-Qaida et permettant de confectionner le poison mortel." French is an astonishing language to me, sometimes remarkably direct, sometimes equally dense. Probably the best part of it is the cognates with English, though, which produce an effect in the reader like no other language. Until today, I would never have put "confection" and "mortal poison" together; but now that they have, I am reminded of that scene in V. C. Andrew's _Flowers in the Attic_, which was required reading in a high school that would have done better to require Chaucer, wherein the children are poisoned by cookies topped with cyanide. Such are the benefits of language studies, I suppose: new ideas rise from the semantics alone. Usually the ideas are kinder.
Le Figaro discusses the recent find of Ricin poison in the Paris subway system. The amounts were not sufficient, authorities helpfully tell us, to kill hundreds. Wonderful news.
My favorite line from this story: "[D]ocuments estampill�s al-Qaida et permettant de confectionner le poison mortel." French is an astonishing language to me, sometimes remarkably direct, sometimes equally dense. Probably the best part of it is the cognates with English, though, which produce an effect in the reader like no other language. Until today, I would never have put "confection" and "mortal poison" together; but now that they have, I am reminded of that scene in V. C. Andrew's _Flowers in the Attic_, which was required reading in a high school that would have done better to require Chaucer, wherein the children are poisoned by cookies topped with cyanide. Such are the benefits of language studies, I suppose: new ideas rise from the semantics alone. Usually the ideas are kinder.
On North Korea:
Today's news is that the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea--usually, "North Korea") has postponed talks with South Korea, blaming them for allegedly raising their military alert status. North Korea seems to see this as a prelude to war.
Earlier this month, an unofficial spokesman for the DPRK promised nuclear strikes against the United States in the event of any such invasion. The article wildly claims that there are a hundred 'suspected' nuclear weapons in the DPRK, numbers I've not seen elsewhere. If memory serves, the CIA thinks the actual numbers are two to six. However, the statements the man makes about the DPRK's ability to produce nuclear weapons look accurate to me--six new warheads by April is not impossible, given their hidden nuclear processing plants (see yesterday's links) and the possibilty of underground testing (cf. the gentleman's comments on becoming an "official nuclear power" as one way of neutralizing American influence on the penninsula).
I am still thinking about options for dealing with the DPRK. Ideas welcome.
Today's news is that the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea--usually, "North Korea") has postponed talks with South Korea, blaming them for allegedly raising their military alert status. North Korea seems to see this as a prelude to war.
Earlier this month, an unofficial spokesman for the DPRK promised nuclear strikes against the United States in the event of any such invasion. The article wildly claims that there are a hundred 'suspected' nuclear weapons in the DPRK, numbers I've not seen elsewhere. If memory serves, the CIA thinks the actual numbers are two to six. However, the statements the man makes about the DPRK's ability to produce nuclear weapons look accurate to me--six new warheads by April is not impossible, given their hidden nuclear processing plants (see yesterday's links) and the possibilty of underground testing (cf. the gentleman's comments on becoming an "official nuclear power" as one way of neutralizing American influence on the penninsula).
I am still thinking about options for dealing with the DPRK. Ideas welcome.
Pope: War "threatens fate of Humanity."
And to think I'd always thought the Catholic Church had a pretty fixed idea about the "fate of humanity."
And to think I'd always thought the Catholic Church had a pretty fixed idea about the "fate of humanity."
Stanley Kurtz on North Korea in National Review Online. Kurtz is being sloppy, with a large number of qualifiers and a number of bald assertions (e.g., "Even if Yongbyon stays quiet, the North Koreans will shortly be selling nuclear fuel manufactured in their clandestine plant(s) to al Qaeda." Well--maybe. It's wise to act as though that were going to be the case, because the consequences of it happening are so severe. Still, here's a place where one of those qualifiers would have been useful). Even so he's got some things worth reading. The first is the existence of clandestine uranium processing plants, whose activities/existence can't be examined. Earlier this week I was discussing with a close friend a theory I had that they might test a weapon underground, thereby creating more fissible material on the instant as well as announcing that they were a nuclear state. She didn't think they would, not wishing to create quite -that- big a stir. Here's a reminder that they don't have to do so in order to keep producing uranium, though not as speedily as with undergound tests.
The Agonist is reporting "unconfirmed" Israeli reports that the 3rd Infantry is bypassing the sites of resistance. The 3rd Infantry, Mechanized, is out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, not far from Savannah. They are called "the Rock of the Marne" due to their performance in a battle not well remembered by the president of France, who seems to think that military control of an area comes from bureaucrats rather than forces on the ground.
Unconfirmed reports are just that, but it sounds plausible to me. There is no possibility that the 3rd would leave an active enemy at its back, however, with access to its supply lines. What this likely means is that an envelopment of the resisting forces is in progress. There are two ways to go about this, and I don't know what the current plan calls for. The usual fashion is to invest on three sides, leaving open a way for an enemy to retreat. This isn't an act of kindness. The notion is to hit them until they are forced to abandon their defensive positions, withdrawing in the only way that is left available. Since you know which way they are going, you can set ambushes (or, in this case, use air power) to rout and slaughter them along the way. Recall here the "highway of death" from Gulf War I.
It is also possible to perform a complete encirclement. Usually this is not done, unless your forces are so superior that you do not fear having to defend all points against a breakout attempt. The three-sided investment allows for greater predictability of enemy actions. However, in this case, it is entirely possible the 3rd might attempt this, completely investing the resisting forces and destroying them with airstrikes, mopping up later.
Although most of the reported airstrikes are in cities just now--as that is where the reporters are--it appears that this tactic is in fact what is being used in the Western campaign.
