The right question is "So What?" We note that British Petroleum enjoyed revenues for 20 years or so--and so did US oil companies.
Perhaps a more important question is raised by L Todd Wood, excerpted here: https://dad29.blogspot.com/2026/05/tucker-vs-wood-on-iran-hmmmmm.html but with a link to the whole essay.
Taken together, the stories told at your link and at Wood's place double-underline CIA incompetence, or worse.
I mean, I'd start with the question, "Is this report true?" I'm not endorsing it, only raising it.
I am prepared to believe that it might be true, partly because the standard history serves the interests of the Western Left, and partly because it serves the interest of the CIA. Either of those has in the past frequently, demonstrably led to fictions becoming received history. When they happen to align, the class interests of the academics and the bureaucracy -- which recruit from each other, and therefore have some of their interests in alignment anyway -- are hard to overcome.
Still, before trying to interpret it we probably should pause to see if it's correct.
Now, MEK I do know something about. I ran into them in Iraq. In fact, we were giving them shelter; the last I heard they were allowed to move in and occupy parts of Camp Liberty near the Baghdad Int'l Airport. I spent a little time on Liberty in 2007-8; it had the best PX in Iraq, as well as the only decent pizza joint. (Why did it have a pizza restaurant? I have no idea. But it did.)
After we left, MEK moved in there and the Iranians/Shia militias would come by and rocket or mortar them now and then, just like they used to do for us. I'm not sure how stout MEK is as a fighting force -- I don't think they're as good as the peshmerga -- but they are definitely an interested party.
My sense is that the government is worried about fragmenting Iran, which is worrisome to them because it complicates control. I would take it as disaggregation and actively pursue that as a policy, but I'm not in charge: still, a Kurdish region and a Balochi region and then a small place for MEK and a smaller Persia for those who like the Shah, each of those would be small enough to be manageable problems if they were problems at all. But the Kurds alone worry the diplomats -- that could lead to revanchist movements in Iraq and Turkey and Syria as well -- and the Balochi might break off part of Pakistan, etc. The instability is what they fear the most.
I was on a call with -- let's call it "a major maritime insurance company" -- last week. Iranian shadow fleet tankers that are capable are now taking their oil to Europe and selling it there, seeking an exit into legitimate markets because the Iran->China shadow pipeline is closing.
The Chinese Belt & Road initiative had two major routes west, overland through Russia and through Iran. The Russian route is closed thanks to the war Putin started; the Iran route is closed currently also, but it looks like it will be permanently so. Massive investments are going to be lost by the Chinese over this, as already in Venezuela.
I saw your post calling into question whether Trump understands that we still do import oil on a net basis. I don't know the answer to that. I do know, however, that this is shaping up to be a grand strategic victory -- one that could put us in the position to control whether China gets the oil it needs or not. If that prevents a war over Taiwan, this will have been worth doing even apart from the benefits to the Iranian people. I continue to think that it's overdetermined in favor, in spite of the legitimate questions about the wisdom of the administration, the role of Israel, and so on and so forth.
4 comments:
The right question is "So What?" We note that British Petroleum enjoyed revenues for 20 years or so--and so did US oil companies.
Perhaps a more important question is raised by L Todd Wood, excerpted here:
https://dad29.blogspot.com/2026/05/tucker-vs-wood-on-iran-hmmmmm.html but with a link to the whole essay.
Taken together, the stories told at your link and at Wood's place double-underline CIA incompetence, or worse.
I mean, I'd start with the question, "Is this report true?" I'm not endorsing it, only raising it.
I am prepared to believe that it might be true, partly because the standard history serves the interests of the Western Left, and partly because it serves the interest of the CIA. Either of those has in the past frequently, demonstrably led to fictions becoming received history. When they happen to align, the class interests of the academics and the bureaucracy -- which recruit from each other, and therefore have some of their interests in alignment anyway -- are hard to overcome.
Still, before trying to interpret it we probably should pause to see if it's correct.
Now, MEK I do know something about. I ran into them in Iraq. In fact, we were giving them shelter; the last I heard they were allowed to move in and occupy parts of Camp Liberty near the Baghdad Int'l Airport. I spent a little time on Liberty in 2007-8; it had the best PX in Iraq, as well as the only decent pizza joint. (Why did it have a pizza restaurant? I have no idea. But it did.)
After we left, MEK moved in there and the Iranians/Shia militias would come by and rocket or mortar them now and then, just like they used to do for us. I'm not sure how stout MEK is as a fighting force -- I don't think they're as good as the peshmerga -- but they are definitely an interested party.
My sense is that the government is worried about fragmenting Iran, which is worrisome to them because it complicates control. I would take it as disaggregation and actively pursue that as a policy, but I'm not in charge: still, a Kurdish region and a Balochi region and then a small place for MEK and a smaller Persia for those who like the Shah, each of those would be small enough to be manageable problems if they were problems at all. But the Kurds alone worry the diplomats -- that could lead to revanchist movements in Iraq and Turkey and Syria as well -- and the Balochi might break off part of Pakistan, etc. The instability is what they fear the most.
I was on a call with -- let's call it "a major maritime insurance company" -- last week. Iranian shadow fleet tankers that are capable are now taking their oil to Europe and selling it there, seeking an exit into legitimate markets because the Iran->China shadow pipeline is closing.
The Chinese Belt & Road initiative had two major routes west, overland through Russia and through Iran. The Russian route is closed thanks to the war Putin started; the Iran route is closed currently also, but it looks like it will be permanently so. Massive investments are going to be lost by the Chinese over this, as already in Venezuela.
I saw your post calling into question whether Trump understands that we still do import oil on a net basis. I don't know the answer to that. I do know, however, that this is shaping up to be a grand strategic victory -- one that could put us in the position to control whether China gets the oil it needs or not. If that prevents a war over Taiwan, this will have been worth doing even apart from the benefits to the Iranian people. I continue to think that it's overdetermined in favor, in spite of the legitimate questions about the wisdom of the administration, the role of Israel, and so on and so forth.
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