Nicomachean Ethics I.10

There are thirteen chapters in the first book, if you are wondering. 

Aristotle was just talking about a complete life being necessary for the fullness of happiness. He now continues on the topic of describing and analyzing this 'completeness' requirement.

Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity?

Remembering that this is pre-Christian, this discussion of being happy after death is differently pointed than it would be after the conversion of Europe. Hades was described in the Odyssey as a pretty miserable place; not Hell exactly, but not happy for certain. Achilles appears to Odysseus and basically explains that life is always better than being dead, and that there's nothing good in the underworld. 

Philosophically, it is a puzzle to suggest that a dead man can be happy if happiness is an activity. That deserves further exploration, which we get: 

But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age and has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants- some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.

It's worth noting that honor turns out to be the principal consideration for the happiness of the dead. Whether their descendants flourish might concern them, if they could be concerned after death; but whether they are honored or dishonored pertains to them themselves.

But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.

This section treats what I think is a real problem with the approach of thinking of happiness as being judged once overall. If happiness is an activity, you can only be happy when you're doing it. It's in your control, at least while you're alive, but you won't always be doing it. Thus, you won't always be happy.

Aristotle notes that it would be incoherent to say that we can only judge happiness after death, because at that point action is no longer possible. (Those of you who are serious students of philosophy, note the talk about predication. This is a very serious matter for Aristotle, as it will be for Kant and others; but it is inside baseball for those who are not deeply committed to the study of philosophy.)

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.

Emphasis added. There's a lot going on there. Your actions echo in permanence if they are virtuous, and those who are virtuous do more of them more often; and therefore, they are among the honored dead. This is almost exactly what Odin tells his listener in Havamal 77. 

Yet we also see a tension that will continue through the book: the perfectly vicious are very similar to the perfectly virtuous. You will always remember the events of 9/11, and everyone knows the name of Lee Harvey Oswald. They too found what they did to be pleasant, indeed worthy of dying for. For now I will just raise this problem and not resolve it. Why is the life of virtue preferable to the life of committed vice? They look surprisingly alike, but as a vicious man you'd get to do whatever you want all the time.

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.

AVI has pointed us to studies that indicate that in fact this stuff matters much less than we think it does: an individual has a kind of happiness level, and shortly after either a great fortune or misfortune they return to it. Aristotle did not consider that as a possibility, and I think would have been surprised by it. He does however suggest that one's character is important to whether one is easily disturbed by misfortune; see two quotes down.

If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean.

Here's one reason to prefer virtue to viciousness. 

For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.

So here this isn't inherent, as AVI's data suggests; it is instead a product of having become wise and good. Aristotle thinks this hardens you against misfortune.

Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by many great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid successes.

When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add 'and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So much for these questions.

Emphasis added. That may be surprising, since how could happiness be both an 'activity' and an 'end'? Well, all activities aim at ends, so it's not a crazy thing to say: you exercise to have the ability to perform, so that performance is both the activity of exercise and the end of it. 

Happiness is an activity, then, but also the end being sought by the activity: it is an end in itself.