Unconfirmed reports are just that, but it sounds plausible to me. There is no possibility that the 3rd would leave an active enemy at its back, however, with access to its supply lines. What this likely means is that an envelopment of the resisting forces is in progress. There are two ways to go about this, and I don't know what the current plan calls for. The usual fashion is to invest on three sides, leaving open a way for an enemy to retreat. This isn't an act of kindness. The notion is to hit them until they are forced to abandon their defensive positions, withdrawing in the only way that is left available. Since you know which way they are going, you can set ambushes (or, in this case, use air power) to rout and slaughter them along the way. Recall here the "highway of death" from Gulf War I.
It is also possible to perform a complete encirclement. Usually this is not done, unless your forces are so superior that you do not fear having to defend all points against a breakout attempt. The three-sided investment allows for greater predictability of enemy actions. However, in this case, it is entirely possible the 3rd might attempt this, completely investing the resisting forces and destroying them with airstrikes, mopping up later.
Although most of the reported airstrikes are in cities just now--as that is where the reporters are--it appears that this tactic is in fact what is being used in the Western campaign.
On the War:
The best site I've found for following war developments, with the understanding that he's printing rumors as well as confirmed reports, is The Agonist. There are a number of good warblogs for seeing unfolding events, but most of them claim to be mystified by the strategy the coalition is using. This seems to be resulting in some worries among observers that things may yet turn bleak.
Well, there are two big dangers left: the Special Republican Guard, and the taking of Bagdad. However, I think I can give a picture of the emergent strategy that ought to calm fears.
1) The coalition has moved quickly to seize entry points (airfields, the seaport), communication points (esp. bridges) and oil fields. Ground troops have been used rather than air power because these needed to be taken whole. In spite of "surprisingly stiff resistance," pace the W. Post, there is only one confirmed fatality from combat. I suspect there have been quite a few more among special operations troops, but we may never know exactly what their toll is.
2) Special operations forces seem to have the run of Bagdad, judging from the various reports coming out about the decapitation strike, as well as intelligence gathering. This bodes well for the coming campaign, and suggests we have a significant number of defectors/traitors assisting our intelligence forces.
3) The bulk of the coalition military is advancing only until it meets resistance. This is not true in the sensitive areas mentioned in point 1; those had to be taken, so resistance was broken. Yet it appears to be otherwise true. The US Army seems to be advancing cautiously in order to separate Iraqi military units into those which will surrender, and those which will fight. The ones that fight back are being pinned down, but not broken. This gives the illusion that they are holding their own against our forces. In fact, it is probably a strategic decision to pin them down for later air strikes. Once they are enveloped, they will be broken by the application of air power, with ground forces merely mopping up survivors.
Looks like a well planned operation. No surprise there: the joint US/British forces offers the two best collective minds in the military world.
The best site I've found for following war developments, with the understanding that he's printing rumors as well as confirmed reports, is The Agonist. There are a number of good warblogs for seeing unfolding events, but most of them claim to be mystified by the strategy the coalition is using. This seems to be resulting in some worries among observers that things may yet turn bleak.
Well, there are two big dangers left: the Special Republican Guard, and the taking of Bagdad. However, I think I can give a picture of the emergent strategy that ought to calm fears.
1) The coalition has moved quickly to seize entry points (airfields, the seaport), communication points (esp. bridges) and oil fields. Ground troops have been used rather than air power because these needed to be taken whole. In spite of "surprisingly stiff resistance," pace the W. Post, there is only one confirmed fatality from combat. I suspect there have been quite a few more among special operations troops, but we may never know exactly what their toll is.
2) Special operations forces seem to have the run of Bagdad, judging from the various reports coming out about the decapitation strike, as well as intelligence gathering. This bodes well for the coming campaign, and suggests we have a significant number of defectors/traitors assisting our intelligence forces.
3) The bulk of the coalition military is advancing only until it meets resistance. This is not true in the sensitive areas mentioned in point 1; those had to be taken, so resistance was broken. Yet it appears to be otherwise true. The US Army seems to be advancing cautiously in order to separate Iraqi military units into those which will surrender, and those which will fight. The ones that fight back are being pinned down, but not broken. This gives the illusion that they are holding their own against our forces. In fact, it is probably a strategic decision to pin them down for later air strikes. Once they are enveloped, they will be broken by the application of air power, with ground forces merely mopping up survivors.
Looks like a well planned operation. No surprise there: the joint US/British forces offers the two best collective minds in the military world.
War clarifies:
Many wished to believe that there was no evidence of a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorist networks. Hours into war, a connection now emerges: a top officer of the Palestine Liberation Front, Ahmed al-Baz, was killed in that bombing attack on the Baghdad bunker. What, one wonders, was a high level officer of a terrorist group doing at a meeting of Hussein's top generals? Feels like a connection between the Iraqi government and a terrorist group--a pretty tight connection.
Many wished to believe that there was no evidence of a connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorist networks. Hours into war, a connection now emerges: a top officer of the Palestine Liberation Front, Ahmed al-Baz, was killed in that bombing attack on the Baghdad bunker. What, one wonders, was a high level officer of a terrorist group doing at a meeting of Hussein's top generals? Feels like a connection between the Iraqi government and a terrorist group--a pretty tight connection.
More on idealism:
"Some readers will say that this is a mere fantasy. I answer that it is the actual history of mankind. This, as a fact, is how cities did grow great. Go back to the darkest roots of civilization and you will find then knotted round some sacred stone or encircling some sacred well. . . .
The eighteenth-century theories of the social contract have been exposed to much clumsy criticism in our time; in so far as they meant that there is at the back of all historic government an idea of content and co-operation, they were demonstrably right. But they really were wrong, in so far as they suggested that men had ever aimed at order or ethics directly by a conscious exchange of interests. Morality did not begin by one man saying to another, 'I will not hit you if you do not hit me'; there is no trace of such a transaction. There is a trace of both men having said, 'We must not hit each other in the holy place.' They gained their morality by guarding their religion. They did not cultivate courage. They fought for the shrine, and found they had become courageous. They did not cultivate cleanliness. They purified themselves for the altar, and found that they were clean."
G. K. Chesterton, "The Flag of the World," Orthodoxy
There is much here that is right, even for those who, like myself, are not at all Catholics. The classical liberal tradition has its roots in Socrates, who did cultivate courage--see the "Laches." Yet Socrates has his roots in Homer, and Homer in the lost tales of old. At base, that classical liberal tradition to which I subscribe is a well drawing on an underground sea. The well is a rational, thoughtful way of obtaining the water in an orderly and predictable fashion. The water, though, is a wild thing, whose power and energy is prior to and greater than our own.
"Some readers will say that this is a mere fantasy. I answer that it is the actual history of mankind. This, as a fact, is how cities did grow great. Go back to the darkest roots of civilization and you will find then knotted round some sacred stone or encircling some sacred well. . . .
The eighteenth-century theories of the social contract have been exposed to much clumsy criticism in our time; in so far as they meant that there is at the back of all historic government an idea of content and co-operation, they were demonstrably right. But they really were wrong, in so far as they suggested that men had ever aimed at order or ethics directly by a conscious exchange of interests. Morality did not begin by one man saying to another, 'I will not hit you if you do not hit me'; there is no trace of such a transaction. There is a trace of both men having said, 'We must not hit each other in the holy place.' They gained their morality by guarding their religion. They did not cultivate courage. They fought for the shrine, and found they had become courageous. They did not cultivate cleanliness. They purified themselves for the altar, and found that they were clean."
G. K. Chesterton, "The Flag of the World," Orthodoxy
There is much here that is right, even for those who, like myself, are not at all Catholics. The classical liberal tradition has its roots in Socrates, who did cultivate courage--see the "Laches." Yet Socrates has his roots in Homer, and Homer in the lost tales of old. At base, that classical liberal tradition to which I subscribe is a well drawing on an underground sea. The well is a rational, thoughtful way of obtaining the water in an orderly and predictable fashion. The water, though, is a wild thing, whose power and energy is prior to and greater than our own.
More on chivalry:
This is an article from the Chronicle Review on teaching the ethic of honor at the Naval Academy. The most relevant point for those who have argued that chivalry is antiquated romanticism:
"When warriors fight murderers, they may be tempted to become like the evil they hope to destroy. Their only protection is their code of honor. The professional military ethics that restrain warriors -- that keep them from targeting those who cannot fight back, from taking pleasure in killing, from striking harder than is necessary, and that encourage them to offer mercy to their defeated enemies and even to help rebuild their countries and communities -- are also their own protection against becoming what they abhor."
Also, the NY Times has this anitwar article comparing the curent conflict to the Trojan war. This is exactly the kind of argument that fascinates me: an attempt to work out right ethics in the context of the Western tradition. There can be no better guide. My opinion is that the proper model from the Iliad is Odyessus. As the article points out, he took some pains to avoid war (although even Odysseus didn't hold out for twelve years of diplomacy). Once the war was joined, however, he bent himself to the business of victory. No fighter was more cunning or inventive. Master soldier and mariner, Homer called him: perhaps an early Marine.
Still, the real point at which the Trojan War comes into our world is this: we are on the cusp of a r eturn to an age in which war means the total destruction of cities. In the ancient world, a taken city was laid waste utterly, men and boys killed, women enslaved, the buildings razed, the crops burned, and sometimes--as at Carthage--the earth sowed with salt. Even the mechanized warfare of WWII was not so thorough. Dresden, firebombed, still was healthier than Troy when the Greeks finished with her.
The United States government, through its military and intelligence services, is the force in the world most devoted to and capable of preventing the return of such horrors. This is the real threat of nuclear terrorism: We are the Trojans, this time, with a hungry horde of black ships by the sea. It is we who must watch for the Trojan horse. We must be emphatic. Wait and watch, suggests the author of the Times piece: perhaps the enemy will starve. Perhaps they'll just slip out of the horse and plan a new attack. Let's burn the horse instead.
This is an article from the Chronicle Review on teaching the ethic of honor at the Naval Academy. The most relevant point for those who have argued that chivalry is antiquated romanticism:
"When warriors fight murderers, they may be tempted to become like the evil they hope to destroy. Their only protection is their code of honor. The professional military ethics that restrain warriors -- that keep them from targeting those who cannot fight back, from taking pleasure in killing, from striking harder than is necessary, and that encourage them to offer mercy to their defeated enemies and even to help rebuild their countries and communities -- are also their own protection against becoming what they abhor."
Also, the NY Times has this anitwar article comparing the curent conflict to the Trojan war. This is exactly the kind of argument that fascinates me: an attempt to work out right ethics in the context of the Western tradition. There can be no better guide. My opinion is that the proper model from the Iliad is Odyessus. As the article points out, he took some pains to avoid war (although even Odysseus didn't hold out for twelve years of diplomacy). Once the war was joined, however, he bent himself to the business of victory. No fighter was more cunning or inventive. Master soldier and mariner, Homer called him: perhaps an early Marine.
Still, the real point at which the Trojan War comes into our world is this: we are on the cusp of a r eturn to an age in which war means the total destruction of cities. In the ancient world, a taken city was laid waste utterly, men and boys killed, women enslaved, the buildings razed, the crops burned, and sometimes--as at Carthage--the earth sowed with salt. Even the mechanized warfare of WWII was not so thorough. Dresden, firebombed, still was healthier than Troy when the Greeks finished with her.
The United States government, through its military and intelligence services, is the force in the world most devoted to and capable of preventing the return of such horrors. This is the real threat of nuclear terrorism: We are the Trojans, this time, with a hungry horde of black ships by the sea. It is we who must watch for the Trojan horse. We must be emphatic. Wait and watch, suggests the author of the Times piece: perhaps the enemy will starve. Perhaps they'll just slip out of the horse and plan a new attack. Let's burn the horse instead.
Why I love the United States Marine Corps:
"When I give you the word, together we will cross the Line of Departure, close with those forces that choose to fight, and destroy them. Our fight is not with the Iraqi people, nor is it with members of the Iraqi army who choose to surrender. While we will move swiftly and aggressively against those who resist, we will treat all others with decency, demonstrating chivalry and soldierly compassion for people who have endured a lifetime under Saddam's oppression. . . ..
"You are part of the world's most feared and trusted force. Engage your brain before you engage your weapon. Share your courage with each other as we enter the uncertain terrain north of the Line of Departure. Keep faith in your comrades on your left and right and Marine Air overhead. Fight with a happy heart and strong spirit."
Maj. Gen. J. Mattis, commander, 1 Marine
There is probably no other institution on earth that honestly and completely accepts chivalry as an operating principle. The USMC still believes in it, though, with a whole heart. Believing, they bring it back into the world, and make it real again. Today I toast them: it's all I can do. Another day, if Fate smiles, I may do more.
"When I give you the word, together we will cross the Line of Departure, close with those forces that choose to fight, and destroy them. Our fight is not with the Iraqi people, nor is it with members of the Iraqi army who choose to surrender. While we will move swiftly and aggressively against those who resist, we will treat all others with decency, demonstrating chivalry and soldierly compassion for people who have endured a lifetime under Saddam's oppression. . . ..
"You are part of the world's most feared and trusted force. Engage your brain before you engage your weapon. Share your courage with each other as we enter the uncertain terrain north of the Line of Departure. Keep faith in your comrades on your left and right and Marine Air overhead. Fight with a happy heart and strong spirit."
Maj. Gen. J. Mattis, commander, 1 Marine
There is probably no other institution on earth that honestly and completely accepts chivalry as an operating principle. The USMC still believes in it, though, with a whole heart. Believing, they bring it back into the world, and make it real again. Today I toast them: it's all I can do. Another day, if Fate smiles, I may do more.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110003213
This is an interesting bit of speculation from the Wall St. Journal that touches on a question I've been interested in for a while. KSM is said to be a Baluch from Kuwait, which is a fascinating notion to me. The folks I've met who have Baluchistan ties have been princes of fellows. The so-called "Lions of Pakistan," they are a tribal people whose independence is carefully, and vigorously, guarded. How Baluchi ended up as leaders in al Qaeda will prove to be a fascinating story, whether or not Iraqi intelligence was involved as the article suggests.
This is an interesting bit of speculation from the Wall St. Journal that touches on a question I've been interested in for a while. KSM is said to be a Baluch from Kuwait, which is a fascinating notion to me. The folks I've met who have Baluchistan ties have been princes of fellows. The so-called "Lions of Pakistan," they are a tribal people whose independence is carefully, and vigorously, guarded. How Baluchi ended up as leaders in al Qaeda will prove to be a fascinating story, whether or not Iraqi intelligence was involved as the article suggests.
Let's start with an article from the London Spectator.
This is on the subject of one of the more famous jihadis, Abu Hamza. Hamza, through his firey anti-West speeches in London, attracted the attention of a fair number of men who would later have famous names: Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid are two such.
The article finally comes down against deporting Hamza. I'm thinking the author is in the right here, conditionally. My reasons are as follows:
In the American South, we have had a long tradition of dealing with a group similar to Al Qaeda in most respects: the Ku Klux Klan. Anyone who has had occasion to listen to an old Klansman talk recognizes Hamza's attitude at once. There are "good" jews/blacks, but a lot of "bad" ones too, who need to be controlled or destroyed. The righteous, who understand the conflict at hand, are few and always at such an extremity of need that violence is justified as a method of controlling the evil, unfit men (if "men" is the right word, they will often add).
In my great-great grandfather's day, our family hunted and killed these folks in the mountains of Tennessee. The various White-terror groups, who later banded together into the KKK (even as various Islamist groups seem to be banding together now) used their power largely against the unarmed and frightened, through lynchings, whippings, and burnings. We did then what the Green Berets are doing now in the mountains of Afghanistan: it was a part of the history of freedom that is largely omitted from the history books, that guerrilla campaign that began with the end of the Civil War, and lasted through Reconstruction.
Now, though, the KKK has grown old and feeble. The response of most listeners is just as the response to Hamza mentioned in the article: after a few minutes' hearing, you recognize the madness. Men like Hamza serve to discredit their movements more than anything else that can be done. Let him stay, and talk.
But let us also do what we do with the KKK: infiltrate his group with informants. The aged Hamza, the old KKK man, they aren't dangerous, but they attract young men who are. Thus they are doubly useful: first in discrediting their movements to the reasoned majority, and second in drawing the dangerous young into our circle of vigilance, if only we trouble to maintain it.
This is on the subject of one of the more famous jihadis, Abu Hamza. Hamza, through his firey anti-West speeches in London, attracted the attention of a fair number of men who would later have famous names: Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid are two such.
The article finally comes down against deporting Hamza. I'm thinking the author is in the right here, conditionally. My reasons are as follows:
In the American South, we have had a long tradition of dealing with a group similar to Al Qaeda in most respects: the Ku Klux Klan. Anyone who has had occasion to listen to an old Klansman talk recognizes Hamza's attitude at once. There are "good" jews/blacks, but a lot of "bad" ones too, who need to be controlled or destroyed. The righteous, who understand the conflict at hand, are few and always at such an extremity of need that violence is justified as a method of controlling the evil, unfit men (if "men" is the right word, they will often add).
In my great-great grandfather's day, our family hunted and killed these folks in the mountains of Tennessee. The various White-terror groups, who later banded together into the KKK (even as various Islamist groups seem to be banding together now) used their power largely against the unarmed and frightened, through lynchings, whippings, and burnings. We did then what the Green Berets are doing now in the mountains of Afghanistan: it was a part of the history of freedom that is largely omitted from the history books, that guerrilla campaign that began with the end of the Civil War, and lasted through Reconstruction.
Now, though, the KKK has grown old and feeble. The response of most listeners is just as the response to Hamza mentioned in the article: after a few minutes' hearing, you recognize the madness. Men like Hamza serve to discredit their movements more than anything else that can be done. Let him stay, and talk.
But let us also do what we do with the KKK: infiltrate his group with informants. The aged Hamza, the old KKK man, they aren't dangerous, but they attract young men who are. Thus they are doubly useful: first in discrediting their movements to the reasoned majority, and second in drawing the dangerous young into our circle of vigilance, if only we trouble to maintain it.
State v. Patterson, January Term 1873
Extract from State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (Vermont Supreme Court, January Term 1873)
It is not deemed needful for the purposes of this case, with reference to its future prosecution, to discuss specifically any other subject, except that of the dwelling-house being one's castle, as bearing upon his right to kill or to use deadly weapons in defense of it. This is presented in the 3d request in behalf of the respondent, which is, in the language used by HOLROYD, J., in charging the jury in Meade's case, infra, viz.: “The making of an attack upon a dwelling, and especially in the night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person, for a man's house is his castle.” The purpose of this request seems to have been, to justify the killing with the gun, as a lawful mode and means of defending the castle, as well as the person within it. Looking to the state of the evidence, it is not altogether obvious what there was in the case to warrant its being claimed that the respondent killed Flanders as a means of defending himself or his castle. It was claimed in behalf of the prosecution, and the evidence given in that behalf showed, that the gun was not fired at Flanders as a measure of force, to repel and prevent him from breaking into the house. Moreover, in the exceptions it is said, “The respondent testified that he fired to the ground, and the object in firing was, not to hit them, but to scare them away.” The respondent seems not to have regarded it a case, or a conjuncture, in which it was needful or expedient to use a deadly weapon as a means of forceful resistance to meet and repel an assault on his house-whatever such assault in fact was-or to protect himself from any threatened or feared assault on his person. The gun, loaded with powder alone, would have served all the needs of the occasion, and of the exigency which the respondent supposed then to exist and to press upon him.
Nevertheless, the point was made by said 3d request. It was indicated in the charge that the case, State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 670, was invoked in support of it, and it is cited in this court for the same purpose. That case professes to decide only the question involved in and presented by it, viz., whether it was criminal under the statute for the respondent to resist an officer in the service of civil process within his dwelling-house, such officer having unlawfully broken into the house for the purpose of making such service. The language of the opinion is to be interpreted with reference to the case and the question. That case in no respect involved the subject of the use of a deadly weapon with fatal effect in defense of the castle; and it is not to be supposed that the judge who drew up the opinion was undertaking to discuss or propound the law of that subject.
To come, then, to the subject as it is involved in this case under said 3d request. In Foster's Crown Law, 319, it is said, “The books say that a man's house is his castle for safety and repose to himself and family.” In Cook's case, Cro. Car. 537, an officer, with a capias ad satisfaciendum [basically an arrest warrant], went with other officers, for the purpose of executing the same, to the dwelling-house of the respondent, and, finding him within, demanded of him to open the door and suffer them to enter. He commanded them to depart, telling them they should not enter. Thereupon, they broke a window, and afterwards went to the door of the house and offered to force it open, and broke one of the hinges; whereupon Cook discharged his musket at the deceased and hit him, and he died of the wound. “After argument at the bar, all the justices, seriatim, delivered their opinions, that it was not murder, but manslaughter; the bailiff was slain in doing an unlawful act in seeking to break open the house to execute process for a subject, and every one is to defend his own house. Yet they all held it was manslaughter; for he might have resisted him without killing him; and when he saw and shot voluntarily at him, it was manslaughter.”
That was one of the earliest cases, and was fully considered; and it has been cited in all the books on criminal law since its decision in 1640 (15th Car. I.),-with some incorrectness of statement, in 1 Hale P. C. 458, and in other books adopting Hale's text. This is in some measure rectified by a remark, 1 East P. C. 321-322. See, also, Roscoe Cr. Ev. 758; also 1 Bishop Cr. L. § 858, n. 2 (5th ed.) It is to be specially noticed that what made it manslaughter was, that, in order to defend his castle, it was not necessary to kill the bailiff.
The same idea of necessity, in order to relieve the killing from being manslaughter, exists in the case of defending one's person, as stated in Hawkins P. C. 113: “Homicide se defendendo [self defense] seems to be when one who has no other possible means of preserving his life from one who combats him on a sudden quarrel, or of defending his person from one who attempts to beat him (especially if such attempt be made upon him in his own house), kills the person by whom he is reduced to such an inevitable necessity.”
In a learned note in 2 Archb. Cr. L. 225, it is said: “But when it is said that a man may rightfully use as much force as is necessary for the protection of his person and property, it should be recollected that this rule is subject to this most important modification,-that he shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life, or great bodily harm. **** You can only kill to save life or limb, or prevent a great crime, or to accomplish a necessary public duty. It is, therefore, clear, that if one man deliberately kills another to prevent a mere trespass on his property-whether that trespass could or could not otherwise be prevented-he is guilty of murder. If, indeed, he had at first used moderate force, and this had been returned with such violence that his own life was endangered, and then he killed from necessity, it would have been excusable homicide. Not because he could take life to save his property, but he might take the life of the assailant to save his own.”
Harcourt's case, 5 Eliz. stated 1 Hale P. C. 485-6, shows that this doctrine is not new. “Harcourt, being in possession of a house by title, as it seems, A. endeavored to enter, and shot an arrow at them within the house, and Harcourt, from within, shot an arrow at those that would have entered, and killed one of the company. This was ruled manslaughter, and it was not se defendendo, because there was no danger of his life from them without.” What was thus ruled is the key to the author's meaning in the next following paragraph of his book, which see.
The idea that is embodied in the expression that, a man's house is his castle, is not that it is his property, and, as such, he has the right to defend and protect it by other and more extreme means than he might lawfully use to defend and protect his shop, his office, or his barn. The sense in which the house has a peculiar immunity is, that it is sacred for the protection of his person and of his family. An assault on the house can be regarded as an assault on the person, only in case the purpose of such assault be injury to the person of the occupant or members of his family, and, in order to accomplish this, the assailant attacks the castle in order to reach the inmates. In this view, it is said and settled that, in such case, the inmate need not flee from his house in order to escape from being injured by the assailant, but he may meet him at the threshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means rendered necessary by the exigency; and upon the same ground and reason as one may defend himself from peril of life, or great bodily harm, by means fatal to the assailant, if rendered necessary by the exigency of the assault.
This is the meaning of what was said by HOLROYD, J., in charging the jury in Meade's case, 1 Lewin C. C. 184. Some exasperated sailors had ducked Meade, and were in the act of throwing him into the sea, when he was rescued by the police. As the gang were leaving, they threatened that they would come by night and pull his house down. In the middle of the night a great number came, making menacing demonstrations. Meade, under an apprehension, as he alleged, that his life and property were in danger, fired a pistol, by which one of the party was killed. Meade was indicted for murder. Upon that state of facts and evidence, the judge said to the jury: “A civil trespass will not excuse the firing of a pistol at a trespasser in sudden resentment or anger, &c. * * But a man is not authorized to fire a pistol on every intrusion or invasion of his house. He ought, if he has reasonable opportunity, to endeavor to remove him without having recourse to the last extremity. But the making an attack upon a dwelling, and especially at night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person; for a man's house is his castle; and, therefore, in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an assault; but no words or singing are equivalent to an assault; nor will they authorize an assault in return, &c. * * There are cases where a person in heat of blood kills another, that the law does not deem it murder, but lowers the offence to manslaughter; as, where a party coming up by way of making an attack, and without there being any previous apprehension of danger, the party attacked, instead of having recourse to a more reasonable and less violent mode of averting it, having an opportunity so to do, fires on the impulse of the moment. In the present case, if you are of opinion that the prisoner was really attacked, and that the party were on the point of breaking in, or likely to do so, and execute the threats of the day before, he, perhaps, was justified in firing as he did. If you are of opinion that he intended to fire over and frighten, then the case is one of manslaughter and not of self-defence.”
The sense in which one's house is his castle, and he may defend himself within it, is shown by what is said in 1 Hale P. C. 486, that “in case he is assaulted in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from flying, as that would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by flight.” Now, set over against that what is said in 1 Russell, 662, and the true distinction between the house as property, on the one hand, and as castle for protection, on the other, is very palpable, viz: “If A. in defence of his house, kill B., a trespasser, who endeavors to make an entry upon it, it is, at least, common manslaughter, unless, indeed, there were danger of life;” p. 663. “But where the trespass is barely against the property of another, the law does not admit the force of the provocation as sufficient to warrant the owner in making use of a deadly or dangerous weapon; more particularly if such violence is used after the party has desisted from the trespass.” In Carrol v. The State, 24 Ala. 36, it is said: “The owner may resist the entry into his house, but he has no right to kill, unless it be rendered necessary in order to prevent a felonious destruction of his property, or to defend himself against loss of life, or great bodily harm.” Cited 2 Bishop Crim. Law, § 707, 5th ed. That case impresses us differently from what it does the learned author, as indicated by his remark prefacing the citation.
As developing and illustrating the prevailing idea of the law as to what will justify homicide se et sua defendendo [in defense of himself and his own], it is not without interest upon the point now under consideration, to advert to what is said upon the general subject. In McNally, 562, it is said: “The injured party may repel force by force in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth by violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he findeth himself out of danger; and if in such conflict he happeneth to kill, such killing is justifiable.” Wharton incorporates this into his work as text. The same is found in the older books. 1 Hale, 485-6; also in Foster's Crown Law, 273; 1 Russell, 667; and in other books, ad lib. But, to apprehend this in its true scope and application, it is important to have in mind what is said in 1 Russell, 668: “The rule clearly extends only to cases of felony; for if one come to beat another, or take his goods merely as a trespasser, though the owner may justify the beating of him so far as to make him desist, yet if he kill him, it is manslaughter. *** No assault, however violent, will justify killing the assailant under a plea of necessity, unless there be a manifestation of felonious intent.” See Archb. Crim. Law, 221, cited 9 C. & P. 22.
This covers the cases of statutory justification of homicide, both under our own, and under the English, statutes, and, in principle and in reason, it is in keeping with the common law as to se defendendo, in defining the scope of which in this respect, it is well laid down that, “before a person can avail himself of the defence that he used a weapon in defence of his life, it must appear that that defence was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself from such serious bodily harm as would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate danger.” 1 Russell, 661.
The law of the subject, as given in the books thus cited and referred to, seems to have been adequately apprehended by the court, and, so far as we can judge from what is shown by the record before us, it was not administered erroneously or improperly in the trial, as against the respondent.
It is not deemed needful for the purposes of this case, with reference to its future prosecution, to discuss specifically any other subject, except that of the dwelling-house being one's castle, as bearing upon his right to kill or to use deadly weapons in defense of it. This is presented in the 3d request in behalf of the respondent, which is, in the language used by HOLROYD, J., in charging the jury in Meade's case, infra, viz.: “The making of an attack upon a dwelling, and especially in the night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person, for a man's house is his castle.” The purpose of this request seems to have been, to justify the killing with the gun, as a lawful mode and means of defending the castle, as well as the person within it. Looking to the state of the evidence, it is not altogether obvious what there was in the case to warrant its being claimed that the respondent killed Flanders as a means of defending himself or his castle. It was claimed in behalf of the prosecution, and the evidence given in that behalf showed, that the gun was not fired at Flanders as a measure of force, to repel and prevent him from breaking into the house. Moreover, in the exceptions it is said, “The respondent testified that he fired to the ground, and the object in firing was, not to hit them, but to scare them away.” The respondent seems not to have regarded it a case, or a conjuncture, in which it was needful or expedient to use a deadly weapon as a means of forceful resistance to meet and repel an assault on his house-whatever such assault in fact was-or to protect himself from any threatened or feared assault on his person. The gun, loaded with powder alone, would have served all the needs of the occasion, and of the exigency which the respondent supposed then to exist and to press upon him.
Nevertheless, the point was made by said 3d request. It was indicated in the charge that the case, State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 670, was invoked in support of it, and it is cited in this court for the same purpose. That case professes to decide only the question involved in and presented by it, viz., whether it was criminal under the statute for the respondent to resist an officer in the service of civil process within his dwelling-house, such officer having unlawfully broken into the house for the purpose of making such service. The language of the opinion is to be interpreted with reference to the case and the question. That case in no respect involved the subject of the use of a deadly weapon with fatal effect in defense of the castle; and it is not to be supposed that the judge who drew up the opinion was undertaking to discuss or propound the law of that subject.
To come, then, to the subject as it is involved in this case under said 3d request. In Foster's Crown Law, 319, it is said, “The books say that a man's house is his castle for safety and repose to himself and family.” In Cook's case, Cro. Car. 537, an officer, with a capias ad satisfaciendum [basically an arrest warrant], went with other officers, for the purpose of executing the same, to the dwelling-house of the respondent, and, finding him within, demanded of him to open the door and suffer them to enter. He commanded them to depart, telling them they should not enter. Thereupon, they broke a window, and afterwards went to the door of the house and offered to force it open, and broke one of the hinges; whereupon Cook discharged his musket at the deceased and hit him, and he died of the wound. “After argument at the bar, all the justices, seriatim, delivered their opinions, that it was not murder, but manslaughter; the bailiff was slain in doing an unlawful act in seeking to break open the house to execute process for a subject, and every one is to defend his own house. Yet they all held it was manslaughter; for he might have resisted him without killing him; and when he saw and shot voluntarily at him, it was manslaughter.”
That was one of the earliest cases, and was fully considered; and it has been cited in all the books on criminal law since its decision in 1640 (15th Car. I.),-with some incorrectness of statement, in 1 Hale P. C. 458, and in other books adopting Hale's text. This is in some measure rectified by a remark, 1 East P. C. 321-322. See, also, Roscoe Cr. Ev. 758; also 1 Bishop Cr. L. § 858, n. 2 (5th ed.) It is to be specially noticed that what made it manslaughter was, that, in order to defend his castle, it was not necessary to kill the bailiff.
The same idea of necessity, in order to relieve the killing from being manslaughter, exists in the case of defending one's person, as stated in Hawkins P. C. 113: “Homicide se defendendo [self defense] seems to be when one who has no other possible means of preserving his life from one who combats him on a sudden quarrel, or of defending his person from one who attempts to beat him (especially if such attempt be made upon him in his own house), kills the person by whom he is reduced to such an inevitable necessity.”
In a learned note in 2 Archb. Cr. L. 225, it is said: “But when it is said that a man may rightfully use as much force as is necessary for the protection of his person and property, it should be recollected that this rule is subject to this most important modification,-that he shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life, or great bodily harm. **** You can only kill to save life or limb, or prevent a great crime, or to accomplish a necessary public duty. It is, therefore, clear, that if one man deliberately kills another to prevent a mere trespass on his property-whether that trespass could or could not otherwise be prevented-he is guilty of murder. If, indeed, he had at first used moderate force, and this had been returned with such violence that his own life was endangered, and then he killed from necessity, it would have been excusable homicide. Not because he could take life to save his property, but he might take the life of the assailant to save his own.”
Harcourt's case, 5 Eliz. stated 1 Hale P. C. 485-6, shows that this doctrine is not new. “Harcourt, being in possession of a house by title, as it seems, A. endeavored to enter, and shot an arrow at them within the house, and Harcourt, from within, shot an arrow at those that would have entered, and killed one of the company. This was ruled manslaughter, and it was not se defendendo, because there was no danger of his life from them without.” What was thus ruled is the key to the author's meaning in the next following paragraph of his book, which see.
The idea that is embodied in the expression that, a man's house is his castle, is not that it is his property, and, as such, he has the right to defend and protect it by other and more extreme means than he might lawfully use to defend and protect his shop, his office, or his barn. The sense in which the house has a peculiar immunity is, that it is sacred for the protection of his person and of his family. An assault on the house can be regarded as an assault on the person, only in case the purpose of such assault be injury to the person of the occupant or members of his family, and, in order to accomplish this, the assailant attacks the castle in order to reach the inmates. In this view, it is said and settled that, in such case, the inmate need not flee from his house in order to escape from being injured by the assailant, but he may meet him at the threshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means rendered necessary by the exigency; and upon the same ground and reason as one may defend himself from peril of life, or great bodily harm, by means fatal to the assailant, if rendered necessary by the exigency of the assault.
This is the meaning of what was said by HOLROYD, J., in charging the jury in Meade's case, 1 Lewin C. C. 184. Some exasperated sailors had ducked Meade, and were in the act of throwing him into the sea, when he was rescued by the police. As the gang were leaving, they threatened that they would come by night and pull his house down. In the middle of the night a great number came, making menacing demonstrations. Meade, under an apprehension, as he alleged, that his life and property were in danger, fired a pistol, by which one of the party was killed. Meade was indicted for murder. Upon that state of facts and evidence, the judge said to the jury: “A civil trespass will not excuse the firing of a pistol at a trespasser in sudden resentment or anger, &c. * * But a man is not authorized to fire a pistol on every intrusion or invasion of his house. He ought, if he has reasonable opportunity, to endeavor to remove him without having recourse to the last extremity. But the making an attack upon a dwelling, and especially at night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person; for a man's house is his castle; and, therefore, in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an assault; but no words or singing are equivalent to an assault; nor will they authorize an assault in return, &c. * * There are cases where a person in heat of blood kills another, that the law does not deem it murder, but lowers the offence to manslaughter; as, where a party coming up by way of making an attack, and without there being any previous apprehension of danger, the party attacked, instead of having recourse to a more reasonable and less violent mode of averting it, having an opportunity so to do, fires on the impulse of the moment. In the present case, if you are of opinion that the prisoner was really attacked, and that the party were on the point of breaking in, or likely to do so, and execute the threats of the day before, he, perhaps, was justified in firing as he did. If you are of opinion that he intended to fire over and frighten, then the case is one of manslaughter and not of self-defence.”
The sense in which one's house is his castle, and he may defend himself within it, is shown by what is said in 1 Hale P. C. 486, that “in case he is assaulted in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from flying, as that would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by flight.” Now, set over against that what is said in 1 Russell, 662, and the true distinction between the house as property, on the one hand, and as castle for protection, on the other, is very palpable, viz: “If A. in defence of his house, kill B., a trespasser, who endeavors to make an entry upon it, it is, at least, common manslaughter, unless, indeed, there were danger of life;” p. 663. “But where the trespass is barely against the property of another, the law does not admit the force of the provocation as sufficient to warrant the owner in making use of a deadly or dangerous weapon; more particularly if such violence is used after the party has desisted from the trespass.” In Carrol v. The State, 24 Ala. 36, it is said: “The owner may resist the entry into his house, but he has no right to kill, unless it be rendered necessary in order to prevent a felonious destruction of his property, or to defend himself against loss of life, or great bodily harm.” Cited 2 Bishop Crim. Law, § 707, 5th ed. That case impresses us differently from what it does the learned author, as indicated by his remark prefacing the citation.
As developing and illustrating the prevailing idea of the law as to what will justify homicide se et sua defendendo [in defense of himself and his own], it is not without interest upon the point now under consideration, to advert to what is said upon the general subject. In McNally, 562, it is said: “The injured party may repel force by force in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth by violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he findeth himself out of danger; and if in such conflict he happeneth to kill, such killing is justifiable.” Wharton incorporates this into his work as text. The same is found in the older books. 1 Hale, 485-6; also in Foster's Crown Law, 273; 1 Russell, 667; and in other books, ad lib. But, to apprehend this in its true scope and application, it is important to have in mind what is said in 1 Russell, 668: “The rule clearly extends only to cases of felony; for if one come to beat another, or take his goods merely as a trespasser, though the owner may justify the beating of him so far as to make him desist, yet if he kill him, it is manslaughter. *** No assault, however violent, will justify killing the assailant under a plea of necessity, unless there be a manifestation of felonious intent.” See Archb. Crim. Law, 221, cited 9 C. & P. 22.
This covers the cases of statutory justification of homicide, both under our own, and under the English, statutes, and, in principle and in reason, it is in keeping with the common law as to se defendendo, in defining the scope of which in this respect, it is well laid down that, “before a person can avail himself of the defence that he used a weapon in defence of his life, it must appear that that defence was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself from such serious bodily harm as would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate danger.” 1 Russell, 661.
The law of the subject, as given in the books thus cited and referred to, seems to have been adequately apprehended by the court, and, so far as we can judge from what is shown by the record before us, it was not administered erroneously or improperly in the trial, as against the respondent.
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